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Introduction 
1. We live in a world where terms like “Cyber crime” no longer belong in the realm of 
science fiction. Modern devices such as smart phones and tablets have brought the internet 
not only to our fingertips but to our bedsides, our pockets and to our children. And yet 
there is strong evidence that access to such technology, with all its opportunities and 
benefits, can put our businesses and our families at increasing risk of exploitation and 
internet-based crime (E-crime).  
2. Identity theft, industrial espionage, credit card fraud, phishing, child exploitation - 
criminals use the internet as a means to commit a wide range of crimes. Perpetrators range 
from lone hackers, activist groups, Nation States sponsoring industrial espionage and 
organised criminal gangs. Victims include individuals who fall prey to scams and password 
theft to multinational companies such as, famously Sony. The financial details of 23,000 
users of Sony Online Entertainment were stolen when its networks were breached by 
hackers in March 2011. The cost of the clean-up was reportedly $172m and the events 
caused a 9 %  share price drop.   
3. The internet has also been used to great effect by criminals to trade their cyber wares. 
Investigators have uncovered sophisticated black market operations such as DarkMarket 
and ShadowCrew who use the internet to trade cloned credit card data and bank account 
details, hire botnets (infected networks of computers) and deliver hacking tutorials.  
Although difficulties in establishing precise figures about the rate and the cost of cyber 
crime are acknowledged there is general agreement on its rapidly growing scale. Norton 
have calculated its global cost to be $388bn dollars a year in terms of financial losses and 
time lost. This is significantly more than the combined annual value of $288bn of the 
global black market trade in heroin, cocaine and marijuana.  
4. UK governments have had a centralised approach to cyber crime and wider cyber 
threats since the launch of the UK’s first Cyber Security Strategy in June 2009 and the 
corresponding National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP) launched in November 2011.  
In the course of this inquiry we have looked specifically at the Home Office’s remit under 
its much heralded Cyber Security Strategy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4    E-crime 
 
 
1 What is e-crime? 
Defining e-crime 
5.  Like traditional crime, e-crime can take many shapes and can occur at almost any time 
or in any place. Criminals use a number of methods, depending on skill-sets and goals. 
There is a variety of different terminology used when referring to internet-related crimes. 
The terms ‘e-crime’ and ‘cyber crime’ are often used interchangeably but during this 
inquiry we have recognised that there are variations between organisations in the way these 
terms are defined. Defining e-crime has shaped the manner in which organisations such as 
the Police and  Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) understand and respond to 
the evolving criminal threats presented in the digital ages. 
6. Cybercrime is defined by police as the use of any computer network for crime.1 The 
Home Office and the SOCA-led  Cyber Threat Reduction Board (TRB)  use a three-fold 
categorisation, dividing e-crime into:  
a) ‘pure’ online crimes, where a digital system is the target as well as the means of 
attack. These include attacks on computer systems to disrupt IT infrastructure, 
and stealing data over a network using malware (the purpose of the data theft is 
usually to enable further crime); 
 
b) ‘existing’ crimes that have been transformed in scale or form by their use of the 
internet. The growth of the internet has allowed these crimes to be carried out 
on an industrial scale; and    
 
c) use of the internet to facilitate drug dealing, people smuggling and many other 
‘traditional’ types of crime. 
 
 
7. The TRB’s broad definition recognises the transformational effect of the internet and 
computer systems in existing crimes. Other organisations include specific offences: the 
Council of Europe’s Cybercrime Treaty uses the term cybercrime to refer to offences 
ranging from criminal activity against data to content and copyright infringement. The 
United Nations Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer Related Crime 
includes fraud, forgery, and unauthorized access with its definition  of cybercrime.2 
8. The European Commission in 2007 proposed a threefold definition similar to TRB’s, 
identifying cyber crime as: 
• Traditional forms of crime committed over electronic communication networks and 
information systems 
• The publication of illegal content over electronic media 
 
1 http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/in_depth/uk/2001/life_of_crime/cybercrime.stm  
2 United Nations, Manual on the Prevention and Control of Computer-Related Crime ,1994 
E-crime    5 
 
 
 
• Crimes unique to electronic networks. 
The main offences covered by existing European and national legislation are: 
• privacy offences: illegal collection, storage, modification, disclosure or dissemination of 
personal data; 
• content-related offences: the dissemination of pornography, in particular child 
pornography, racist statements and information inciting violence; 
• economic crimes, unauthorised access and sabotage: offences relating to unauthorised 
access to systems (e.g. hacking, computer sabotage and distribution of viruses, 
computer espionage, computer forgery, and computer fraud); 
• intellectual property offences: violations of the legal protection of computer programs 
and databases, copyright and related rights.3 
9. The Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) use the following definition of e-crime 
in its 2009 E-crime Strategy:  
“the use of networked computers or internet technology to commit or facilitate the 
commission of crime”.  
10. This broad definition could cover crimes that are facilitated through using the internet 
as a means of communication.  We are concerned that the TRB and the ACPO definitions 
could be problematic for law enforcement agencies as they risk referring to all crimes 
whose perpetrators use the internet to organise themselves as ‘e-crime’. It is possible that 
this type of definition could therefore could blur the distinction between crimes carried out 
using the internet and crimes carried out offline where the internet is used only as an 
accessory e.g. a drug deal where the dealers communicate via email. Professor Peter 
Sommer, Visiting Professor at de Montfort University and a Visiting Reader at the Open 
University  explained that “when the term “computer crime” first came into popular usage 
in the early 1970s the proportion of the population that had access to computers was tiny” 
and consequently “it was possible to see computer/cyber/e-crime as distinct purely in 
terms of the demographics of potential offenders”. 4  Modern definitions of cyber crime 
need to recognise that large numbers of  crimes are likely to have a “computer” element 
simply because at least 77% of the population own a PC.5 
11. We are further concerned that  other aspects of e-crime may not be covered within the 
definitions of cyber crime used by law enforcement agencies. Professor Peter Sommer 
pointed out that ACPO’s definition appeared to exclude “the use of computers to carry out 
frauds which don’t involve networks, the acquisition of illegal material such as child or 
extreme pornography and the deployment of techniques  to generate forged documents”.6  
 
3 http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/fight_against_organised_crime/l33193b_en.htm  
4 Ev 101, para 13 (Prof Peter Sommer) 
5 Ofcom,  http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr11/UK_CMR_2011_FINAL.pdf 
6 Ev 101, para 11 (Prof Peter Sommer) 
6    E-crime 
 
 
12. During our inquiry it became clear that the definitions of what constituted e-crime or 
cyber crime needed frequent revision if organisations wish to attempt to define the rapidly 
evolving nature of the e-crime threat. However, e-crime is becoming increasingly hard to 
define as discrete from other crimes because so many criminals now use online devices and 
generate digital evidence. Crimes  that have been transformed by the internet and those 
unique to electronic networks should continue to be defined and recorded as e-crime. 
This will enable the police to develop an appropriate level of sophisticated technical 
resource to respond to these crimes.  
13. The ever- increasing incidence of the use of the internet in some form in traditional 
crimes indicates the futility of special categorisation for such offences.  We recommend 
that more police officers are trained in digital crime detection and equipped with 
digital forensic skills. These should become standard skills for officers undertaking 
relevant investigations. 
Recognising the threat of e-crime 
14. Since the creation of the World Wide Web in 1991, the internet has become 
increasingly central to our economy and our society.  Internet and other information 
systems have transformed our working environment, driving economic growth, 
connecting people and providing new ways to communicate and co-operate.  
15. Cyberspace is the term used to describe the internet and other information systems that 
form an interactive domain made up of digital networks used to store, modify and 
communicate information. Digital networks underpin the supply of electricity and water to 
homes, help organise the delivery of food and other goods to shops, act as an essential tool 
for businesses across the UK and connect our TVs and games consoles to data. 
16. We have seen worrying evidence that the growth of cyberspace has also opened up the 
UK to serious security threats.  Constant contact with digital networks is a fact of modern 
life. The UK Cyber Security Strategy, published by the Cabinet Office in 2011,  suggests 
that this development of technology  “will be on the scale of the very biggest shifts in 
human history, such as the coming of the railways, or even learning to smelt metals.” 7 The 
Strategy goes on to acknowledge that as a country “– we have no choice but to find ways to 
confront and overcome these threats if the UK is to flourish in an increasingly competitive 
and globalised world”.8 EMC and RSA, one of the world’s major IT infrastructure and 
service providers, told us that the cybercrime threat was sophisticated, complex, and 
rapidly evolving. They explained that there was “a thriving criminal ecosystem”  that 
mirrored the legitimate IT market where criminals could “freely buy and sell malicious 
software and services”. EMC and RSA estimated that this rapidly maturing online black 
market had led to a “tenfold reduction in the cost to access cyber crime tools and services 
and an increase in the volume and sophistication of attacks”.9 
 
7 Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy, Protecting and promoting the UK in a digital world,  November 2011, 
Para 2.1-2.3 
8 Cabinet Office, The UK Cyber Security Strategy, Protecting and promoting the UK in a digital world,  November 2011, 
Para 2.1-2.3 
9 Ev 86, Executive summary 
E-crime    7 
 
 
 
17. The UK Cyber Security Strategy argues that “the digital architecture on which we now 
rely was built to be efficient and interoperable”. It acknowledges that when internet usage 
first started to grow in the UK, security was less of a consideration. Yet a growing number 
of adversaries now use cyberspace to steal, compromise or destroy critical data. The scale of 
our dependence means that our prosperity, our key infrastructure, our places of work and 
our homes can all be affected. Art Coviello, Executive Chairman of RSA (the Security 
Division of EMC2), told us that people overlook the extent to which our increased 
dependency on digital services has extended opportunities for malicious activity: 
 “We have now developed so many web applications, we have so many remote access 
devices, mobile devices, we have so many points of entry into our enterprise...we 
have expanded the attack surface and made it literally easier for the attackers to take 
advantage of us.”10 
18. We discussed the threat of e-crime to the UK with a number of our witnesses. Dr Ian 
Brown, Associate Director of Oxford University’s Cyber Security Centre and Senior 
Research Fellow at the Oxford Internet Institute, told us that there was “ quite a bit of 
evidence that organised criminal gangs have moved into cybercrime”.11 Commissioner 
Adrian Leppard, City of London Police, told us that the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau 
had identified around 1,300 organised crime groups who used fraud as their main means 
of gaining money. He estimated that a quarter of these groups were using the internet as 
their “main means” of committing fraud. Work undertaken by the National Fraud 
Intelligence Bureau had shown that “about 25 countries predominantly target the UK”.12  
19. David Livingstone, Associate Fellow, International Security Research Directorate, 
Chatham House, explained  that the amount of valuable and attractive goods and items 
that could be found on UK-based IT systems was “probably a relatively rich hunting 
ground for organised criminal gangs”.13 We were told that the top five countries where 
organised criminal groups were using e-crime to attack the UK were “mainly eastern 
European, and Russia”.14 Mike Andrews, National E-Crime Co-ordination Manager for the 
National Trading Standards E-Crime Centre, told us that e-crime attacks were coming 
from many places including: other European member states; former members of the 
eastern bloc; and the  far east. He cautioned that it was “very difficult to pinpoint specific 
locations because it truly is, to use a cliché, a global problem”.15 Art Coviello, Executive 
Chairman, RSA,  cautioned that “one of the problems with any attack is attribution, being 
able to trace the attack back to its source”. He told us that “to point the finger at a particular 
nation is clearly not the right thing to do” but reasoned “that given the level of 
sophistication that we see in attacks, it can only be sponsored by nation states”.16  
 
10 Q 311 
11 Q 226 
12 Q 64 
13 Q 225 
14 Q 66 
15 Q 135 
16 Q 314 
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20. We asked our witnesses whether the “war” on e-crime was being fought and won. 
Commissioner Adrian Leppard, City of London Police, told us that “we are not winning. I 
do not think we are winning globally, and I think this nature of crime is rising 
exponentially”.17 Ilias Chantzos, Senior Director, Government Affairs for EMEA and APJ, 
Symantec reflected that “As the technologies change, the attack surface changes, the 
techniques that the attackers are going to use change. What is important is that we adjust 
ourselves and follow that moving target in order to achieve that objective. We will never 
have 100% security”.18 Art Coviello believed “we can win the war, but we are not winning it 
yet”.19 
21. David Livingstone, Associate Fellow at the International Security Research Directorate, 
Chatham House, told us that the “war on cyber crime” was very serious and “getting 
worse”.20   However, GCHQ’s published earlier this year reported that a staggering 80% of  
cyber attacks could be stopped through basic information risk management.21 Iain Lobban, 
Director GCHQ, had previously outlined how cyber crime is not just a national security or 
defence issue but is something which goes to the heart of our economic well-being and 
national interest. He stated that  “good Information Assurance practice will solve 80% of 
Government’s Cyber Security vulnerabilities. By this we mean observing basic network 
security disciplines like keeping patches up to date. That, combined with the necessary 
attention to personnel security and the ‘insider’ threat, will offer substantial protection for 
each individual network”.22 However David Livingstone was concerned that whilst such 
attacks could be prevented by “getting the basics right” the public were generally unaware 
of what “those basics might be”.23 
22. It is of great concern that the majority of cyber crime could be prevented by better 
awareness by the user. Whilst the sophisticated threats will remain, we must do more to 
protect our information online.  The Government and the private sector both have a 
strong incentive to educate users and maintain awareness of cyber crime. We 
recommend that, through its various channels, all organisations, businesses and 
schools must provide users with appropriate information and risk management 
training. 
23. We regard as very serious indeed the words of the most senior policeman in the 
Committee that we are not winning the war on E-crime.  
could be axed as spending is cut. We agree with him that this is a very worrying 
trend. 
 
17 Q 62 
18 Q 311 
19 Q 311 
20 Q 222 
21 GCHQ, Countering the cyber threat to business, Spring 2013 
22 Iain Lobban, Director GCHQ, International Institute for Strategic Studies 12 October 2010, 
www.gchq.gov.uk/Press/Pages/IISS-CyberSpeech.aspx  
23 Q 236 
country on online fraud, Commissioner Leppard of City of London Police who
 told the 
24. Commissioner Leppard told us that a quarter of the 800 specialist internet crime
 officers 
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At a time when fraud and e-crime is going up, the capability of the country to address it 
is going down. 
25. Ministers have acknowledged the increasing threat of E-crime but it is clear that 
sufficient funding and resources have not been allocated to the law enforcement 
responsible for tackling it. Professor Ross Anderson told us that “we should be putting 
more of the cyber budget into policing and less of it into the intelligence sphere, into 
cyber war.”24 We also note as a principle, that if personal data is held in any database, 
no matter how secure, there is a risk of it being accessed inappropriately, either through 
human error or malice.25 The only way to ensure data does not leak is not to collect it. 
 
 
24 Q 121 
25 Qq 131–132 [Professor Ross Anderson & Professor Peter Sommer] 
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2 The Cyber Security Strategy 
The current strategy 
26. The  threat to national security from cyber attacks is real and growing. In October 2010, 
the National Security Strategy identified the cyber threat to the UK, which includes cyber 
crime, as a Tier One threat. This is a higher threat category than the threat of nuclear 
attack, but has received less attention and expenditure.  That is to say, a threat of the 
highest priority for UK national security, taking account of both likelihood of cyber attacks 
and the impact they could have. This assessment brought hostile attacks upon UK cyber 
space by other states and large scale cyber crime alongside  such major threats as 
international terrorism and international military crisis.26 
27. Terrorists, rogue states and cyber criminals are among those targeting computer 
systems in the UK. The Coalition Government’s approach to tackling e-crime has been 
focused on the revised Cyber Security Strategy released in November 2011, which set out 
how the UK will support economic prosperity, protect national security and safeguard the 
public’s way of life by “building a more trusted and resilient digital environment”. 27   The  
Cyber Security Strategy is an integral part of the National Cyber Security Programme 
(NCSP) launched in 2010.   
28. The NCSP includes: 
i. Creating a new cyber crime capability as part of the National Crime Agency 
ii. Mainstreaming cyber training throughout the police  
iii. Encouraging the use of ‘cyber specials’ by police forces 
iv. Promoting international cooperation and shared understanding of cyber crime 
v. Creating a single reporting system for individuals and small businesses to report  
cyber crime 
vi. Ensuring existing legislation is fit for purpose and used to optimum effect 
vii. Taking action to tackle hate crime on the internet  
viii. Reviewing existing legislation to ensure it remains relevant and effective 
ix. Encouraging the courts to use existing powers to impose appropriate sanctions 
for online offences. 
 
29. Dr Ian Brown, Associate Director of Oxford University’s Cyber Security Centre and 
Senior Research Fellow at the Oxford Internet Institute, told us that winning the war on 
cyber crime required a broad spectrum response from a number of areas of government. 
He believed that the Government was working along “the right lines in developing law 
enforcement”. Other witnesses stressed the importance of Government efforts to persuade 
other countries to take similar action.28 
 
26 Cabinet Office, A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, CM  7953, November 2010, 
pg 27 
27 Ev 61, para 16 
28 Q 224 
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30. However RSA, an American computer and network security company,  told us that its 
experience of dealing with both the public and private sectors suggested that, whilst recent 
policy initiatives such as last year’s National Cyber Security Strategy have advanced the 
Government’s understanding of the cyber threat and how best to respond to it, the private 
sector remained ahead in terms of understanding its scale and maturity, and implementing 
appropriate measures to deliver greater security.29 We note the increasing threat posed by 
state industrial espionage, and international e-crime committed for political purposes, 
such as the purported attacks on the Guardian from Syria and  attacks from China on 
the US media. The Government must not underestimate the danger such attacks pose 
to our infrastructure and take firm action with offending countries to cease their 
activities, using international forums to raise these issues.  
31. We recommend the establishment of a dedicated espionage response team that 
British companies, media, and institutions can immediately contact to report an attack 
and who can also provide training in order to counter attacks. 
Measuring e-crime 
Why does it matter? 
32. The Government has committed £650million to the NCSP to improve the nation’s 
cyber capabilities in order to help protect “the UK’s national security, its citizens and our 
growing economy in cyber space”.30 As the Government strives to reduce overall 
expenditure, it is of note that this significant resource is being directed against online 
threats. Witnesses told us that this funding has gone primarily to the intelligence agencies.  
33. It is difficult for us to test policy-makers’ and enforcement agencies’ understanding of 
the level of threat posed by cyber criminals or where those threats arise in a public 
environment without compromising their effectiveness.  Our witnesses however suggested 
that, while the potential threat to national security from cyber attack is reasonable well 
understood, there is a very poor grasp of the persistently high threat of large volume, low 
level crime online. 
34. Whilst security services receive the lion’s share of NCSP funding some witnesses have 
argued that  the funding would be better used “locking up more villains”. 31  Professor  Ross 
Anderson told us that the NCSP’s  budget should go to law enforcement and “less of it into 
the intelligence sphere”, as the threat is primarily from a small number of prolific criminal 
gangs. 32 He explained that the Government had made a “very welcome increase of £640 
million in the cyber security budget two years ago, but 59% of it went to GCHQ and only a 
few million to the police.”33  
 
29 Ev 87, para 14 
30 Ev 61, para 16 
31 Q 121 
32 Q 121 
33 Q 121 
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Concern over UK government measurements  
35. The Government’s accepted measure on the cost of e-crime to the UK economy is the 
one produced by the Cabinet Office in conjunction with Detica.  A number of our 
witnesses expressed scepticism regarding this cost estimated of £27bn. Professor Ross 
Anderson told us that the Detica report had met with ‘widespread scorn’.34 
 
34 Ev 21 
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36. Professor Peter Sommer told us that the report on the cost of cyber crime produced by 
Detica, lacked credibility as it excluded “any reference to children, any reference to the 
effects of malware, but included industrial espionage, which happens not to be a crime in 
this country”. He was also concerned about  how precise figures on an industry-by-
industry basis of the amount of losses incurred as a result of industrial espionage were 
generated.39 
37.  Following the controversy prompted by the findings in the Cabinet Office/Detica 
report, Sir Mark Welland, the Chief Scientific Office at the Ministry of Defence, 
commissioned further analysis to “unbundle things into direct and indirect costs”.40 
Professor Ross Anderson told us that this research resulted in figures which found more 
credibility with independent experts and within the security and IT communities.41 
Nevertheless it appears that the  Home Office at least still relies on the Cabinet 
Office/Detica figures. 
38. We understand that any measure of crime will always be subject to challenge and e-
crime even more so. However we are puzzled that the Government continues to use 
highly controversial figures, in which independent experts or indeed other government 
departments such as the Ministry of Defence have little confidence, as its basis for 
policy-making. 
39. Improving the way in which e-crime is reported and recorded is key to improving 
Parliament’s and the public’s understanding of it. It is important that policy makers 
have an up to date and accurate estimate of the threats from e-crime. We therefore 
recommend that the Government publicly distances itself from the £27bn estimate of 
the annual cost of e-crime to the UK economy. 
40. We recommend that the Government commission a working group of experts, 
drawing on existing good practice already developed by academia and industry, to 
produce annual figures which show the incidence of e-crime and any observable trends. 
This group should include representatives from the cyber security industry and 
independent experts to ensure the figures are robust. 
Trends in e-crime 
41. The UK’s crime statistics demonstrate that the incidence of e-crime is high and 
increasing. Surveys, such as the British Crime Survey, demonstrate that individual cyber 
crime victimization is significantly higher than for ‘conventional’ crime forms. 
Victimization rates for online credit card fraud, identity theft, responding to a phishing42 
attempt, and experiencing unauthorized access to an email account, vary between 1 and 17 
per cent of the online population for 21 countries across the world, compared with typical 
 
39 Ev 101 
40 Q 120 
41 Ross Anderson and Foundation for Information Policy Research, Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime 
42 See glossary 
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burglary, robbery and car theft rates of under 5 per cent for these same countries.43 We 
note that many victims of e-crime will not be aware that they are victims. 
42. The British Retail Consortium (BRC) is the lead trade association for the retail sector 
representing the whole range of retailers, from small independent stores through to the 
large multinational companies such as Tesco and Marks and Spencer. The BRC’s Retail 
Crime Survey for 2011-2012 found that the total cost of e-crime to the retail sector was 
£205.4 million in 2011-12.  The diagram below shows that this cost is made up from direct 
losses, spending on security and lost revenue.  
 Direct losses
Total cost - £77.3 million
Key components of loss:
• Identification-related frauds 
such as account takeovers-at
least £20m
• Card and Card-Not-Present 
frauds–at least £15m
• Refund frauds-£1.2 million in 
known losses.
Security costs
Total cost: at least £16.5m 
This figure excludes payments to 
banks for systems such as 3D 
Secure an ‘chargebacks’’
Lost revenue
Estimated losses:£111.6 million 
Estimated losses in revenue 
experienced as a result of 
legitimate business being rejected 
through online fraud prevention 
measures came to.
.
£205.4m
 
43. Evidence from  RSA and Symantec also attest to an increase in the threat from e-crime. 
The RSA’s Anti Fraud Command Centre (AFCC) combines counter-intelligence, threat 
monitoring, and threat analysis capabilities to neutralise attempts by cyber criminals to 
steal money and information. In the first seven years of its operation, the AFCC shut down 
more than 500,000 cyber attacks. The first six months of 2012 saw an increase in attacks 
with the AFCC shutting down 150,000 attacks, at a rate of 1,000 attacks per day. In June 
and July 2012 RSA dealt with 250,000 attacks, on average about one per minute. Based on 
this experience RSA has told us that “ the cyber threat is increasingly significant and it is 
now crucial for all sectors to recognise the dangers involved and respond”.44 
44. Symantec reported similar experiences. It told us it undertakes an annual global study 
of e-crime threats and trends in e-crime. Based on the data used for its 2011 report it told 
us that in 2011 Symantec blocked more than 5.5 billion malicious attacks, an increase of 
more than 81% from the previous year. Symantec’s report identified the following trends: 
 
- The number of unique malware identified by Symantec increased by 41% on the 
previous year; 
- The number of web attacks blocked per day increased by 36% on the previous 
year; 
 
43 UNODC Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime 
44 Ev 88, para 17 
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- An increasingly high volumes of malware45 attacks along with an increase in 
sophisticated targeted attacks, where the user may not know they are being 
attacked due to the ability of the attacker to slip under the radar and evade 
detection;  
- A rise in advanced persistent threats and attacks on the infrastructure of the 
internet itself;  
- An increase in the number of data breaches of individuals and business 
information with more than 232.4 million identities worldwide exposed overall 
during 2011; and  
- A reduction in the overall level of spam (a popular vehicle for conducting cyber 
crime) from 85.5% of all email in 2010 to 75.1% in 2011. Symantec says this 
reduction is largely seen as being due to law enforcement action which shut 
down Rustock, a massive worldwide botnet,46 responsible for sending out large 
amounts of spam.  
 
45. The latest Norton Cybercrime Report published in September 2012 with findings  
based on a survey of more than 13,000 adults across 24 countries, reported that there were 
an estimated 556 million victims of cyber crime each year. This is  more than the entire 
population of the European Union. In the UK, Norton estimated that more than 12.5 
million people had fallen victim to cybercrime within the past twelve months. The cost of 
these cyber crimes to the UK was a massive £1.8 billion with an average cost of £144 per 
cybercrime victim -bearing in mind how many people are not aware of the crimes, this is 
probably an underestimate.47  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45 Malware is malicious computer code that can be classified into four main threat types: viruses, backdoors, worms and 
Trojans. 
46 See glossary 
47 Norton Cybercrime Report, September 2012 
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3 Law enforcement and legislation 
New national law enforcement landscape 
46. RSA told us that it was necessary “for the government to start taking a more proactive 
approach to tackling e-crime, rather than relying on the largely reactive structures 
currently in place”. They noted that one “notable exception” was the highly successful 
Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre which actively sought to prevent the 
sexual abuse of children and catch those involved perpetrating these crimes. RSA suggest 
that the Government consider expanding “this pre-emptive policing framework to 
confront other forms of cyber crime head on”.48  
47. In response to such criticism, the Government has proposed changes to the national 
law enforcement e-crime landscape. The National Crime Agency (NCA) will be established 
by the end of 2013 under provisions granted by the Crime and Courts Act 2013 and will sit 
the centre of the reformed law enforcement landscape.  
48. As part of the NCA, it is proposed to establish a National Cyber Crime Unit (NCCU),  
to focus on tackling two types of cyber crime:  
a) crimes that can only be committed by using computers and the internet, and 
that occur where a digital system is the target as well as the means of attack. This 
includes attacks on computer systems to cause disruption (for example 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks49), and the stealing of data over a 
network often to enable further crime (for example through the spread of viruses 
and other malware, or computer and network intrusions (hacking).  
 
b) “existing” or traditional crimes that have been transformed in scale or form by 
the use of the internet, such as fraud or the sharing of indecent images of 
children. The growth of the internet has opened up a new (often global) market 
for these crimes, which allows for a degree of anonymity, operation on an 
industrial scale, and has created new opportunities for organised criminal groups 
to finance their activities. 
 
49. The Home Office told us that by focusing on these two categories of cyber crime the 
NCCU will use its resources and skills to tackle the most sophisticated areas of cyber crime, 
whilst supporting the NCA and wider law enforcement in taking responsibility for tackling 
cyber-enabled crime. This principle of supporting general law enforcement to assume 
responsibility for tackling cyber enabled crime, rather than looking to a specialist cyber 
unit to lead, will underpin the work of the NCCU.  It will bring together the national law 
enforcement response to cyber crime under one roof. This single capability to work closely 
 
48 Ev 88, para 21 
49 See glossary 
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with other partners, such as GCHQ, is intended to strengthen the UK’s overall resilience 
and incident response to cyber threats. 50 
50. The Government intends that the third type of cyber crime, that of crimes that are 
facilitated by the internet, will be tackled by usual policing. The Police are mainstreaming 
cyber awareness, capacity and capabilities throughout their service.51     
51. The Home Office argues that the National Cyber Crime Unit will deliver a range of 
benefits to the current law enforcement response to cyber-enabled crime, including: 
• A single, high-profile law enforcement lead dedicated to combating organised 
cyber criminals;  
• A more targeted focus on the most serious incidents of cyber crime, removing 
the criminals who facilitate cyber-enabled crime further downstream; 
• A stronger, more cohesive response to the most serious cyber-enabled crime;  
• Dedicated resources to drive a step-change in cyber capabilities across law 
enforcement, police service and wider partners; 
• Stronger partnerships at all levels, including delivery of a single point of contact 
for rapid response to dynamic threats and closer engagement with industry and 
academia; 
• Closer joint working with the Security and Intelligence Agencies through 
improved ICT connectivity and intelligence sharing.52 
 
The diagram below illustrates the key changes envisaged to the law enforcement under the 
NCSP. 
 
50 Ev 63, para 30 
51 Ev 62, para 29 
52 Ev 63, para 31 
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• Force lead on fraud including
internet-enabled fraud
• hosts two national fraud
centres:
   • The National Fraud
   Intelligence Bureau which
   collates, analyses and
   disseminates intelligence
   related to fraud including
   e-crime intelligence
• The National Fraud
   Reporting Centre, ‘Action
   Fraud’. This is a single
   online reporting point for
   victims of fraud. Reports
   are then fed into the
   National Fraud
   intelligence Bureau.
• Investigates serious cases of
  e-crime including network
  intrusions, use of malicious
  code, denial of service
  attacks and internet -
  enabled fraud
• Coordinates national ACPO
   e-crime programme
   including:
   • Forensics
   • Training
   • Coordination with other
      agencies
   • Setting up regional
      e-crime hubs
• Hosts the Virtual Task Force
  for the financial services
  industry (collaborative
  working group between
  industry and law
  enforcement).
• Hosts the SOCA e-crime
  unit within the Intervention
  Directorate
• Works closely with the
  international arm of SOCA
  to tackle serious cyber
  crime threats from
  overseas
• Hosts the UK electronic
  Crime Task Force in
  partnership with the US
• Operationally independent
from SOCA but accountable
to their board
• Coordinates intelligence
  and enforcement activity
  connected to child
  exploitation online
  including:
  • Victim identification
  • Developing public
    awareness campaigns
  • Reporting point for all
    incidents of child
    exploitation online
• Point of contact for
  international law
  enforcement. Leads the
  Virtual Global Taskforce to
  tackle exploitative
  international online
  networks
Home Office
and its 
Executive
Agencies
Police service
strategy and
governance
Operational
law
enforcement
agencies
2013 Law
Enforcement
Landscape
Key
Current law enforcement unit
NCA unit to be operational in 2013
Current operational accountability
Migration into NCA
City of London
Police
National Crime Agency
National Cyber Crime Unit
CEOP
Economic
Crime
Command
Organised
Crime
Command
Border
Policing
Command
Home Office
National Fraud Authority
Association of Chief Police Officers
• Executive agency of the Home Office
• Lead the ‘Fighting Fraud Together’ strategy including internet - enabled fraud
• Undertaking an in-depth study into the cost of cyber crime to the UK public
• Lead on the Action Fraud reporting button along with City of London Police
• Sets the policing strategy for tackling e-crime through the ACPO e-crime strategy
• Coordinates the National e-Crime Programme to deliver the strategy’s objectives
City of London Police Police Central e-Crime
Unit
Serious & Organised
Crime Agency
Child Exploitation &
Online Protection Centre
 
 
52. In its evidence to our inquiry, RSA cautioned that the Government that: 
  “must ensure that NCA’s remit, and the boundaries and inter-relationships with 
other agencies involved with e-rime, are well understood by all. Furthermore, it is 
imperative for the agencies currently involved in the response to e-crime to continue 
functioning at their optimum level throughout the transition process to prevent 
criminals taking advantage of any potential lapses in effectiveness or increased 
vulnerability”.53 
53. We welcome the steps being taken by Government to bring together different cyber 
crime units into the NCA to form a single National Cyber Crime Unit. This rationalises 
the current confusing plethora of different agencies and police organisations involved 
 
53 Ev 88, para 22 
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and should enable a more co-ordinated approach, strong strategic leadership and 
development of the elite level of skill required to tackle this cyber war. 
54. We were concerned however that the National Fraud Reporting Centre and the 
National Fraud Intelligence Bureau based in the City of London Police were not being 
transferred into the NCA. In our view it makes sense to concentrate the national 
reporting, investigative and intelligence structures for e-crime in one organisation.  We 
were surprised at the decision given the formation of the new economic crime 
command in the NCA and given we were told that the UK was the main online target of 
gangs in 25 countries. 
55. The Committee’s report on grooming published earlier this year found that sexually 
exploited children were still being failed by statutory agencies, and the recent court 
cases of Mark Bridger and Stuart Hazell have highlighted the role of online indecent 
images in child abuse. An NSPCC Freedom of Information request revealed that five 
police forces alone had seized 26 million indecent child images and 2,312 people were 
arrested for such offences last year. CEOP also estimates there 50,000 indecent child 
images on Peer2Peer networks.  We are therefore alarmed that CEOP is having its 
budget cut by 10% over 4 years, its experienced Chief Executive is leaving and it could 
lose its laser-like focus when merged with the NCA.  
56. We also note DCS McMurdie’s comments that e-crime sentences are too lenient. 
We were surprised by the fact Anonymous hackers who cost Paypal over £3.5m were 
given sentences of  7 and 18 months and do not believe they would have received such 
sentences had they physically robbed a bank of £3.5 million. The DPP should review the 
sentencing guidance and ensure e-criminals receive the same sentences as if they had 
stolen that amount of money or data offline. 
Regional and local capability 
Regional hubs 
57. One of the key aims of the Government’s Cyber Security Strategy is to improve the 
understanding of e-crime and the skills to investigate it across the police service. The 
Strategy commits the police to: 
a) Mainstream cyber awareness, capacity and capabilities throughout its service; 
b) Encourage the use of ‘cyber specials’ to bring in  those with the required specialist skills; 
and 
c) Increase law enforcement agency capability on e-crime and develop new training to do 
so. 
58. Police Central e-Crime Unit has delivered three regional e-crime hubs to build on its  
national capability and improve regional capability and response times. The hubs were 
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launched in February 2012 and are based in the North West, East Midlands and Yorkshire 
and Humber.54  
59. We welcome the establishment of regional hubs to support and develop local 
capacity and skills. Mainstreaming e-crime investigative skills throughout the police 
force is key to improving capacity across the board. We welcome the work currently 
being undertaken by Police Central e-crime Unit and others in this area. 
60. However commitments to improve mainstream skill levels have been around for 
years and practice has not so far matched rhetoric. We hope to see clear evidence that 
the work promised is being undertaken and clear benchmarks to measure if skills are 
improving.  
Processing Digital evidence – digital forensics 
61. The profusion data and the multiplication of devices upon which it is stored make it 
impossible for the police to examine all data and devices which may contain information 
relevant to investigations. The police refer to the process by which they decide what 
potential digital evidence to seize and examine as triage.  Some of our witnesses suggested 
that insufficient attention was paid to how and by whom such triage was conducted. 
62. In her evidence to the Committee, DS McMurdie said that work was being done to 
train all front line officers in the search and seizure of digital material and that the option of 
training digital scenes of crime officers was also being considered.55 Andy Archibald, the 
Deputy Director of SOCA’s Cyber Crime Unit, told us that SOCA were training officers as 
Digital Forensics Officers.56 
63. Professor Peter Sommer, who acts as an expert witness in digital forensics, supported 
the move to improve digital forensics in-house. He reasons that it is vital that the forensic 
team work with the investigating officer in order to reconstruct events accurately. Both 
Professor Sommer and Professor Anderson assessed current capacity in the police as 
patchy. They found pockets of excellence, in SOCA and the Police Central e-crime Unit, 
but more widely there was still a considerable lack of necessary skills. 
64. We welcome the  development of specialist Digital Scenes of Crime and forensic 
officers and note that the search and seizure of digital material should only be done 
when it is proportionate. 
International capacity and cooperation: working in partnership and 
obtaining evidence from overseas 
65. The majority of cyber criminals operate outside of the UK’s jurisdiction, SOCA told us 
that this hindered identification and prosecution. Criminal groups were able to base 
themselves in a number of different jurisdictions and could therefore operate from 
 
54 More detail on the role of regional hubs can be found in Peter Goodman’s evidence from 20 November 2012. 
55 Q 90 [DCS McMurdie] 
56 Q 90 [Andy Archibald] 
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countries with weak criminal sanctions for online offences.  The Police Central e-crime 
Unit found it difficult to obtain evidence from countries with whom the UK had no 
established relationship.57 Andy Archibald, Deputy Director, Cyber and Forensics, Serious 
Organised Crime Agency, told us that “relationships had to be worked at and worked at 
hard. We need to identify those countries that have the greatest impact on the UK, and 
how we can leverage some assistance or some co-operation from them”. 58 In order to do 
this, he explained, placing staff in international partnerships was pivotal: 
We have relationships in a number of areas internationally-with Interpol, with 
Europol, with the Commonwealth Cyber Initiative-and we have liaison officers in 
some key locations overseas. In relation to the EU, we have a member of staff with a 
cyber skill background embedded in the development of the European Cybercrime 
Centre, which will go live in January. We want to influence the direction and the 
vision for that unit to ensure it complements the UK approach..59  
66. In its one year report on the Cyber Security Strategy 2011, the Cabinet Office highlight 
international cooperation as being crucial to building ‘a vibrant and secure cyberspace’. It 
says the UK has worked towards this by: 
• Encouraging wider adoption of the Budapest Convention on cyber crime, putting in 
place compatible frameworks of law that enable effective cross-border law enforcement 
and deny safe havens to cyber criminals 
• Building a wide network of international partners 
• Strengthening relationships with traditional allies and building relationships with a 
‘broad range’ of countries 
• Improved international cooperation to tackle cybercrime through legislation and 
operation work 
• Established the Cyber Capacity Building Fund 
67. DAC Hewitt argued that the most important tool for getting results internationally was 
establishing a strong relationship between law enforcement agencies:  
‘primarily from our perspective the Police Central e-Crime Unit, which is the main 
operational unit that is hosted currently within the Metropolitan Police, has 
developed very strong relationships with most of the key countries and law 
enforcement in the key countries with which we work, and the Crown Prosecution 
Service does likewise with the prosecuting authorities’.60 
The Cabinet Office’s forward plan for the Cyber Security Programme included the 
objective of building cooperation between the UK and international law enforcement 
agencies including more joint operations.   
 
57 Q 99 
58 Q 99 
59 Q 97 
60 Q 368 
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Obtaining digital evidence from overseas 
68. Increasingly, the police require access to digital evidence held outside UK jurisdiction. 
In evidence to us SOCA and Police Central e-crime Unit described the difficulties 
associated with established processes for obtaining such evidence. For example, obtaining 
evidence through Multi-Lateral Assistance Treaties (MLATS) was described as being 
extremely slow (with it often taking months for them to get the evidence they needed) and 
resource intensive.  Detective Chief Superintendent Charlie McMurdie, Head of the Police 
Central e-Crime Unit, commented: 
 One of the issues around that is the timeliness of the response and the volumes of 
data that we are looking for, and then the legislation for that country to be able to 
approach the service provider to get the data on our behalf or for them to progress 
that.61 
69. We were alarmed to hear from police witnesses that they often experienced 
difficulty in retrieving data from sites based abroad. We hope that such companies will 
adopt a more constructive attitude going forward and be willing to engage with public 
authorities. They reap huge financial benefits from the public entrusting them with 
their data and they should be willing to be open and accountable for the actions they 
take with it.  
EU Justice and Home Affairs measures 
70. Under Protocol 36 of the Lisbon Treaty the UK has the option to opt out of police and 
criminal justice measures adopted under the Maastricht Treaty, provided it does so before 
December 2014 when the measures will be adopted under the Lisbon framework, thus 
giving the Court of Justice of the European Union jurisdiction. The Home Secretary has 
signalled her intention to opt out of these measures. The option applies to all measures en 
masse. The UK will then be able, subject to agreement by the EU, to opt back in to any of 
the measures it decides will be of use. 
71. There are at present 133 such measures. They can be divided roughly into the following 
groups: instruments intended to influence substantive criminal law; instruments intended 
to influence criminal procedure; instruments relating to police co-operation; and 
instruments designed to secure mutual recognition.62 A number of instruments that fall 
into the last two categories could effect on the UK’s ability to tackle e-crime.63  
72. The international scope of e-crime provides a strong argument that the UK should 
focus on increasing cooperation between police forces in other states and making these 
mechanisms as effective as possible. As the proportion and volume of crime with an 
online element increases, we expect more police investigations to straddle international 
 
61 Q 94 
62 CELS, Opting Out of EU Criminal Law: What is actually involved?, September 2012 
63 One measure in the first category ‘Measures intended to influence substantive criminal law’ relates to e-crime ‘Council 
Framework Decision 2005/222/JHA of the 25 February 2005 on Attacks against Information Systems’. However this 
has is likely to soon be replaced by a new Directive and the UK has already opted in to the proposal for it. Council 
Decision 2000/375/JA to combat child pornography on the internet is also a substantive measure but the UK’s 
domestic law already criminalises child pornography on the internet. 
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boundaries,  and more evidence relating to the offences against the UK and its residents 
to be located in overseas jurisdictions. 
73. To this end, we cannot understand why the UK has refused to support funding for 
the new Europol CyberCrime Centre C3 which facilitates vital cross-Europe 
information sharing. E-crime does not recognise country borders and it is essential that 
we have strong international cooperation to ensure offenders are brought to justice and 
citizens protected. Strengthening our defences and international investigation capacity 
will save money in the long term and we recommend that the UK supports additional 
EU funding for the Centre. 
74. We are deeply concerned that EU partner countries are not doing enough to prevent 
cyber attacks from criminals within their countries on the UK. We will return to this 
matter in our inquiry into the proposal to opt out of the EU police and criminal justice 
measures which were adopted before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force.  
Reporting and recording e-crime 
Current UK crime recording practises 
75. Currently only violations of the Computer Misuse Act 1990 are recorded as electronic 
crimes. Crimes that are carried out using the internet defined as offences in other Statutes 
are recorded as an offence under the substantive legislation.64 There is no central recording 
of crime under the method by which it was committed. For example online frauds such as 
lottery and dating scams are recorded as violations of the Fraud Act 2006 and not as e-
crimes. The Home Office told us that it is taking steps to improve the identification of e-
crimes within recorded crimes and crime surveys. 
76. Some of our witnesses stated that even crimes that violate the Computer Misuse Act 
1990 are usually recorded according to the criminal’s intent. For example, a Denial of 
Service Attack would probably be recorded as extortion if its perpetrator was using it to 
blackmail the website owner. A phishing attack could also be recorded as fraud or money 
laundering. Witnesses say this is largely due to the Crown Prosecution Service’s perception 
that the Computer Misuse Act 1990 exists to fill in gaps in other forms of legislation.65 
77. Indeed, some of our witnesses also raised concerns regarding the recording and 
reporting of fraud. The Foundation for Internet Policy Research said that the previous 
Government’s policy change which saw victims of fraud reporting the crime to their banks 
in the first place rather than to the police meant that the rate of recorded instances of fraud 
understates the reality. FIPR points to the British Crime Survey which shows that UK 
households are twice as likely to be victims of fraud than of traditional acquisitive crime.66 
It added that the 2005 policy change had: 
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“caused the fraud statistics to go down, but it opened up an even larger gap than is 
usually the case between the crimes reported through the police, on the one hand, 
and the crime levels reported through victim surveys on the other. Now, for most 
practical purposes, official recorded crime is useless in determining the level of 
fraud”67 
78. The National Trading Standards Board has also questioned the utility of the current 
reporting and recording system: 
It is fair to say that the current recording mechanisms probably are not adequate 
because you tend to find that the illicit activity would get recorded as a general fraud 
or a consumer protection legislation issue in terms of, for example, a trademarks 
offence if they were counterfeit goods. They tend to get classified under those areas, 
but the e-crime element is not necessarily always picked up. Therefore, it is fair to say 
that there is probably a large-scale under-reporting of e-crime and its true economic 
impact.68 
79. The British Retail Consortium says that one of the main problems faced by its members 
in reporting e-crime was the lack of clarity about case acceptance criteria for reporting 
online fraud or crime to national agencies. It told us that that its members often spent time 
preparing detailed reports expecting the relevant agency to accept the case but then found 
that their case had fallen short of the acceptance criteria and needed to be reported 
locally.69 
Action Fraud 
80. The Government has made ‘Action Fraud’, the single national reporting centre for 
financially motivated online crime.  Since August 2011 Action Fraud has had the capability 
to record the enablers of fraud in fraud reporting. Between its launch in August 2011 and 
April 2012  49,037 reports of fraud were made to Action Fraud, of which 45% were enabled 
online. The City of London Police say that the majority of traditional frauds have been 
eclipsed by fraud with an online element.70   
Improving recording practises 
81. A number of our witnesses recommended the introduction of a new field on crime 
reporting forms to indicate whether or not there is digital evidence related to the reported 
crime. This would enable the police to build a clearer picture of where digital evidence was 
important and to allocate resource accordingly. It would also inform decisions about the 
amount of resource needed in the field of digital forensics.71 When we put this to Deputy 
Associate Commissioner Martin Hewitt, the ACPO lead for e-crime, he acknowledged that 
more information would enable the police to build a better intelligence picture but he 
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doubted that victims and the person receiving the report would have the level of  
knowledge needed to accurately record details about how the crime was carried out. 
“The more information we have the better. Recording the method relies on a level of 
knowledge within the victim and a level of knowledge within the person who is 
receiving the report to do that effectively, but I think we are trying to get towards 
that.... The more information the better, but I don’t think necessarily the answer is 
going to be just having more expansive MO submissions on the crime reports “.72 
82. We welcome the online Action Fraud reporting function. We recommend that  a 
clear link to the Action Fraud website is placed on websites where people are likely to  
experience  attempted fraud or visit when they believe they have been a victim of online 
fraud such as police forces, banks, email providers, trading standards.  
83. Current recording practises are inadequate to give an accurate picture of the extent 
to which reported crime is committed over the internet. We recommend the 
introduction of an additional field on crime reporting forms to indicate whether or not 
there was digital evidence relating to a crime. This would help the police to understand 
the extent of the problem they were facing and to make sure they have the appropriate 
resources in place. 
84. We are very concerned that there appears to be a ‘black hole’ where low-level e-
crime is committed with impunity. Criminals who defraud victims of a small amount 
of money are often not reported to or investigated by law enforcement and banks 
simply reimburse victims. Criminals who commit a high volume of low level fraud can 
still make huge profits. Banks must be required to report all e-crime fraud to law 
enforcement and log details of where attacks come from. The perceived untouchable 
nature of these low-level criminal acts is exemplified by the adverts RSA noted on 
Facebook advertising ‘fraud as a service’. 
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4 Can web service providers protect  our 
data? 
Growth of e-crime on social networks 
85.  Over half of UK households now use social networking sites. Facebook is the most 
popular social network in the UK with two thirds of internet users having accounts on the 
site. Facebook told us that it has 33 million UK users and approximately a billion users 
worldwide.73 Twitter estimated that it had 10 million users in the UK, 200 million 
worldwide.74 Google+ had 2.5m.75 Social networking has become the most popular online 
activity, accounting for 19% of all time spent online worldwide.76 The popularity of social 
networks and the vast amount of data they store about individuals is making them a prime 
target for cyber criminals.  
86. During our inquiry we spoke to the providers of the most popular web services in the 
UK: Facebook, Twitter and Google. We asked them if there had been an increase in the 
number of attacks on services. Facebook’s Simon Milner, Director of Public Policy, told us 
that there was “consistent evidence” that people were hacking Facebook in the UK and the 
US.77 Sinead McSweeney, Director of Public Policy EMEA, Twitter, confirmed that there 
had been an increase in terms of “advanced, persistent threats from sophisticated and well-
resourced individuals with expertise, with resources”.78  
Drivers of e-crime on social networks 
87. Sophos reported that social networks were an increasingly popular platform for cyber 
criminals. It linked the rise in e-crime on social  media to the trend in mobile cyber crime 
as users increasingly accessed social networks through mobile phones: 35% of UK mobile 
phone users accessed social network sites through their phones in 2010-11.79 Sophos also 
reported that 50% of all smartphones were connected to Facebook for 24 hours a day. As 
well as popularity, Sophos has identified the implied trust between users of social networks 
as being a key reason for being increasingly targeted by cyber criminals. 80 
88. The Norton 2012 Cyber Crime Report, which surveyed c.13,000 adults across 24 
countries, identified the targeting of social networks as one of two key trends in the 
development of e-crime. The report found that: 
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• 4 / 10 social network users had been a victim of e-crime on social 
networks; 
• 1/6 social network users reported that someone had hacked into their 
profile and impersonated them; 
• 1/ 10 users had been victims of scams or fake links on social networks. 
• 19% of respondents had been notified that their password for a social 
networking site had been compromised and needed to be changed.81 
89. Imperva recently analysed the conversation threads on one of the internet’s largest 
hacker forums (it has a membership of 250,000) and a number of smaller forums. It found 
that social networks were of increasing interest to online hackers. Facebook was the most 
popular platform discussed, featuring in 39% of conversations. Twitter was a close second, 
being mentioned in 37% of conversations. Other sites featured can be seen from the chart 
below. A common request in these discussions was for assistance in hacking into an 
individual’s social network profile, either to spy on them or for revenge.82 
Social networks popularity. Percentage of threads with keyword September 2011-September 2012 83 
Google+
5%
LinkedIn
4%
myspace
15%
Twitter
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Facebook
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90. The Police Central e-Crime Unit told us that it saw social networks being used for 
general and bespoke phishing scams and together information with which to blackmail 
users.84 
 
81 Norton, 2012 Cyber Crime Report, p13, http://now-
static.norton.com/now/en/pu/images/Promotions/2012/cybercrimeReport/2012_Norton_Cybercrime_Report_Master_FI
NAL_050912.pdf 
82 Imperva, Hacker Intelligence Initiative, Monthly Trend Report #13, p7 
83 Ibid. 
84 Q 100 
E-crime    29 
 
 
 
Types of e-crime carried out on social networks 
Identity theft / phishing on social networks 
91. Many types of scams on social networks involve hijacking a user’s account by luring 
them to a webpage with a fake log-in for their account or malware that installs a keylogger 
(a programme that records key strokes)on their computer. Upon gaining control of the 
account, the scammer can then contact the user’s friends and attempt to scam them by 
impersonating the user and pretending that they are in trouble and need some money.  
They can also post messages and links that will compromise their accounts in turn. 
Accounts may also be hijacked in personally motivated attacks as a means of revenge or to 
spy on a user’s actions.  
92. In evidence, RSA explained how users of social media could be providing information 
unwittingly to criminals: “attackers are increasingly gathering intelligence on their targets, 
sometimes months in advance of an attack, using social media and other means to 
understand which individuals possess the assets they want, and crucially how to tailor, or 
“socially engineer”, their attacks to increase their likelihood of success. Indeed cyber 
attackers prefer using social engineering in this way because in so doing they are able to 
evade traditional perimeter controls more easily.”85 
Theft of personal information  
93. Scammers can steal personal information from social networkers, especially those who 
do not use privacy settings appropriately (see above) or develop other socially-engineered 
attacks against the user or their friends. Weaknesses in the design of social networks can 
help scammer’s access personal information. For example the account settings on networks 
such as Google+ are automatically set to public. Sarah Hunter, Google’s Head of Public 
Policy in the UK, told us that the hijacking of Google accounts was “a significant problem”. 
She said that there was some evidence that phishing emails, as in emails that have been sent 
to people in an attempt to try to get their passwords out of them, were “increasingly 
coming from accounts—emails from people they think they know. Of course, they are not 
from people they know; they are from those accounts that have been hijacked”.86 Google 
said it had spent “a lot of money and a lot of time trying to prevent accounts from being 
hijacked in the first place. We spend hundreds of millions of pounds in keeping our users’ 
data safe”.  
94. Google appears to have had some success in protecting its users, Sarah Hunter 
confirmed that over the last two years the number of Google accounts hijacked had 
decreased by 99.7%. She told us that Google has developed technology that scans account 
activity and identifies suspicious activity:  
For example, if you have a Gmail account and you signed in from London, and then 
an hour later signed in from Australia, we would see that as a signal of suspicious 
activity, and we would ask you a few questions, some security questions; “Are you 
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really you?” That is an amazingly effective way to stop hijacking, and as a result we 
have significantly reduced the number of hijacked accounts.87 
95. Facebook has no formal review process for ‘apps’ developed by third parties that are 
accessible on its platform. Many of these apps require users to give the developer access to 
some of their personal account information. Cyber criminals may use apps as another way 
of evading security checks and stealing personal information. 
96. As RSA explained: 
 “cyber criminals are out to steal personal information for financial gain. This 
information can range from an individual’s credit card details and web or corporate 
logins, to an organisation’s highly confidential plans or data. Indeed the value of 
personal data to a cyber criminal is much higher than a credit card or bank account 
number alone. For example, the average selling price of a US credit card on the 
criminal black market is around $1.50. But when that card is sold with a full identity 
profile, the value can be up to ten times greater.”88 
Clickjacking 
97.  In a practice known as ‘clickjacking’ malicious code can be hidden beneath legitimate 
buttons or other clickable content on a website. The content is often given sensationalist 
headlines to entice users to click on it. Previous examples include: “Lady Gaga found dead 
in hotel room,” and  “Japanese tsunami launches whale into building.” Users believe they 
are clicking on one thing, such as a video or article but are actually clicking on  an invisible 
button that releases a worm into their computer.89 
Advance fee / romance scams 
98. Cyber criminals may use social network platforms to persuade users to send an advance 
fee in order to receive a prize or take part in a ‘get rich quick’ scheme. Scammers have also 
persuaded users to part with money by developing an ‘online relationship’ with 
individuals.90 After a while they persuade their victim to send them money on the basis that 
they are in trouble or want to visit the victim in person but can’t afford to do so. This type 
of fraud is prevalent on dating websites. 
Twitter Direct Messages (DMs) 
99. One recent spate of attacks used Twitter Direct Messages, to tell users that they are 
featured in a YouTube video. Users who click on the link are greeted with what appears to 
be a video player and a warning message that “An update to YouTube player is needed” but 
the download is in fact a trojan which will infect the user’s computer. 
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Cyber bullying and Twitter Trolls 
100. Cyber bullying and Twitter Trolls are terms that relate to cyber bullying on social 
media sites. This type of bullying is particularly high amongst young people. Parents have 
spoken out about their children being bombarded with vicious or sexually explicit taunts 
from their peers and being pressured  to take part in sexual activities, sometimes of a 
violent nature.91 There have been several high profile cases of celebrities and public figures 
becoming victims of ‘Twitter Trolls’, users who send malicious, offensive and threatening 
tweets to others. In a recent court case Frank Zimmerman, who sent a message to Louise 
Mensch threatening her children, was given a 26 week suspended  prison sentence.92 Trolls 
are not just an issue for Twitter however, Facebook recently launched a campaign in 
Australia to encourage users to stand up to online bullies. Bullying can and does occur on 
many other web platforms. 
101. Online services should be ‘secure by design’ e.g. new account settings should be set 
by default to private with the user sharing information with friends or publicly only if 
they actively choose to do so. Users should not be asked to submit personal details that 
are known to be helpful to fraudsters. For example, users should be discouraged from 
giving their date of birth. 
102. We recommend that providers of web services take users through a short 
explanation when they sign up for an account about how to keep their data secure and 
how criminals could use certain data against them. Users should not be asked to 
provide such valuable personal data. 
103. We are concerned that many users may not grasp the full extent of the data they 
are sharing with private companies. The interest in and opposition to plans to increase 
data availability to the Government (e.g. witness the fate of the proposed Data 
Communication Bill) makes us question whether public are really relaxed about 
sharing so much data or if they are simply unaware they are doing so. 
104. We are deeply concerned that it is still too easy for people to access inappropriate 
online content, particularly indecent images of children, terrorism incitement and sites 
informing people how to commit online crime. There is no excuse for complacency. We 
urge those responsible to take stronger action to remove such content. We reiterate our 
recommendation that the Government should draw up a mandatory code of conduct 
with internet companies to remove material which breaches acceptable behavioural 
standards. 
105. We note those companies that donate to the Internet Watch Foundation, and 
encourage them to increase their contributions. Additionally, we recommend that the 
Government should look at setting up a similar organisation focused on reporting and 
removing online terrorist content. 
 
91 Laura Bates, ‘Next generation of social media exposing girls to sexual abuse’, The Independent Website, 13 February, 
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106. We are concerned to note the Minister’s assertion that off the shelf hacking 
software is increasingly available to untrained criminals and recommend the 
Government funds a law enforcement team which is focused on disrupting supply. 
Improving software standards 
107. Engineering the Future has been outspoken about the need to improve the design of 
new software to make it more resilient against attack. It says that: 
The capability of seemingly benign attachments, such as pdf files or jpeg pictures to 
execute malicious code or website attacks ... all result from wholly avoidable mistakes 
by the developers of the faulty software. 
the main source of risk is not, as widely claimed, unsafe behaviour by computer users 
but, rather, the design flaws and programming errors that make normal, reasonable 
behaviour unsafe.93 
108. Engineering the Future says that improving public awareness about online risks will 
be ineffective if sufficient incentive is not given to software manufacturers to create 
products that do not expose their customers to such serious risks. It would like to see a 
timetable announced for introducing a Europe-wide measure of liability on manufacturers 
and importers of faulty software for the damage that avoidable defects cause.  
109. Symantec however has raised doubts, from the point of view of anti-virus software 
providers, about the extent that software companies can be held responsible for security 
breaches. It says that since the company cannot control how effectively consumers install 
and use their products it cannot be liable for a security breach as the fault may lie in the use 
of the software rather than in its design. 
110. It has said that software providers would only accept liability for their products if they 
could assume a level of control over the way in which they were being used. This, Symantec 
says, would involve companies using 
‘privacy invasive technology to provide the ability to monitor and control the 
behaviour and actions of users for example to ensure that the software  is being used 
for only the purpose for which it was supplied or sold.’ 
111. Symantec says that the legal, privacy and cost issues that this approach would give rise 
to is unlikely to make it an attractive option for users. It has also said that such an approach 
would stifle innovation and competition: 
 An approach along these lines could not only impact the control users have on their 
PC’s but  could also stifle technological innovation and competition in the 
marketplace by promoting particular business models. A move towards more closed 
platforms or a situation where one dominant technology provider could dictate what 
can, or cannot, be installed on its system due to liability concerns may limit 
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consumer choices to only sites or online content that are approved by PC providers  
based on a  level of risk.94  
112. We recommend that software for key infrastructure be provably secure, by using 
mathematical approaches to writing code. 
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5 Effectiveness of public awareness 
campaigns 
Promoting public awareness 
113. Witnesses from the police emphasised the importance of prevention through 
increasing peoples’ awareness of the threats and what they can do to protect themselves.  
“The goal in cyber has to be around prevention activity and developing prevention 
activity.”95  
Deputy Assistant Commissioner Martin Hewitt, ACPO e-crime lead, told us that we had to 
get to a point where “as citizens, organisations and businesses, are not, effectively, leaving 
the windows and the doors open when we leave the office or when we leave the house”.96  
114. Whilst we have heard evidence that a great deal of the responsibility of holding data 
securely lies with the organisations who hold that information and who develop the  
software used, it is a fact that criminals often use social engineering methods to target 
victims. Users are not without responsibility for their own data and can take steps to 
protect their personal information online. Recent work by Nominet showed that 43% of 
smartphone and tablet users did not have security measures such as anti-virus software, 
remote wipe facilities in the case their device is lost or stolen, or the latest version of their 
operating system installed on their device. The Police e-Crime unit told us that improving 
awareness about the amount of data that people put in the public domain and what 
criminals can use it for was key to preventing crime. 
There is a real opportunity, as you have just heard, about public awareness with that. 
There is freedom of speech, and people put all sorts of information on the internet 
without realising how vulnerable that makes them. Our information is out there on 
500 to 600 different databases at any one time, and the criminal groups run 
automated programmes harnessing all that data around us, day in, day out, and then 
they will utilise it to their advantage97 
Assessing the success of prevention activity in the UK 
115. Some of our witnesses have told us about successful public awareness campaigns that 
have been carried out such as The National Fraud Authority’s ‘The Devil’s in your Details’ 
Facebook campaign. However they also highlighted the difficulties in reaching internet 
users with information about both staying secure online and also about how to recognise 
and report fraud if they have been a victim. Adrian Leppard, Commissioner of the City of 
London Police, told us of the work  in prevention going on under the Cyber Security 
Strategy. However he acknowledged that educating the public was a challenge, noting “We 
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do have to push that out in better campaigning and much more public messaging about 
it”.98 
116. In the Commissioner’s view, prevention work would be more effective if it: 
• Involved stronger partnership with the private sector; 
• Used platforms such as television that reached a wide audience; 
• Had specific campaigns targeted at different segments of society, 
particularly vulnerable ones; 
• Had more funding from the Government. 
The lack of funding for prevention activity was raised as an issue by other witnesses who 
were concerned that the only prevention work which had specifically been allocated 
funding by the National Cyber Security Programme-Get Safe Online received £395,000, 
only 0.06% of the total budget.  
117. Other witnesses have argued that prevention has limited utility. Professor Ross 
Anderson has told us that it put too greater onus on consumers:  
I am not quite as enthusiastic about public education as some other people, because 
of the simple fact that computers and mobile phones and social networking sites 
tend to ship with unsafe defaults because it is better for selling advertising.99  
118. He also argued that since a lot of economic damage is done by a small number of 
cyber criminals it would be more efficient to arrest and prosecute them. 
119. We recommend that guidance about keeping personal data secure should be 
incorporated into all online services that request personal data from their users.  
120. It is as important that children learn about staying safe online as it is that they 
learn about crossing the road safely. We welcome teaching about online safety and 
security taking place in schools and initiatives such as ‘safer internet week’.   
121. The children we spoke to believed an important part of learning to stay safe online 
was being taught to respect others online and not to say things that you wouldn’t say to 
their face and we agree. 
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Annex: Glossary of terms 
Apps — (abbreviation for ‘application’) a piece of software that can run on a computer, a 
mobile device, or from a web browser. 
Bot — a computer that has been compromised to serve the hacker’s need without the user’s 
knowledge. 
Botnet — a networks of bots which can act together to achieve a collective aim. 
Browser — a web browser is a program used to access the World Wide Web  
Conversation threads — messages which are grouped together (usually by subject), e.g. on 
an internet forum or by an email client like outlook or gmail, as a visual aid to the user. 
Cookies — small data files generated by a website and saved onto your computer when you 
first visit the website. Their purpose is to identify you, so that the site can keep track of your 
movements ; they may also store your personal data or preferences. Some browsers allow 
users to delete specific cookies or prevent cookies from being created, this allows the user a 
higher level of privacy but could affect website functionality on their computer as many 
websites are designed to require cookies to function properly. 
• Session cookies — temporary files that are deleted when the browser is closed 
• Persistent cookies — files designed to store data for an extended period of time. 
Each persistent cookie is created with an expiration date, once the expiration date is 
reached, the cookie is automatically deleted. Persistent cookies are what allow 
websites to “remember you” for two weeks, one month, or any other amount of 
time. 
Denial of Service (DoS) attack — an attack on a computer system (typically a web server) 
which aims to make the system unavailable by flooding it with internet traffic so  that it 
becomes overloaded and inoperable. 
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack — as above but carried out by a number of 
networked computers controlled by one master (a botnet). 
Domain Name System (DNS) — The Internet uses the Domain Name System (DNS) to 
allow computers to identify each other. To connect to the Internet, each computer requires 
a unique numerical label called an IP address. IP addresses are matched to memorable 
labels called domain names, stored in a global database. For example, instead of typing the 
IP address 194.60.38.75, to connect to the computer that hosts the parliamentary website, 
the domain name www.parliament.uk is used. 
Domain names generally follow the format www.xxxxx.yyy, where: 
.yyy is the top level domain, which can be a country code such as ‘.uk’ or a generic 
domain such as ‘.com’ or ‘.org’; 
.xxxxx is the second level domain such as ‘.parliament’, ‘.co’ or ‘.google’; 
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additional subdomains, such as ‘www.’ can be used to the left. 
The DNS is coordinated to ensure addresses and domain names are unique. Due to the 
number of names and addresses they are stored on specialist computers. 
Hosting / website hosting — Housing, serving and maintaining files for websites.  A Web 
Host provides internet access through a system called a server. A Web Hosting company 
may have many servers to hold many gigabytes of information. This requires a fast 
connection to the internet and most hosting companies offer fast connections which would 
be very expensive for businesses to take out for their individual websites.  
Internet Protocol (IP) —  the method or protocol by which data is sent from one computer 
to another on the Internet 
IP address — see “Domain Name System” 
Malware (malicious software) — A catch-all term for software with malicious intent. The 
uses of malicious software range from placing excessive demand on a computer’s 
resources, to destruction of data or even hardware. In some cases the user is made aware of 
the presence of the malware, for example when it sends a message to the user or deletes the 
contents of a hard drive. Recent forms of malware may operate without the user’s 
knowledge, steal financial information such as credit card details, or convert infected 
computers into an asset for the attacker. 
Common types of malware work as follows: 
• Viruses infect computers or other electronic devices and are passed on by user 
activity, for example by opening an email attachment. 
• Worms self-propagate using an internet connection to access vulnerabilities on 
other computers and to install copies of themselves. They are often used as a 
conduit to grant attackers access to the computer. 
• Trojans are malware masquerading as something the user may want to download 
or install, that may then perform hidden or unexpected actions, such as allowing 
external access to the computer. 
• Spyware transmits information gathered from a computer, such as bank details, 
back to an attacker. For example ‘keylogging’ software records anything entered 
using the keyboard, such as passwords. 
Phishing — Sending fraudulent emails to individuals that claim to come from a legitimate 
source (e.g. internet retailer or bank). The aim of these emails is to persuade the victim to 
voluntarily disclose sensitive information such as bank account and credit card details that 
can then be exploited to defraud them. 
Root-kit — software to gain and maintain privileged access to computer systems; can be 
used to conceal other malware;  
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Trojan / Trojan Horse — Malicious software programmes which are disguised as benign 
applications such as computer games or antivirus software. Once installed on a system, 
they can cause data theft and loss, as well as system crashes or slowdowns. Trojans can also 
be used as launching points for other attacks, such as distributed denial of service (DDoS). 
Many Trojans are used to manipulate files on the victim computer, manage processes, 
remotely run commands, intercept keystrokes, watch screen images, and restart or shut 
down infected hosts. Unlike viruses and worms, Trojans do not reproduce by infecting 
other files nor do they self-replicate. 
URL (Universal resource Locator) — formatted text string used by Web browsers and 
other software to identify a network resource on the Internet. Network resources are files 
that can be plain Web pages, other text documents, graphics, or programs. A URL consists 
of three parts: a network protocol, a host name or address a file or resource location.   
Virus — A computer virus attaches itself to a program or file enabling it to spread from 
one computer to another, leaving infections as it travels. Almost all viruses are attached to 
an executable file, which means the virus may exist on your computer but it actually cannot 
infect your computer unless you run or open the malicious program. It is important to 
note that a virus cannot be spread without a human action, (such as running an infected 
program) to keep it going. Because a virus is spread by human action people will 
unknowingly continue the spread of a computer virus by sharing infecting files or sending 
emails with viruses as attachments in the email.  
Widgets — a “widget” is an application that sits on top of a Web site and offers users 
additional interactive features. There are four main types of Widget: (1) a widget engine 
(such as dashboard apps like Apple’s Mac OS X v10.4, Windows Vista Sidebar, or Yahoo! 
Widgets), (2) GUI widgets (which are a component of a graphical user interface in which 
the user interacts), (3) Web widgets (which refer to a third party item that can be 
embedded in a Web page), and (4) mobile widgets (a third party item that can be 
embedded in a mobile phone).  
Worms — A worm is similar to a virus by design and is considered to be a sub-class of a 
virus. Worms spread from computer to computer, but unlike a virus, it has the capability 
to travel without any human action. A worm takes advantage of file or information 
transport features on your system, which is what allows it to travel unaided. The biggest 
danger with a worm is its capability to replicate itself on your system, so rather than your 
computer sending out a single worm, it could send out hundreds or thousands of copies of 
itself, creating a huge devastating effect. One example would be for a worm to send a copy 
of itself to everyone listed in your e-mail address book. Then, the worm replicates and 
sends itself out to everyone listed in each of the receiver’s address book, and the manifest 
continues on down the line. 
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Conclusions and recommendations 
C&R Sub heading 
1. Crimes  that have been transformed by the internet and those unique to electronic 
networks should continue to be defined and recorded as e-crime. This will enable the 
police to develop an appropriate level of sophisticated technical resource to respond 
to these crimes.  (Paragraph 12) 
2. The ever- increasing incidence of the use of the internet in some form in traditional 
crimes indicates the futility of special categorisation for such offences.  We 
recommend that more police officers are trained in digital crime detection and 
equipped with digital forensic skills. These should become standard skills for officers 
undertaking relevant investigations. (Paragraph 13) 
3. It is of great concern that the majority of cyber crime could be prevented by better 
awareness by the user. Whilst the sophisticated threats will remain, we must do more 
to protect our information online.  The Government and the private sector both have 
a strong incentive to educate users and maintain awareness of cyber crime. We 
recommend that, through its various channels, all organisations, businesses and 
schools must provide users with appropriate information and risk management 
training. (Paragraph 22) 
4. We regard as very serious indeed the words of the most senior policeman in the 
country on online fraud, DAC Leppard of City of London Police who told the 
Committee that we are not winning the war on E-crime.  (Paragraph 23) 
5. DAC Leppard told us that a quarter of the 800 specialist internet crime officers could 
be axed as spending is cut. We agree with him that this is a very worrying trend. At a 
time when fraud and e-crime is going up, the capability of the country to address it is 
going down. (Paragraph 24) 
6. Ministers have acknowledged the increasing threat of E-crime but it is clear that 
sufficient funding and resources have not been allocated to the law enforcement 
responsible for tackling it. Professor Ross Anderson told us that “we should be 
putting more of the cyber budget into policing and less of it into the intelligence 
sphere, into cyber war.” We also note as a principle, that if personal data is held in 
any database, no matter how secure, there is a risk of it being accessed 
inappropriately, either through human error or malice. The only way to ensure data 
does not leak is not to collect it. (Paragraph 25) 
7. We note the increasing threat posed by state industrial espionage, and international 
e-crime committed for political purposes, such as the purported attacks on the 
Guardian from Syria and  attacks from China on the US media. The Government 
must not underestimate the danger such attacks pose to our infrastructure and take 
firm action with offending countries to cease their activities, using international 
forums to raise these issues.  (Paragraph 30) 
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8. We recommend the establishment of a dedicated espionage response team that 
British companies, media, and institutions can immediately contact to report an 
attack and who can also provide training in order to counter attacks. (Paragraph 31) 
9. We understand that any measure of crime will always be subject to challenge and e-
crime even more so. However we are puzzled that the Government continues to use 
highly controversial figures, in which independent experts or indeed other 
government departments such as the Ministry of Defence have little confidence, as 
its basis for policy-making. (Paragraph 38) 
10. Improving the way in which e-crime is reported and recorded is key to improving 
Parliament’s and the public’s understanding of it. It is important that policy makers 
have an up to date and accurate estimate of the threats from e-crime. We therefore 
recommend that the Government publicly distances itself from the £27bn estimate of 
the annual cost of e-crime to the UK economy. (Paragraph 39) 
11. We recommend that the Government commission a working group of experts, 
drawing on existing good practice already developed by academia and industry, to 
produce annual figures which show the incidence of e-crime and any observable 
trends. This group should include representatives from the cyber security industry 
and independent experts to ensure the figures are robust. (Paragraph 40) 
12. We welcome the steps being taken by Government to bring together different cyber 
crime units into the NCA to form a single National Cyber Crime Unit. This 
rationalises the current confusing plethora of different agencies and police 
organisations involved and should enable a more co-ordinated approach, strong 
strategic leadership and development of the elite level of skill required to tackle this 
cyber war. (Paragraph 53) 
13. We were concerned however that the National Fraud Reporting Centre and the 
National Fraud Intelligence Bureau based in the City of London Police were not 
being transferred into the NCA. In our view it makes sense to concentrate the 
national reporting, investigative and intelligence structures for e-crime in one 
organisation.  We were surprised at the decision given the formation of the new 
economic crime command in the NCA and given we were told that the UK was the 
main online target of gangs in 25 countries. (Paragraph 54) 
14. The Committee’s report on grooming published earlier this year found that sexually 
exploited children were still being failed by statutory agencies, and the recent court 
cases of Mark Bridger and Stuart Hazell have highlighted the role of online indecent 
images in child abuse. An NSPCC Freedom of Information request revealed that five 
police forces alone had seized 26 million indecent child images and 2,312 people 
were arrested for such offences last year. CEOP also estimates there 50,000 indecent 
child images on Peer2Peer networks.  We are therefore alarmed that CEOP is having 
its budget cut by 10% over 4 years, its experienced Chief Executive is leaving and it 
could lose its laser-like focus when merged with the NCA.  (Paragraph 55) 
15. We also note DCS McMurdie’s comments that e-crime sentences are too lenient. We 
were surprised by the fact Anonymous hackers who cost Paypal over £3.5m were 
given sentences of  7 and 18 months and do not believe they would have received 
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such sentences had they physically robbed a bank of £3.5 million. The DPP should 
review the sentencing guidance and ensure e-criminals receive the same sentences as 
if they had stolen that amount of money or data offline. (Paragraph 56) 
16. We welcome the establishment of regional hubs to support and develop local 
capacity and skills. Mainstreaming e-crime investigative skills throughout the police 
force is key to improving capacity across the board. We welcome the work currently 
being undertaken by Police Central e-crime Unit and others in this area. (Paragraph 
59) 
17. However commitments to improve mainstream skill levels have been around for 
years and practice has not so far matched rhetoric. We hope to see clear evidence 
that the work promised is being undertaken and clear benchmarks to measure if 
skills are improving.  (Paragraph 60) 
18. We welcome the  development of specialist Digital Scenes of Crime and forensic 
officers and note that the search and seizure of digital material should only be done 
when it is proportionate. (Paragraph 64) 
19. We were alarmed to hear from police witnesses that they often experienced difficulty 
in retrieving data from sites based abroad. We hope that such companies will adopt a 
more constructive attitude going forward and be willing to engage with public 
authorities. They reap huge financial benefits from the public entrusting them with 
their data and they should be willing to be open and accountable for the actions they 
take with it.  (Paragraph 69) 
20. The international scope of e-crime provides a strong argument that the UK should 
focus on increasing cooperation between police forces in other states and making 
these mechanisms as effective as possible. As the proportion and volume of crime 
with an online element increases, we expect more police investigations to straddle 
international boundaries,  and more evidence relating to the offences against the UK 
and its residents to be located in overseas jurisdictions. (Paragraph 72) 
21. To this end, we cannot understand why the UK has refused to support funding for 
the new Europol CyberCrime Centre C3 which facilitates vital cross-Europe 
information sharing. E-crime does not recognise country borders and it is essential 
that we have strong international cooperation to ensure offenders are brought to 
justice and citizens protected. Strengthening our defences and international 
investigation capacity will save money in the long term and we recommend that the 
UK supports additional EU funding for the Centre. (Paragraph 73) 
22. We are deeply concerned that EU partner countries are not doing enough to prevent 
cyber attacks from criminals within their countries on the UK. We will return to this 
matter in our inquiry into the proposal to opt out of the EU police and criminal 
justice measures which were adopted before the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force.  
(Paragraph 74) 
23. We welcome the online Action Fraud reporting function. We recommend that  a 
clear link to the Action Fraud website is placed on websites where people are likely to  
experience  attempted fraud or visit when they believe they have been a victim of 
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online fraud such as police forces, banks, email providers, trading standards.  
(Paragraph 82) 
24. Current recording practises are inadequate to give an accurate picture of the extent 
to which reported crime is committed over the internet. We recommend the 
introduction of an additional field on crime reporting forms to indicate whether or 
not there was digital evidence relating to a crime. This would help the police to 
understand the extent of the problem they were facing and to make sure they have 
the appropriate resources in place. (Paragraph 83) 
25. We are very concerned that there appears to be a ‘black hole’ where low-level e-crime 
is committed with impunity. Criminals who defraud victims of a small amount of 
money are often not reported to or investigated by law enforcement and banks 
simply reimburse victims. Criminals who commit a high volume of low level fraud 
can still make huge profits. Banks must be required to report all e-crime fraud to law 
enforcement and log details of where attacks come from. The perceived untouchable 
nature of these low-level criminal acts is exemplified by the adverts RSA noted on 
Facebook advertising ‘fraud as a service’. (Paragraph 84) 
26. Online services should be ‘secure by design’ e.g. new account settings should be set 
by default to private with the user sharing information with friends or publicly only 
if they actively choose to do so. Users should not be asked to submit personal details 
that are known to be helpful to fraudsters. For example, users should be discouraged 
from giving their date of birth. (Paragraph 101) 
27. We recommend that providers of web services take users through a short 
explanation when they sign up for an account about how to keep their data secure 
and how criminals could use certain data against them. Users should not be asked to 
provide such valuable personal data. (Paragraph 102) 
28. We are concerned that many users may not grasp the full extent of the data they are 
sharing with private companies. The interest in and opposition to plans to increase 
data availability to the Government (e.g. witness the fate of the proposed Data 
Communication Bill) makes us question whether public are really relaxed about 
sharing so much data or if they are simply unaware they are doing so. (Paragraph 
103) 
29. We are deeply concerned that it is still too easy for people to access inappropriate 
online content, particularly indecent images of children, terrorism incitement and 
sites informing people how to commit online crime. There is no excuse for 
complacency. We urge those responsible to take stronger action to remove such 
content. We reiterate our recommendation that the Government should draw up a 
mandatory code of conduct with internet companies to remove material which 
breaches acceptable behavioural standards. (Paragraph 104) 
30. We note those companies that donate to the Internet Watch Foundation, and 
encourage them to increase their contributions. Additionally, we recommend that 
the Government should look at setting up a similar organisation focused on 
reporting and removing online terrorist content. (Paragraph 105) 
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31. We are concerned to note the Minister’s assertion that off the shelf hacking software 
is increasingly available to untrained criminals and recommend the Government 
funds a law enforcement team which is focused on disrupting supply. (Paragraph 
106) 
32. We recommend that software for key infrastructure be provably secure, by using 
mathematical approaches to writing code. (Paragraph 112) 
33. We recommend that guidance about keeping personal data secure should be 
incorporated into all online services that request personal data from their users.  
(Paragraph 119) 
34. It is as important that children learn about staying safe online as it is that they learn 
about crossing the road safely. We welcome teaching about online safety and security 
taking place in schools and initiatives such as ‘safer internet week’.   (Paragraph 120) 
35. The children we spoke to believed an important part of learning to stay safe online 
was being taught to respect others online and not to say things that you wouldn’t say 
to their face and we agree. (Paragraph 121) 
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Formal Minutes 
Wednesday 17 July 2013 
Members present: 
Keith Vaz, in the Chair 
James Clappison 
Michael Ellis 
Dr Julian Huppert 
Steve McCabe
Mark Reckless 
Mr David Winnick 
 
  
Draft Report (E-crime), proposed by the Chair, brought up and read. 
Ordered, That the draft Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph. 
Paragraphs 1 to 121 read and agreed to. 
Annex agreed to. 
Resolved, That the Report be the Fifth Report of the Committee to the House. 
Ordered, That the Chair make the Report to the House. 
Ordered, That embargoed copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the provisions of 
Standing Order No. 134. 
Written evidence was ordered to be reported to the House for printing with the Report (in addition to that 
ordered to be reported for publishing on 4 September, 16 October, and 20 and 27 November 2012, and 5 
February, 19 and 26 March, and 16 and 23 April 2013). 
[Adjourned till Tuesday 3 September at 2.30 p.m. 
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Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 1
Oral evidence
Taken before the Home Affairs Select Committee
on Tuesday 30 October 2012
Members present:
Keith Vaz (Chair)
Nicola Blackwood
Dr Julian Huppert
Steve McCabe
________________
Examination of Witness
Witness: Peter Davies, ACPO lead on Child Protection and Abuse Investigation and Missing Children, gave
evidence.
Q1 Chair: Mr Davies, good afternoon. You are in
demand before Select Committees.
Peter Davies: Indeed.
Chair: I have to tell you that when Jim Gamble went
and we heard that CEOP was going to be part of the
NCA we were very worried that you might lose your
profile, but you now find yourself centre stage as far
as these very serious matters are concerned. Could we
deal first with Operation Yewtree and the Savile
allegations?
Peter Davies: Of course.
Q2 Chair: How are you involved in respect of these
allegations? Are you leading an investigation? Are
you providing advice to those who are investigating?
Peter Davies: Thank you for the opportunity. Let me
explain. In addition to being Chief Executive of
CEOP, I am the lead for ACPO—the Association of
Chief Police Officers—on child protection, child
abuse investigation and missing children. It is in that
capacity that I have most involvement with the Jimmy
Savile case. Prior to the broadcast of the Exposure
programme a few weeks ago, it became very clear
from the media that a number of people were coming
forward making disclosures, primarily against Jimmy
Savile, of abuse that had happened some time ago. At
that point there was no way of knowing where the
majority, or a substantial chunk of those offences,
might have taken place, so we put a process in place,
supported by the Metropolitan police, to make sure
that there was support for any victims who wanted to
disclose through contacting helplines, but also so that
we could gather all the data and get the most
comprehensive picture possible.
Q3 Chair: You fit in where? You are obviously not
running Yewtree; Yewtree is being run by the Met.
Peter Davies: I was just going to come to that. The
day after the broadcast, it became clear that at least
one of the centres of activity had been London and
the Metropolitan police stepped up and volunteered to
take on the inquiry. At that point I stepped back. The
inquiry, the gathering of data and the commissioning
of any investigations following that are in the hands
of the Metropolitan police, led by Commander Peter
Spindler. Where I retain an interest on behalf of
ACPO is that the circumstances around Operation
Bridget Phillipson
Mark Reckless
Mr David Winnick
Yewtree may well raise questions that might affect
public confidence in policing or provoke questions we
should ask of ourselves, because we are very much in
the business of making sure that such a series of
events could not possibly happen again.
Chair: Indeed.
Peter Davies: I still have an interest in the police
service identifying what lessons may be learnt,
learning them and acting upon that learning.
Q4 Chair: Very helpful. When you last came before
us you rated the public sector’s ability to protect
children from child exploitation as being five out of
10. Knowing what you now know and looking at the
whole situation since you have been director, would
you improve on that score for the public sector or do
you think it is worse than you suspected?
Peter Davies: I gave two scores: one for effort, one
for attainment.
Chair: Yes you did.
Peter Davies: I think both scores would have gone
up in the intervening period. There is evidence, for
example, from Barnardo’s, who published a report in
April this year that showed that a significant
proportion of Local Safeguarding Children Boards—
who very much have the best opportunity to impact
on this—had committed to far greater activity than
was apparent to us when we did our thematic
assessment the previous year. I have contacts both
through ACPO and through CEOP with a number of
police forces and with institutions such as the National
Working Group, led by Sheila Taylor MBE.
It seems extremely clear that practitioners are
embracing the need to learn more, improve their
processes, invest resources and knowledge in dealing
more effectively with group-related child sexual
exploitation. Effort has moved up, attainment has
moved up, because more forces are delivering
investigations, and I know of a number of proactive
investigations yet to see the light of day that are taking
place around the country. Both scores have improved.
[Interruption.] I apologise, I am trying to talk over
the bell.
Chair: No, we should apologise to you. You are
giving us some very interesting information. I am not
sure whether that is a vote or they are just telling us
they are closing. Let us go on. You paint a better
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picture, but yesterday you were quite critical, were
you not? You said you were sad and angry that until
recently some frontline professionals had struggled to
grasp the complex nature of sexual exploitation.
Peter Davies: The issue is how far I cast my eyes
back.
Chair: Mr Davies, I apologise. I was relying on the
information of Mr Winnick who is very experienced
and distinguished, because I too saw Remaining
Orders of the Day. However, he was wrong. We are
going to suspend the Committee for the vote, but I
know you are in difficulties.
Peter Davies: I might have difficulties because of
another Committee.
Chair: I assure that the next Committee is also going
to be voting, so they will all be ten minutes late.
Peter Davies: Thank you. I will be here.
Chair: Okay, so I am going to suspend the Committee
for 10 minutes.
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.
On resuming—
Q5 Chair: To repeat my question, in case people
have forgotten, only yesterday you said you were sad
and angry that until recently some frontline
professionals had struggled to grasp the complex
nature of sexual exploitation. You launched a very
helpful video, which is now on YouTube, but does
that not show that people are just not trained to deal
with this very important issue, even now in 21st-
century Britain?
Peter Davies: Yes, could I just separate a couple of
things? Thank you for acknowledging the training
video. What I was referring to there were some
examples when it seemed very clear that people had
not taken steps to identify a child at risk and done the
right thing by them. I think for anybody who has spent
their whole working life trying to protect the public,
“sad” is not quite adequate for how you feel about
that, because that is not what any of us joined the
police service for. My role at the moment is not to say
everything has always been fine, but to acknowledge
that the police service, among other partners, has to
raise its game and set about the business of raising
our game with all due urgency. There is nothing
wrong with having a little bit of feeling behind that as
well. It is implicit in the fact that we created a training
video that the need for frontline practitioners, for
people who might be—[Interruption.] Do you want
me to go on?
Q6 Chair: What struck me most from the evidence
that we received from David Crompton was the fact
that they had no prosecutions this year for child
grooming and child abuse?
Peter Davies: Yes.
Q7 Chair: Not only that, but he said there were only
eight officers now in Rochdale dealing with this issue.
But we have heard that since Yewtree began, they now
have 30 serving Metropolitan police officers dealing
with those allegations. I just wondered about that, and
the Committee, I think, were concerned that the
expertise was not getting out to the 43 forces.
Peter Davies: Yes. I think Mr Crompton was referring
to the very specialist officers dealing with very little
else except grooming and child sexual exploitation,
and if he did not at the time, I am sure he would have
wanted in hindsight to point out that, of course, they
can be supported by a number of other officers and
staff from South Yorkshire police to deal with some
of these inquiries. Indeed, those who do these
inquiries can get support from CEOP, from the United
Kingdom Human Trafficking Centre, from SOCA and,
in future, from the NCA. The other observation I
would make is that prosecution is not the only
measure of success here.
Q8 Chair: What is the other measure?
Peter Davies: There are a number of measures, and
effort does not always result in successful prosecution.
These are very complex, very time-consuming
inquiries and they are a considerable investment of
resources. For all their importance, they are not the
only job that the Chief Constable of South Yorkshire
has to do.
Chair: Sure.
Peter Davies: He has to make decisions about
apportioning his resources accordingly. But my point
is if that, for one year, there have not been any
successful prosecutions, I do not think that is the same
thing as them not having done any work in this area,
because sometimes these investigations can take
significantly more than a year to come to fruition. In
answer to your question about what the other
outcomes are, equally valid outcomes are that children
who are in these hugely vulnerable situations are
rescued from them, safeguarded and protected and
move on to be survivors of victimisation rather than
ultimate victims.
Q9 Chair: But we do not have statistics on it all,
do we? Who would have the statistics? Although the
previous witnesses are going to write to us with
information they have, you are very clear that if we
come to you and ask about the number of people
involved in online grooming, you will tell us.
Peter Davies: Yes.
Q10 Chair: It is a pleasure taking evidence from
CEOP because they seem to have their information at
their fingertips and they tell Committees and the
House what is going on. There seems to be an absence
of those facts and figures, maybe not conclusions, and
I accept what you say—this takes a long time—but
the facts and figures that are necessary for the public
to be reassured.
Peter Davies: Yes. I am very grateful for the positive
comment about CEOP. I was present for the previous
evidence. I think we clearly identified last year in our
thematic assessment, and through ongoing work—and
I am sure the Children’s Commissioner for England,
when they publish their interim report in November,
will identify—that there is still a way to go before
really reliable national data collected to a consistent
standard are available on this phenomenon.
Chair: Yes, thank you.
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Peter Davies: So, I would not put myself forward as
being the person who has all that data for a number
of different reasons, which I think you know.
Chair: We accept that.
Q11 Mr Winnick: What evidence is there, Mr
Davies, of the internet being used by groups and
gangs—criminals of the despicable variety—to groom
children for sexual exploitation?
Peter Davies: I think here we are getting into a
difficult area where if we are not careful, we can over-
categorise things and fail to see the joins. I think I am
right, Mr Winnick, in understanding that your
question is about the extent to which these groups,
who engage in something that is loosely called
localised grooming, also use the internet to do so, or
is it a wider question about how many people?
Mr Winnick: The former.
Peter Davies: Thank you. The truth is that social
networking and mobile data and mobile
communications are pretty much universal for
children and young people who, of course, fall victim
to this kind of thing. We have plenty of cases where
a group that targets children locally will use social
networking or internet-based communications as an
integral part of what they do. My professional view
though is that it is an adjunct to a pattern of offending
that is really based on spotting vulnerability in local
areas offline. It is a tool in their toolkit, but it is not
the primary driver of what they are doing. That
remains, in my view, identifying children who are
vulnerable almost in a physical sense—seeing what
their habits are, seeing where they are and engaging
with them face to face.
Q12 Mr Winnick: Given the very nature of social
media, is there any firmer action that could be taken
by the authorities, by the police, by Government?
Peter Davies: That is a massive debate. The
Committee are moving on to the communications data
legislation, which, I suppose, is approaching that
question from one particular angle. There are ways in
which legislation might increase the responsibility on
service providers and on communicams from service
providers to be more vigilant in looking for grooming
activity on their networks and have an obligation to
report it. To be fair, on a voluntary basis, we have a
very good relationship with the majority of service
providers. They support something called the Internet
Watch Foundation that does a lot of very good work
to take down and deny people access to images of
child abuse, for example. Against the extra bits of
legislation that could happen, there has to be weighed
the fact that there is freedom of speech, and people
do not take kindly to legislation that can be seen as
censoring or restricting access to the internet.
Q13 Mr Winnick: It may be not the solution after
all.
Peter Davies: I am not sure it is the solution. I think
we need to tackle the human behaviour. Actually that
is a truism about just about everything CEOP does. It
is about human behaviour; the fact that it takes place
now on the internet does not take away that our main
focus is human behaviour in all its unpleasantnesses.
Mr Winnick: One would have to be an incurable
optimist to believe that human behaviour is going to
change to that extent. It is a question of dealing with
what undoubtedly is a form of criminality. Thank you
very much, Mr Davies.
Peter Davies: Thank you.
Q14 Nicola Blackwood: Mr Davies, you mentioned
earlier that just having no prosecutions for one year is
not an indicator of no action being taken by a police
force, which clearly is the case. We do not want to
discourage police forces that are taking action in this
area. But clearly there has been an ongoing problem
with very few prosecutions for a long period of time,
not just for one year. Would you agree that there is
an ongoing problem with not just police forces not
recognising the problem, although some are taking
action now, but also the CPS not wanting to prosecute,
not finding witnesses credible and feeling that it is
difficult to get evidence that would hold up in court?
Peter Davies: Yes, I would agree. It is a whole range
of issues. It is not just about police forces, although
that is where I can speak with most authority. It is fair
to say that the investment in training and resource that
was explained by Chief Constable Crompton is a good
step forward and the picture I have from policing is
that it is developing at a pace in terms of tackling this
phenomenon. We are going to move that along with a
further action plan on behalf of ACPO to make sure
that the right steps are in place in every force and the
right tools are available to every force. But yes, of
course, one of the aspects of this is that it is hard to
prosecute. We know that victims occasionally do not
realise they are victims until quite late in the
exploitation process. They are often selected for their
vulnerability, and paedophiles generally select victims
partly because they would make poor witnesses and
would not even have the confidence to report. The
prosecution service have to make decisions based on
the realistic prospect of conviction and what is in the
public interest. On both those counts, it can be
difficult to balance the best interests of the victim.
Q15 Nicola Blackwood: Yes, that is true. But given
that the Director of Public Prosecutions has himself
accepted that there needs to be a review of the way in
which the CPS handles these cases, I think that we can
accept that there is significant room for improvement.
Peter Davies: Yes, and I think the room for
improvement in the CPS will be the ready availability
of sufficient specialist expertise to the prosecutors
who have to assist and direct in these investigations
and make charging decisions and prepare
prosecutions.
Q16 Nicola Blackwood: Can I take you back to
some of the comments you were making about online
grooming? We received evidence from the Children’s
Commissioner, Sue Berelowitz, who explained that
her inquiry had found evidence that online
pornography was exacerbating the problem of child
sex abuse by normalising abusive behaviour. Can I
ask whether, in your professional opinion, that has
been your experience, given that CEOP not only has
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experience in online child abuse but has also moved
more recently into child sexual exploitation?
Peter Davies: In my professional opinion, the level of
exposure to pornography that is available on the
internet can be harmful for children who access it, and
actually can be harmful for anybody who is vulnerable
to that kind of thing. Clearly, it has a role to play in
normalising or making people think that some types
of behaviour are appropriate when actually they are
not. I do see it as an issue. My professional view is
that there is work being done on that, and I do not see
it as the overriding driver behind child sexual
exploitation. It is a risk, it is a concern, but there are
other bigger factors at play.
Q17 Nicola Blackwood: What is your view of the
proposals to put in place upstream filters? There are
two areas. I do not whether if you are able to answer
the first question. Do you think that it would be
technically possible and, secondly, do you think that
it is the best answer to deal with the problem of easily
accessible pornography that children can find on the
internet?
Peter Davies: I have no problem with the concept; I
know that some do, but I personally do not. The issue
for me is it could be technically feasible to put it in
place but I do not think we should underestimate the
ability of people who are able and adept at operating
the internet to get to what they want to get to
regardless of what filters are put in place. I see it as a
useful risk mitigation measure if it proves to be
acceptable. I do not think it will stop pornography
falling into the hands of children, for example, nor
will it, of itself, stop the circulation and availability of
child abuse images.
Q18 Nicola Blackwood: Is that your personal view?
I know that you work with a number of partners like
Google and Facebook and so on; would that be the
sort of position that the partners within those
organisations take or not?
Peter Davies: I am not sure they would take the same
position. They might have a different view about the
advisability and feasibility technically of doing it. My
personal view is that anything is technically feasible
if you really want to do it enough. The issue for me
is that I do not think, of itself, it would stop children
having access to pornography, which I think is what
people would like it to do. Children will find a way
on the internet just as, frankly, those that wanted to
generally found a way before the internet existed. As
a risk mitigation tool, I have no problem with it and I
think it will help some children by denying them
access to material that they should not see. I do not
think it will stop children accessing pornography
online.
Q19 Nicola Blackwood: What is a better way
forward?
Peter Davies: I do not see anything wrong with that
as part of a wider way forward. Another equally
essential part of the way forward is doing the kind of
thing that CEOP does, which is educating children
who will be exposed to material, who may well be
exposed to material, whether we like it or not—
educating them to understand what is going on, to
understand the risks involved in their activity, and to
understand what to do if things go wrong or if they
have concerns.
Going back to my previous point to Mr Winnick, we
are dealing with human behaviour. I do think human
behaviour can be changed and one of the best ways
of doing that is giving human beings better
information and better thought processes about these
things. I do not see any problem with what is being
proposed in terms of denying some children access to
pornography. That will not be the whole answer; we
will still have to end up sitting down having proper
conversations with our kids about how to deal with
that material responsibly because it is still a risk that
they might access it.
Q20 Bridget Phillipson: Apologies for missing the
first part of your evidence to the Committee. What
role do you think that web hosts and ISPs should have
in identifying and removing indecent images of
children?
Peter Davies: At the moment, there is general support
for the Internet Watch Foundation, which has a role
on their behalf of circulating reference numbers of
websites that carry illegal imagery, and basically
denying people access to them. Within the United
States, by way of comparison, there is legislation that
places an obligation on service providers to report
incidents of child exploitation to a receiving centre,
and a slice of those reports come to the UK. It may
well be that we will want to place a further obligation
on service providers to report it than is currently the
case in the UK. It may well be that we would also
want to place some expectation on them to look for it
more proactively than may currently be the case. I am
no legislator, but those would be the two key areas
where we could possibly look for more from the
industry.
Q21 Bridget Phillipson: That certainly sounds like a
sensible approach, which could lead to the outcomes
that we all want to see. Do you have any
understanding as to why we have not gone down that
route so far?
Peter Davies: I do not really understand why we have
not gone down that route so far. Having some
awareness of what it took to get the US model into
law—the Protect Our Children Act 2008—I do not
underestimate the difficulties in doing so, and I think
that came about partly by a happy set of circumstances
whereby both the main parties actually ended up
agreeing on that piece of legislation. I am simply
speaking from a practitioner’s point of view of what
would help. I do not underestimate the difficulty of it.
Bridget Phillipson: Thank you.
Q22 Chair: Following on from what Bridget
Phillipson said, an FOI request revealed that five
police forces had seized 26 million images of children
on the internet. Only 2,312 people were arrested for
those offences. Your own figures show that there were
50,000 indecent images on peer-to-peer networks.
That is roughly seven times larger than the 7,200
names that came over in Operation Ore. It may sound
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as if we are just keen to prosecute everybody we can,
but at the end of the day how do you actually
prosecute that very high volume of people in order to
stop the indecent images of children appearing? These
are phenomenally large figures.
Peter Davies: They are phenomenally large figures
and, from my point of view, if it was possible to
investigate every single one and prosecute every
single one, then I would be perfectly happy to do so.
Q23 Chair: But is it right that you have been trialling
the sending of letters to people to say, “We notice that
you have been on to the website, you have accessed
indecent images, please stop”? Is that what you are
doing?
Peter Davies: No, it is not what I am doing.
Q24 Chair: But have you heard of that?
Peter Davies: I have heard of that. If I can just
continue with the previous issue, this is criminality. It
needs to be addressed as criminality. Just because lots
of people do it, it does not reduce the level of
criminality it represents. Actually, the report that we
put out in June this year identified a pretty strong link
between the possession of child abuse images and the
risk of somebody being a contact abuser. It is
criminality in its own right, it is a re-victimisation of
the children whose abuse is depicted in the images
and it is an indicator and risk to the public, and I
would love there to be the capacity to do more about
it. In the absence of that capacity, and I think the
National Crime Agency might increase that capacity
from time to time, we have to prioritise. Within that
population there are people who are clearly posing an
extremely high threat to children, and that is where
we direct our efforts. The initiative that you are
describing was an attempt by one police force,
possibly two, to deal with all the other people who,
because of prioritisation and resources, cannot be
tackled any other way. It was a pilot scheme and it
was done under very controlled circumstances.
Q25 Chair: Was it successful?
Peter Davies: I have not seen evidence of its success
and I would not be recommending it to other forces
to try. But let us be very clear, from my point of view,
it is probably better to do something about these
people than nothing. I would prefer that we had the
capacity to investigate these people for the criminals
they are, and arrest and prosecute them in every
single case.
Q26 Chair: But as Nicola Blackwood says, you have
a very good and strong relationship with the internet
providers.
Peter Davies: Yes.
Q27 Chair: Why are we not asking them to do more
to remove these indecent images of children from the
internet? They seem to have no responsibility for any
of this. They put it out there but they are not actually
doing anything, are they?
Peter Davies: The service providers can obviously
speak for themselves. If I paraphrase what many of
them would say, it would be that they are not
responsible for what goes on in their pipework, they
just provide the pipework—if I can use a plumbing
analogy. I do not really buy that entirely; I think they
have some level of corporate and social responsibility.
We have quite a good relationship operationally with
many of the organisations that we might have in mind.
Where there are things they can do to help, within the
law and within their own legislation in the home
country in which they are based, they are quite
amenable to doing that. If you had some of these
service providers here, they would talk you through
some of the difficulties of actually taking that level of
control. I think it is important to emphasise that these
are not people who demonstrate no moral standing at
all; every service provider is different, and the extent
to which they are prepared to take steps is different
and we have to deal with them on an individual basis.
Q28 Steve McCabe: Can I ask about the question of
resources? You touched on it by saying you have to
cut your cloth. What is the position? Do you have
broadly adequate resources to deter and detect
offences against children, or are you woefully ill-
equipped?
Peter Davies: We ourselves, as a centre, have a pretty
stable resourcing situation. We are subject to the CSR
and what we have been able to do through a
modernisation process is actually increase the number
of people in the centre while taking on board a modest
budget cut. The wider issue is that we do everything
we do as a centre through a range of other partners.
Any member of a police force is potentially one of
our partners in protecting children. We have 70,000 or
80,000 volunteers in classrooms who take our
education products and deliver them to children.
Within the centre, our resourcing was never designed
to be adequate to take on the whole problem. I think
it is adequate to take an approach to the problem in
the way we are currently doing. I look forward to the
extent to which the National Crime Agency gives us
new opportunities to engage more resources from the
agency when necessary to mount some more
operations. I think the key to the success that CEOP
does have is in our understanding that the effect we
deliver is generally through other people, which
places the emphasis less on what our budget figure
is—although it is still important to have a minimum—
but actually far more on the quality of the
relationships we have, the synergies we can realise
and the extent to which we can persuade other people
to get involved in our business as well.
Q29 Steve McCabe: So CEOP, for what it does, is
adequately resourced. Were you hinting there that the
cuts these other people—the other police forces and
education services—are receiving are going to make
it more difficult for them to do the extra part of the
work?
Peter Davies: No, I was not hinting that.
Steve McCabe: I wanted to understand.
Peter Davies: I understand the question, I welcome
the question. The observation I make on that is that I
regularly check in with a network I have of heads of
public protection units in police forces up and down
the country, asking them what is happening and the
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extent to which austerity is affecting them. Very
reassuringly, the general message I get is actually that
resources are being upheld and re-thought in terms of
how they are used within public protection, and it
seems to me as if public protection and the protection
of children is still something the police service is keen
to hold up regardless of austerity. That is the general
picture, so it is quite encouraging.
Q30 Steve McCabe: Okay, thanks. Can I ask one last
thing? I read somewhere that the budget for the
National Cyber Security Programme is about £650
million, of which approximately £65 million goes to
the Home Office to deal with online offences. Is that
the right balance?
Peter Davies: That is a very difficult question for me
to answer.
Q31 Steve McCabe: Well, in your opinion?
Peter Davies: In my opinion, given what the money
is for and knowing how it has been spent, the part that
has been allocated to the Home Office is fine. Cyber-
crime is like many other aspects of what I deal with;
you could invest any amount of money in it, and if
the overall pot is £65 million, and your question is,
“Well, is it right to apportion a certain amount to the
Home Office?” I have no reason to think it is not, and
I have seen some of the benefits that it has delivered.
But if you are in the business of child protection, there
is always more to be done than the resources will
allow, however much you have, and we have to
prioritise, work smart, make the best of our
partnerships and make the best use of the resources
we do have.
Steve McCabe: Okay, thank you.
Q32 Nicola Blackwood: I wanted to follow up on
your answer to the Chairman on the issue of what you
do when you find a very disturbing image online of a
child who is clearly being abused, and exactly how
you follow that up and gather evidence to an offence
because clearly you do not know where that child is
or where the offender is. It is quite a simple question,
but could you walk the Committee through that so we
could understand your process?
Peter Davies: Nowadays, we get about 1,500 referrals
a month to CEOP, some of which will be the kind of
pictures that you talk about. We open them, record
them, risk assess them within 48 hours and decide
whether, firstly, they portray a child being at risk and,
secondly, what initial investigative steps are required.
I am consciously slipping into my next Committee,
but let me just take the opportunity to tell you how
important it is that there is proper retention of and
access to communications data to enable us to do
that work.
Moving on from that, it depends how difficult it is to
identify the child. I have known of cases—one of
which came to fruition recently—where we tried just
about everything to identify a child. We finally
managed to do it, found the geographic location,
passed the intelligence on to the local police force
who did a really good intervention that safeguarded at
least two or three children and will doubtless result in
some prosecution in the future.
Each image is different. Some of them have been in
circulation for some time, in which case our job is to
know who has already had it. But we keep these
images and we examine them and look at their usage
for any sign—any opportunity to identify the child
depicted. Some of the lengths to which to some of the
team go is quite extraordinary. It is probably not for
the public domain, but if the Committee has an
opportunity to visit, then you will see some of that
for yourselves.
Q33 Nicola Blackwood: Do you think that there is a
need for legislative changes, other than on the
communications data that you already mentioned, in
order to enable you to effectively prosecute in this
area? Are there any gaps?
Peter Davies: If there was one piece of legislation that
would help us, it would be the retention of and access
to communications data on an organised basis.
Anything else is at a long distant second level of
importance. There are some ways in which the
legislation that, for example, enables preventive
orders to be put in place for sex offenders could be
changed, because the current array of opportunities is
not hugely well used and does not always follow the
people who pose the biggest risk. I think the
legislation is pretty adequate for the job; there are not
any glaring gaps. It might be worth looking at whether
we should seek to criminalise what you could call the
written word that is clearly paedophilic and predatory
in nature, in the same way as we criminalise child
abuse imagery and virtual images of children. That is
one area in the online world where the legislation
could be improved but, mark my words, it would be
nothing like as important as making sure that we get
communications data back to identify victims and
offenders, which is currently, to some extent, a lottery.
That is the big game at the moment, and it is really
important to understand the relevance of that to child
protection.
Nicola Blackwood: Okay, thank you.
Chair: I am sure you will continue that at the next
Committee.
Peter Davies: Indeed.
Chair: For which you are very late at the moment.
Peter Davies: Good heavens. So I am.
Q34 Chair: Mr Davies, thank you for coming in.
One final thought, as this inquiry goes on, we are
concerned by the lack of co-ordination and it may well
be that CEOP ends up in the NCA as doing more than
just online protection.
Peter Davies: Yes.
Q35 Chair: We have heard some very good
witnesses throughout this inquiry but it still lacks that
one central point. In a very brief answer, do you think
that is right—that we need to move in this way? We
have 43 forces doing different things, with different
expertise, the Human Trafficking Centre, SOCA doing
its bit or the NCA doing its bit. There you have a
degree of expertise that is unrivalled in your
organisation. Maybe this is the way forward.
Peter Davies: Yes. We already go beyond the online,
and actually group-related child sexual exploitation is
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one of the five priorities for the centre this year.
Whether the national leadership comes through
ACPO, or through a CEOP command with the
National Crime Agency, greater coherence and clearer
leadership are things that would be usefully brought
to bear on the situation. From my point of view, the
NCA and the national coordination tasking model
provides a useful model through which that might be
done.
Chair: Sure. Mr Davies, thank you very much for
coming today.
Peter Davies: My pleasure, thank you very much.
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Nicola Blackwood
Mr James Clappison
Michael Ellis
Dr Julian Huppert
In the absence of the Chair, Mr Winnick was called to the Chair.
________________
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Deputy Assistant Commissioner Martin Hewitt, ACPO e-crime lead, and Deputy Chief
Constable Peter Goodman, regional e-crime lead for East Midlands, gave evidence.
Q368 Chair: Mr Goodman and Mr Hewitt, good
afternoon—I do not think it is quite good evening as
yet. The Chair has had to leave for various reasons,
but we are grateful to you for coming along.
The globalised nature of e-crime is often cited as a
major barrier to identifying those responsible and
bringing them to justice. How are the United Kingdom
police building a relationship with their counterparts
in dealing with what is undoubtedly an international
menace? Would you agree it is an international
menace?
DAC Hewitt: Most definitely. It is fair to say that
trying to ascribe a region around cyber crime is
challenging in itself. You will hear talk about force
level or national level or regional level, and actually
the vast majority is international in its nature in terms
of where the victims are, where the perpetrators are
and where the systems they are using are. Inevitably
we have to find a way of dealing with this in
investigative terms and preventative terms that works
across boundaries.
The Government has ratified the Budapest
Convention, and we are supporting the EU
Cybercrime Centre that is being set up in Europol, but
primarily from our perspective the Police Central e-
Crime Unit, which is the main operational unit that is
hosted currently within the Metropolitan Police, has
developed very strong relationships with most of the
key countries and law enforcement in the key
countries with which we work, and the Crown
Prosecution Service does likewise with the
prosecuting authorities. There are undoubtedly
significant issues because you get into cross-
jurisdictional issues that can be quite challenging for
us. There are, with certain countries, logical levels of
trust issues in terms of how much we are able to share
and how much they will share with us, and it is just
the number of players that can be involved in
operations.
We are working well with others, but there is no doubt
that this is an area where I think globally we need to
move forward in terms of how we allow ourselves to
work across jurisdictions and to gather evidence
quickly, which is one of the biggest issues for us
because generally we would work through the normal
mutual legal assistance process. That can be very slow
in what are often quite fast-moving investigations. It is
about those police-to-police relationships, but I think
Steve McCabe
Bridget Phillipson
Mark Reckless
globally we need to move forward in terms of how
we deal with this challenge.
Q369 Chair: There was an error on my part. I should
have asked you to identify your name, rank and
responsibility.
DAC Hewitt: Sorry.
Chair: No, that is my mistake.
DAC Hewitt: I am Martin Hewitt, Deputy Assistant
Commissioner within the Metropolitan Police Service.
I work within Specialist Crime and Operations and
have the chief officer oversight for the Police Central
e-Crime Unit. I am leading for ACPO on the
migration of the e-Crime Unit into the National
Crime Agency.
DCC Goodman: I am Peter Goodman. I am Deputy
Chief Constable for the East Midlands. I serve the five
forces of the East Midlands around counter-terrorism,
serious and organised crime and major crime. In
relation to cyber-criminality, I have led on the project
to deliver the regional hubs in three locations across
the country, and I am just about to take over the
national cybercrime portfolio that was vacated by
Janet Williams on her retirement.
Q370 Chair: Thank you. Before I ask any further
questions, is there anything you want to add, Mr
Goodman, to what Mr Hewitt has said?
DCC Goodman: No, there is not. We have discussed
beforehand.
Q371 Chair: I see. I will not describe that as a
conspiracy in any way, shape or form. One assumes
that the counterparts to the police in our country are
in the main—I would be surprised otherwise—quite
willing to co-operate in enforcing the law and
bringing the culprits to justice, but are there
difficulties now and again so far with police overseas?
DAC Hewitt: Generally speaking, law enforcement
will be keen to assist but, as I say, you get into those
kinds of jurisdictional challenges. One of the
challenges—and we were just discussing it outside—
is that certainly in most European countries, the
method of investigation is run by an examining
magistrate and somebody judicial, and they find it
quite strange operating with us on a police-to-police
basis. But it is trying to find a way we can operate
within the bounds of our legislation and our
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procedures, and equally, so in a sense the challenges
are no different than they are in any other international
investigation. I think in the cybercrime arena it is
pretty much there in every example, whereas in others
it will be in a few. There is a challenge around how we
equalise processes and allow us particularly to move
evidence quickly from one jurisdiction to another to
move an investigation on.
Q372 Chair: E-crime has come up for obvious
reasons with all the technology involved in bringing
this to the forefront. Would you say that it is going to
increase substantially compared with other forms of
criminal activity?
DAC Hewitt: I would say that it is, largely because
what it is generally doing is either presenting
opportunities for new forms of criminality that can be
very profitable—and for all sorts of other
motivations—or facilitating technology more
generally, and the cyber-environment is facilitating
existing criminality. I think one of the factors that
Government agencies and everyone involved needs to
take in is the speed with which it changes. We have
worked in organised crime and serious crime for many
years, and most other forms of serious crime will
mutate and develop their methodology in relatively
slow time to changes in the environment—to changes
in what we do. In the cyber-world, you are talking
about that happening almost constantly, and so the
people who are out there are trying to find new ways
and trying to overcome the defences that are being put
in place within business and privately. You can only
see that cyber, in its broadest definition, is going to
increase because so much more of our lives are run in
that space.
Q373 Chair: Which inevitably leads to the question
that presumably there will be far more officers trained
to deal with this.
DAC Hewitt: Yes.
Q374 Chair: Mr Goodman, is that your view?
DCC Goodman: Yes, very much so, and some of the
work we have done around the regional hubs
demonstrates the extra value that we can gain as a
consequence of greater understanding, greater
technical skills and also greater investigative
techniques. This is the one area of policing at the
moment where you are likely to have an offence
committed in one part of the world through
technology that is held in another, with a victim in a
third part of the world, and that is an extremely
complex environment, especially, as Martin says,
because it mutates so very quickly from one form to
another.
We are seeing some of the serious and organised crime
partnerships of the past—criminal partnerships—that
are now understanding the profit that can be got from
this, so it is a very complex environment. We in the
police service, together with our partners, need to
make sure that we are understanding how that
changes, understanding the problem and making sure
we understand how we will respond effectively.
Q375 Mr Clappison: Without naming them, are
there any particular countries that you find commonly
tend to be involved in this sort of crime—as the
headquarters for the people who are the brains behind
the crime? Are you completely satisfied, if there are,
with the response you get from Governments there?
DAC Hewitt: There are areas you would tend to see
more criminality emanating from, and there are other
areas where the technology and operating systems
would tend to be. Some of those are challenging. The
other important aspect to remember about cyber,
which again makes it quite different to some other
forms of criminality, is the range of activity that
cybercrime can include. We have tended to be talking
here around the kind of cybercrime for a financial
profit in the fraud sense but, at the other end, you have
cybercrime as hacktivism, as it will be called, and
running up to state-sponsored and terrorism as
delivered by cyber. All that is going on
simultaneously. Another one of the challenges is some
of the key actors in that activity, because of their
technical skill and their knowledge, could be present
in any of those different arenas, which again is quite
different in its makeup to what we would normally be
dealing with in either the terrorist or the crime world.
But there are countries, and they will be fairly
obvious, where there are real challenges with working
with them. As I say, some of our challenge, of course,
is in some environments it is going to be difficult for
us to share information, but we have overcome that in
some instances and we work very closely with a
number of countries. It really is about trying to
generate globally intolerance to this type of
criminality and the willingness for people to share
information and to take part.
Q376 Mark Reckless: Mr Goodman, I understand
you are the ACPO lead on e-crime, and as I
understand it, Mr Hewitt, you are the ACPO lead for
the Police Central e-Crime Unit. Could you explain
your division of responsibilities, the role of the Police
Central e-Crime Unit, and particularly the role of
ACPO in overseeing this area?
Chair: In some respects you have done that, but if
you would give a fuller picture arising from the
question.
DAC Hewitt: When this first emerged as an issue
there was a single ACPO lead, Janet Williams, who I
think has probably given evidence before you in the
past. Janet was part of the original process that led to
the creation of the Police Central e-Crime Unit. PCeU,
as we call it, is the funded team that has grown now to
being over 100 members of staff, that has the primary
investigative capability for tackling high-level cyber-
criminality.
Q377 Mark Reckless: Who does that report to?
DAC Hewitt: That reports ultimately to me within the
Metropolitan Police, because it is hosted in the
Metropolitan Police. We are in a process of transition
at the moment and, ultimately, PCeU will become part
of the National Cyber Crime Unit that will sit within
the NCA when that is created in about a year’s time.
We are in a transition process at the moment and what
will then happen is a cyber-capability will remain,
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obviously, in the Metropolitan Police for dealing with
specific issues there, but the responsibility for being
the top-level investigative capability will transition
across to being within the National Cyber Crime Unit
within the NCA.
I have the operational oversight and also, having been
involved in it for the past two or three years, the lead
for that transition work to make sure that in capability
terms we don’t lose anything at the point when PCeU
transitions into being part of the National Crime
Agency from a national perspective.
DCC Goodman: I have picked up the strategic role
from Janet Williams around the development of cyber-
capability and cyber-responses around the country
within the last three or four days, so I hope you will
be reasonably gentle with me on the basis of that.
That includes the development of the hubs around the
country, their performance and the outcomes that they
achieve. It is about developing a comprehensive
training programme on behalf of the police service—
from executive level right down to first responders—
so that we increase knowledge among the police
establishment. It is about developing the ways and
means to enable communities, businesses and large
enterprise to prevent the commission of offences
against them, which have not been developed in a
comprehensive way before. It is around making sure
that we get our victim engagement right, because there
will be many thousands of victims here who are
looking for a response from us when we have yet to
understand fully what that looks like.
Q378 Mark Reckless: You speak of victim
engagement. We have had some engagement from the
British Retail Consortium, which says that a number
of its members have put an awful lot of work into
preparing cases where they, and potentially other
companies, have been the victims of e-crimes, but
they have then been disappointed that these have not
then been taken forward by the police. Can you offer
them any hope for the future in that area?
DAC Hewitt: I can, I think, but I absolutely recognise
their frustrations at the moment. The challenge that
we are facing is, having got ourselves beginning in
cybercrime and creating the Police Central e-Crime
Unit, we have moved on enormously in terms of our
capability and capacity to deal with things at a higher
level. What we are trying to catch up with now is to
get all the police forces aware of the phenomenon and
capable of dealing with the phenomenon, because
clearly once the Police Central e-Crime Unit
transitions into the National Cyber Unit, there will
have to be a threshold around the level of
investigation that they undertake. The work that Peter
referred to in terms of mainstream understanding,
knowledge and capability around the country and in
terms of training people up to have a capability and
having the hubs is all designed to allow us to be able
to investigate crimes at a lower level more generally.
The goal in cyber has to be around prevention activity
and developing prevention activity. I know it is often
rolled out, but it is the simplest image to use: we have
to get to a point where we, as citizens, organisations
and businesses, are not, effectively, leaving the
windows and the doors open when we leave the office
or when we leave the house. We have to start working
much more collaboratively with business, industry
and other Government agencies to make sure that
everybody out there has the best information about
protecting themselves in the first instance. Then we
need to increase our capability to be able to
investigate when a crime does occur. I know it is in
some of the written evidence that you have already
received, but the latest GCHQ assessment was that
80% of the criminality that was reported could be
prevented with relatively straightforward security
measures being taken, either by the individual or by
the organisation. I think collaboratively we have to
work much more closely together. We undoubtedly
have to develop our ability to investigate lower level
crimes.
Of course, there is another important difference,
which is if someone’s house is burgled, there may well
be other burglaries that have taken place, but that is
essentially an individual crime that the police will go
along and investigate. If someone has a relatively low-
level cyber attack that steals some money out of their
bank account, steals their identity or whatever, the
chances are that they are going to be one of many,
many victims, because that is the nature of the
criminality. We need to be working at understanding
that picture and then getting up that chain to start
being able to do the disruption and the prevention
higher up.
Chair: We have a bit of a problem—for my
colleagues, and also for Mr Goodman and Mr
Hewitt—that I think we are going to be deserted in
this Committee if we go on beyond 5 pm. So I am
keeping an eye on the clock and keeping an eye on
the questions and the answers. They are very
informative, but we have to make some progress.
Q379 Mark Reckless: Just very quickly, the Home
Office tells us that it is planning to have changes in
how e-crime is recorded. Do you know when that is
going to come in? Is that going to help you in your
work? It may be an extra bureaucracy for officers
locally to have to do that.
DAC Hewitt: The view is around changing some of
the recording. As it says in the evidence there from
the Home Office, there is no such thing as a
cybercrime on the current recording system. We need
to be very careful that we are answering the right
question, because for me this is not about how many
are we recording. A harassment, a theft or a fraud is
still a harassment, a theft or a fraud, whether that is
delivered through a cyber platform or not. The more
important point for me is for us to be able to have
information that allows us to understand the nature of
those attacks and where they are coming from, and
then allows us to work out what we can do to deal
with them at that high level to prevent them
happening.
Q380 Dr Huppert: Presumably in order to allocate
your resources effectively, you have to know how
these crimes are being committed. Do you have
enough information? Would you want to see the
modus operandi of a crime always recorded with the
offence so that you know exactly what is e-crime that
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you can tackle and what is not, and how you should
allocate those resources?
DAC Hewitt: The more information we have the
better. Recording the method relies on a level of
knowledge within the victim and a level of knowledge
within the person who is receiving the report to do
that effectively, but I think we are trying to get
towards that. The key issue for me is using as many
reporting mechanisms as possible, so some of this will
come through crime reporting and some of it needs
to come through our relationship with business and
industry who are informing us of attacks that they
have fallen prey to or that they have successfully
prevented, and then it is building as much information
as we possibly can about the methodology, who the
victims are and the nature of the information, because
it is normally data that people are trying to get to in
the first instance. All that allows us then to work again
with partners, both public and private sector, to
identify the way that you can either block that
methodology or tackle or investigate. The more
information the better, but I don’t think necessarily
the answer is going to be just having more expansive
MO submissions on the crime reports.
DCC Goodman: Just to add on the back of that, it is
interesting that we talk about crime recording and, of
course, we ought to move to a process where,
wherever possible, we understand the part that cyber
has played in a particular type of criminality. One of
the big stumbling blocks to that is that often the
victims of that cyber-criminality won’t know—and
they certainly won’t know—the detail of what has
been committed against them. A victim of a dwelling-
house burglary will tell you they came in through the
front transom window and they stole the video
recorder from the lounge and they went out via the
front door. It is very difficult for a victim, even if they
discover it, to understand how £200 has gone missing
from their personal account, so it is not without
complexity.
Q381 Dr Huppert: Let me come back to the issue of
resources but just pick up on this issue about the
victims. As I understand it, you currently have the
Police Central e-Crime Unit, SOCA and CEOP, and
you have the City of London Police, which has a role
on internet-enabled fraud. If I am victim, who do I go
to? Do you seamlessly pass people from one group to
another, or are there silos, as happens in most other
areas?
DAC Hewitt: In the first instance you would go to
your local police force. The process, as you will be
aware I am sure, with Action Fraud, which sits within
the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, is developing
a process to take some of the cyber reports as well to
try to build the picture.
Q382 Dr Huppert: Do you think that is working, by
the way?
DAC Hewitt: I think it is a start, and we need to get
to a point where we can get a bigger picture of what
is going on. I think the system at Action Fraud is not
designed to give the real granularity of detail about
individual offences, but what it can be, hopefully, in
the future is part of the broader picture of the
offending type. Do we pass a victim seamlessly?
Sadly, probably the answer to that would be no, but
that is the work that Peter is doing around information
for officers. Now cyber-awareness will form part of
pretty much every basic and advanced investigative
course that police officers do. There is a whole range
of electronically delivered awareness training. It is all
about building that picture up and then being able to,
I think most importantly, give a victim a very honest
picture of what that experience is going to be and what
they are going to get as a result of reporting that
crime, but it is not seamless at the moment.
Q383 Dr Huppert: I think we will be making some
suggestions about that. Can I come back to the money
issue? In the whole National Cyber Security
Programme, I think 10% of the money—£63
million—is given to the Home Office to tackle e-
crime. Do you think that is the right balance in terms
of the whole National Cyber Security Programme, and
what are your priorities for spending that £63 million?
Chair: I think that Mr Goodman is suggesting that is
a lead question for you, Mr Hewitt.
DAC Hewitt: Coming from pretty much a standing
start, that was probably the right sort of allocation of
money to allow us to develop and understand the
capability we needed to develop, and then the
capacity. A large part of that money has gone to
creating the Police Central e-Crime Unit and
developing that capability and capacity. We have the
three regional hubs now up and running. It is about all
the development of the training to mainstream cyber-
understanding as part of law enforcement training for
anybody who works within law enforcement. We have
high-level accredited training. We have started to try
to understand how we manage digital forensic
processes as well. One of the challenges you have at
the moment—unlike when I was originally going in
and searching people’s houses when I arrested them—
is when you walk into someone’s house, there will be
probably five or six electronic devices that are
essentially computers. It is how we understand and
how we better triage what we submit for forensic
examination, because otherwise the system gets
clogged with what questions we are asking the
providers to give us. It is work around forensic, work
around crime reporting and work to try to develop the
virtual taskforce working with business and industry,
but the significant point for me is we cannot solve this
issue as law enforcement. This will only be solved by
Government, law enforcement and other agencies all
bringing to bear their abilities and then working with
business and industry.
Chair: I think that is a very valid point indeed, and I
am glad you have mentioned and emphasised that.
Q384 Dr Huppert: One last very quick question. We
have talked a lot about resources and setting up the
infrastructure. Are there any legal powers that you
need, or any legislative changes that would make a
difference, or is it largely about resources and
training?
DAC Hewitt: There is work under way to review the
Computer Misuse Act, which I would say is not fit for
purpose now. It is a fairly old piece of legislation, and,
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as we said, this is changing very quickly, so that work
is under way as a review.
Q385 Dr Huppert: That is the main one.
DAC Hewitt: Yes, from my perspective.
Q386 Steve McCabe: Mr Hewitt, I understand that
the Cyber Security Strategy requires you to
mainstream cyber-awareness and skills through the
police service. How do you measure your success in
doing that?
DAC Hewitt: In the first instance, the reality is you
measure it by the output and the delivery, and, as I
said, we have a programme now that takes you right
from being newly appointed and from being a trained
police officer through all the investigative stages that
a person would go through in their career, with cyber
being part of that, right up to the training for very
senior officers. In the first instance, it is going to be
about measuring the fact that we have created those
programmes and that they are being delivered and
everyone is undertaking them. As we move forward,
the measure will be whether we are more effectively
dealing with the issue and, as was previously asked,
whether, when someone walks in and report a
cybercrime, we are dealing better with that than we
currently do.
Q387 Steve McCabe: Mr Goodman, you have
mentioned the regional e-crime hubs. Just succinctly,
what are the goals of e-crime hubs?
DCC Goodman: They set out to achieve three main
goals. One was to increase the strategic capability we
have across the country because there was no real
accredited capability developed outside London
before they were delivered. We now have that in three
locations—in the East Midlands, in the North West
and in the Yorkshire and Humber region—but they
don’t just service those regions. They service the
entirety of the country in a very strong partnership
with the Police e-Crime Unit. Secondly, it was to start
to develop some of that tactical awareness among
officers around victim care and around the
methodology that they can adopt. Thirdly, it is very
much around raising awareness, not just within the
law enforcement community but among broader
communities of the prospect of cyber-criminality and
the means of preventing some of that taking place.
Steve McCabe: That is lovely. Thank you very much.
Q388 Mr Clappison: On the definition of e-crime,
do you think that crimes that use the internet only for
organisation or communication—other types of crime
that is—be categorised as a type of e-crime, or do you
think that just conflates the issue?
DAC Hewitt: My take on this is we are in danger of
asking the wrong question. The reality is, as I think I
said in one of the earlier answers, that there is going
to come a point where almost every crime that takes
place has some involvement of some form, and I
wonder what we achieve by doing it. I would rather
get us to a point where we understand the impact of
technology on crime, whether it is what I would call
a pure cyber right down to, “I used my device to
facilitate it”, and then we understand what it is we
need to do to deal with that—either to prevent it or to
detect it. The danger is that we go down a route of
wanting to define things when, quite frankly, the
criminals out there are not thinking about that. They
are just using whatever method is the most convenient
to do the crime.
Mr Clappison: That is very helpful. Thank you.
Chair: Gentlemen, undoubtedly there will be further
sessions, and we will be calling other witnesses. It
may well be the Committee, or the Chair in
particular—who, as I have said, is not able to be
here—will want to write to you and ask further
questions, but we are most grateful to you for coming
today. It is a new field for us—perhaps more of a new
field for us than it is for you—but it is one which
certainly this Home Affairs Committee is going to
explore, hence the reason we were very pleased you
were able to give evidence today. Thank you very
much indeed.
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Examination of Witness
Witness: Commissioner Adrian Leppard, City of London Police, gave evidence.
Q57 Chair: Mr Leppard, thank you very much for
coming in. Apologies for keeping you waiting.
Commissioner Leppard: Thank you, Chairman.
Chair: As you know, the Committee is conducting an
inquiry into e-crime, and we are hearing from a
number of stakeholders. You obviously have the lead
in respect of this area. How big is the team that you
have working with you, and where are you based at
the moment?
Commissioner Leppard: City of London Police has
about 13,0001 people altogether. About 250 people
specialise in fraud and economic crime, and the roles
we have are dedicated fraud investigation teams, but
for this meeting in particular, we also host the
National Fraud Intelligence Database, the one single
repository of all reported crime intelligence from the
police, members of the public and the private sector.
Q58 Chair: Will you be keeping that under the New
Landscape of Policing?
Commissioner Leppard: Yes.
Chair: Why?
Commissioner Leppard: Because we have effectively
built very good relationships with the private sector,
and personal data-sharing relationships. We have
highly skilled officers. We have a good track record
of taking cases to court, and in the discussions we
have had with the National Crime Agency, there is
nobody who can see any benefit that we would gain
by moving any of that to another agency. It would
not increase efficiency or effectiveness, and it would
cost more.
Q59 Chair: It is interesting because, of course, the
Committee is concerned about New Landscape of
Policing, which has not been completed; it is an
unfinished masterpiece of the Home Secretary’s. We
were concerned about the very same arguments you
have just mentioned. As far as CEOP was concerned,
the previous director of CEOP made the same
arguments that you have made—that, “It is better
outside because we have relationships with the private
sector and we want to continue with it”, but CEOP
was included in the National Crime Agency.
Everything else to do with e-crime is going to be in
the NCA. That is right, is it not? Would it not have
been sensible to put them all together? Either give that
1 Note by witness: The Commissioner actually said £1,300
during the session, however after checking figures £1,100
would be a more accurate figure.
Bridget Phillipson
Mark Reckless
Karl Turner
Mr David Winnick
function to you and the City of London Police or take
your functions and put them in as part of the NCA?
Commissioner Leppard: It is absolutely sensible to
have the debate, and I think what we focused on is,
where is the added value? Where is the added benefit?
Q60 Chair: Sure. But the debate is over because the
decision has been made already.
Commissioner Leppard: It has. If I may, Chair, as you
know, under the National Crime Agency there are four
commands. Three of them—CEOP, Organised Crime
and Border Police Force—all have their own assets
and agencies. There is a body there. Economic crime
does not, and we will represent policing. Of course
there are many other agencies, like the Serious Fraud
Office, the Office of Fair Trading and many other
agencies that all have to work together, and the
challenge of that particular command will be to get
the best benefit.
Q61 Chair: Is there an argument to give it all to you,
since you are doing such a good job? We will examine
your job in a second, but since you appear to be doing
such a good job, is it not better to have one function,
the e-crime function, in the City of London, where
you have your specialists, rather than have them put
into the NCA, which is at the moment, as I have
said, incomplete?
Commissioner Leppard: Chair, I do not agree with
that, no. I think the way it functions at the moment,
with us representing policing, one part of the agency
under the economic crime command, and hosting the
intelligence function, and then working very closely
to the strategic priorities of the National Crime
Agency, is probably the most effective way to work.
Q62 Chair: Let us turn to some of the results. The
British retailers have said that online internet crime
reached £205 million last year, and the global
economy loses about £114 billion due to online crime.
Are we winning? You have heard the argument, “Are
we winning the war on drugs?” There are different
arguments on that. But, as far as e-crime is concerned,
are we winning this battle? Almost every week we
have another example of somebody breaking in. The
Home Office website was the last time somebody
broke into something official. Who are these people
who keep, in effect, running rings around some of the
best police officers in the country?
Commissioner Leppard: The direct answer to your
question is we are not winning. I do not think we are
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winning globally, and I think this nature of crime is
rising exponentially, which is clearly why you are here
and asking these questions today. As a country, we are
as far advanced as any other European country, and
indeed anywhere else in the world, but we are new in
our development. I am sure you have heard evidence
already from the cyber crime strategy, the new money
and development. This Government has put a focus
on economic crime. We have a focus on cyber. Many
other countries have not, but we do have to bring all
that together, and that will take a couple of years.
I have many facts and figures, which I can give you,
about the nature of the scale of the threat, in terms of
cyber and organised crime.
Q63 Chair: Yes, we are coming on to some of that.
In terms of identifying countries, is there a particular
country or group of countries where, when you arrive
in the morning at City of London Police, you say, “My
goodness, there is something else coming from this
country. They obviously have the expertise to try to
challenge what we are doing”?
Commissioner Leppard: There are countries in terms
of the nature of the threat we are facing.
Q64 Chair: Could you give us an example?
Commissioner Leppard: To give you the nature of the
threat that we know in the National Fraud Intelligence
Bureau, we map organised crime groups and we know
that about 1,300 of those groups are doing nothing
but fraud as their main means of gaining money, as a
criminal enterprise. A good 25% of them are using
cyber as their main means—in other words, internet-
enabled criminality. The work we have done to
identify countries shows that about 25 countries
predominantly target the UK.
Q65 Chair: Give me the top five.
Commissioner Leppard: The top five are mainly
eastern European, and Russia is another country that
we know hosts some of the criminality. That is not the
Russian Government, but the criminality is hosted in
that country.
Q66 Chair: In terms of the eastern European
countries?
Commissioner Leppard: We have countries, such as
Romania and others, which we are working with. With
all these countries we are working with the law
enforcement agencies, but I am trying to give
Members of the Committee a picture of the nature of
the criminality.
Q67 Chair: Sure, absolutely. You are obviously
creating partnerships with the law enforcement
agencies in those countries, to try to challenge the
criminal elements from Russia and eastern Europe
who seek to attack us through cyberspace.
Commissioner Leppard: Yes. Two challenges are
really important for us. One is about how we deal with
prevention. The other is in terms of cyber crime. By
“cyber crime” I mean not just the technical attack but
the fact that internet enabling is allowing a lot of fraud
to be perpetrated across borders. A big challenge for
us as a country is understanding the international
threat and what the UK Government can do, with law
enforcement, to try to gauge more effectively in other
countries to combat that threat.
Q68 Chair: I was in Washington in the summer, and
in the meetings that I had one was specifically about
cyber crime and e-crime. The Americans certainly
seemed to be very worried, and President Obama
seems to be extremely worried, about this type of
crime. Are the Americans working with us on things?
Are they more advanced than we are? Do they have
more resources? Are they more likely to be under
attack than we are?
Commissioner Leppard: I think all of those things,
Chairman. They have more resources. They are likely
to get more attacked because of the nature of the scale
of the business they have. In terms of the specialisms,
we share a lot of knowledge.
You will hear from Charlie McMurdie from the Police
e-Crime Unit that we have as much knowledge
through SOCA and the Police e-Crime Unit as any
other country has. But they are right to be worried
about the scale of the threat, and you have heard from
the British Retail Consortium. I think they have shown
something like a 30% increase in online fraud attacks
in the last year alone. This is a very worrying
criminal trend.
Q69 Steve McCabe: Mr Leppard, one of the
Government’s cyber security goals is to mainstream
the capacity of police forces and law enforcement
agencies to deal with e-crime or cyber security issues.
How well are we doing in pursuit of that goal?
Commissioner Leppard: As you will hear from
Charlie McMurdie, the Police e-Crime Unit, which
has been leading on that, has been doing a good job
to take training into police forces, right down to the
beat officer level, to increase a better level of
awareness, and there is certainly a marked difference.
We have our own training capacity. We have an
academy, and we train investigators in how to use the
internet. If you said where we were two years ago to
where we are, there is a marked difference in skills—
not just of specialist fraud investigators, but all
different types of roles within policing. Of course,
there is still a journey to go, but we are certainly on
that journey.
Q70 Steve McCabe: Are there any areas that cause
you particular concern or that you would want to draw
the Committee’s attention to?
Commissioner Leppard: My area of special expertise
is around economic crime and fraud but, as I have
said, 50% of that is now being enabled through the
internet. My concern, when I look across the country,
in terms of fraud expertise, is that we know that the
number of dedicated fraud investigators in policing is
reducing. We anticipate it will reduce by 25% over
the CSR period. There are only about 600 dedicated
fraud investigators in British policing and we have
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2002 of those, so the real worry is that, at a time
when fraud and e-crime is going up, the capability of
the country is going down.
I have had discussions with the Home Office about
creating a new national capability for economic crime
that would support specialist agencies, like the PCeU,
that will be dedicated fraud investigators. The Home
Office have been very supportive of that, and I am
looking at that funding proposal now.
Steve McCabe: Thank you very much.
Q71 Karl Turner: Clearly, victims of online fraud
suffer real harm—psychological harm, among other
things. What is your view of sentences? Are they
currently too lenient or about right? What is your
opinion?
Commissioner Leppard: It would probably be
inappropriate for me to comment on sentencing. Each
case is utterly different, and the judicial guidelines are
that each case will be considered on its own merits
and the level of harm, and I know judges do give
consideration to that harm.
If I may endorse your point, one of the biggest frauds
that we experience on the internet is called mass
marketing—that is, the selling of online shares. Some
50% of the victims of that—and it is a £3.5 billion
loss—are over 65. The average loss of those people is
£25,000. That is a significant loss to the most
vulnerable people in our society. The only comment I
would make is that I would hope, like you, that due
consideration is given in sentencing to the harm that
victims are experiencing.
Q72 Karl Turner: What is your opinion, though,
Commissioner? You have experience in seeing cases
dealt with in criminal courts. Do you believe that the
judgment of the court, the sentence passed down by
the judge, reflects the psychological harm done to its
victims or not? Please say yes or no. Do you think it
does or it doesn’t?
Commissioner Leppard: In some cases it does, but in
some cases it doesn’t.
Q73 Dr Huppert: Commissioner, can I follow on
from some of the direction of that question, and ask
about how you deal with the victims of online fraud?
Certainly, when I have had constituents concerned
about this, the sense is that the bank requires them to
prove that they were the victims of fraud, rather than
regulations protecting them. What is your assessment
of that balance? Is the protection the right way round?
Commissioner Leppard: There are two questions
there. If I come back to the regulations, which I think
are good and sound in this country, if we can get a
victim through into Action Fraud, which will be the
central reporting for all fraud and cyber crime in this
country—as I am sure Members know, Action Fraud
is the core central web centre, basically, that comes
into the NFIB, the City of London Police—we then
2 Note by witness: A review of national police fraud squad
resources undertaken in Summer 2011, established that
approx 650 staff investigated fraud, of which approx 190
were from the City of London Police. These are in addition
to the 200 City Police resources as stated initially.
have a very extensive engagement with them,
supported by the Victim Support Scheme.
We monitor their satisfaction about how they have
been treated as a victim, and the percentage levels of
satisfaction range between 90% and 95% of victims.
That is them saying, “We were satisfied with how we
were dealt with”. The issue is whether we can get
enough knowledge that people need to report in the
first instance, and that is a constant battle to get public
awareness into that. I am very comfortable that, once
they are in the system, we do the best possible job
to represent their interests, look after them and keep
them informed.
In terms of the bank’s role—you asked me specifically
about regulation—I do think we have a very good
regulation system in this country. There is always a
challenge about whether the banks themselves and
different banks are complying with all the regulations,
and that is always the issue in terms of enforcement—
that is probably a question better given to the
Financial Services Authority, in terms of how they
comply—but I think we have a good and effective
regulatory system.
Q74 Dr Huppert: What steps do you take to make
people aware that they ought to be reporting?
Particularly for people who are not that digitally
literate, who will still, nonetheless, use online banking
and things like that.
Commissioner Leppard: I did say at the beginning, as
well, that there are two issues. One is about prevention
and the international dimension, but there is a big
challenge for us. Knowing the nature of the threat at
the moment, knowing it is reaching into every aspect
of society, we must put a lot of energy into our public
campaigning, and that is not just prevention.
There is some great work going on under the Cyber
Security Strategy, very effective work in prevention.
The National Fraud Authority has put on a great
campaign on Facebook—you may have seen it—“The
Devil’s in your Details”. If you have not seen it, I
suggest you do. It is a great way of helping people
realise what we need to do. But, as you say, if I speak
to an average member of the public and say, “Have
you heard of Action Fraud?” they will say no, often,
until they then want to know, “How do I report my
fraud?” If they have not gone on the internet, how do
they find that? It is a challenge we have, and I accept
that challenge. We do have to push that out in better
campaigning and much more public messaging about
it.
Q75 Mark Reckless: Commissioner, what role do
you see for public awareness campaigns in tackling
fraud?
Commissioner Leppard: We have to put a huge
amount of energy into this for the future. We need to
stop thinking about fraud and cyber crime as
something that perhaps only affects a smaller part of
our population. It is affecting everybody. The second
highest reporting coming into Action Fraud is online
shopping, and it is in every community now.
Yes, we have to do prevention with the private sector.
The biggest payback for us as a country is working
with the private sector. I would like to see more
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campaigns similar to those on television that you
might have seen, with drink-driving or road safety,
and more investment from the Home Office and other
agencies with cyber security—perhaps through the
Cabinet Office money—to focus into segments of
society.
It is a fairly long answer but, if I may, the National
Fraud Authority does some excellent work at
segmenting victims of frauds and cyber, and the
campaigns are targeting different groups in our
society. We need to put more energy into that, I think.
Q76 Mark Reckless: When you say “working with
the private sector”, do you see that as distinct from a
general public awareness campaign?
Commissioner Leppard: The private sector has as
much interest as us in trying to reduce cyber crime
and fraud commercially. You will be aware that we
have done a lot of work with different sectors—the
insurance sector and the banking sector—to start
finding ways in which they can fund some policing
activities. There must be ways we can be innovative
with the public sector so that they can help, perhaps,
in some of the public messaging that we are going to
do, particularly in relation to funding some of that.
Q77 Mark Reckless: If you had to choose between
more money for your team of officers enforcing on
these issues versus money for public awareness
campaigns, which would it be?
Commissioner Leppard: You would have to take a
balance on that. The primary mission that I stand for
is to protect the citizens of this country and, if I
believed public messaging would protect more
defrauded victims, then that is where the money
should go.
Mark Reckless: Thank you.
Q78 Chair: There was an attack on the Home
Secretary’s constituency website and the Home Office
website earlier this year by an anonymous cyber
criminal. What sanctions will he or she face, once he
or she goes through the system? Will it be jail? Will
there be a fine?
Commissioner Leppard: Firstly, you need to know
what offence they have committed.
Q79 Chair: But he has obviously committed some
offence, if he has been arrested and charged, has he
not?
Commissioner Leppard: There will be either the
Computer Misuse Act or the Fraud Act; they are the
two main Acts. When that person goes to court, they
will be charged, clearly, and there will be a hearing,
either summary or it will be at the Crown Court, and
the sentencing would be dependent on the sentencing
guidelines of the country.
Q80 Chair: What are they, roughly?
Commissioner Leppard: Each case, as you are
probably aware—
Q81 Chair: What is the maximum for something of
this kind, depending on what they are charged with?
Commissioner Leppard: It depends on whether it is
an indictable offence or not, but you can get up to
eight to 10 years for a fraudulent offence. You can get
the same for computer misuse. It is unlikely to be
anything more than that.
Q82 Chair: Al-Qaeda has advocated a cyber jihad.
Have you heard about this?
Commissioner Leppard: The threat from cyber and
terrorism is something we have been working on with
Government, GCHQ and other agencies, for many,
many years, certainly.
Q83 Chair: Do they engage in e-fraud activities, as
far as you are aware, or do they just try to disrupt
existing websites?
Commissioner Leppard: No, there is plenty of
evidence to show that some of the financing for
terrorist activities worldwide will use fraud as a means
of gathering money.
Q84 Chair: Does that apply to al-Qaeda as well?
Commissioner Leppard: It does, yes.
Q85 Chair: How would you seek to disrupt that?
Commissioner Leppard: We do seek to disrupt that
now. In terms of other agency responses—MI6, MI5,
GCHQ—all have some of the new cyber money, and
all are taking actions to disrupt and protect UK
citizens in that sense. Where a crime is committed,
either the PCeU department behind me, Charlie or
ourselves will work with those agencies.
Q86 Chair: As far as al-Qaeda is concerned, is there
a country that it emerges from in terms of these cyber
attacks? Is there an area of the world that you look to
and think, “That is the country”?
Commissioner Leppard: I am not able to answer that
question; I do not have enough knowledge to. There
may be others who can answer that, and I am happy
to write to the Committee later if you wish.3
Q87 Chair: Please, that would be very helpful. One
final question, Commissioner, on the issue of
changing the law. If there is one thing you would like
this Committee to do in its recommendations—we
have just started this inquiry, obviously—what would
it be? One thing to make your life easier, to make it
easier for you to be able to do your job.
Commissioner Leppard: In terms of legislation, I
know there is already a review of the Computer
Misuse Act going on, and I think we need to look
carefully at that to make sure it is fit for purpose. If I
give you an example of that, the biggest threat we
face in fraud is information data leaving either
individuals or businesses. That is the way we are
going to prevent fraud. If information is taken on a
3 Note by witness: I have made some enquiries, with my own
staff, and with other intelligence agencies, and it is clear that,
due to the sensitive nature of the information, I am unable
to provide a detailed written answer. The owners of this
information are the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC),
and I have been advised that the Home Affairs Select
Committee has a process by which it can speak with
representatives from JTAC, and that this would be the most
effective rote by which to obtain this information.
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USB stick out of a business, is that an offence under
the Computer Misuse Act? Only if you can then prove
what it is going to be used for? We need to look
carefully at that against the nature of the threat we are
facing, to say, “Is it still fit for purpose, or should we
review it?”
Chair: We will certainly look at that. Can I take this
opportunity to thank you and your team for the work
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Detective Chief Superintendent Charlie McMurdie, Head of the Police Central e-Crime Unit,
and Andy Archibald, Deputy Director, Cyber and Forensics, Serious Organised Crime Agency, gave evidence.
Q88 Chair: Ms McMurdie, Mr Archibald, you are
very welcome. The Chair has to go to the Liaison
Committee and that is why he has had to leave. Could
I begin by asking both of you how you are measuring
whether or not skill levels are improving in terms of
tackling this problem?
DCS McMurdie: Do you want me to start, Chair? I
am Charlie McMurdie, Head of the Police Central e-
Crime Unit, and also responsible for the National e-
Crime Programme Delivery Team, which is the piece
of business that looks at skilling up law enforcement
capability. One of those programmes is to improve
mainstream law enforcement cyber capability. In
relation to the current skill set, we conducted a
training needs analysis, looking at the requirement
within law enforcement. Part of that ties in with the
strategic policing requirement, which has been
ongoing. That now includes a cyber aspect to that
requirement among forces.
To be fair, I think we found there was a particular
dearth in cyber capability currently within law
enforcement, and that cyber or the use of technology
is an integral part to virtually every aspect of our
policing response. With that in mind, a number of
programmes were initiated. If I look at those in two
different camps: one was a large piece of work with
Skills for Justice to map out the competencies and the
national occupational standards that law enforcement
should have around cyber capability.
The other piece of work that we are doing is to build
and embed cyber training programmes within all the
current mainstream police training courses in forces.
From day one, when you join as a police officer, you
will have a cyber component. Those courses are
ongoing. They are being built, and we are looking at
the first two main courses being rolled out in March
next year that will focus on primarily open-source
intelligence, but also the training course and
awareness package for senior officers. The other
courses are being built as we speak to go into the
investigation process.
Q89 Chair: Thank you. Mr Archibald?
Andy Archibald: At the Serious Organised Crime
Agency, we have a similar process in place at the
minute. The challenge is very much that we have an
existing workforce and investigators whose skills are
very much in investigating in a traditional sense.
There have been changes in the use of the internet in
recent years, and as that has accelerated the skill sets
that you do? In some ways it has taken us a long time
to get to this inquiry, but I know you all have been
working very hard on this area, and we are very
grateful. Please pass on my thanks, and those of the
Committee, to all the officers in your team.
In the absence of the Chair, Steve McCabe was
called to the Chair.
to carry out investigations are very different, so we
recognise that and we are addressing that in a range
of ways. Initially, there is a basic foundation level of
training required for all staff. We are accommodating
that through some e-learning, which is accompanied
by doing some testing of the learning to ensure that
some of the messages have got through.
However, we recognise that different levels of skills
will be required, to investigate from a foundation level
to a cadre of staff who have more advanced skills and
more capability, so we are focusing on a smaller
number who have some greater skills in this area.
Lastly, to develop or to identify some people with a
particular aptitude for developing skills in this area to
quite an advanced stage, so we have three levels there.
We are also working with partner agencies. We have
gone through some of this transition, particularly
around GCHQ. We are listening to their experiences,
learning from what they have gone through, and we
are about to get some support from them in relation
to some of the more technical aspects about how we
also incorporate that into our training.
Q90 Chair: Thank you. What of the future? Can we
anticipate something like the equivalent of a digital
scenes of crime officer?
DCS McMurdie: I think that is a real opportunity, and
that is another area that we are doing some work
around to skill up front-line officers around search,
seizure and retrieval of digital material. That is one of
the competencies and one of the training packages that
we are building. That obviously ties in with enabling
those staff, not with just the right knowledge, but with
the right tools to ensure that we are doing a
proportionate seizure when they go out to these
investigations, reducing the amount of material that
we are bringing in. We are looking at the opportunity
for bespoke—as we use at the moment—scenes of
crimes officers, so a higher level of search and seizure
capability from that front-line member of staff.
Chair: Thank you.
Andy Archibald: If I could add, likewise we have
identified within our organisation a number of
individuals with particular skills and trained them as
digital forensics officers, so in terms of the seizure
and the initial forensic examination, they are skilled
and have developed skills in that area. Equally, there
is a saving in terms of how we secure those services.
We have previously outsourced some of that work. We
are now able to bring that in-house, and we have seen
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some successes as a result of doing that internally,
rather than outsourcing.
Q91 Dr Huppert: International co-operation is a key
part of all this, and presumably you both have key
operational relationships with European counterparts,
for example. To what extent are those underpinned by
the existing EU justice and home affairs measures,
and which ones are you most reliant on? Whichever
of you wishes to answer.
Andy Archibald: In relation to the threat that we face
from cyber crime, clearly it is a global threat and
international partnerships are pivotal. We have
relationships in a number of areas internationally—
with Interpol, with Europol, with the Commonwealth
Cyber Initiative—and we have liaison officers in some
key locations overseas.
In relation to the EU, we have a member of staff with
a cyber skill background embedded in the
development of the European Cybercrime Centre,
which will go live in January. We want to influence
the direction and the vision for that unit to ensure it
complements the UK approach. We have someone
there and we want to ensure that those countries that
would benefit from some capacity building—I do not
know if I am heading in the right direction with this.
Q92 Dr Huppert: As you will know, the
Government is considering whether to opt out of all
of the Justice and Home Affairs measures. I think
there are 134 of them. It would be interesting to know
which ones you make use of and would want to see
us stay within.
Andy Archibald: We make use of Europol and we
make use of Eurojust. I think the issue of—
Q93 Dr Huppert: Are those the only ones?
Andy Archibald: In terms of cyber, those are the main
ones that certainly we make use of at the minute. We
have quite an extensive international network. In
terms of Europol, the Euro Cybercrime Unit and
Eurojust are particular initiatives that we are involved
in and are engaged with on a frequent basis, and we
have staff there to influence that.
Q94 Dr Huppert: Detective Superintendent?
DCS McMurdie: From our perspective, we do a load
of fast-time international working operationally, but
then we have the strategic sharing and engagement
that takes place. From our perspective, a lot of our
joint operations that we have currently running with
numerous countries or working together are funded
under the JIT programme, and a lot of the work
around research and data sharing and co-ordination
of international investigations is managed and funded
within Europol, so there is a potential impact that we
would see there.
Q95 Dr Huppert: I would be grateful if you could
write with a full list of any others that you do use,
even occasionally. You do not have to list them all
now, but I would be grateful if you could do that.
Can I also just ask about cloud computing services?
That is posing a number of new challenges. How do
you interact with the various cloud computing
services, particularly the ones based overseas? Do you
work through the providers? Do you work through
UK courts or overseas courts? What are your routes?
DCS McMurdie: All the above. Every investigation
that we touch has either suspects, infrastructure or
victims, somewhere in the world or everywhere in the
world. The opportunity to capture fast-time, network
traffic, attacks, victim data off cloud services,
wherever those servers may be, anywhere in the
world.
Normally the way that we will work that would be
with parallel investigations, fast-time setting up,
wherever the actual data or the server manages to
exist. We will run a parallel investigation with that
country, get the data preservation in place, share fast-
time intelligence and then follow up through the
MLAT process. One of the issues around that is the
timeliness of the response and the volumes of data
that we are looking for, and then the legislation for
that country to be able to approach the service
provider to get the data on our behalf or for them to
progress that.
Q96 Dr Huppert: Do you find the MLAT process
satisfactory, or does it need to be improved?
Andy Archibald: It is very slow, and often, as Charlie
described, the police response and engagement
bilaterally is much more efficient and faster.
A couple of points around that, if I may, that I think
would help. In terms of securing that information
when it is cloud computing, we use the existing
legislation that serves the Serious Organised Crime
and Police Act, and we can go through the process to
secure that information there. Where MLAT exists in
terms of an evidential chain, it is right that we can use
that. Of course there are hard-to-reach countries and
we do not have those arrangements there. That makes
it more challenging with a country with whom we do
not have those arrangements, and often we will find
that it is those countries where we have to try to
penetrate to get the information.
Q97 Dr Huppert: We have MLATs with most
countries, I believe.
Andy Archibald: Most, yes.
Q98 Dr Huppert: So there is just a small list of them
that are particularly problematic.
DCS McMurdie: The issue with the MLAT is it is
extremely slow; we are talking about months to obtain
that data. We cannot wait months if somebody is
under attack or that data has been compromised and
is being used for mass fraud, for example. Also, the
MLAT process for mainstream police investigations,
looking away from pure cyber, whether it is online
bullying, whether it is the use of technology to
commit any type of offence, low-level type of offence,
that data may sit anywhere in the world. Local forces
do not have the resources to go through the MLAT
process, and certainly the Crown Prosecution Service
does not have the resources to deal with that volume
of requests.
Q99 Dr Huppert: It sounds like the MLAT process
could be tweaked. Are there any other key challenges
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you have with operating with overseas counterparts?
Are there any other suggestions on how to overcome
those? If not, that is—
Andy Archibald: We are developing our approach
internationally. It is a real challenge because of the
nature of this particular threat. Those relationships
have to be worked at and worked at hard. We need to
identify those countries that have the greatest impact
on the UK, and how we can leverage some assistance
or some co-operation from them. That is about
identifying where we can put our resources to
achieve that.
For example, in the earlier session, you had mention
of the US experience, and certainly some of the work
around academia, around partnership working with
industry, around law enforcement all coming together,
there are some very good and well developed
examples there, which we are also part of. It is about
internationally identifying where our key relationships
are, have we got those relationships right and are they
in the right place and, equally, is there the opportunity,
perhaps, to share some capability with other countries
in this particular area?
DCS McMurdie: I certainly echo those comments, but
we have two main issues. The UK we can make as
safe and secure as we possibly can. We can have great
legislation here. The cyber criminals know they will
go to the weakest country, the hardest to reach
country, and they will use its infrastructure or commit
their attacks from there, so we keep chasing our tail
to a certain degree around that. We have seen that with
a lot of the internet governance work, with sites being
hosted in hard-to-reach countries that we cannot have
an impact on.
The other aspect that we have to respond to is where
we are being attacked in the UK from systems,
infrastructure coming through proxies, potentially.
Quite often we do not know where that attack is
emanating from within the time-critical period, and
the ability to reach out to wherever that attack may
come from and take action is not covered by UK
legislation and UK powers. There are some issues
around that.
Q100 Karl Turner: We hear that criminals are
increasingly using social networking sites to target
potential victims of online scams. I wonder whether
your observations support that assertion.
DCS McMurdie: Twofold, without going into too
much of our operational tactics that we use in
investigations, but criminals more often than not also
have a social network footprint that is quite useful
sometimes when we are conducting an investigation.
Yes, we have seen social networks being used as per
phishing-type scams. So dissemination of the scam-
type email, as well as bespoke, looking at individuals’
open-source footprint to target them specifically,
particularly where you are trying to get an inroad into
an organisation or use that intelligence to corrupt
individuals or harness vulnerabilities that may exist.
It is used in a number of ways, to be honest.
Andy Archibald: The other point to make around that
is that there are well known social networking sites
that we will all be familiar with, but internationally
there are a considerable amount of social networking
sites. We have evidence and have seen those for sale
on criminal forums, so you would buy a social
networking site that you could then restrict access to
and use that. Equally, in terms of social network sites,
we have seen some online chat rooms; again, access
to those chat rooms is restricted. Malware and other
tools and techniques, which they can sell and market
to have cyber attacks, are being dealt with and traded.
Q101 Karl Turner: Do you think there should be
stronger requirements on social networking sites about
storing information and sharing personal data?
DCS McMurdie: There is a real opportunity, as you
have just heard, about public awareness with that.
There is freedom of speech, and people put all sorts
of information on the internet without realising how
vulnerable that makes them. Our information is out
there on 500 to 600 different databases at any one
time, and the criminal groups run automated
programmes harnessing all that data around us, day in,
day out, and then they will utilise it to their advantage.
There is a real prevention opportunity. There are data
sharing issues around obtaining the data when it has
been compromised from some of those network
providers and social networking sites. More often than
not, a lot of them exist over in America, and how we
obtain that data back. I think we need a balance
between awareness and some sort of guidance about
what personal data should or should not be retained
about individuals.
Q102 Karl Turner: Talking of public awareness,
where should the spend go? Should it be on public
awareness campaigns or on law enforcement?
DCS McMurdie: We talk about prevention, and most
people tend to think Action Fraud, Get Safe Online,
the public awareness piece, which does need doing,
and is very important. A lot of people will not tend to
look at that sort of advice until they have fallen foul,
and that is human nature. There is an opportunity to
increase that public prevention with perhaps tactical
engagement, so more physical interaction.
Part of the training programme that we are doing is
skilling up prevention officers to give individuals that
face-to-face prevention messaging, but the prevention
work that we tend to do, because of our role remit, is
to go after the guys that are harvesting hundreds of
thousands of identities. We then would call that
prevention in getting those identities, disseminating
them among industries to prevent them being utilised.
That is a prevention, and that is something that we
capture our performance around.
There is also, with that, a responsibility for who will
take those hundreds of thousands of identities and do
the preventative piece of work, to tell that individual,
“Your computer is potentially compromised. Your
financial identity is in the hands of that criminal
group” to stop it being used. We currently share all
that data with the UK Payments Association, so the
UK banks, and we share it with the ISPs, but where
we are dealing with thousands and thousands of
identities we cannot go after each of those victims, so
there is a victim care issue there as well.
Andy Archibald: I do not think it is an either/or. In
terms of the response to cyber crime, there are a range
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of things and a range of opportunities for us to have
an impact. Prevention and public awareness is a key
aspect of that. The Commissioner in his previous
evidence referred to that as well. Get Safe Online is
one example of that. The work that they are
pioneering in terms of increasing public awareness,
ensuring that members of the public and society are
aware of anti-virus and how to protect themselves is
a really, really important message, in terms of both
reducing the threat and managing the threat.
A number of figures are quoted, but about 80% of
attacks could be prevented if individuals or small
businesses had protected themselves and taken
advantage of anti-virus software. There is an
education we have to go through, and I think we need
to ensure that we invest the appropriate effort there.
The challenge for us is: how do you measure what you
have prevented, if we have done some preventative
activity? I chair the steering group for Get Safe
Online, and that is the challenge that I have put out to
that group. If we are going to invest resources and
money here, we need to be clear about the benefit and
the success of that campaign.
Q103 Mr Winnick: The Police Central e-Crime
Unit, which you head, reported that it has prevented—
and I give the figure; I have it in front of me—£538
million of harm since last November. If that is not
spin, and I would not for one moment dream that it
could possibly be, how is it calculated?
DCS McMurdie: There is a bit of a formula behind
it, sir, and the issue is how we capture the harm
around the work that we are undertaking and the harm
that we are preventing.
Q104 Mr Winnick: The precise sum?
DCS McMurdie: That precise sum, which has now
increased, and we look at the ratio of investment, so
how much it costs me to fund that operation versus
how much harm we prevent—so, how many of those
identities that have been stolen, and how much fraud
they would have facilitated over a period of time. The
harm formula was put together with our performance
team within the Metropolitan Police, with the
assistance of Professor Levy and
PricewaterhouseCoopers, some time ago, and then
subjected to a number of challenge panels, including
the Home Office and the Audit Office. It is a fairly
complex process to look at the costs that different
companies suffer.
We tend to very much underestimate the figures when
we look at data that has been stolen that could be used
for fraudulent purposes, because you cannot assume
that all that data would successfully perpetrate that
fraud. Likewise, we do not tend to use the victim
figure because, with a lot of the victims, there is a
notional figure for how much harm and how much it
costs that victim to sort out their accounts or sort out
their bank accounts or that payment that has not gone
through. We tend not to use that as well, because a
lot of the victims that have had their financial data
compromised are not necessarily aware of that fact,
and that is resolved by the banks.
All our figures—and I have the latest harm reports
here for the next six months—are calculated using the
same formula. What is really useful is the ratio,
whether people may dispute the figures, of how much
fraud would be perpetrated with an identity. The ratio
of return on investment is steadily increasing, so the
performance of my unit, whichever formula, or
sticking to that same formula, is substantially
increasing. I would put that down to our building
better relationships within industry and academia,
who are working with us every time we take these
investigations on.
An example of that is the work that we are doing with
the Virtual Task Force, so all the banks now work
hand-in-hand with my team and it costs me
substantially less to take on that investigation and run
that at a very fast pace. Whereas historically it might
have taken me six, seven or eight months to conduct
that investigation, I can now do that in partnership
with the banks within a number of weeks, so it is
cheaper.
Q105 Mr Winnick: So it is a complex calculation, at
the best of times?
DCS McMurdie: It is slightly complex, but I have an
explanation that I can certainly send in to you.
Q106 Mr Winnick: I am sure the Chair would agree
that would be very useful. I mentioned the figure of
£538 million, which you have reported, and you said
it has increased. What is the latest?
DCS McMurdie: £797 million within 18 months.
Q107 Mr Winnick: Total, in all?
DCS McMurdie: That is how much harm my unit
has prevented.
Q108 Mr Winnick: It has more or less doubled from
November last?
DCS McMurdie: No, we were at £538 million, I
believe. It has gone up, perhaps not the same
increment, but we have had to back-burner some cases
because of the Olympics response that we have put
in place.
Q109 Mr Winnick: By a third, perhaps; a quarter to
a third. I have not done the arithmetic. How far does
SOCA differ from the analysis?
Andy Archibald: We have a range of measures in
terms of how we measure how successful we are
being, and Charlie has emphasised the importance of
arrests in that in particular; it is vitally important in
terms of public confidence and deterrent in the UK
that we make arrests.
The reality is that being successful in cyber crime
involves much more than arrests. We have heard about
prevention and about having public awareness, but
equally the threat that we face is international. While
the victims may be in the UK, those who are
perpetrating the offence may be in one part of the
world, those who have produced the malware will be
in another part, and the financial transactions could be
in another country entirely.
In terms of arrests and disruptions, we do rely—in
terms of having a real impact on cyber crime—on the
co-operation of a range of different partners and
countries. If we continually arrest in the UK, for the
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reasons I have identified, that is part of the solution.
What we really want to see, to have an impact, is
those that are producing the malware, hosting the
criminal forums internationally and laundering the
money—those are the people that we need to target to
have the greatest impact.
We measure some of those things in terms of how
we share intelligence and intelligence packages with
colleagues internationally, and how we then track
what they are going to do with that intelligence and
the difference it makes. We have some way to go in
terms of the UK and the National Crime Agency,
National Cybercrime Unit, coming up with a
measurement, a metric and a narrative that describes
how successful we are. I think it is a range of things,
all the way from prevention, awareness, arrests in the
UK, and arrests and targeting internationally with
partners.
Q110 Mr Winnick: Thank you. Just one question.
How many are in your unit, the personnel?
DCS McMurdie: Within my unit, sir?
Mr Winnick: Yes.
DCS McMurdie: We have recently grown from
around 32 or 33 staff, we now have an establishment
of 107 police officers, police staff. That includes three
regional hubs, where we fund three staff in each of
those hubs in the north-west. In addition to that, we
have a number of special constables and members of
industry that come in and assist us. We have gone
through substantial growth as a result of the spending
review last year. We have increased by 70-odd staff.
Q111 Mr Winnick: The permanent staff, apart from
what you have said, people coming in?
DCS McMurdie: About 107 to 108. That includes the
team that delivers on those national programmes of
work as well.
Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Professor Peter Sommer and Professor Ross Anderson gave evidence.
Q113 Chair: Professor Anderson, you said that one
of the problems for policymakers is to understand the
scale of e-crime and its costs. What are the main
difficulties in establishing accurate measures?
Professor Sommer: Defining what you are trying to
measure. Most of the—
Chair: No, I am asking Professor Anderson first,
sorry. I will come to you in a second.
Professor Sommer: Sorry.
Professor Anderson: I would agree that measurement
is an issue, and the British Government, the European
Government and the American Government tend to
use different measures. We produced a report on the
costs of cyber crime, to which I drew the Committee’s
attention, where we dealt with this issue by simply
setting out separate categories. We have a category for
those things that are indubitably cyber crime because
they did not exist before the internet—things like fake
AV software.
There is a category for crimes that existed before but
whose modus operandi has changed completely, such
Mr Winnick: Thank you very much.
Q112 Karl Turner: I think you said, Superintendent,
that in your view judges are passing down lenient
sentences to cyber criminals—sentences that do not
really reflect the harm that that criminality causes.
What do you think that is down to? Do you think it is
anything to do with the difficulty of the victims giving
evidence as to the degree of harm that has caused to
them? What else might it be?
DCS McMurdie: A number of issues. It is very
difficult to put a figure on potentially thousands of
victims that have been compromised and evidence
how much harm that has caused. This is an age-old
problem.
We had a case at court last week. Potentially, several
hundred victims had been attacked, and not all of
those victims are prepared to stand up and evidence
that fact. It is also difficult for judges, perhaps, when
they are faced with individuals who tend to be fairly
young, quite often, with no previous convictions.
They have committed an offence over the internet
against a big banking company or whatever the
business may be that has suffered some sort of loss.
With fraud, you can see the financial amount that has
taken place. I think there is work to be done by law
enforcement to capture the loss and the harm, the loss
of those facilities in being able to trade. How much
harm does that cause? To put that in front of the judge,
to enable the judge to get a better picture and
sentence appropriately.
Chair: Ms McMurdie, Mr Archibald, thank you very
much.
as payment card fraud and much of banking fraud.
Then there is a third category for frauds that have
been defined to be cyber crimes because they are done
online, such as tax fraud and welfare fraud. All VAT
returns are now filed electronically, so if you have a
carousel fraud, that is by definition now cyber crime,
although the mechanisms used by people to do that
are essentially no different than they were five years
ago when they were all on paper. The robust way to
deal with this, I think, is to just look at the
categories separately.
Q114 Chair: Thank you. Professor Sommer, you
were about to comment.
Professor Sommer: My apologies for interrupting
prematurely. Most of these things can be defined in a
number of different ways. Nearly all the frauds are
going to be regarded as offences under the Fraud Act
2006, which was specifically designed to cover the e-
dimension. Prior to the Fraud Act 2006, there was an
issue as to whether you could have the deception of a
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machine—in other words, a computer—and that
overcame that problem, and there are lots of useful
categories within that.
Some of the other types of activity are clearly going
to be offences against children. In all the estimates
that people have been making about levels of harm,
nobody has been talking about children, although in
fact your first session this afternoon was all about
children. I do not have the faintest idea how you are
going to measure the harm to a child, even one whose
photograph has been put up on to the internet and is
there for all time. A lot of the figures end up being
rather fanciful.
I have been listening very carefully to Charlie
McMurdie’s explanations of what she meant by harm
and although I am a great fan of her work, I have
always had great difficulty in understanding what this
harm factor was, other than as the means of
persuading people to fund her work. It does seem to
me that there is an overall problem in Whitehall that,
unless you can put figures on to something, the
problem does not exist, and if the figures do not exist
then you invent them.
I suppose an overwhelming argument of that is a
report produced by Detica on the cost of cyber crime,
which managed to exclude any reference to children,
any reference to the effects of malware, but included
industrial espionage, which happens not to be a crime
in this country, even though we know it causes
potentially a great deal of harm. How they managed
to get precise figures on an industry-by-industry basis
of the amount of losses incurred as a result of
industrial espionage really beats me.
One of the things I would suggest to the Committee
is that perhaps the most important statistic of all is to
look at the level of computer ownership and,
consequently, the level of computer use in the country.
The figures from the Office for National Statistics and
Ofcom are almost identical. We are now well past the
three-quarters mark in terms of individual PC
ownership within the home. They are all typically
going to be connected permanently to the internet via
broadband. My guess is that after next Christmas
when lots of people will have bought tablets, those
figures will have gone up enormously. To take the
matter even further, although I entirely recognise why
the Committee is looking at e-crime, perhaps we can
no longer make the separation between crime and e-
crime, and the fact that we are trying to do so, other
than looking at issues of how do we resource and how
do we split up the various entities that are addressing
it, trying to produce overall statistics may not be
terribly helpful in the end.
Chair: That is very helpful, coming from you,
because it takes us on a different track.
Q115 Dr Huppert: It is a pleasure to see both of you
again. I think I have detected scepticism about Detica
and Home Office figures before, in a range of
contexts. Can I firstly ask about digital forensic
capability within the police force as a whole? What
level do you think that is at, and how could it be
improved?
Professor Sommer: It is very patchy. As I think you
know, I am a part-time academic. Most of my income
comes from acting as an expert witness, and I
specialise in digital forensics. When I say “patchy”, I
do not mean to say it is bad. It means that there are
patches of astonishing excellence. They are often at
relatively low rank levels in the police. They are
constables, they are sergeants, but you will find a
number of them have Master’s degrees. Having had
to examine some of those dissertations, they are a very
high level and they are internationally regarded as
such.
Once you get away from those enthusiastic specialists,
once you get away from what you will find in the elite
teams of the sort that you have heard from SOCA and
PCeU, then it gets really pretty bad. One of the
problems at the moment is that the police are trying
to economise to meet the 20% reduction target. Then
permanent staff—perhaps civilians—are being let go,
and resource is being made to the private sector.
There is a particular trap I want to draw the attention
of the Committee to. Competitive tendering for
outside forensic work sounds a very good idea, but in
digital forensics what happens is that you are not just
sending something away and saying, “Do you have a
match for this DNA? Do you have a match for this
fingerprint?” Most digital forensics is about
reconstructing events. So the digital forensics
specialists, whether they are private sector, whether
they are police, need to work together with the
investigating officer. That happens in the elite groups.
In my experience, it happens really increasingly rarely
in the lower levels of ordinary crime, where digital
evidence is important.
Q116 Dr Huppert: Just to be clear, in the areas
where you say it is bad, is it that digital forensics are
not done, or that they are done incorrectly?
Professor Sommer: The problem is that if you have
competitive tendering, it rather assumes that the
tender is perfectly framed so that people know what
to respond to. If the mainstreaming process of which
Charlie McMurdie talked about, which I think is very
important, is imperfect, then what they are asking the
tenderer to do is probably malformed. If you are
squeezing them on price, there is no incentive for
them to go back and say, “Excuse me, you are asking
the wrong question”, so they just deliver on what they
are being asked to do. As a result, lots of things get
missed, and may only occur, may only arise, if there
is then a strong defence where questions are being
asked.
Q117 Dr Huppert: I will bring Professor Anderson
in in a second. But can I just be clear—do you think
there are any cases where it is not that things are
missed, but things are inaccurately found?
Professor Sommer: I do not think I have a universal
knowledge. My worry is much more things that are
missed, rather than incorrect conclusions being found.
Q118 Dr Huppert: Professor Anderson?
Professor Anderson: I would agree that forensics tend
to be patchy. There have been many cases of things
missed, one or two notorious cases of wrong
conclusions being drawn, although that tends to have
been some years ago, as things are getting better.
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Generally, the problem is that, as computers and
communications become embedded everywhere,
digital forensics then become a part of every
investigation. The state of affairs is better than it was
15 years ago, when I started getting involved in
policy, or 30 years ago, when I started doing this, but
it still has some way to go.
Q119 Dr Huppert: What steps do you think need to
be taken to improve it? What should we be
recommending?
Professor Anderson: The ability to deal with digital
evidence has to be integrated into the police force
everywhere and at all levels. You might care to draw
an analogy with the arrival of the motorcar two
generations ago. It would now be unthinkable for a
police officer to be unable to drive, unless they had
been disabled but kept on in a back-room job, but it is
perfectly thinkable to find even chief constables who
would get their secretaries to deal with their e-mail.
Dr Huppert: Unlike Members of Parliament, of
course.
Professor Sommer: We have heard a lot about
mainstreaming, and I do not regard it as the fault of
the officers you have had in front of you. This policy
of mainstreaming has been around for five years, at
least, to my certain knowledge, if you go and look
back at some of the policy documents that have come
out, and it always comes along very, very slowly. One
of the other areas you need to look at probably is
the capability within the Crown Prosecution Service
to handle all these things. You can see the policies are
there. It is just that they are not rolling out at the speed
with which people are using computers. As a result,
digital evidence is important.
Q120 Mr Winnick: Professor Anderson, you have of
course appeared before us on previous matters in the
last Parliament. I do not think events have proved you
wrong by any means. You are both rather sceptical
about the action being taken on e-crime, but you were
present a few moments ago when the Head of the
Police Central e-Crime Unit referred to the sum of
money, now over £700 million—increased, as she told
us, from November last year. Surely that demonstrates
that it seems to be working.
Professor Anderson: What we have done in the
analysis that we did for the Costs of Cyber Crime
Report, which was requested by Sir Mark Welland,
the Chief Scientific Officer at the MoD, after there
was widespread scorn for the Detica report, was to try
to unbundle things into direct and indirect costs. When
you look at that, you discover that many of the costs
of cyber crime are indirect costs, and I do not think
that official accounting takes this into account
properly.
Let me give you an example. In the year 2010, about
a third of all the spam in the world was sent by one
botnet, the Rustock botnet, and the owners of that
botnet earned about $3.5 million from what they did.
There was a colleague of mine in California who went
to the trouble of tracing this with test purchases of
Viagra and so on so that he could get some forensics.
In broad terms, spam cost the world $1 billion, most
of this falling on ISPs and on service companies like
Google. If a third of those are back to the Rustock
botnet, then for every $1 the bad guys made, there
was $100 of costs fell on everybody else. This is very,
very different from traditional fraud, such as tax fraud,
where the amount that the fraudster gets away with is
typically most of it, and the indirect costs, the
enforcement costs and so on and so forth, are but a
small proportion. So, you are dealing with an
intrinsically different animal than you are with
conventional fraud, and using conventional Home
Office methodologies is not necessarily the best way
forward.
Q121 Mr Winnick: Either Professor Sommer or
Professor Anderson, as briefly as you can, what would
you say the Government should be doing that it is
not doing?
Professor Anderson: We should be locking up more
villains. We should be putting more of the cyber
budget into policing and less of it into the intelligence
sphere, into cyber war, broadly defined. This
Government made a very welcome increase of £640
million in the cyber security budget two years ago,
but 59% of it went to GCHQ and only a few million
to the police. Had I been in the room when that
decision was taken, I would have argued for the police
to get more at the expense of GCHQ.
Q122 Mr Winnick: Professor Sommer, more or less
the same?
Professor Sommer: More or less the same. I want to
add something, and I think it emerged out of your
questioning. I think you were absolutely right to press
everybody on public education and on prevention,
because no matter how good the police are, they are
only going to be able to scratch the surface, and there
is a lot to be said for helping people help themselves.
In addition to doing that, one of the big routes for
cyber crime is the so-called botnet, when you have
poorly-secured computers, so there is a public health
argument as well in terms of persuading people to
look after their computers.
Again, if you go back to the budget, I have been
looking at this budget, and I was looking at it again
last week when we had the annual report from the
Minister, and I was saying, “Where is this
preventative thing?” and it has all rolled into other
places. It almost becomes discretionary for the police,
as part of their role, how much they are going to
assign to it. If one looks at the single element that is
assigned to public awareness, which is Get Safe
Online, their budget over four years is £395,000. That
is 0.06% of the total. That seems to me to be tragically
low, and I agree with Ross that taking a few million
away from GCHQ, for all the good work we believe
they are doing, and putting that over to public
prevention would be astonishingly good value for
money.
Q123 Mr Winnick: Would you, have you, or are you
intending to put this in writing to the appropriate
Minister?
Professor Sommer: I put it in writing, partly, to you,
and I was rather hoping that, as an influential Select
Committee, the Minister would see it. I have raised
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this with the Cabinet Office. In fact, I raised it before
their first report was published. They did call a
number of us in to discuss a number of the issues, and
I did keep on saying, “How much are you assigning
towards all of this and towards public education?”
They said, “You make a very interesting point”, but
when I came to look at the assignments and the final
documents, I obviously was not as successful as I
would have liked to have been.
Mr Winnick: The Ministers will see our report in due
course, and hopefully the Home Secretary or
whatever, the officials, will go through the questions
and answers of sessions like this. Thank you very
much indeed.
Q124 Mark Reckless: I am a little concerned about
dismissing perhaps what GCHQ is doing with this
money, not least because I do not have a good
understanding of what that money—
Professor Sommer: I am not dismissing. They easily
have the largest budget, on the basis that £650 million
over four years is not going to be extended. The
obvious place to look, if you are going to take money
away, is the largest budget-holder.
Q125 Mark Reckless: Is it not possible that that may
lead to some things that are very important not being
done?
Professor Sommer: I do know a few people at
GCHQ, but my overview of their general policy, I am
afraid, is as opaque as almost everybody else’s who is
outside that particular environment. It has always
been, I think, the big problem in evaluating police
cyber security policy. There were a number of
discussions both before and afterwards, and I
remember asking the Cabinet Office, who were
disposing of the money, and alas, as with so much to
do with intelligence work, you have to take it on trust
and hope that the trust is justified.
Q126 Mark Reckless: But you do not take it on
trust, and are confident that if that money were
redeployed there would be better returns to it?
Professor Sommer: All I am saying is that, if you
take an organisation that has only £100,000 a year,
does not have an office, and you were to give them
another £1 million, I suspect that the benefits would
be rather greater than another wonderful machine to
carry out surveillance by GCHQ. That would be my
guess.
Q127 Mark Reckless: Thank you. Do you
recommend making any changes to crime recording
practice to get a more realistic or broader
understanding of online crime? Would that be
sensible?
Professor Anderson: This is something that we have
spoken about a number of times over the years, since
2005 when the previous Government—unfortunately,
in my view—decided that fraud reporting should be
done to the banks, rather than to the police. This
caused the fraud statistics to go down, but it opened
up an even larger gap than is usually the case between
the crimes reported through the police, on the one
hand, and the crime levels reported through victim
surveys on the other. Now, for most practical
purposes, official recorded crime is useless in
determining the level of fraud.
The most recent UK official figures that we have are
annex 3 to the British crime survey for 2010, which
suggested that, although our risk of becoming victim
to a traditional acquisitive crime, such as burglary or
car theft, was about 2% per annum, your risk of
becoming a victim of fraud was about 5%. The only
figures we have had since then was a Eurostat survey
in 2011, which was conducted across the Member
States of the EU, which suggested that in the UK we
were in the second-worst position after Latvia.
Both the experience of crime and the fear of crime
appear to be significant in this country, yet official
crime statistics do not give us any pointer, at least in
England. In Scotland, things are different, because
there was a survey there last year that indicated that
the main fear of crime north of the border is of online
crime, card and online banking crime—not of
violence or mayhem, despite my countrymen’s
reputation for that. Very, very patchy official statistics
have arisen. If you could nudge the Government
towards fixing that, that would be useful.
Professor Sommer: There is another recommendation
you might like to think about. If you perhaps follow
my earlier remark that lots of things can be defined
both as a cyber crime and as an ordinary crime, the
police have systems for when a crime is reported to
enter things on to a form so that they can build up
statistics and they can then follow the crime up. There
was some discussion a few years ago about
introducing a field in that form as to whether there
was digital evidence.
I do not know how matters have progressed at the
moment, but that seemed to me to be an excellent idea
because at very, very low cost you would be able to
go back across a whole range of crimes, see where
digital evidence seemed to be important and you
would then be able to do resourcing. That would be
without getting into statistics about whether it is a
fraud or whether it is an extortion or any other sort of
thing that you might call cyber crime. It seemed to me
to be a low-cost solution. I know there was a proposal.
I do not know where it has gone to at the moment,
but I think it might be something the Committee may
want to probe.
Q128 Dr Huppert: Firstly, Professor Anderson, just
very quickly, you were somewhat critical of the
limited amount of funding that was given to the police
from the cyber security programme. How much
should they be getting? Can you put a number on the
size you would like to see?
Professor Anderson: I have not thought that through
in concrete budgeting terms, but what is needed in
operational terms is basically to train the entire UK
police force to deal with digital issues competently,
and to have sufficient specialist resources that we are
able to go after the perpetrators of large-scale
globalised petty crime. This is one of the things that
is almost ignored at the moment.
Typical large-scale cyber crime might consist of
somebody in Russia sending out 100 million phish
and getting a few hundred respondents and defrauding
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each of a few thousand pounds. Each of these crimes
individually falls below the radar. What we need to
do, in order to have a proper determinative effect, is
to consider them in total and work together with
agencies in other countries where there are victims, to
go after the bad guys and lock them up. That is not
being done enough at the moment.
Q129 Dr Huppert: Professor Anderson, you cited, in
your evidence to us, the banking regulations being the
UK’s biggest legislative failure in relation to tackling
e-crime. How would you change that?
Professor Anderson: What I have been doing to try
to change it is trying to educate people about the
consequences of the regulatory failure. The problem
is that in Britain, banks often find it easy to blame
their customers for fraud. We have been doing this
firstly through the press. There was a Channel 4
Dispatches programme last night, which showed that,
for example, the Ombudsman was dealing with about
70 cases per day where customers did not get their
money back from banks after fraud.
We have been lobbying BIS and the Bank of England
about this. The problem was that the Financial
Ombudsman Service considered itself to be
independent, and therefore nobody wanted to touch
it. The Financial Services Bill that is currently going
through Parliament—or perhaps it has just gone
through; I do not know—should give the FCA the
power to regulate the Ombudsman Service from next
year, so we will be seeing the FCA and presenting
files to them of cases in which the Ombudsman has
failed.
The failure is that the Ombudsman, in effect, has
completely ignored the Payment Services Regulations
2009, and people going to the Ombudsman with
complaints found that the responders were unaware
of the existence of the regulations. The banks have
therefore being treating the Payment Services
Regulations as if they did not exist. There is consumer
protection, which the European Parliament and this
Parliament wisely enacted, but it has not had any force
or effect.
Q130 Dr Huppert: One suggestion that we have had
from some people is that victims who suffer personal
loss should have some liability if they were negligent
about their own computer security. Do you think there
is any merit in approaches like this, either of you?
Professor Anderson: The banks certainly claim that
they will blame people if there was gross negligence.
In practice, they often blame people as a routine
matter, even when it is not clear there was negligence
at all. One of the things you have to be very careful
about here is safe default. I am not quite as
enthusiastic about public education as some other
people, because of the simple fact that computers and
mobile phones and social networking sites tend to ship
with unsafe defaults because it is better for selling
advertising.
So you have to think very, very carefully in this
context: what do the equipment vendors, the service
providers and so on want people to do, and what are
the risks to which that exposes people? In such
circumstances, you then have to ask to what extent it
is reasonable, in given circumstances, for banks to
impose liability on people. The problem is it is a
shallow gain here. Everybody is trying to push
liability on everybody else. It is even fashionable in
the industry. We call it leverage. The buck has to stop
somewhere, and ultimately it is down to the legislator
to decide where the buck should stop.
Professor Sommer: The problem is also evidence.
How do you show that something has actually
happened? Most people have no idea how to even
address the problem, so they are always at some
considerable disadvantage, as Ross has pointed out.
Q131 Chair: Finally, gentlemen, could I ask whether
you think it is possible to secure large Government
databases against cyber attack?
Professor Anderson: There is a problem in that you
can have security or functionality or scale. If you are
a good engineer you can have any two of those, but
people putting out tenders for systems in Whitehall
tend to assume that getting all three is trivial.
Q132 Chair: Professor Sommer?
Professor Sommer: I think Ross has captured it. The
more people that have access to a system, the more
likely it is that there will be some sort of failure, even
if the technical side of it is absolutely immaculate.
You are right to ask the question. I am afraid it is
an impossibility.
Chair: Gentlemen, can I thank you very much on
behalf of the Committee for your evidence? That
concludes our business for today.
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Q133 Chair: We have business in the House today,
so I must apologise if, as is likely, in the middle of
your evidence I suspend the Committee so that
Members can vote. We will come back, so do not feel
that we have abandoned you. As you know, the
Committee is undertaking an inquiry into e-crime and
clearly the views of your organisation in particular.
Mike Andrews, you are the e-crime co-ordination
manager for the National Trading Standards E-Crime
Centre. Could you tell us something about current
trends in this area? Is it on the increase at the
moment?
Mike Andrews: Yes, there is certainly anecdotal
evidence to support the suggestion that there is an
increase in e-crime, particularly in terms of the trading
standards remit, which is where we are approaching
this from in terms of scams that are targeted at
consumers. Some examples that we are particularly
seeing are job opportunity scams, advance fee frauds,
anti-virus software scams and vehicle-matching
scams. What we are seeing more and more is that a lot
of these scams that were done in the physical world, in
terms of trading standards enforcement, are now
moving more and more towards being perpetrated
online, on the internet and email and technology like
that to facilitate the crimes.
Q134 Chair: From where you are and from what you
see, where are these scams coming from? Are they
onshore, or are they coming other countries?
Mike Andrews: There is a mixture. In terms of
obviously getting into trading standards, we are
looking at where we can enforce UK legislation, but
more and more the intelligence that we are receiving
suggests that there is an increasing element of
offshore criminality.
Q135 Chair: What the Committee is very interested
in is the fact that certain other countries appear to be
targeting the United Kingdom, partly because of our
very buoyant retail market. If you look offshore, is it
coming from other European countries or from
beyond Europe?
Mike Andrews: It is very much a mixture. It is from
other European member states; it is from former
members of the eastern bloc; it is coming from the far
east. It is very difficult to pinpoint specific locations
because it truly is, to use a cliché, a global problem.
Bridget Phillipson
Mark Reckless
Mr David Winnick
Q136 Chair: Mr Ironside, welcome. Your own recent
survey shows losses of about £205 million?
Tom Ironside: It does.
Chair: How does that compare to other losses that are
suffered by the retail industry, such as shoplifting and
other crimes of that kind? Are you seeing an increase
in this trend?
Tom Ironside: Yes. Our annual retail crime survey
was published at the start of last week, and that
showed a £1.6 billion impact on the retail sector of
crimes relating to retail activities. That represents a
smaller proportion of overall retail turnover than the
£205 million does of the £29 billion or £30 billion
that currently passes through online retailing. You can
see that it is some way beyond the more general sort
of tonal activity that takes place across the sector. I
think that some of that is associated with the fact that
it is a relatively new channel with relatively new
challenges and, we think, some particular issues to be
focused on from a law enforcement perspective in
particular.
Chair: We will come on to some of those.
Q137 Michael Ellis: Mr Ironside, can I just ask you
about two particular issues. One is proportionality.
How do you approach the prosecution of offenders
who may have stolen an item that in and of itself is
of low value, but where the prosecution will obviously
necessarily cost an awful lot more than the value of
the item? There is a public interest in prosecuting
those individuals, but do you have anything to say
about the issue of proportionality?
Tom Ironside: I think we have a general view about
proportionality, in that we see that any criminal retail
activity is a matter of serious concern and should be
taken seriously by all concerned. We have a broader
issue in relation to e-crime in particular, which is that
we think that local response, be it in terms of
reporting, of investigation or of enforcement, is seen
to be not ideal as it currently stands. We have
questions about the extent to which local law
enforcement officers are in a position to meaningfully
progress cases. It is more from that perspective that
we approach that question.
Q138 Michael Ellis: Can I ask you also about the
increased use of mobile technology, because you have
spoken about this and the challenges that the increased
use of mobile technology holds for retailers? What do
you perceive to be the main challenges?
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Tom Ironside: From a mobile perspective, we do not
see that there is a different set of criminality that
accrues to mobile commerce as compared with other
forms of online retail criminal activity as it currently
stands. We put a lot of that down to using exactly the
same sorts of measures to screen and tackle fraud
within an m-commerce environment. There is an
emerging expert view that the real challenge in mobile
technology is the personal information that people
keep on their mobiles, and that seems to be more
problematic. It is more about the information that
mobile phone users are choosing to store on their
phones, and there is the potential for malware and
other software applications to access that. But that is
not a specifically retail-related issue.
Q139 Mr Winnick: Mr Andrews, you have a
particular responsibility, have you not, for the
protection of the public? Do you feel that sufficient
protection is available for people, bearing in mind the
scams that are now constantly being undertaken?
Mike Andrews: It is fair to say that in terms of
legislative protection and of what criminal
enforcement can be undertaken or of the civil
remedies that are in place, the existing legislation is
broadly adequate because it works equally well in the
physical world as it would do in the virtual world in
terms of e-commerce and e-crime. From that
perspective, we do not really have any issues. The
difficulty we have is more from the enforcement side,
in particular the changes that have been put in place
in terms of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers
Act and plans in the draft Communications Data Bill
that will potentially make it more difficult for us to
tackle the problem, particularly in relation to getting
communications data in relation to offending that is
happening online.
Chair: Thank you. I am going to stop you there
because we have to vote. We will continue with the
questioning afterwards; we will not abandon you. I
suspend the Committee until 4.15pm.
Sitting suspended for a Division in the House.
On resuming—
Q133 Mr Winnick: Mr Ironside, you represent of
course the retailers. Retailers obviously want to make
as much profit as possible. It would be odd otherwise,
as you are in business to succeed and I am sure at
the same time to try to be as fair as possible to your
customers. Do you feel that customers have enough
protection against online scams?
Tom Ironside: Consumer relationships are absolutely
fundamental to the successful running of BRC
member businesses. We certainly feel that the
resourcing that is now being allocated to looking at
online scams, rip-offs and other borderline criminal
activity is absolutely right, because if consumers lose
confidence in online commercial activity, then that has
a knock-on effect right across the sector, we would
feel. We do not have a perspective that there is
insufficient resourcing currently, but we welcome the
fact that this focus is emerging.
Q134 Mr Winnick: Yes. You are sitting together. I
assume there is some co-ordination between the
organisation Mr Andrews represents and retailers?
Tom Ironside: We were just talking about the fact that
there definitely should be some co-ordination between
our organisations, and we can see some strong
potential in doing so. I am aware that the unit Mr
Andrews is working in is relatively new, so it
prevents—
Mr Winnick: At this moment there is not, but it is
your intention there should be?
Tom Ironside: Indeed.
Mr Winnick: Mr Ironside, I should have thought the
initiative, to a large extent, should come from your
part of the affair.
Tom Ironside: We are very happy to make that
connection and see whether there are ways that we
can work together.
Q135 Mr Winnick: From this day onwards, so to
speak. During the break when we were having a rather
crucial vote, you came to the conclusions that you just
told us?
Tom Ironside: There was clearly quite close
alignment between the sorts of things that we were
saying in our submissions, happily, and I can see that
there is potential for us to work closely in the future.
Mr Winnick: Perhaps we could be kept informed of
developments.
Tom Ironside: Very happy to.
Mike Andrews: Absolutely, yes.
Q136 Chair: In respect of victims of some of these
crimes, recently my credit card was hacked, a PayPal
account was set up in my name and money taken out
of my account to pay for something. Obviously the
money has been returned by the bank, but when I
inquired of PayPal and others who was responsible,
there did not seem to be any interest in finding out
who was responsible for this; the main interest was
obviously in ensuring that I was satisfied and that I
had my money back. Do you think that this is a
problem in dealing with online crime: nobody traces
it to the very end to find out what has happened?
Mike Andrews: I think you have absolutely hit the
nail on the head there. Before the suspension, one of
the points I was keen to stress was that when you are
dealing with the physical world it is relatively easy to
identify if somebody is up to no good. It is quite easy
to identify a shop or a house that you can pay a visit
to in the physical world, but in the virtual world it is
that much more difficult to trace where the offender
is. You are relying on e-mail addresses, credit card
numbers, mobile phone numbers and so on, and to
trace that information is quite difficult. That is where
we have serious concerns in relation to the proposed
changes to allowing local authorities to have access to
communications data, because clearly the access to
the subscriber and usage information in relation to
communications data is vital in being able to track
and trace offenders who are operating in the virtual
environment. Proposals to remove access to that
information would have a significant detrimental
impact on our ability to trace those offenders, and the
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example you have highlighted there is a perfect case
in point.
Q137 Mr Clappison: How successful do you think
Action Fraud has been at gaining recognition as a
central reporting point for e-crime?
Mike Andrews: I think recently there has been a lot
of publicity. I believe it was five police force areas it
was initially trialled in and it is now being rolled out
across the remaining police forces in the UK. We
welcome the idea of having a central reporting point
for all forms of fraud and obviously in particular in
relation to e-crime and internet fraud. What we are
slightly concerned about is how that information is
then co-ordinated and disseminated to agencies like
ourselves so that we can take appropriate action,
because obviously we have a remit in terms of
enforcing consumer protection legislation. It is vital
that that information that is fed into organisations such
as Action Fraud is properly co-ordinated and
disseminated to agencies who can take the appropriate
action. We welcome the progress that has been made,
but I think it is quite clear that we need to engage
closely with them to ensure that information is
followed up.
Q138 Mr Clappison: On that point, do you think that
current crime recording conventions give an accurate
picture of the profile of e-crime? How do you think
this could be improved?
Mike Andrews: It is fair to say that the current
recording mechanisms probably are not adequate
because you tend to find that the illicit activity would
get recorded as a general fraud or a consumer
protection legislation issue in terms of, for example, a
trademarks offence if they were counterfeit goods.
They tend to get classified under those areas, but the
e-crime element is not necessarily always picked up.
Therefore, it is fair to say that there is probably a
large-scale under-reporting of e-crime and its true
economic impact.
Q139 Chair: What kind of communication is there
between banks, the law enforcement agencies and
yourselves, not just yourselves as individuals, but in
terms of retailers? I think you have said in the past, Mr
Ironside, that there needs to be better communication
between banks and card users. What kind of
information would it be helpful for you to have in
order to deal with this very serious problem?
Tom Ironside: There are a couple of areas in
particular that we have identified where we think
improvements could be made to the way in which
banks communicate with retailers. When a card is
flagged as lost or stolen, we find out very rapidly that
that is the case and we can take action as a result.
However, where fraudulent activity is undertaken, the
communications links are much slower, and we think
there is a clear case for that being addressed and
flagged in an appropriate way so that retailers can take
appropriate action at the time in question. The other
issue that has been raised by members in this context
is wanting to have a better or deeper understanding in
relation to card-not-present transactions, where again
there is an absence of depth of knowledge, which
would allow retailers to respond particularly when
fraud turnover threshold ratios are being approached.
I think there are some quite straightforward things that
would assist retailers to respond in an appropriate
way.
Q140 Chair: I would have thought that the arrival
of the unique personalised PIN number—presumably
only people who know what their PIN number is
should be able to use a credit card—would have cut
down on the amount of fraud that is being committed,
but it seems to have gone up.
Tom Ironside: I am absolutely sure that chip and PIN
has had a significant impact in that context.
Chair: What, to make it better or worse?
Tom Ironside: It is a counter-factual case, but it has
prevented fraudulent activity that would have
otherwise taken place. However, it is a growing area
of retail activity, so it is accompanied by criminality
that sits alongside that and not all of that relates to
card-not-present activity. Some of it is identification-
related; some of it is refund fraud. There are all sorts
of different strands to it.
Q141 Chair: But presumably, even though you might
be able to stop the use of a fraudulent card, if
somebody has ordered something online and
purchased it, it must be very difficult to get back the
product itself. You may be able to stop the use of the
card. Is there any evidence to suggest that you get the
product back?
Tom Ironside: I suppose it depends on the point at
which the fraudulent activity is detected. There is
considerable sophistication in the way that the third-
party screening companies look at commercial
approaches from customers. Where there are multiple
uses of the same card across a range of different
products, where there are a multiple uses of the same
address in deliveries, then that can throw up warning
signals in advance.
Q142 Lorraine Fullbrook: You have both criticised
the capacity of law enforcement to respond to low-
level, high-volume e-crime. Have you noticed any
improvements in this area?
Tom Ironside: From our point of view, if I can
respond, we have not, and I think that retailers’
perspective currently is that there is a lack of
confidence in the local response. I think it is
understandable that at a local level you will not
necessarily have the expertise or the resourcing to
adequately address what can be a technologically
complex and difficult area of criminality. What we
would like to see—and it goes back to an earlier
answer—is a very effective central reporting
mechanism that allows bulk reporting because, as I
was mentioning, quite often you get a linked range of,
say, 200 offences, all of which relate to a single card
or a single address. Expecting an individual case
report for each of those is perhaps not the best way to
go about things and we think there are ways to make
that process as business-friendly as possible.
Mike Andrews: I echo that and I would like to think
that the advent of Action Fraud as a central reporting
centre would help to collate that intelligence so you
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can identify these patterns. The problem is that, from
a trading standards perspective, you may get a number
of different reports that are reported to individual local
authorities, but then trying to collate that into this
issue of low value but high volume is very much an
area where we have a key remit to enforce that.
Q143 Lorraine Fullbrook: Mr Andrews, you have
said that the recent changes to RIPA have impaired
the ability of trading standards officers to investigate
online offences. What is your estimate of the
proportion of your investigations that have been
adversely affected by the changes?
Mike Andrews: The changes are very recent. The
changes in terms of having judicial approval for RIPA
authorisations only came into effect in November, so
it is quite difficult to quantify that at the moment, but
I am aware that the Local Government Association is
in the process of collating figures from local
authorities across the UK to try to quantify the
problem that this is causing. What is more concerning
is not so much the changes to RIPA in terms of doing
directed surveillance. I go back to my earlier point:
the key changes that are planned are in relation to
access to communications data, because that is
fundamental to allowing us to track and trace offences
that are occurring online. Removal of our ability to
access that data will severely hinder the work that we
can do.
Q144 Lorraine Fullbrook: You see that currently as
an obstacle?
Mike Andrews: Yes.
Lorraine Fullbrook: What other obstacles would
trading standards encounter when investigating
online crime?
Mike Andrews: One of the key areas is the cross-
border nature of e-crime, and that is why the unit that
I am responsible for has been set up. Trading
standards obviously operates at a local level through
local government, but clearly e-crime is not confined
to any one local authority area. Hence we have set up
a national unit to tackle that problem, but at the same
time we rely on colleagues in local authority
departments to support us in that endeavour. Clearly
government resources are under severe pressure in
terms of budget cuts and e-crime is not always seen
as a priority by council members and local politicians.
Trying to get that engagement and work with local
authorities is quite difficult in these times of austerity,
so that is a key barrier for us. Further to that is also
the very nature of e-crime. It is quite a complex, time-
consuming area of criminality to investigate, hence
the resources required to do so are quite—
Q145 Chair: Finally from me, DAC Leppard from
the City of London Police said that we are not winning
the war against online crime, and only last week a
number of people who had anonymously hacked into
PayPal had been given sentences of between seven
months and 18 months, even though they had been
responsible for fraud of £3.5 million, and one would
believe that if you had robbed a bank, you would get
a bigger sentence than that. Are you concerned, first,
about the level of sentences of those who are involved
in e-crime? Secondly, are we winning or are we losing
the war against e-crime? Mr Andrews first, and then
Mr Ironside.
Mike Andrews: I think the case you have highlighted
there is a perfect example in that perhaps the
sentencing is not adequate, because, as you have
pointed out, if somebody walked into a bank with a
sawn-off shotgun, they would have probably received
a sentence significantly longer than that. Are we
winning the war? Again, it goes back to the ability to
properly quantify e-crime and the economic impact. I
do not think we can fully quantify that at this stage,
but it is certainly true that unfortunately the cyber-
criminals are generally one, two or even three steps
ahead of law enforcement in terms of their ingenuity
and the methods that they have to hide behind the
anonymity of the internet, and it makes it all the more
difficult for us to track and trace those sorts of
offenders.
Tom Ironside: From our perspective, if you do not
have meaningful and effective enforcement, i.e. if you
do not take appropriate action once criminality has
been identified and see the punishment that flows
through from that, then that obviously causes some
extremely difficult messaging and potentially
encourages additional criminality. Looking at
incidence of e-crime, I think investment by businesses
is successfully screening out lots of criminal activity.
We can see potential in a move to a central reporting
mechanism, but what we really need to see is that
central reporting mechanism working effectively and
delivering the investigations and enforcement that
flow out of that. That is something for the future rather
than something that is here already.
Chair: Mr Andrews and Mr Ironside, thank you very
much for coming. I am sorry it has been a disjointed
session, but we are most grateful to you for coming,
and there must be other information that you feel
would be of help to us. If there is, please do not
hesitate to write to us. We are very pleased that you
have had the opportunity to bond during the important
vote on boundaries in answer to Mr Winnick’s
question.
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Q146 Chair: The Committee is now in session. I
refer all those present to the Register of Members’
Interests, where the interests of Members of this
Committee are noted. This is a session of the
Committee’s inquiry into e-crime, and at the end of
this session we will go into private session to consider
other business. Could I welcome Simon Milner, Sarah
Hunter and Sinéad McSweeney? Thank you very
much for coming to give evidence.
It has been a long, hard struggle for this Committee
to try to get your companies to appear before us. As
you know, we were very keen to hear evidence from
the people responsible for security, because of course
this inquiry is into e-crime, but that I understand was
not possible. Is that correct, Ms Hunter?
Sarah Hunter: We are happy to provide further
evidence in private with our security leads, and I am
happy to talk about the broader policy issues today.
Q147 Chair: Yes, we did want to do this, but I think
there was a problem with getting them because they
are all in America. Are your security people in
America, Mr Milner?
Simon Milner: Yes, the people who lead for us on
law enforcement liaison are in the US.
Q148 Chair: Yours, Ms Hunter, also in America?
Sarah Hunter: That is right, yes.
Q149 Chair: Yours, Ms McSweeney, also in
America?
Sinéad McSweeney: Yes, that is correct.
Q150 Chair: Therefore, the operation of Google,
Facebook and Twitter in the UK is quite limited, is
that correct? How many people do you have working
here, Mr Milner?
Simon Milner: We have around 130 people working
in the UK, predominantly in our sales operation,
although we also established an engineering group in
October last year, so that is a growing part of our
operation in London.
Q151 Chair: I am going to start with a question that
was raised by the judge in the Birmingham case last
week concerning the use of the internet by
organisations and individuals who are perpetrating
attacks and verbal incitement of attacks against
individuals in the state. I went on YouTube this
morning, which of course is owned by Google, and I
Mark Reckless
Chris Ruane
Mr David Winnick
noted the fact that the preachings of Anwar al-Aulaqi,
who was head of al-Qaeda in the South Arabian
Peninsula, are still on YouTube, and those addresses,
some of which could be seen to be inciting religious
and racial hatred, are still on YouTube. Why is it that
they are retained on there, given the record of that
individual?
Sarah Hunter: It is a good chance to talk about this.
Thank you for bringing it up. It is worth saying from
the outset that we in no way condone the use of
YouTube for terrorist content, and to that end we have
very, very strict community guidelines on YouTube
that go way beyond the law. For example, it is not
allowed on YouTube to post content that is inciting
violence; it is not allowed to post content that is hate
speech. When a user flags to us that there is content
up on there that is breaking those guidelines, we
review that content and we take it down, and these
flags get reviewed within an hour, so it is a very
quick process.
Q152 Chair: How many people do you have doing
that?
Sarah Hunter: We have many people. They are
spread across the globe so that we can make sure that
whatever time zone you are in, when you flag
something, it is immediately looked at. They are
spread across a number of different locations.
Q153 Chair: But bearing in mind that this particular
individual has been described as, when he was alive,
number three to Osama bin Laden, and that he headed
the organisation in the South Arabian Peninsula that
was responsible for many deaths, why is his content
still on YouTube?
Sarah Hunter: When content gets flagged to us as
having broken our guidelines, these people review it,
and they look at every single one and they look at it
very carefully, and they look at the context. They look
at what is actually being said, and they look at
whether it is indeed inciting violence.
Q154 Chair: So you have looked at it? Somebody
has looked at all these references to Anwar al-Aulaqi?
Sarah Hunter: If someone has flagged it to us, yes.
Q155 Chair: “Flagging” means what? Can you tell
us?
Sarah Hunter: When you go on to YouTube and you
look at a video, in the bottom right-hand side there is
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a little flag sign, and you can click on that and it says,
“Do you want to report this content?” and you have
to click on the reason why, and that is what flagging
means.
Q156 Chair: Sure, and this has been done in this
particular case?
Sarah Hunter: I don’t know if it has been done in
every single video. Anyone could do it. I could do it;
you could do it.
Q157 Chair: No, I know, but I am referring to it
specifically, and if you do not know the content—I am
very happy to accept that you do not know the
content, but this is the content of speeches by Anwar
al-Aulaqi, who was wanted for a number of criminal
activities and whose preachings were noted by the
judge in the bombing trial of last week in
Birmingham. Are you familiar with what I am
talking about?
Sarah Hunter: I have seen some of this content on
YouTube.
Chair: You have?
Sarah Hunter: I have seen some of his content on
YouTube, yes.
Q158 Chair: You are satisfied that this content is not
content that YouTube is concerned about and that
ought to be taken down? Somebody has looked at this
content, they are very happy that it comes within your
guidelines and it therefore remains on the internet?
You are happy with that, are you?
Sarah Hunter: I haven’t personally looked at all of
this content, and it is just worth remembering the scale
of content on YouTube. There are 72 hours of content
uploaded on to YouTube every single minute of the
day, so it is just physically not possible for us to look
at every single video that gets uploaded. We rely on
our users, and there are hundreds of millions of people
across the world looking at YouTube all the time.
When they tell us there is content that breaks the
guidelines, that is when our team kicks in, reviews it
and removes it.
Q159 Chair: You will then look at it. As a matter of
policy, can you just tell me how many of these videos
you have taken down as a result of somebody alleging
a criminal act is being incited and therefore you have
had to remove those videos?
Sarah Hunter: I don’t think we have specific numbers
of how many broadly are flagged and then removed.
We have numbers of how many—
Q160 Chair: You have no indication of how many
people have complained or flagged? An internet
company like yours, with so many databases, so many
experts, will not know how many people have flagged
a particular video?
Sarah Hunter: We probably would internally within
the YouTube removals team, but I don’t personally
have that number here, no.
Q161 Chair: No. So, you would know? You do have
that information?
Sarah Hunter: When a video gets flagged, yes.
Q162 Chair: Yes, and you would also have the
information of how many of these videos have been
taken down?
Sarah Hunter: Of the ones that have been flagged,
yes.
Q163 Chair: Yes, and how many are there?
Sarah Hunter: I couldn’t tell you now. I can
probably ask.
Q164 Chair: Would you write to the Committee?
Sarah Hunter: Absolutely. I will ask.
Chair: We are very happy if this needs to be in
private. I do not see why it should be, because this is
just a matter of fact. If you could write to us and tell
us the figures as to how many of these videos have
been flagged and how many have been taken down—
Sarah Hunter: Absolutely.
Q165 Mr Winnick: Following what the Chair has
just said, recognising again the extent of the
communications involved—some totally unknown,
obviously, up to 10 to 15 years ago—it is not simply
the rantings of the cleric mentioned by the Chair, but
other incitements to hate crimes, certainly against
Muslims, anti-Semitism and the rest. You say matters
are flagged up when complaints are made. My
question is, before complaints are made, what sort of
control is there to try to ensure that hate crimes—
incitement against people because of their racial
origin, religion or sexuality—do not go on?
Sarah Hunter: Because of the scale of the amount of
content that gets uploaded on to YouTube, we do not
have a way of reviewing it in advance of its being
posted, but it is an amazingly effective system, this
flagging system. Because we have hundreds of
millions of people looking at YouTube all the time,
things get flagged very, very quickly, so if there is
content that the users, the real people using YouTube,
believe is breaking our hate speech rules, for example,
it gets reviewed and taken down within an hour.
Q166 Mr Winnick: There is all the difference,
obviously, between that and a newspaper, which
would be very anxious, if it was responsible,
regardless of its political stand, not to include any
item that incited hatred. In this form of technology,
that is not possible, or does that—
Sarah Hunter: Yes. YouTube is a very different
platform to a website that a newspaper publishes.
Mr Winnick: I understand.
Sarah Hunter: We do not choose what content gets
put up on there, and that is one of the great things
about this platform—that anyone can put content up
on YouTube and express a view or launch a band or
put a film up. It is an incredibly open system, and
it means that people have an opportunity to express
themselves in a way they never had before. If you
look at the use of YouTube, for example, in the
Middle East, it has been an amazingly powerful force
for good in terms of improving democracy. Yes, our
role is very, very different from a newspaper
publisher’s.
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Q167 Mr Winnick: It is open, really, to any hate
merchant, until fortunately, hopefully, someone flags
it up pretty quickly?
Sarah Hunter: As I said earlier, we really don’t want
the platform to be used for those ends—
Mr Winnick: Obviously not.
Sarah Hunter:—and we do have these strict
guidelines. I think what we are talking about here is
the means for making sure the platform is kept open
and the means for which it is being kept clean. I think,
as I said earlier, this is a rather effective way of
making sure bad content is taken down as effectively
and efficiently as we can.
Q168 Chair: Yes; thank you. Let us move on to the
issue of criminal targeting. Mr Milner, those of us who
are using Twitter declare our interest. I am a very bad
Twitter user, but you have, I understand, 6 million,
6.2 million—
Simon Milner: I am Facebook, so—
Chair: Ms McSweeney is Twitter; all right.
Simon Milner: I am happy to answer any questions
about Facebook.
Chair: There are 6.2 million people on Twitter at the
moment in the UK, or is it more?
Sinéad McSweeney: Sir, no. Our worldwide users,
200 million—
Chair: In the UK?
Sinéad McSweeney:—and 10 million in the UK.
Q169 Chair: Facebook?
Simon Milner: In the UK, 33 million, and globally,
a billion.
Q170 Chair: As far as Google is concerned, how
many users do you have?
Sarah Hunter: I have to say I don’t know. I apologise.
I could find out for you. Obviously, we are different
from these two companies, and we have about 53
different services. We have Gmail, we have YouTube,
and we have Google Search.
Q171 Chair: Indeed. We have received very
powerful evidence from the police and others about
the way in which criminals are hacking into the
internet—in particular Twitter, Facebook and other
internet service providers. Ms McSweeney, is this on
the increase, or is it being contained?
Sinéad McSweeney: I think that our own view would
concur with some of the evidence that you have heard:
that there is an increase in sophisticated, well-
resourced attacks on platforms. I draw a distinction
between the incident that we spoke publicly about
recently, which was an attack on the platform, and
the individual account compromises that people see
occasionally, which generally arise from a
compromise of the individual’s account or their
password or their email because they clicked on a
link. So there are two different things.
But in terms of advanced, persistent threats from
sophisticated and well-resourced individuals with
expertise, with resources, there has been an increase
in those, and we are currently working with law
enforcement in the United States on the recent
incident, but in its broadest sense it is important that
there is a sharing of information between companies
and law enforcement and the kind of work that you
are doing here to highlight it, because it is a threat to
the internet, rather than to individual companies.
Q172 Chair: Indeed. Mr Milner, do you share that
concern of Ms McSweeney? Is it on the increase as
far as Facebook is concerned? Are people hacking
into Facebook?
Simon Milner: Yes. That is something certainly that
my security colleagues would concur with: that we
see consistent evidence in the UK, as you have heard
from a number of senior people from law enforcement
over the past several months, and in the US.
For instance, the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint
Centre, which you may have come across, reports
every year on the statistics on the complaints it
receives about internet crime, and they have
consistently reported year-on-year increases. The
main areas of crime that they say are on the increase
are financial scams, including criminals posing as the
FBI and saying, “Your computer has been
compromised. Give us your details, and we can help
you out”—actually they are scamming them—and
identity theft. Those are the two areas they report as
on the increase, and that concurs with our own view
about attacks on our own users.
Q173 Chair: There has been evidence put forward
that this is coming from countries like China. Would
you have a list of countries or individuals where these
attacks are coming from? Obviously you have read
about what is being alleged concerning the launching
of attacks in China. Would you concur with that?
Simon Milner: We are certainly aware of that
suggestion from the authorities, and it is very much
something we leave to the authorities, to law
enforcement and to international authorities to offer a
view on where those attacks are coming from. It is
not something that we have been public about in terms
of our views on that.
Q174 Chair: For you, Ms McSweeney, I think you
were referring to the recent events when 250,000
emails and other information of your users were, in
effect, stolen.
Sinéad McSweeney: Yes. Our security people noted
some unusual activity and quickly took action to close
that down, but in the course of which they believed
there was a possibility that some password
information of users had been compromised, so they
reset the passwords of those users and immediately
notified them by email, and we also made a public
statement. We don’t hold a lot of personal information
on our users, so it would generally be email and
passwords.
Q175 Chair: Presumably, your organisations employ
very clever and sophisticated people. Are they able to
tell you where these attacks are coming from—which
country or which individuals?
Sinéad McSweeney: In the context of the recent
incident, our security people, those clever people that
you talk about, are working very closely with law
enforcement, and in that context, given my own
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background in policing for 10 years, I would be
anxious not to say anything here that might
compromise or prejudice those investigations.
Q176 Chair: No, we understand that, but we have
had evidence from the City of London police that
most of the attacks are coming from gangs in
countries like Russia and Eastern Europe, and China
was also raised, but you do not have any information
for this Committee on particular countries? They
have it.
Sinéad McSweeney: I think they, given their expertise
in the area, are best placed to make those public
pronouncements.
Q177 Chris Ruane: Before you mentioned that if
somebody flags up a hate crime, you will be on top of
it within an hour, but what action do you take when
users report that their accounts have been hijacked or
that they have been victims of online scams or abuse,
and how long does that process take? Also, when you
are deciding to take an item down, whose standards
do you use? Whose laws do you use? Is it the US,
China, EU, or an amalgamation? Are there regional
differences around the world?
Sarah Hunter: Shall I start on the hijacking issue?
Hijacking of accounts is a significant problem. There
has been some evidence that phishing emails, as in
emails that have been sent to people in an attempt to
try to get their passwords out of them, are increasingly
coming from accounts—emails from people they
think they know. Of course, they are not from people
they know; they are from those accounts that have
been hijacked. We spend a lot of money and a lot of
time trying to prevent accounts from being hijacked
in the first place. We spend hundreds of millions of
pounds in keeping our users’ data safe. We employ
350 security engineers dedicated to this task.
In the last two years, we have seen the number of
accounts hijacked—Google accounts hijacked; that is,
across all the Google products—decrease by 99.7%.
We have done that by developing a technology that
scans account activity and looks at suspicious activity.
For example, if you have a Gmail account and you
signed in from London, and then an hour later signed
in from Australia, we would see that as a signal of
suspicious activity, and we would ask you a few
questions, some security questions; “Are you really
you?” That is an amazingly effective way to stop
hijacking, and as a result we have significantly
reduced the number of hijacked accounts.
In the few cases where the accounts do unfortunately
get hijacked, you as a user can go to the sign-in page,
so the YouTube sign-in page or the Gmail sign-in
page, and click, “I don’t have my password. Someone
has stolen my account”, or whatever, and you
automatically are taken through some security
questions to identify that you are indeed yourself,
something like, “What mobile phone number did you
give us to associate with the account?” or, “What was
the back-up email address you gave us when you set
up the account?” Those pieces of information you
would know but the criminal would not know. Once
you provide us that information, we restore your
settings and block the person who has hijacked the
account, so it is a very, very quick and automatic
service that we have put in place to prevent people
being locked out of their accounts for long.
Q178 Chris Ruane: Whose standards do you—
Sarah Hunter: That is a Google set of standards.
Chris Ruane: Right, but the other aspect of abuse
and slander and hate crimes, that monitoring: whose
standards do you use for that?
Sarah Hunter: On YouTube, going back to the
conversation earlier, our community guidelines are set
by Google, and they are our own internal standards.
They have evolved over the years.
We introduced a flag for terrorist activity just a couple
of years ago, and that is a relatively new innovation.
Those standards are things that we ourselves have set
up. With YouTube, it is a platform where we own, we
host all the content, we set the rules of the road, and
we want it to be a platform where—is the balance
right between people feeling like it is a platform they
want to enjoy, they feel safe on, but also that is used
for free expression? That is almost a premise of the
guidelines that we have set.
Q179 Steve McCabe: I just wanted to ask you if you
were familiar with a Trojan or a virus called Ukash,
which I believe is spelled U-K-A-S-H, which
masquerades as an official police document. I
wondered if any of you had encountered that or had
any complaints from your users about being victims
of it.
Simon Milner: It is not something I have come
across, but I am happy to ask my security colleagues,
and if they have heard of it, I will write to the
Committee to explain, but it is not something that I
have come across from any of my colleagues involved
in the security side of our platform.
Sarah Hunter: Me too, I am afraid. I can find out.
Q180 Steve McCabe: Would that be because you do
not necessarily have the level of technical detail that
would identify that? I am asking because I understood
this was quite a common occurrence and that it is
actually quite a nasty piece of work because it
demands money by untraceable vouchers that are
designed to permeate the system. There may be other
versions of the same thing; I see you nodding. I
understood it was quite common, and I was just
surprised. What I wanted to ask was: what do you do
about something like that?
Sinéad McSweeney: If it is of assistance, it is not
something that we would be experiencing within the
platform, and I think that is what my colleagues are
saying. It is a common scam within email systems,
rather than within a platform like Twitter or like
Facebook.
My familiarity with it comes from work around crime
prevention in communication in my previous job with
the Irish police, where we had to highlight the fact
that people may be receiving this email that purported
to come from law enforcement, as my colleague from
Facebook mentioned earlier, and was looking for
either money or information in order to get somebody
out of a perceived difficulty that the email suggested
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they had got themselves into. But in terms of it being
within the platforms, no, that is not our experience.
Simon Milner: It is the same for us, in the sense that
when people are receiving messages on Facebook, it
is from people they know. We are a platform on which
you have to use your real identity. You make
friendships, typically with people you know in the real
world, and you can only receive messages from those
friends. Therefore, we do not have the same kind of
email functionality, where if somebody can find your
email address on a list somewhere, they can send you
an email.
Something like 90% of email is spam, whereas
significantly less than 5% of all the traffic on
Facebook might involve some kind of spam. It is a
very different order of magnitude, and I suspect
Ukash—although I will ask my colleagues about
this—is an email-based Trojan, rather than something
that affects our platform.
Steve McCabe: Maybe I can come back later,
Chairman, to the question about whether you always
get Facebook messages from people you know, but
we can return to that.
Q181 Chair: Yes, of course, Mr McCabe. The
Norton 2012 Cybercrime Survey reported that 40% of
users of social networks have said that they were the
victims of e-crime, which is a very large figure. Are
you surprised at that figure, Mr Milner?
Simon Milner: I am surprised at that figure, in that,
as Ms Hunter was explaining earlier, we similarly use
very sophisticated technology to block attempts to
attack our users at the source in invisible ways that
our users would never see. We are constantly
updating that.
Security is an arms race and you have to be very
vigilant to see what is coming around the corner and
to make sure you are prepared for it, and the great
majority of our users never experience a problem.
That is certainly a number I don’t recognise in respect
to Facebook, and I will happily look at the Norton
survey to understand whether or not they break down
their data into particular social media platforms, but it
is certainly not something that we see on a regular
basis in the UK, or anywhere else around the world,
in terms of those kinds of numbers.
Q182 Chair: Ms McSweeney, what does e-crime
cost your organisation? Can you put a cost on e-crime
as far as Twitter is concerned?
Sinéad McSweeney: No, I couldn’t put a cost on it.
From our point of view, we want users to enjoy the
platform that is provided to them to discuss any range
of issues, so it is in our interests to ensure that that
experience is not being disrupted by e-crime. Twitter
is a slightly different platform in that it is very public,
so most of what people communicate on Twitter is
visible to anybody who wants to look at it, so it is less
attractive, even for spam activity. It is detected more
easily, because it is visible if one particular account is
“@-replying” lots of accounts at the same time, so
from our point of view it is not—
Chair: Yes, thank you. Ms Hunter?
Sarah Hunter: We haven’t made an assessment across
the board. As I said earlier, we have spent hundreds
of millions of dollars to date on protecting our users’
data, so it is not cheap, but it is incredibly important.
I think user trust is really at the heart of—
Q183 Chair: Hundreds of millions of dollars?
Sarah Hunter: Yes, and I think user trust is at the
heart of our business model. If you think about all
of our businesses, they are free, and there is lots of
competition. There are lots of alternatives. If users do
not believe we are keeping their data safe, they will
go somewhere else, so it really is in our commercial
interests to make sure the platform is kept as safe as
possible.
Q184 Chair: Mr Milner, could you put a cost on it?
Simon Milner: No, it is not a number that we have
ever made public, nor is it one that I am aware of.
Chair: But presumably you do spend money on it.
Simon Milner: Of course. I am sure we spend quite a
lot of money on it, but it is not something where, as I
said, we have released a public figure on how much
we spend on that.
Q185 Mr Clappison: Perhaps I could ask Ms Hunter
this question. How do private companies navigate the
patchwork of different national laws when it comes to
online security and data protection, and do you think
there should be a more international approach?
Sarah Hunter: It is complex. The internet is a global
platform and people across the world use it, and
Governments across the world want to keep their
users safe online. I suppose from a law enforcement
perspective it is no different to international crime
offline. If you are pursuing an international
investigation, you have to deal with lots of different
colleagues in other countries. Google Inc is a US-
based company, so I think one of the key tactics or
the key tools in ensuring that law enforcement can
address online crime is to think of the MLAT process,
the multilateral assistance treaties, and those are the
agreements between the US and other countries for
cross-border investigations to take place.
I looked at some of the previous evidence you had
talking about MLAT and how it was a slow process,
and I think that is something we should be definitely
looking at to speed up. The UK and the US have a
renowned close relationship, and I think if we can
make that process work any better, that is surely going
to help law enforcement.
Q186 Mr Clappison: Perhaps I can put the same
point to Ms McSweeney, because she obviously has a
different perspective on this, coming from her
background.
Sinéad McSweeney: I think, again, because of the
nature of the platform, an awful lot of the material
that law enforcement would be interested in obtaining
is available and public to them. Similar to my Google
colleague, our emphasis, other than emergency
requests, would be on the MLAT procedure, but that is
something that we also gave evidence at the previous
hearing and felt that this was something that could be
improved to make it better for all of the parties to the
process in terms of acquiring information.
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In terms of the patchwork of laws, aside from things
like law enforcement requests and data privacy, we
also have country-withheld content, where if there is
a tweet or an account that is illegal in one country but
not in others, it can be withheld in that country. For
example, an account advocating Nazi messages in
Germany was withheld in Germany, and anti-Semitic
content was withheld in France.
Q187 Mr Clappison: Would it be withheld here as
well, then? Would it be withheld in this country
because it was withheld in Germany?
Sinéad McSweeney: If the content was illegal within
the jurisdiction—
Mr Clappison: It might not be technically illegal
here, but we probably do not want to see it.
Sinéad McSweeney: The standards by which we
judge that content are the Twitter rules and the legal
content, if it is illegal—the laws of the particular
country within which the report is coming from. If the
content is illegal in a country, it can be withheld on
request from law enforcement or Government.
Q188 Mr Clappison: Could I ask the witnesses what
they think of the new European draft data protection
regulation?
Simon Milner: I am happy to help you with that. It
might be worth, just by way of preface, explaining
that the way Facebook operates in Europe is that all
users in Europe, including all 33 million account-
holders in the UK, have a contract with Facebook
Ireland, and therefore they are regulated under EU
data protection law by the Office of the Data
Protection Commissioner in Ireland. We are regulated
here, and therefore of course we are very interested in
changes in the EU framework that will impact on Irish
national law and therefore the rules that we have to
face.
We think the law does need modernising. It has been
a long time since it was last updated and it certainly
needs modernising for the internet age. There is a very
vigorous debate going on in Brussels, as you may
know, involving national Governments. We think
there are some good proposals that have come out of
the Commission, including the idea of a one-stop
shop, so companies that are operating across Europe
and are handling citizens’ data should be able to be
regulated in one place under a regulation that applies
right across Europe, and not be subject to the
oversight of regulators in each one of those countries.
We think that is a very good proposal, and indeed
that is effectively how we operate with the Irish Data
Protection Commissioner.
There are some things that are more worrying, and—
Q189 Mr Clappison: I was going to ask you if there
was anything that was more—
Simon Milner: Yes, there are some things that are
more worrying, but there is a lively debate and an
openness we see in the Commission and some
Members of Parliament for reflecting on these. Things
like requiring explicit consent every time your data is
used for something new, we think that that should be
content-specific, so in a service like Facebook, which
people join to share their data—you do not join
Facebook to keep things to yourself; you join it to
share—it shouldn’t be the case that every time we are
introducing a new feature, you have to provide
explicit consent to that.
Q190 Mr Clappison: Could you explain how exactly
that would work? What is being proposed by the
European Commission?
Simon Milner: Remember that there are a number of
different proposals. There are the Commission’s
original proposals. We have had two reports from the
Parliament that have contained different sets of
amendments, so there are now a range of different
proposals out there, but one of them is certainly
requiring a much more granular form of explicit
consent almost at every turn.
One of the things I hope Members will be familiar
with is the e-privacy directive. How it is played out is
that every time you go to a new website, you see this
similar kind of banner saying, “This site uses cookies.
Click here to make sure you are all right with them”.
If you started seeing that on more and more websites
all the time, the whole experience of using those sites
would become much less attractive, frankly, much
more fragmented, and it would also stymie innovation.
There are lots of policy-makers who agree that we
have to get the balance right between allowing
companies to innovate—and that is not just the likes
of us on this panel, but also lots of small companies
that are using our platforms and creating new data-
driven businesses, including in the UK—while also
allowing users of the internet to protect and control
their data.
Q191 Steve McCabe: I was struck by that point
about having to keep telling people about cookies.
Doesn’t that really mean that if you can do away with
that, you are entitled to give people forced advertising
whether they want to view it or not?
Simon Milner: No, not necessarily. One of the things
that we should recognise is that you can offer different
kinds of control. For instance, on our platform we
provide very granular control that enables you, if you
see an ad from a company you do not want to see, to
click on that ad and tell us, “I don’t want to see ads
from this company again”, and we will ask you why,
so you can control it.
Q192 Steve McCabe: After you are forced to view
it; that is my point. You are giving people something
that they did not ask to see, aren’t you?
Simon Milner: I am not sure that is entirely right. I
think people recognise that they are getting some
fantastic services for free, but those services have to
be paid for, a bit like watching ITV. You expect that
you are going to see adverts when you watch ITV.
You don’t decide what ads you are going to see; ITV
does. With the kind of platform we operate, we can
provide you with advertising that is much more likely
to be of interest to you because we know more about
you, and we can use that data to help you have a
better experience.
Chair: That is enough advertising from Facebook.
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Q193 Mark Reckless: Mr Milner, you said that you
had 33 million Facebook users in the UK and I think
around 1 billion globally. What is the number for the
EU?
Simon Milner: I would have to check that and come
back to you. I don’t have an EU number in my head,
but it will be obviously substantial. The UK I am
pretty sure is our biggest market in Europe, but there
are lots of other markets where we do quite well as
well.
Q194 Mark Reckless: Assuming we are in the
hundreds of millions potentially for the EU, isn’t that
rather a lot of users for the Office of the Irish Data
Protection Commissioner to oversee?
Simon Milner: No, because the Facebook platform is
the same wherever you are in the world. We have a
single platform. There is no such thing as
facebook.co.uk or facebook.ie for Ireland. It is a
single platform that operates on the same basis
throughout Europe, and indeed throughout the world,
and therefore when it comes to the Irish Data
Protection Commissioner he is able—and indeed he
has over the last few years conducted a major audit of
all of our data use policies and dived deep into
everything we do in terms of how we handle data. He
has produced a public report. I am happy to share the
link to that report with you. No, in fact, he is
absolutely able to handle that volume of users,
because the service is the same and the way we handle
people’s data is the same wherever you are.
Q195 Mark Reckless: I am glad that Facebook has
such confidence in him, but we were asked to have a
similar measure of trust in the Icelandic authorities in
respect to financial regulation. Are you able to clarify
to the Committee how many staff there are in the
Office of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner?
Simon Milner: I think that is really a matter for Mr
Hawkes and his team, and—
Q196 Mark Reckless: You were relying on him and
telling us how deep he had gone and what fantastic
work he had done.
Simon Milner: I think the best thing to do would be to
look at the report. They have produced two substantial
reports, one in December of 2011, which runs to
several pages, lots of recommendations, a highly
detailed, technical report, and they brought in
technical experts from outside of the Commission to
help do that. They then did a follow-up report, which
was published in September of last year. I am happy
to share those reports, and we certainly have not had
any other authority come to us and say they have not
done a decent job. Certainly, Chris Graham, of the
Information Commissioner’s Office in the UK,
recognised that as a high-quality audit of our business.
Q197 Mark Reckless: Yes. Mr Milner, you relied on
the Irish Data Commissioner, and you ask the
Committee to have assurance in the work that it does
on the basis of that Commissioner. It is not an
unreasonable question for me to ask you how many
people are in the Office of the Irish Data
Commissioner. I do not particularly want our Clerks
to find out. I understand if you do not know
immediately, but could I ask you to write to the
Committee with that information?
Simon Milner: I am happy to write to the Committee,
and I will also provide a copy of his reports.
Q198 Mark Reckless: Thank you. Ms McSweeney,
clearly I understand the Twitter position is that the
liability for all content posted through Twitter lies
with the user who has posted it, but can I ask what
responsibility you feel to remove hate speech or
threatening content from Twitter?
Sinéad McSweeney: The fundamental basis for
Twitter’s existence as a platform is to facilitate the
sharing of ideas and to facilitate discussion on a range
of issues, and we have found that and put a premium
on the fact that we don’t mediate or monitor that
content. However, we do take some responsibility for
the content in terms of we have an objective set of
standards, the Twitter rules, by which that content can
be judged if it is reported to us by another user, and
also, as I have mentioned earlier, the laws of the
individual countries. We feel that, as a platform
founded on the ideals of free speech, the only way in
which we can do that is to measure content against
those objective standards, because we don’t want a
situation where people would feel that content was not
available on Twitter because of Twitter’s view, as
some kind of corporate view or a subjective view on
an issue.
Going back to the old John Stuart Mill quote that
anybody who studied jurisprudence would have
studied in college, the best counter to bad speech is
good speech, and in some ways the concept around
community self-regulation and the process by which
users and individuals are educated as to what is good
speech and bad speech is better achieved when people
are called out on bad speech than when it just
disappears and nobody is sure of why it has
disappeared. There was a recent example in recent
days where an account tweeted something that many,
many people considered to be offensive about a young
actress who was attending the Oscars. Rather than
somebody external stepping in and removing that
content, the people who tweeted that themselves
removed that content and apologised for it because of
the outrage that they received from the community.
That is not always an easy place in which to be.
It does not mean that Twitter condones the content
of some of the speech that appears on our platform.
However, where speech is short of being illegal—and
we have seen examples with homophobic speech,
where an offensive and homophobic discussion was
taken over by others and ended up being a more
affirming approach, so that is the approach we take.
Q199 Chair: Thank you, Ms McSweeney. In respect
to what Mr Reckless has just asked you, pictures
purportedly of James Bulger’s killer, Jon Venables,
were posted on Twitter on 14 February, and the
Attorney General has said that he is taking contempt
proceedings against those who posted the
photographs.
I understand that this is a huge network and there is a
lot of information going up on the internet, but here
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is an example where somebody is acting unlawfully,
where the Law Officer—you have worked for the
Attorney General in Ireland, I understand—has said
that he is going to take the people who have posted
these photographs on Twitter to court. Why are you
not taking down those photographs when you know
that it is unlawful for them to put them up?
Sinéad McSweeney: There are a number of aspects to
this. I am conscious of the sensitivity of this particular
case, and I don’t want to be drawn into issues around
any individual accounts. We work with law
enforcement here in the UK. We have established
points—
Chair: Just on the principle, as opposed to the detail.
Sinéad McSweeney: We have established points of
contact with law enforcement in the UK. Where they
communicate with us about content and bring content
to our attention that is illegal, the appropriate steps
and actions are taken by the company, and you may
read into those words what you wish in the context
of the—
Q200 Chair: You would expect an approach from a
law officer, not necessarily on this particular case? If
something is on the internet, on Twitter unlawfully,
you would expect somebody to come to you and say,
“We are going to launch contempt proceedings. Take
it down”, and it clearly has not happened?
Sinéad McSweeney: No, I didn’t say that. As I say,
we have ongoing contact with law enforcement in the
UK, and we have established points of contact with
law enforcement in the UK.
Q201 Chair: They would come to you?
Sinéad McSweeney: When they come to us, we take
the appropriate action. Just to be clear, there are a
number of reasons why it has to be reported to us.
The first is a very practical one: it is the scale of the
material. We have 400 million tweets a day, so we
cannot proactively monitor and mediate that content.
Also, we need to be sure. There are straightforward
cases like the one you have mentioned, but there are
others where we need to be clear that the report is
coming to us from an authorised legal entity who is
acting in good faith.
Q202 Chair: That is the only bit that concerns me
about your evidence so far. I think the whole
Committee accepts that the internet is a power for
good. With the evidence that we have received in
terms of criminality, I would just have expected more
proactive activity on the part of yourselves as
providers. In answer to what Mr Winnick said earlier
and my previous questions and what Mr Reckless has
put to you all so far, you all seem to be waiting for
someone to come to you before you act. Is that unfair?
Sarah Hunter: I don’t think that is fair—I think it is
a little unfair, if I may. For example, we run a service
called Safe Browsing. When we developed Google
Search, we had to scan the trillions of web pages out
there to create our search index. We have developed
technology that scans those sites and that identifies
where sites are hosting malware, so codes that can
infect your computer. That scanning technology, this
Safe Browsing technology, identifies about 10,000
websites every single day that we think are suspect.
That information we create into a list that comes up
in Google Search results. You may have noticed in
Google Search that sometimes there is a website, and
beneath it it says, “This site may have been
compromised”. That tells you that there is probably
malware or something bad on that site. We have
developed this technology, we spent a lot of money
developing this technology, and this technology is
now free to other browsers to use.
We developed the list, but it is then used by Safari, by
Firefox, by our competitors, to make their own search
results and browsing safer. The idea that we are not
taking responsibility I think is a little unfair. This is a
significant investment. As I think Sinéad said earlier,
we do depend on people to trust the internet for the
good of our businesses, because if they don’t, they are
not going to use it.
Chair: Sure. We will come back to you, because other
colleagues want to come in.
Q203 Bridget Phillipson: Certainly in terms of
Twitter, there have been a number of prosecutions
recently that have resulted from comments that people
have tweeted. Do you think your users fully
understand how the law works online, and how would
you respond to the recent guidance offered by the
Director of Public Prosecutions in this area?
Sinéad McSweeney: I think it is important that people
increasingly understand that online is no different
from offline, that what is illegal offline is illegal
online, and in that context, when people sign up to
Twitter, they agree in very simple language that they
will abide by the laws of the country in which they
themselves are when they are using Twitter.
There is an extent to which you can over-complicate
it and talk about, “People should not have to
understand the law”, but an awful lot of that which
becomes law is just common sense or human decency,
or it is good interpersonal behaviour. The law is a way
of ensuring that there is a method by which society
can enforce those standards, so to that extent I think
users have—as indeed across the kind of keeping safe,
as well as breaking the law—their own obligations to
educate themselves about how to stay safe, how to
stay secure online, but equally they need to deploy
their own judgment about how they use the platforms
in the context of the laws of the country in which
they are.
Simon Milner: Perhaps I can help on the Director of
Public Prosecutions point. That is an area where the
law is different online than it is offline, in that you
can say some things in this space, in a spoken way—
and indeed I have heard Keir Starmer talking about
this. He could say things in a public forum that would
be perfectly legal. If he put them in an email or in a
Facebook message or a tweet, they would be illegal,
and it is one of the ways in which the online and
offline are not properly aligned, and something
hopefully the Government will look at as it looks at
the Communications Act in the coming years.
Therefore, the approach that Mr Starmer is proposing,
and indeed he is already asking public prosecutors to
adopt, we think is the right one. He has it spot on, but
cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [E] Processed: [29-07-2013 13:16] Job: 029956 Unit: PG05
Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/029956/029956_o005_michelle_130226 ECrime corrected transcript.xml
Ev 38 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence
26 February 2013 Sarah Hunter, Simon Milner and Sinéad McSweeney
he should focus on the context and the harm that
might result from a communication that might, as it
were, accentuate the impact of it, rather than just
exactly what was said in the communication itself. We
are very impressed by the analysis, and we think he
has it spot on. I guess the proof will be in the pudding
as it plays out over the next several months.
Q204 Bridget Phillipson: Just one follow-up to Ms
McSweeney. There was a case just last year where a
rape victim was named repeatedly via Twitter. Clearly,
the responsibility for doing that is the responsibility
of those who choose to post that content, but is that
something that you have learned from? How would
you respond to that then and now? Is there any
difference?
Sinéad McSweeney: Again, we would have to be
aware that it was happening, because we won’t
necessarily know that it is happening on the platform.
Again, where issues like that are brought to our
attention, we can take action. The naming of rape
victims—again it should be obvious to most people
that that is not something—you do not have to know
that it is illegal or that it is contempt, because in some
senses in personal, offline conversations we tend to
talk about rape or the victim of rape in whispered
tones. We know that it is a sensitive issue, so why
people would change their behaviour when they are
online is different, but again, the issue—if it is
flagged, if it is reported to us, yes, we can take action.
Q205 Bridget Phillipson: It is just the number of
people that you can reach with such a message is far
greater than a conversation you might have with one
or two people. You could potentially reach millions of
people, as opposed to a conversation one-to-one or in
a small group. That is the damage, isn’t it?
Sinéad McSweeney: Yes, it is. It is, potentially, and
that is why, for example, the Law Commission here is
currently doing a substantial consultation on
contempt, and we have attended the symposium and
are taking an interest in that, because the world has
become more complicated.
Chair: Thank you. I should say to colleagues and
witnesses that we are expecting a vote shortly.
Q206 Mr Winnick: Ms McSweeney, arising from
the replies you gave to Mr Reckless and to the Chair,
I am slightly concerned because, without putting
words into your mouth, I think you said, in effect,
rather like Ms Hunter previously, that there is a debate
and that people can put their views—obviously they
can—and then if there are complaints, the matter will
be looked into. You see, if someone on Twitter said,
“Hitler was right”, or, “The Holocaust never
occurred” which is not a criminal offence in this
country—there is no reason why it should be—or a
rape victim very much in the media “asked for it”—
such a crude sort of description, and absolutely
disgusting—presumably that is simply on Twitter and,
until someone complains, it remains on Twitter. Am
I right?
Sinéad McSweeney: But those events, those instances
that you talk about, don’t just happen on Twitter.
People stand up in football stadiums and hurl racial
abuse at players on the field. Those—
Q207 Mr Winnick: Does that justify going on
Twitter?
Sinéad McSweeney: Those around them will call
them out on that, and similarly on Twitter, rather than
Twitter deciding as a corporation or as a bunch of
individuals whether that is good or bad. Our approach
is that the other users of the platform decide what is
good speech and what is bad speech. Also, we do give
users the ability to control their own experience. If I
have a particular set of interests, that is what I will get
from Twitter. I may never see a tweet about football or
golf or sport in general. I will see lots of tweets about
politics, about policing, about things in which I am
interested, so people can define their own experience.
The problem is that taking the bad speech away
doesn’t remove the thoughts from somebody’s mind,
doesn’t remove those sentiments from society, and
sometimes is it better to see those thoughts and see
them challenged than to just remove them from the
public mind and public view.
Q208 Mr Winnick: So, anything should really go on
Twitter until someone complains?
Sinéad McSweeney: No, we don’t say that anything
should go on Twitter. We have a set of rules, we have
rules by which we believe our users should behave,
and we also ask that our users obey the laws of the
countries in which they live.
Q209 Mr Winnick: The examples I gave of
someone, sick in mind, obviously—“Hitler was right.
The Holocaust never occurred”, or, “The rape victim
asked for it”; that could and would go on Twitter?
Sinéad McSweeney: There are individuals who stand
in universities and make those statements.
Q210 Steve McCabe: It does sound as if you are
coming dangerously close to describing yourself as
the innocent arch-facilitator, that Twitter trolls are the
responsibility of everybody else and that cyber-
bullying is entirely the responsibility of those who do
it. I do not deny their responsibility, but it does seem
to me they are able to do it with enormous reach
because of the service you provide, and if that results
in a youngster deciding to take his own life or some
other tragedy—certainly the parents of a child who
killed themselves in my constituency have met with
Facebook staff—surely if it results in that, you have
to go back and examine what you do and decide what
more you can do to control this thing that you have
unleashed.
Sinéad McSweeney: I do not think we are standing
back from our responsibility. I know that within
Twitter we have—
Q211 Steve McCabe: What is it that you have done
that you have not told us about so far that shows you
taking more control and responsibility for it? Because
what I have heard so far is how you react when
somebody else takes control and reports it to you.
Sinéad McSweeney: I think there are two sides to
that. On the safety side, not only do we have a set
cobber Pack: U PL: COE1 [O] Processed: [29-07-2013 13:16] Job: 029956 Unit: PG05
Source: /MILES/PKU/INPUT/029956/029956_o005_michelle_130226 ECrime corrected transcript.xml
Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 39
26 February 2013 Sarah Hunter, Simon Milner and Sinéad McSweeney
of rules by which users’ behaviour is measured and
observes the laws of the country, we also have a
hugely—densely, almost—populated safety centre
with advice. There are safety tips for parents, teens,
teachers—like all of the other companies here, we
participate in Safer Internet Day. We have
relationships with all of the key organisations in this
space, and just as the bad speech, as you would term
it, reaches millions of people, those safety messages,
that advice, those resources that are there to help
people who are experiencing bullying, who are
experiencing depression or mental health difficulties
are also there on all our platforms and accessed by the
individuals who are vulnerable and who are helped
by them.
On the security side, again, yes, we talked about the
instances that are flagged to us, but, as I know only
too well from 10 years in policing, the best antidote
to crime is prevention. It is all very well to react to a
crime, to detect a crime, but the best activity that any
law enforcement involves itself in, or corporations
like ourselves, is to educate people.
Q212 Steve McCabe: But I am asking you how you
are preventing. I hear a lot about how you react when
something has happened and somebody reports it, and
you say you have some warning material displays, but
how do you prevent it? It happens persistently.
Sarah Hunter: Shall I give an example of something
we have done at Google, because obviously we have
been around a bit longer than Twitter? There was a
case a couple of years ago where there were some
suicide cases, and they were, in the inquest, reported
to have used Google Search to identify ways to harm
themselves and eventually, sadly, kill themselves.
There was quite a public outcry about this and, sort
of, “What can be done?”
We met with the Samaritans to talk about this, because
obviously no one wants to see these sort of cases,
and we are companies run by human beings who feel
responsible, so we wanted to talk to them about how
to prevent this sort of thing from happening. Some
people were saying, “You should just remove all sites
that mention how to kill yourself from the internet.
You should just block them from the search”. The
Samaritans said, “No, that is not how we think you
should react, because a lot of these sites are sites
where people go and talk and find people with
common interests to help them not kill themselves.
They are support groups as much as they are
information sites”. Their preferred response, and what
we ended up doing, was when someone searches for
“How to kill yourself” on Google—
Q213 Chair: Sorry, could you just clarify? You are
telling us that a website that says, “How to kill
yourself” is actually a support group to help to keep
people alive?
Sarah Hunter: In some cases, the sites they were
referring to were actually self-help forums for people
who are feeling depressed, and someone saying, “I
want to kill myself”—“Well, no, don’t kill yourself”,
and they were as much forums for preventing suicide
as they were for—but the Samaritans’ solution, and
this is going back to the original question, was that
when someone searches for “suicide”, an advert
should come to the top of the Google Search box,
saying, “Are you feeling depressed? Do you want to
talk to someone? Call the Samaritans”. So the searcher
was prompted to go and seek help, rather than going
to one of the more invidious sites, so I think there
are ways—
Q214 Chair: So, you do that now?
Sarah Hunter: We do that now, yes.
Q215 Chair: Would you do that for other areas, for
example, somebody who was following the site of
Anwar al-Aulaqi? Would you have a little thing going
up saying, “If you want to blow people up, come to
this site instead”?
Sarah Hunter: We do offer a service for all charities;
that they can get free advertising, up to $10,000 a
month worth of advertising on Google, so a lot of
charities do take up that offer. I can’t think of another
example. Someone like the NSPCC is—
Q216 Chair: Would you give us some of those
examples? It would be very helpful if we had
examples, if you could write to us—
Sarah Hunter: Absolutely.
Chair:—of where you have now put up a banner
when people search against a particular site, and
there—
Sarah Hunter: It is the charities who do that, not us,
but yes—
Chair: No, but if you could give us examples—
because you must have it, because obviously you do
not give it away free.
Sarah Hunter: We do. It is free for any charity.
Chair: All right, so you would have a list of all these?
If I could have it—
Sarah Hunter: Yes, I do. I will happily do that.
Q217 Steve McCabe: Chairman, if we are going to
get those examples, could we get a little bit of
background on how the charity was selected? The
example you quote is very—
Sarah Hunter: Any charity can do it.
Steve McCabe: Yes, but what I am saying is the
example you quoted where the Samaritans came to
you, that is rather obvious. I would interested to know
how other charities have been—
Sarah Hunter: I am happy to do that.
Chair: Along with the statistics of how many
complaints were made and how many sites were
taken down?
Sarah Hunter: Of course.
Q218 Chris Ruane: This is to Simon Milner. We
understand that some models of HTC mobile phones
have a Facebook app in the root directory which
cannot be removed or reliably turned off, which
therefore transmits information about the owner’s
internet use back to Facebook. Are you aware of this,
and do you think this respects users’ privacy and their
right to choose whether or not they wish to share their
data with Facebook?
Simon Milner: That is clearly a highly specific
question and one that warrants a highly specific
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answer that I do not have, but I am happy to write to
you afterwards. I will investigate it and come back
to you.
Q219 Chris Ruane: This one is to Sarah Hunter.
Google has previously been criticised by 10
Information Commissioners for not taking adequate
account of users’ privacy. It has since been fined $22.5
million by the Federal Trade Commission for side-
stepping security settings on the Safari web browser
so that it could track users’ internet use. What
impression do you think this gives of Google’s respect
for users’ privacy?
Sarah Hunter: We deeply regret both of those
incidents. As we said separately at the time, they were
mistakes. We did not intend for that to happen, and as
soon as we identified it, we owned up, we were very
public about it and we tried to rectify the coding
mistakes and make amends. Users trusting us and
keeping their data safe is incredibly important for us.
We take it incredibly seriously, and I think it is our
responsibility to try to earn that trust back when things
like that happen.
Q220 Chris Ruane: How have you done that? How
have you earned that trust back—or have you?
Sarah Hunter: In the UK, the ICO did investigate us;
and they annually audit us now, and we have made a
number of changes to our processes internally as a
result of that audit. In fact, they are due to come back
again very soon, so it is an ongoing process. We
always want to improve, but the ICO audit is part of
that process.
Chair: Thank you. I am afraid we are going to have
to stop; not quite saved by the bell, because you have
been here for an hour and a quarter, and we really are
very grateful to you for giving evidence. It has been
most enlightening.
Sarah Hunter: Thank you for having us.
Chair: We will write to you with further questions.
There are a number of issues that we wanted to take
up with you before we complete our inquiry, but we
are very grateful. Thank you.
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Witnesses: David Livingstone, Associate Fellow, International Security Research Directorate, Chatham House,
Professor Sadie Creese, Professor of Cyber Security at the University of Oxford and Director of Oxford
University’s Cyber Security Centre, and Dr Ian Brown, Associate Director of Oxford University’s Cyber
Security Centre and Senior Research Fellow at the Oxford Internet Institute, gave evidence.
Q221 Chair: I call the Committee to order and ask
our witnesses to excuse us if there is a Division in the
middle of your evidence session. We think that is
likely because there are a number of pieces of
legislation going through today. What will happen is
that I will adjourn the Committee for a certain period
of time. However, we will come back, so don’t feel
that you are being abandoned.
Can I welcome everyone here to the Committee’s
continuing inquiry into e-crime, and could I ask
Members to state if they have any interests that go
beyond the Register of Members’ Interests? I will start
with a question to all our three witnesses concerning
the statement made to this Committee by the head
of the City of London Police, Adrian Leppard, on 11
December. He told the Committee that he felt that the
war against internet crime was being lost. Mr
Livingstone, do you agree with that?
David Livingstone: The first point is about defining
“the war” in that context. This is obviously going to
be an ongoing issue the more that the internet
becomes integral to our lives. Whether it is being
lost—and therefore what is the definition of a victory
or a loss—I would call into question. There are
certainly issues with the amount of crime that is being
committed, and whether it is increasing
proportionately or whether we are now on a track
where we can start taking positive steps—
Q222 Chair: You pose a lot of questions back at the
Committee, but you are not giving us any answers.
What do you think? Do you think that it is being lost?
David Livingstone: It is serious. It is getting worse,
but I think with the strategies that this Government
are putting in place, there is a possibility of closing
that gap, especially if we can work with pace and
agility to match how the bad guys operate inside the
internet.
Q223 Chair: Thank you. Professor Creese?
Professor Creese: With the issues of definition aside,
I suspect it is not currently being lost. If it were
currently being lost then we would see people
withdrawing from cyberspace in many areas, and we
are not. However, we are continuing to witness losses
and we are continuing to witness concerns. Personally,
I think that the losses and the level of threat are going
to increase dramatically, as we continue to expand our
Mark Reckless
Chris Ruane
Mr David Winnick
dependency on cyberspace, and that we are in this
operational environment where we will continue to
have to fight that war on an ongoing sense. So there
will be times when we are ahead and times when we
are behind. We are never going to win it.
Q224 Chair: Dr Brown?
Dr Brown: I would agree with my two colleagues’
comments and say that all crime is a continuing arms
race between the perpetrators and the defenders.
Trying to win this war needs a broad spectrum
response from a number of areas of government. I
think the UK Government are on the right lines in
developing law enforcement, so the UK is going in
the right direction. Persuading other countries to take
some of the same kind of actions will be important,
as the UK Government are trying to do.
Q225 Chair: The other point that he made to us—in
very powerful evidence to this Committee—was that
Britain was being targeted by gangs, specifically from
countries such as Russia and eastern Europe, in the
cyber-wars. Do you agree with that?
David Livingstone: That probably reflects the fact that
we have quite a mature digital economy and the fact
that we use the internet for many things. The amount
of valuable and attractive goods and items that can be
found on UK-based IT systems is probably a
relatively rich hunting ground for organised criminal
gangs, so they are attracted here.
Chair: I am going to stop you there because the bells
indicate a vote. I am going to adjourn the Committee
until we are quorate, which I hope will be at three
o’clock. Thank you.
Sitting suspended for Divisions in the House.
Q226 Chair: We are quorate, so we will resume our
proceedings.
Mr Livingstone, I had asked you about the evidence
given by Adrian Leppard, namely that gangs have
been targeting the United Kingdom, especially from
Russia and eastern Europe. Is there evidence of that,
Dr Brown?
Dr Brown: I think we have seen quite a bit of
evidence that organised criminal gangs have moved
into cybercrime and are specialising in the different
aspects, whether that is writing the software that will
target systems, transferring the money or paying the
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money mules to take the cash out of the system. I
agree with my colleague’s comment that, of course,
the UK is targeted because it is a rich country where
there are a lot of resources worth targeting. I would
not go so far as to say we have crystal clear evidence
that the UK is top of the list, but I think in general,
yes, it is a target.
Q227 Chair: Professor Creese, what is a better way
of ensuring co-operation between different countries
in dealing with internet crime? One of the aspects of
this whole issue that interests the Committee is that
countries seem to be doing things on their own and
not necessarily seeking to share information. Are
organisations such as Europol and Interpol an
effective vehicle to bring together the good guys in
dealing with those who are seeking to break into
systems?
Professor Creese: They are a vehicle—one of many.
In fact, there are already numerous initiatives on the
international stage seeking to increase knowledge, so
the UN, UNESCO and ITU. There are lots of
international organisations working in this space.
Also, if you look at some of the single organisations
and bodies, they are working more closely together
within their own communities. One of the key issues,
as we see the levels of cybercrime rising—which they
will inevitably even as they ebb and fall—is how we
scale up our response. You will have seen in the
various written evidence submissions that you have
received that we are certainly making a huge
investment in the UK to do that, but in truth we are
probably going to have to invest more over the next
10 to 20 years.
Q228 Chair: Because it is the framework, isn’t it? I
visited Interpol last week. It recognises the fact that
we are in a new game dealing with the power of the
internet, but it seemed that countries were not willing
to share that information.
Professor Creese: It will be variable from country to
country. The challenge that we have is that the special
relationships you can establish between any two
countries will be unique and will require their own
processes. What we need to do is to generalise these
processes, standardise them and speed them, so that
when we need to seek evidence in the face of crime
we can do so at speed. The challenge we have at the
moment is we are limited in our ability to do that.
Q229 Dr Huppert: It is good to see you all and,
Professor Creese, we had some interesting discussions
in another context before. I would like to ask about
some of the issues involving consumer use of
technology, so the prevalence now of social media,
Facebook, Twitter and so forth—I am guilty in that
respect myself—but also the widespread use of
Google and things like that. People are sharing far
more information. How effective do you think these
various tech bodies are at trying to manage both the
safety of the information and privacy, which is a
related issue? I am happy for any of you to start.
Dr Brown: The two companies you have mentioned
have absolutely invested a lot in protecting their own
infrastructure, especially—
Q230 Dr Huppert: I think I mentioned more than
two. Which two were you referring to?
Dr Brown: Sorry, I was thinking of Google and
Facebook in particular. They certainly have invested
a lot in protecting their own infrastructure. Clearly
they are targets themselves. We have seen that
especially with Google. Some of the initiatives it has
taken with things like two-fact authentication, where
Google will now increasingly send a passcode to your
mobile phone, for example, if you log on from
somewhere new, are exactly the kind of things we
need. On the privacy side, as the Home Office said in
evidence to you, looking at things like privacy by
design, which the European Commission has
proposed in the European framework, is very
important. If we are going to see systems that will
potentially have gigantic amounts of information
about individuals, make sure that only relevant and
pertinent information is collected in the first place, and
is kept only for the amount of time it is needed, rather
than just taking the approach of throwing everything
into the pot. No matter how good your information
security is, even companies like Google—real-world
experts in doing it—are not going to be able to defend
against every attack, as we saw with allegations of
Chinese hackers breaking into its system.
Q231 Dr Huppert: You are focusing on the defences
against attack but, as I understand it, with Google+ the
account settings are set to “public”. Facebook allows a
whole range of third-party apps with very little
safeguard. People may not be able to attack through
some routes, but it seems to me there is a whole series
of holes there that do allow a lot of information that
could perhaps be used for other purposes to make
attacks on other systems easier.
Dr Brown: I think those default settings are absolutely
critical. That is the other part of what the European
Commission is doing—talking about privacy by
design and by default—so that the settings are
protective and if people choose to open up, that is fine
as long as they are aware of the consequences.
Q232 Dr Huppert: Very quickly, just to finish on
that. If all that the European Commission is doing in
this space and these areas happened, would that solve
the problem?
Dr Brown: I think it will take us a long way. I don’t
think it will solve it.
Professor Creese: Thank you for the brilliant
comments. I will address another issue—the related
issue that you were just getting on to—which is: if
people choose to put it out there, that is their business.
One of the challenges that we face is that, in general,
people do not have a good understanding of the risk.
There is something very unique about cyberspace and
the data you put into it, in that it is persistent: it does
not get forgotten; it can be mined. Often people find
years later that they have forgotten about data they
have put out there. Yet in the meantime, people are
able to aggregate and mine that data, and very often
learn stuff about you and the choices you are likely to
make, which you are probably not even conscious of
yourself. That is perhaps the issue. Focusing on the
privacy risks associated with big data, social
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networking and the like is the question of how we
enable people to make good and safe decisions so that,
in effect, they are managing the risks.
Some of the research we have been involved in has
been looking very specifically at the bleed between
domestic lives and work lives. If people are engaged
in these kinds of technologies in their domestic lives,
could that be used to introduce vulnerability into the
enterprise through more enhanced targeting? In truth,
probably, yes, we are in a situation where that could
be the case.
Chair: We will explore that further with Mr Winnick
when he comes to ask his questions.
David Livingstone: I think there are a couple of other
questions here. Where does the data end up? Under
what legislative arrangements is that retained? For
example, much of the data that users in the UK put
on Facebook may end up in California, where privacy
laws are quite liberal. The data accumulated by
Facebook on many individuals from a lot of countries
may be shared quite freely—more freely than it would
be if it was UK-based data. The other thing is that
there are 1 billion users now on Facebook. This is a
very, very big organisation with a lot of data held. I
am not sure if we know the figures about how many
times it has been hacked successfully—perhaps they
do not even know themselves—and I do not think we
know too much about how its security arrangements
work, so there is that risk that more data are leaking
away than one would want. That is not just Facebook;
that is any large social networking organisation.
I agree with Ian and Sadie here that people are putting
data on there that in the long term they might regret.
As part of Chatham House’s research in the last paper
we were writing with directors of a major UK high
street bank, the comment was, “People are giving
away information on social networks quite freely, and
giving away information that we want them to keep
private,” such as dates of birth and all those kinds of
things that are there to establish identity for financial
safety.
Q233 Dr Huppert: That is exactly what I was
getting on to, because Andy Smith from the Cabinet
Office recently advised at a publishers’ internet
conference, just around the corner from here, that
people should use fake names and fake dates of birth
wherever possible. This caused a bit of a storm, but is
it something that you would all endorse? I see nods—
just for the record, which does not always capture
nods very well. Professor Creese?
Professor Creese: Yes, although in truth some of that
data are obtainable through other routes. Not putting
it on Facebook does not necessarily remove it from
the hands of those you would prefer to remove it from.
If I may just extend this debate into something that
we all—
Chair: Can I just say not too wide, because we have
a lot of questions.
Professor Creese: Not too far, but it is important not
to see this just through the lens of social networking.
You will all be carrying smartphones, no doubt, and
you will all be downloading apps from unknown
creators, and the location-based services and functions
that almost all of us engage with day to day—and will
increasingly do so—are enabling a whole range of
data to be collected and shared. That is not managed
in the same way as you might do in a social
networking environment, and that too poses an
element of risk. One of the things I would like to see
happen is a much more enriched understanding of
how we manage consents around the sharing of
personal data, and to encourage people to see that as
a lifecycle and not a one-off blanket “I accept these
terms and conditions”, when five years later I have
forgotten what I accepted. That is very important to
maturing our society in this space as we move forward
in the 21st century.
Q234 Mr Winnick: I am afraid that modern
technology has had no effect on our going up and
down the stairs and voting, but that is part of
parliamentary life I think.
Can I follow up, Professor Creese, and your two
colleagues? To a large extent, you have dealt with or
touched on the question of public awareness. I don’t
know if would you share it, but I get the feeling that
ordinary members of the public—including ourselves
around the table, for that matter—do not realise, to
the extent that they should, the dangers involved in e-
crime and the illegal practices of gangsters in the
various gangs. Do you feel the Government or some
public authority, or a new public authority for that
matter, could do more? Who wishes to answer—as the
Chair would say, briefly?
Dr Brown: I think the Get Safe Online programme
that the UK runs is a good example of how you can
get information out to people, but I don’t think it goes
far enough. As you say, it is not something that the
broader population is as aware of as it should be. To
some extent that needs some social learning.
Unfortunately, it takes people to know someone who
has suffered a loss really to understand the potential,
in-depth. Just reading about it or seeing it on TV is
not perhaps getting through to people quite strongly
enough yet.
Q235 Mr Winnick: You have answered the question.
May I ask another question that your two colleagues
could answer? What about an advertising campaign?
The advertising people claim that they do all kinds of
wonders. Perhaps I have missed it, but I have not seen
any sort of advertising campaign warning people
about what could likely happen. Do you think any
purpose would be served, Mr Livingstone?
David Livingstone: I think there are many routes that
you could take to make the public more aware of the
vulnerabilities of cyberspace and how to use it with
less risk. There are a few points I would like to make.
One is the amount of money being spent at the
moment by central Government on cyber-security
public awareness. The NAO’s recent report put that at
£4 million out of the £260 million that has been spent
so far out of the national—
Q236 Mr Winnick: But £4 million is a drop in the
ocean, isn’t it?
David Livingstone: That £4 million represents 2%
compared with some other figures that were quoted in
that report. So, for the high-end threats, it is £157
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million. We have a dissonance here with the director
of GCHQ saying that 80% of the problems could be
fixed just by getting the basics right. However,
generally it may be said that the population do not
know what those basics might be, for example
automatic patching, making proper use of anti-virus
and knowing where the risky parts are on the internet.
Perhaps there is a little bit of an imbalance there about
the resources being deployed to create better public
awareness. Although, then, it is not an easy issue. You
have all sorts of segments of society: you have old
and young; you have business and private; and you
have communities and so on.
Then there is the method—not only the messages, but
how you get the messages across. There are some
interesting things that one could take from best
practice in other areas, such as the messaging from
the Department of Health on health matters that is
focused on individual groups to send out very
different messages—perhaps sexual health for 16 to
25-year-olds.
Q237 Mr Winnick: What about smoking?
David Livingstone: Also for flu jabs, to focus more
on the elderly population. The modes of delivery and
what you say on all those are vastly different, and
perhaps some of those mechanics of communication
can be taken forward into the cyber world.
At the moment, I am helping the Scottish Government
with their cyber-security statute, which is in the
context of the devolved Administration. We are
putting the public communications responsibility for
developing that strategy as not a Government thing,
but a business, commerce and law enforcement thing,
where they are developing the means of
communicating about cyber-security risk rather than
the central Government. They are almost appealing on
behalf of the people that they are—
Q238 Mr Winnick: You are doing this at the moment
with the Scottish Government?
David Livingstone: Yes, we are.
Q239 Mr Winnick: How long have you been doing
this?
David Livingstone: About a year.
Q240 Mr Winnick: Thank you. Any comments,
Professor Creese?
Professor Creese: You have had lots of excellent
input. I completely concur that different demographics
require different messaging, some of them primetime
telly and some of them viral YouTube videos or music
videos, no doubt. A point worth making is that Get
Safe Online and other Government initiatives have
been fantastic, and I would imagine that, historically,
what we have done is under-resourced in the
communication element. We have the expertise; we
understand the messages that we need to transmit. The
10 steps for board members that was launched last
September is another good example. I know that 10
steps for SMEs is being looked at. Yes, I agree that
we need to invest in getting the message out there and
that it will require diversity in delivery, and I believe
that is already on the agenda.
Q241 Mr Winnick: I like what your colleague has
just said about the way in which the Health
Department has spotlighted, be it on sexual health,
smoking or indeed excessive drinking.
Professor Creese: Public health campaigns are an
excellent example. You can have a look at some of the
successes that they have had, using fun but scientific
programming around public health and body
awareness among the younger population.
Embarrassing Bodies was one series, and there was a
hugely successful campaign on the internet alongside
that programming. There are experts out there and I
know these kinds of things are already on the agenda,
certainly with the e-Crime Reduction Partnership that
the Government set up. I feel positive that people are
embracing this.
Mr Winnick: I am sure the Committee will take that
very much into account. Thank you.
Q242 Steve McCabe: I think the Government have
arrived at a statistic that says that cybercrime is
costing the UK £27 billion per year. I notice you
laugh. How accurate do you think that figure is, and
do you have any suggestions on how we could get an
accurate measure on this?
Professor Creese: I have not seen the working out that
arrived at the £27 billion number, so I can’t critique it
from a scientific viewpoint. The fact that we have not
seen good evidence behind it would say that perhaps
we can’t give too much weight to it as a particular
number.
Dr Brown: I have a very good paper here that
critiques it—I am sure you have seen it—that Ross
Anderson and colleagues wrote. I think, as he says,
that there is not good evidence for the £20 billion
component of that £27 billion that Detica had
attributed to business costs. Ross and colleagues
produced much more detailed evidence. Some of it is
on the much smaller side, so hundreds of millions of
dollars, looking at things particularly like patent-
infringing pharmaceuticals, for which they estimated
$40 million in loss. Some is potentially very
significant in the longer term, like the welfare and tax
fraud that they thought could cost many billions as
those systems move online, as the Government are
doing to save costs. As Sadie said, showing the
working out and having peer-reviewed scientific
papers that can be looked at year after year, which
Parliament can look at and which other scientific
experts can comment on, and keeping those figures up
to date, is the way to do that.
David Livingstone: Trying to put a figure on it holds
you hostage to fortune, but I think we can easily say
that the losses are very large. Of course there may be
losses that we do not know about because we have
not yet detected the intrusion into servers that, for
example, might hold critical and very valuable
intellectual property. However, it is interesting to note
that it has been a long time since the Government
have actually mentioned £27 billion as this figure.
Indeed, I note that when Mr Maude was launching the
Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership just a
short while ago, he quoted “numbers of billions”. So
I think he has veered away from trying to put a precise
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figure on the scale of loss or harm to a more generic
figure, which I think is probably appropriate.
Q243 Steve McCabe: Dr Brown, if I could ask you
something in particular. I think this report you have
been working on with the UN said that two thirds
of the states involved did not think their own crime
reporting systems were adequate to deal with this
problem. Do you have any suggestions about how
people could develop more adequate crime reporting
systems?
Dr Brown: The least controversial recommendation
that the UN made in the report you are referring to
was that there are many countries—not just in the
developing world—that need a lot of help on capacity
building, with advice from states that have more
experience in Europe and North America. Obviously,
there is a wealth of expertise in industry and academia
to help them to do that. The recommendations that
became more geopolitically controversial were how
far states should be treaty making and taking things
like the Budapest convention, and trying to broaden
that out to cover some of these states so that they
weren’t just improving the evidence, but updating
their legal framework and making it possible to co-
operate with law enforcement agencies from the UK
and elsewhere in dealing with these crimes.
Q244 Chris Ruane: Turning to the role of the police
in combatting digital crime, given that digital
evidence is now a factor in so many crimes, what
strategy do you think the police need to adopt to
increase their capacity to process it? Do you think
there would be any merit in outsourcing digital
forensics?
Professor Creese: We have seen written evidence to
this Committee on strategies that have already been
taken, which from a personal stance I think are very
good. In terms of the outsourcing of the gathering of
forensics, I think one needs to understand that in the
context of how you would maintain quality. There are
always costs associated with how you regulate the
sectors that are going to be working on your behalf,
and what kind of standards you will require them to
comply with in terms of their behaviours, how they
train their staff and the processes they engage in, so
that you can be sure that this evidence maintains an
adequate standard. Of course we are lucky enough in
the UK that we understand these things very well, but
I would encourage you to look very hard at those
kinds of costs in the round. We obviously need to
scale up. I can see why we might well consider
outsourcing simply to reach the scale, but we would
need to think very hard about how one ensured that
we maintained quality in the face of that.
David Livingstone: There is an issue here about
calling on capabilities that already exist—for example
within the financial services industry, where they do a
lot of network analysis of where the current attacks
are coming from—to establish almost the public and
private partnership relationship with law enforcement
laying down criteria, which would then make useful
evidence. The thing that I think is most important is
how quickly this information, intelligence or evidence
can be made available to law enforcement as well,
without the necessary use of production orders and so
on, which can take quite a long time before evidence
can be made available for a criminal pursuit. Forensic
analysis is very expensive indeed, and one has to be
very careful before you commit to doing it in house.
There is a compelling case that some element of the
forensic pursuit of criminals needs to be performed
outside the law enforcement estate. How those
relationships are actually developed I think we will
have to see over time. The speed at which this
information can be made available, without going
through cumbersome processes of production orders
and so on, I think is a key point here.
Q245 Chris Ruane: How do you rate the current
digital forensic capabilities across the UK police
forces?
David Livingstone: I would probably say that they are
starved of resource. They are very good, but they can’t
cope with the volume of crime that is occurring.
Professor Creese: That is going to be true for any
type of crime, not just cybercrime. From my personal
experience, I have always been very impressed by the
professionalism, but clearly they could always benefit
from more resource.
Just to reflect on your question on outsourcing, I
wonder if in part that might ease the international
dimension of gathering of evidence. At the moment it
is very challenging to gather evidence across national
boundaries, but if we were outsourcing internationally,
that might help to overcome some of the latency in
that system.
Dr Brown: At the same time, some of the reasons
why production orders can take some time is that you
have to make sure that you are being proportionate in
the information you are asking for. We don’t want to
wave a wand and say, “We will just hand over all this
data and completely trust the law enforcement
intelligence agencies,” in a way that we have not in
traditional justice systems.
Chair: Thank you very much. This is fascinating
stuff. We may well write to you with further
information and to ask for further facts about this area.
We are most grateful. Apologies again for having to
interrupt your evidence for the votes, but I am afraid
democracy has to march on even for the Home
Affairs Committee.
Mr Winnick: They helped to educate us about this.
Chair: Indeed. Thank you very much. We are most
grateful.
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Q246 Chair: Mr Browne, Ms Worobec and Mr
Allen, thank you for coming. We are coming to the
end of our inquiry into e-crime and we are most
grateful to you for coming here. Apologies for
keeping you waiting beyond the time listed on the
Order Paper.
Can I start with you, Mr Browne? What kind of figure
do you put on the cost to the banking sector of online
fraud every year?
Anthony Browne: It is actually the FFA UK that is
responsible for collecting the figures, but in 2012 they
are £475.3 million for online banking, plastic cards,
cheque and telephone banking fraud, which was in
fact less than 1% of total fraud in the UK. That is
against a sector that is about 8% of GDP. So it is
about 8% of GDP and 1% of fraud. Specifically online
banking fraud—against people’s online accounts and
so on—was £39 million, which is down about 25%.
Q247 Chair: It sounds like a large amount that is
being taken from people’s accounts.
Anthony Browne: It is. One pound of fraud is—
Q248 Chair: You said it is going down. Is it on the
increase in fact overall?
Anthony Browne: Again, it is quoting from FFA UK
figures.
Chair: This is not individual. It is not The X Factor,
so feel free to chip in whenever you want to.
Anthony Browne: It is still at a high level. The
general story is going down over the last 10 years,
although it has tipped up a bit in the last year. You
say it is a lot of money. Clearly it is, although as a
whole the banking sector has a good story to tell,
given the size of the sector and 26 million online
accounts. That is a result of the amazing amount of
work that the industry puts into this. It does take it
very, very seriously. It puts huge amounts of resources
and technology into combatting it and the FSA is the
front line of that co-ordinating industry response.
Q249 Chair: In terms of those figures, are there any
other figures that you think the Committee might be
interested in, Ms Worobec?
Katy Worobec: Yes. To drill down a little bit to the
online fraud, in the figures that we collect, there are
two aspects I think you will be particularly interested
in. One is online banking itself, which is the figure
that Anthony mentioned of £39.6 million in 2012. The
other aspect is online card fraud, which cost the
industry £140.2 million in 2012. If I look back, we
saw peaks in both those types of fraud. The peak for
e-commerce fraud on cards reached just over £181
million in 2008, so we have seen it drop around 23%
since then. At the same time, we have seen online
card spending increase from £41 billion in 2008 to
£68 billion in 2012.
Q250 Chair: So what does that tell us?
Katy Worobec: I think it says that we have been
reasonably successful in reducing online fraud in that
space, at the same time as spending in that channel
has been increasing rapidly. In a similar vein, if I look
at the online banking figures, the peak of the losses
that we have been recording saw it reach just over £59
million in 2009. As we said, it dropped to £39.6
million last year. At the same time, users of online
banking have increased from 22.4 million in 2009 to
26.8 million in 2011, which are the most recent figures
that we have in that space. Again, users have gone up
20% while we have been able to see the fraud
dropping over that period.
Q251 Chair: Mr Allen, is this done by organised
groups? Are there people in a room somewhere in
Europe, or even in the United Kingdom, who are
saying, “We are going to use our skills? We are going
to pool our skills in order to break into people’s bank
accounts and steal money”? Is this organised, or is
it just—
Matthew Allen: Yes. Feedback from our members, as
well as evidence from Europol and other international
bodies, demonstrates there is an international element
to cyber-offending and that there is a degree of
organisation within the crime networks that operate in
this area. I think it is important not to generalise.
There are different aspects of cyber-offending that will
be perpetrated by different groups and in different
ways. Generally speaking, our assessment and that of
international bodies is that there is an international
and organised element to this.
Q252 Chair: Would you have a league table of the
countries where this is coming from or groups of
people, or is this just impossible to pinpoint in the
way that I suggest?
Matthew Allen: No, we don’t have a league table
within the British Bankers’ Association. We have
contributed to a number of Government exercises to
provide our expertise of the nature of some of these
threats. I would also add that the international nature
of the threat is not solely a cyber element—fraud,
money laundering, and other types of financial crime
often have an international element as well.
Q253 Chair: Do you think we ever get to find out
who is responsible, or is it just a case of satisfying the
customer? I give the example of my PayPal account
that was hacked into. Attempts to get to PayPal to find
out whether it had caught the people responsible were
impossible. Once you had pressed all the numbers and
listened to all the music and got to customer service,
nobody would ever tell you who was responsible. It
satisfied me because it put the money back into my
account, but is there a feeling that people are just
satisfied in that way and there is no attempt to get to
the bottom of who is responsible?
Matthew Allen: In the United Kingdom, the National
Fraud Intelligence Bureau has been established and
housed within the City of London Police. That
provides a central body to bring together intelligence
from a range of sectors.
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Q254 Chair: Yes, but give us your intelligence. You
must know about these things. For example, how
many people were prosecuted last year?
Matthew Allen: I don’t have the figures to hand.
Q255 Chair: Does the prosecution system work? Are
you pleased with it? Do you think they get to the end
of the tunnel, or is it just a case of people getting the
money back into their account, so everyone is
happy—the bank is happy; the customer is happy—
but we never get to really find the criminals?
Anthony Browne: Anyone who breaks the law should
face the full force of the law and we want—
Q256 Chair: Yes. Do you have figures for us, Mr
Browne, of how many prosecutions?
Anthony Browne: We don’t collect those figures. It
would be a question for the police or the Crown
Prosecution Service.
Q257 Chair: Do you have those figures?
Katy Worobec: Not the prosecution figures, no.
However, as part of this context, I think it is worth
noting that under the FFA UK we receive intelligence
from all the banks in relation to the fraud that they are
seeing. That is passed through our fraud intelligence
sharing system to the National Fraud Intelligence
Bureau. I think that is the best way in which it can
then look at the whole picture and try to identify
organised criminal networks and try to work through
that. Unfortunately, the nature of this type of fraud
tends to be high volume and low value. It can be very
difficult to investigate every single case and be able
to get a resolution, but what the National Fraud
Intelligence Bureau can do is to look at the
intelligence that comes in from our sector and from
others, match it together and see what that shows in
terms of organised criminal networks. I think that then
gives the police at least some fighting chance of being
able to go out and hit them where it hurts.
Q258 Mr Clappison: I am very interested in the
question that the Chairman has just raised with you.
In a way, you are the victim and the customer of the
bank is a victim. Although the customer may be
compensated or repaid, he or she will go through
some anxiety, no doubt, and you do not like to see
your systems being comprised. The figure you have
given us for penetration of online accounts was £39
million. Is that right?
Katy Worobec: £39.6 million, yes.
Q259 Mr Clappison: I am curious that you seem to
have so little knowledge of what happens to the
people who have been carrying out this crime, because
you are a victim. Has anybody been prosecuted to
your knowledge?
Katy Worobec: Yes, certainly. It is worth mentioning
also we have our own dedicated cheque and plastic
crime unit, which is sponsored by the banking
industry. Although e-crime is not its particular
specialism, it is dealing all the time with these types
of frauds, so it is constantly bringing—
Q260 Mr Clappison: On the penetration of people’s
online accounts—many people obviously have online
banking accounts—are you aware of anybody at all
who has been prosecuted for that offence in this
country?
Katy Worobec: Yes, there have been prosecutions.
What we don’t have is a set of figures that I can give
you. For example, the Metropolitan Police e crime
unit has done a sterling job in terms of dealing with
this type of fraud.
Q261 Mr Clappison: Were the people who were
prosecuted in this country or somewhere else?
Katy Worobec: A mixture, I think it would be fair
to say.
Q262 Chris Ruane: My question leads directly on
from that. Could we have the statistics on the balance
of cybercrimes committed from within the UK and
outside the UK?
Chair: Who would give us those figures?
Katy Worobec: I can tell you approximately how
much fraud we see on UK cards. For example, if I
look at the split for e-commerce—so fraud on UK
cards spent online—it is about 70% in the UK and
30% overseas. That is where we see the spend going.
Q263 Chris Ruane: For that 30% overseas, we heard
of Russia and eastern Europe before. Is that the case
or is it just not the case?
Katy Worobec: Just to be clear, this is where the card
details are used fraudulently. So the card details may
be compromised in any number of ways and then used
to purchase goods from overseas. For example, airline
tickets is a fairly standard area where card fraud is
spent overseas.
Q264 Chris Ruane: If it is eastern Europe and
Russia or wherever, is there co-operation, or is there
a league table of co-operation from those authorities?
Do those Governments view it as serious, or do they
think that it is just happening in the UK so it is not a
concern of theirs? How much concern and co-
operation is there abroad?
Katy Worobec: From the work that we do with law
enforcement—we work very closely with our own
police unit and other forces and the emerging National
Crime Agency—I think it is fair to say it is patchy.
Q265 Chris Ruane: Patchy where.
Katy Worobec: In other words, there isn’t a consistent
approach in terms of response from other countries in
dealing with fraud. Our own DCPCU has just set up,
with funding from the EU, a joint team with
authorities in Romania, because there have been some
specific concerns around fraud in that area. It is trying
to build some good relations with that country, as an
example, but it does seem to be rather hit and miss
in terms of the co-operation that you get from other
countries in Europe and beyond.
Anthony Browne: One of the things we said in our
submission to you is that we would like the highest
international co-operation possible on this issue
because it is an international issue, both at the EU
level and globally.
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Q266 Chair: Your main international organisation is
Europol, is it?
Anthony Browne: That we deal with.
Katy Worobec: Yes, from the law enforcement
perspective, but we look at it also from our
perspective through the international card schemes—
so Visa and MasterCard—because they obviously
have an international footprint.
Q267 Chair: Of course. However, with the main
policing unit, would you have a direct link to Rob
Wainwright or his colleagues in Europol, or do you
go through the Metropolitan Police and they then go
through Europol?
Katy Worobec: I think we have to go through the
Serious Organised Crime Agency at the moment.
Q268 Chair: So you go through what will become
the National Crime Agency.
Katy Worobec: Indeed.
Q269 Chair: Are those structures okay? Is it
working, or could it be a little bit more streamlined?
Katy Worobec: I think it could be more streamlined.
What I mean by that is that I think we should look at
ways in which intelligence can be better shared
between law enforcement and the private sector—the
banking industry. If we can get two-way information
sharing—I think someone spoke earlier about trying
to get better data sharing between countries—I think
we could improve the situation a lot.
Q270 Chair: On a practical basis, if this happens at
5 pm on a Friday and you have uncovered some great
fraud being committed and you pick up a phone, is
there somebody there or have they gone home? Is this
a 24/7 operation that you can deal with?
Katy Worobec: In terms of the banking industry, we
would find that most banks often have footprints in
other countries anyway.
Q271 Chair: No, not the banks. I am talking about
the policing.
Katy Worobec: Right, okay. In terms of our own
police unit, obviously we have a link into that. As far
as more general policing is concerned, we would tend
to go through our DCPC unit.
Q272 Chair: No, I understand that. Is it 24/7 or at 5
pm on a Friday does it all close down? Your system
obviously carries on.
Katy Worobec: Are you talking about the banking
side?
Chair: Not the banking side. When you ring up the
police, or whoever you ring up, and you say,
“Somebody is now emptying all these bank accounts,”
or, “This card has been fraudulently used and we want
to stop it,” is there somebody at the other end of the
phone at 5.05 pm on a Friday?
Katy Worobec: There certainly would be in the
DCPCU, yes.
Q273 Chair: What does DCPCU mean, for the
purposes of the record?
Katy Worobec: Dedicated cheque and plastic crime
unit.
Q274 Chair: Where is it based?
Katy Worobec: It is based in London. It is fully
sponsored by the banking industry. It is a mix of City
and Met officers working with banking industry
investigators and support officers.
Q275 Chair: Good. We had not heard of that before,
I think, so it is always nice to hear about new
organisations. So they are there at 5.05 pm on a
Friday?
Katy Worobec: They certainly are.
Q276 Chair: What about 10.00 am on a Sunday?
Katy Worobec: There will certainly be somebody
available at 10.00 am on a Sunday, or me on my
mobile, so yes.
Q277 Mr Winnick: That is reassuring.
Ms Worobec, you sent a letter to us, I think in
February this year, and you cited a customer survey
by Which? as demonstrating that the vast majority of
customers are refunded quickly—within one week.
However, it does appear to be the case that 29% of
customers surveyed had to wait longer, in some
instances as long as six months. What is your
comment on that?
Katy Worobec: Our statistics show that 98% of fraud
claims are refunded. We have done some work since
that Which? survey—talking to our members—and
96% to 98% are actually refunded either the same day
or the following day.
Q278 Mr Winnick: Sorry, I am getting confused.
Which? says that 29% of customers had to wait
longer, some up to six months. Are you disputing this?
Leave aside the 2% for the moment.
Katy Worobec: Yes. Our members are telling us that
between 96% and 98% are actually refunded the same
day or the following day.
Q279 Mr Winnick: Who is telling you?
Katy Worobec: These are our members, which will be
the retail banks and card issuers in the UK.
Q280 Mr Winnick: Should we have more
confidence in them or in Which?
Katy Worobec: You have to look at the fact that
Which? has done a survey asking people who have
experienced fraud over the last five years what their
experience is. There could be all sorts of reasons
behind the apparent delays, and it would be interesting
to understand a bit more about what the details behind
the survey show us. I am not convinced that it
necessarily conveys the accuracy of the situation,
whereas our members have told us that these are the
figures that they are seeing.
Q281 Mr Winnick: For the sake of argument, say
the situation has changed or Which? could have been
wrong in the beginning, what percentage of customers
would you say have to wait if not for six months,
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certainly, then beyond three months? Do you want to
give a figure?
Katy Worobec: I think it is a very small number. It is
in between 4% and 2% really and I think it will be at
the lower end of the scale, so most will be resolved
in a few weeks. Where lengthy and complex
investigations are required, it may take some more
time to get that sorted. However, they are few and far
between, quite honestly.
Q282 Mr Winnick: I have great hesitation in
challenging any witness, and I do not have any
evidence to do so. Without in any way questioning
your integrity, do you think it is possible to send some
documentation—if the Chair agrees—to back up what
you have just said?
Katy Worobec: I am happy to put these figures in
writing to you, certainly.
Q283 Mr Winnick: With some evidence of what
they are based on.
Katy Worobec: Yes.
Q284 Mr Winnick: It said that 98%—in fact you
have just mentioned it—of those surveyed had their
claims repaid in the end. Let us consider these 2%.
On the basis that it is said that 94% of the UK adult
population now own a credit or debit card, if the
maths are right, this works out at somewhere in the
region of 380,000 people a year. It is quite a large
number of people, isn’t it, that 2%?
Katy Worobec: I am not disputing your maths at all. I
think it is worth bearing in mind that 9.9 billion card
transactions take place every year, so we should look
at this in the context of that. There will always be
a small number of cases where things need further
investigation. These cases can be quite complex and
do take some time to resolve and, frankly, there are
fraudulent claims made as well. So first-party fraud
does play into the mix of the 2% that are not refunded
as well. We must remember that.
Q285 Mr Winnick: Recognising that fraud needs to
be investigated, we would be very simplistic and naive
not to recognise that there are people who are not
genuine, to say the least. Nevertheless, you would
accept that people who have genuinely been the
subject of such fraud should not be in a position where
they lose out.
Katy Worobec: Absolutely. There will always be cases
when unfortunately things are perhaps not handled as
well as they should be. I am not saying there is 100%
success in that space, but I do think the figures stand
for themselves in terms of the overall approach to that
particular issue of refunds.
Q286 Mr Winnick: Yes, and you are going to send
us the documentation. Mr Browne, of course, you are
the chief executive of the British Bankers’
Association. Is the status of bankers high?
Anthony Browne: No. One of the joys of this job is I
get sent all the information when the pollsters ask the
public what they think about banks, and it is—
Q287 Mr Winnick: Are they lower than MPs and
estate agents?
Anthony Browne: I don’t know quite where they
stand compared with MPs or estate agents, but they
are about as low as you can get.
Q288 Mr Winnick: Before I ask you anything else,
I come from a generation in which, despite my
politics, and whatever may have happened in some
other countries—certainly in the 1930s banks
collapsed very rapidly in the United States, and there
was depression and all the rest of it, not confined to
the United States—in the main, in the immediate post-
war period, one did have a feeling that nothing could
be safer than to have your money in the bank. I am
referring to British banks. That feeling of security and
confidence has changed, hasn’t it?
Anthony Browne: I can provide you with third-party
polling data on this. If you look at the confidence that
people have in the banking system, it certainly took a
big hit after 2007—this might be slightly different
from the angle you are taking—after the run on
Northern Rock, but that confidence has largely
returned. People do believe now that their banks are
safe. I know this is not the subject of this session, but
there have been a huge number of reforms in place to
make sure that banks do not fail again.
Q289 Mr Winnick: So why the feeling that the
surveys show, as you readily admit—
Anthony Browne: They are not generally to do with
the safety of banks; it is the disquiet that the public
have. In fact YouGov has a very big poll about this
out tomorrow, which I think will be in tomorrow’s
papers. It is not the safety of banks that people are
worried about. It is more concerns about mis-selling,
the behaviour of bankers and remuneration—all the
things that you debate regularly in Parliament.
In the polling evidence—and I urge you to look at this
YouGov thing—concern about being victims of fraud
really does not register in terms of people’s concerns
about banks. There are a lot of other issues that—
Q290 Mr Winnick: There is a lot for the banks to
worry about.
Anthony Browne: There is, but actually fraud is not
one of them. As you have been saying, 98% of people
who are defrauded get refunded. I didn’t quite
understand the maths you set out earlier, but certainly
the number of people who don’t get a refund is going
to be comparatively small.
Q291 Mr Winnick: Mr Browne, in this survey of
Which? to which I referred, Halifax and Barclays
were found to have the worst performances, with 34%
and 39% of customers experiencing delays. Do you
have any comments on that?
Anthony Browne: Unfortunately, I can’t talk about
individual members. One of the problems banks have
had, and one of the reasons why the opinion of the
banks is low, is because, in the words of Stephen
Hester, they lost sight of the customer. The banks are
determined to make sure that customers are treated
properly, and fraud is an example of that. They have
spent a huge amount of time and effort making sure
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that customers are treated well. Any complaint and
any dissatisfaction is a complaint too many, but the
overwhelming majority of people do get their money
back promptly. That is not being complacent. They
clearly need to raise their game when there is
dissatisfaction.
Q292 Mr Winnick: In your role as chief executive
of the British Bankers’ Association, do you take these
matters up with individual banks? Which? obviously
has high standing.
Anthony Browne: It does. I have a great regard for
Which? and it does a lot of very good work
representing the views of customers. In fact, one of
the things I have done at the BBA is to set up a
consumer panel to make sure we get full input from
consumer groups into our policy-making work to
make sure we can properly address their concerns. To
answer your direct question, I have taken up
individual matters of concern with individual banks.
Q293 Mr Winnick: Of course this is related to the
direct inquiry we are having into e-crime. If people
who feel that they have been the subject of fraud have
sufficient confidence in the banks they are dealing
with, it certainly helps the customer to have the
feeling that the matter will be dealt with pretty swiftly
and in a competent manner.
Anthony Browne: The banks are obliged to deal with
it quickly. Under the payment services regulations,
they have to give an immediate refund when there is
an unauthorised transaction. There is a lot of detailed
FSA guidance about exactly what that means, which
we can talk about if you want. That is certainly the
standard to which the banks work. If people are not
satisfied, they can take their complaint to the Financial
Services Ombudsman. I know you had a previous
witness who gave evidence about this, and there are
something like 70 complaints a week.
Q294 Chair: Mr Winnick has rightly raised this point
and he has rightly raised the Which? report. There is
a big difference, is there not, Mr Browne, between a
bank like First Direct, where 83% of customers were
reimbursed immediately, and Halifax which has a
figure of 64%, and Barclays where only 59% were
reimbursed? You have seen this survey, presumably.
Anthony Browne: I have, yes.
Q295 Chair: How do you account for the difference
between this? It is a very large figure, isn’t it? I should
declare my interest: First Direct is my bank.
Anthony Browne: It has a good reputation. Exactly
what the banks should do, as I say, is set down in
legislation and there is guidance behind it.
Q296 Chair: Yes, but they are not doing it, are they?
Anthony Browne: The point is then that each
individual bank has different protocols about how they
precisely deal with it. Katy would be far closer to the
detail of that than I am.
Q297 Chair: What do we do about this huge
difference that Mr Winnick has highlighted: 83% for
First Direct; 59% for Barclays?
Katy Worobec: I think the difficulty is with the survey
that Which? has run. It is looking at people who have
been claiming fraud refunds over the last five years,
and the impact of the payment services regulations has
really bitten in the last few years. It may be that some
of these have perhaps experienced a fraud in the first
part of that. So we may have seen an improvement in
performance, and I think we probably would do in the
recent past. As I say, I think it is very difficult if I
experienced fraud five years ago to remember exactly
what time scale it took to get my money back. There
is an element of not really being able to get behind
the figures and see exactly how the questions were
asked and so forth. For example, it may be that some
of the respondents did not confirm the fraud
immediately it happened on their account. It may have
started as an unauthorised transaction or a dispute, and
then been confirmed as fraud later. That may have
been part of the delay, for example. So I think there
are lots of reasons behind that.
Q298 Chris Ruane: What are banks and card
providers proactively doing to raise customer
awareness about keeping their financial details secure
online?
Katy Worobec: At Financial Fraud Action UK, we
have done a fair bit of work in the last 12 months
in this space. It is something that we are very much
concerned with. We have been working with the
National Fraud Authority as well. In the earlier panel
you were talking about targeted customer education
and focusing on particular at-risk groups. We have
been working the National Fraud Authority, and I can
give several examples. One was a campaign called
“The Devil’s in your Details” that had two aspects to
it. One was targeting young people, and it did make
use of a viral campaign on YouTube to get the
messages through to that section of the public about
looking after their details and how important it was.
A second aspect of the campaign was targeted at
middle-aged ladies using the internet.
At the other end of the scale, we have also done some
work with elderly and vulnerable people in Durham—
as a pilot initially—where we went out and interacted
with their network. So, going to coffee mornings,
citizens advice bureaux and libraries—those sorts of
things—and getting information out in a face-to-face
way, which resonates with that particular group of
people. There was a range of different activities. “The
Devil’s in your Details” campaign that we ran was a
collaboration between the National Fraud Authority,
the banking industry and the telecoms industry, so it
was getting a joint and consistent message out about
protecting personal information, jointly funded by
those three sectors.
Q299 Dr Huppert: A question for Katy Worobec.
There has been an interesting exchange of letters. I
think you know of my constituents, Steven Murdoch
and Ross Anderson, who have done some very
interesting work on how chip and PIN cards can be
compromised without actually knowing the PIN.
Mr Winnick: A bit of name calling.
Dr Huppert: There have been some fairly strong
words. Professor Anderson has given evidence to this
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Committee, which I think led to your letters. First, do
you accept that it is possible for somebody to have
their chip and PIN used, and it looks like there was a
PIN even though they did not divulge that PIN?
Katy Worobec: We are aware of Ross Anderson’s
research and Ross and his team do a lot of good work
in that space. On the demonstration that they made in
terms of that particular vulnerability in chip and PIN,
we are not saying it is not possible to do that. What
we are asserting is that it is quite a complex and
difficult way of committing fraud, and we are aware
that there are much easier ways, unfortunately, for the
fraudster to commit fraud. The type of attack that
Professor Anderson was talking about relies on the
fact that you need to have a physical card from the
cardholder. If the cardholder reports that card lost or
stolen, the fraud is blocked. That is quite different, for
example, from the skimming of mag stripes, which is
the problem that we have countered by introducing
chip and PIN, where they would have been able to
copy the magnetic stripe of a card and then create a
large number of cards that cloned that original card
without even taking it away from the cardholder. So
that had much more potential for the fraudster being
able to commit fraud on an industrial scale. As I say,
we are not saying chip and PIN is 100% secure, but
it does offer a much more secure platform on which
to work than the old magnetic stripe cards did.
Q300 Dr Huppert: Nonetheless, it means that there
is a possibility that people who claim that money was
taken from them fraudulently—they claim they did
not divulge their PIN, yet the suggestion is made that
they must have done so—are right. Indeed, in 2012,
there were 64,000 complaints to the Financial
Ombudsman Service about banking and credit, and
54% of those for credit cards were found against the
bank. There are various similar figures. Do you think
that the number of disputed chip and PIN cases that
have been referred to the Ombudsman suggest that
there may well be genuine cases where it is falsely
suggested that people may have colluded or been
insufficiently secure with their PIN?
Katy Worobec: I really don’t believe that the cases
where the use of a PIN cited are down to the sorts of
attack that Professor Anderson was talking about in
his research. I think there are easier ways to defraud
the system, as I have said. I would assert that it is
unlikely, in fact, that the bank will simply reject a
claim for a refund just because the legitimate PIN was
used. They will look at a number of factors and
criteria before making a decision about whether a
claim is refunded or not.
Q301 Dr Huppert: Professor Anderson has given
some specific examples, but if you say it is not really
likely to be used because there are easier ways of
fraud, why did you ask Computer Labs to remove the
paper that it published from the internet?
Katy Worobec: We were concerned that some of the
information there might be giving information away
to potential fraudsters. By describing it in the level of
detail that they did in the paper, it might have
encouraged people to try doing that. So we were
concerned that it was not a particularly good way of
talking about that particular type of fraud. What we
would have preferred is for Professor Anderson to
come and talk to us about it and then we could have
seen whether there are things that need to be done.
However, to publish a lot of detail on the internet does
tend to encourage people to try that type of fraud.
Q302 Dr Huppert: It was circulated among a
number of the banking community and he highlighted
it well before it was published. Surely the correct
thing to do is try to fix the problem rather than asking
people not to reveal the fact that it exists. A question
for Mr Allen: what work is being done to try to fix
the chip and PIN technology problem? From reading
the paper, it is clear that it is entirely fixable. You
could update the protocol so that this particular hole
does not exist any more.
Anthony Browne: Can I highlight some points here?
One, and it comes back to several of the questions
here, is that the banks have immense financial interest
to reduce fraud. With 98% of fraud victims being
refunded, it is a direct cost to their bottom line, which
is why they spend a huge amount of money on
combatting fraud and on various publicity
campaigns—
Q303 Dr Huppert: Unless you can insist that it is
the cardholder’s fault, in which case you do not have
to reimburse them.
Anthony Browne: There are a lot of new technologies
coming in the whole time, and Katy has a lot of the
details, which have been very successful in reducing
the amount of fraud. The reason why fraud went down
to a 10-year low, despite a massive increase in cyber
online accounts and everything else, is because of all
these new technological investments that have made
it far more difficult to commit fraud. Obviously it is
not perfect. It is questionable whether any system is
ever capable of being perfect, but the banks are
spending huge amounts of effort to combat it. Sorry,
you asked a question of Matt and I interrupted.
Matthew Allen: In response to the question, banks are
constantly updating their systems and controls, and
this is a constant challenge. We outlined in our
submission to the Committee that this is a highly
mobile threat. It is rapidly evolving, so banks are
very vigilant.
I would also add that there is significant action at the
firm level. At the industry level and at the firm level,
we are constantly working with our members—both
at the BBA and in partnership with FFA UK, to make
sure that we can provide the best possible service to
our members in terms of highlighting new emerging
trends. I can give some examples of the work we have
done in this area. You mentioned Europol earlier. We
have been engaging with Europol. I took a delegation
of five banks to Europol in October. Europol has
recently visited the BBA. That is entirely to try to
find ways to promote a stronger dialogue between law
enforcement, at the international level, with the
banking sector. We have knowledge in the banking
sector of emerging crime techniques and so do law
enforcement, so we are certainly very keen to promote
that dialogue. There is significant work by individual
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firms, but there is also quite a lot of work at the
industry level as well.
Q304 Steve McCabe: I think my question follows on
from this. I do not think anyone disputes that there is
a huge effort and a significant amount of investment
in trying to counter online fraud. Despite that, it does
seem to be on the rise and there is a huge amount of
money being stolen each year. Is that because this is
the sort of crime where the number of criminals and
victims are just expanding, or is it because some of
the security systems are pretty poor and inefficient?
Anthony Browne: Can I just come back to the point,
Mr McCabe, that there is a huge amount of money
and any fraud is too much fraud? However, banking
is 8% of GDP and it is 1% of fraud in the UK, so it
has a far better record than the rest of the economy.
That is not to be complacent but there is—
Q305 Steve McCabe: Most people would regard this
as a relatively new form of crime, so we may still be
in the early stages.
Anthony Browne: Yes.
Katy Worobec: I would like to talk about something
that we have seen recently. In terms of the types of
attacks that we are seeing from fraudsters, it does tend
to be focusing on the customer and trying to dupe
them into giving away personal details and security
details. There is a particular type of insidious fraud
that we have been seeing in the last year. We refer to
it as “courier fraud”. Essentially, particularly elderly
and vulnerable customers are targeted by someone
who phones up claiming to be from their bank or from
the police and says, “There has been fraud on your
account. We need your PIN number, we need your
card, and we need evidence of what you bought.
Please give it to the person who comes to the door,”
and they give their details away.
In a similar vein, there is a constant attack from
fraudsters to try to get people to give their personal
details away. That seems to be where the attacks are
coming from at the moment. In a way, it is less about
the security of the systems, particularly the online
banking system—it is robust—and what it is is that,
unfortunately, the customer is being duped into giving
their details away.
Q306 Steve McCabe: Banks do phone customers
and invite them to give personal details over the
phone. That is not unusual, is it?
Katy Worobec: The sorts of details that you would be
asked as part of the “know your customer” details.
Banks are required to identify a customer when they
phone them up for whatever reason. Unfortunately,
they are asking what look like personal details, but
they are very limited. We are talking about a situation
where people are being asked to give their PINs and
their cards away.
Q307 Steve McCabe: I do not want to interrupt you,
but if the message to the elderly person or the
vulnerable person is, “You should not be duped and
you shouldn’t give over this personal information to
these people who are fishing for your details,” the
very fact that the bank itself asks for personal details
is likely to lead to a degree of confusion in the mind
of that person, surely.
Katy Worobec: I do understand what you are saying.
Unfortunately, the bank is required to do that in order
to identify the customer. It is one of these vicious
circles. What we do say in terms of advice to
customers is if they are at all concerned about who
they think they are speaking to, they should put the
phone down and dial the phone number that is on the
statement or on the website and speak to somebody.
So they go back into the system if they are at all
concerned about anybody they are speaking to, which
I think is the best piece of advice that we can give.
Anthony Browne: It is obviously different if you are
phoning a bank, in terms of telephone banking, and
they ask you to prove your identity when you are
phoning them, as opposed to the bank phoning
individuals, which is far rarer.
Q308 Steve McCabe: Should I deduce from what
you said that you are satisfied that these security
systems you have are adequate and that no criticism
can be made against them, or would that be a wrong
assumption? I just wondered, because you dealt with
only the second part.
Katy Worobec: I wanted to give an example because
I think it demonstrates in a way that the bank systems
are robust. That is what is forcing the criminals to
target the consumer as the weakest point, and that is
really where I was coming from.
Chair: Excellent. Thank you very much for your
evidence. It has been most helpful and we will be no
doubt writing to you. I know you have promised us
some documentation. We would be most grateful if it
could be sent as soon as possible, because we are
about to conclude our report.
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Q309 Chair: I call the Committee to order. This is
the penultimate session of our inquiry into cyber and
e-crime. After this session, we only have the Minister
to take evidence from. I welcome the witnesses to the
dais, and thank you for coming here from a very far
distance. I know, Mr Coviello, you in particular are
not a frequent visitor to the United Kingdom, so we
are glad to have you here.
Art Coviello: Thank you.
Chair: There will be a Division in the House at
3.05pm, so we are hoping to finish your evidence by
then so you do not have to wait for us to come back
after the vote. May I start with you, Mr Coviello.
Obviously, we will go on to talk about fraud and
banking crime and cybercrime in general, but with the
background of the Boston bombings that took place
just 10 days ago, I know your company deals
primarily with financial issues. Have you ever been
asked by the Government of the United States or any
other Government actually to monitor websites in
respect of dealing with terrorism?
Art Coviello: No, that is not something we would
engage in, although our security products and services
extend well beyond the financial sector itself,
including protecting the Government.
Q310 Chair: Given that you look at these websites
every day and you have a large team of people, which
I understand is in Israel—
Art Coviello: Yes.
Chair:—who do the monitoring of these websites,
would it be too much of an extension of what you do
to actually monitor these other websites that are
causing concern to the security services?
Art Coviello: It probably would be. I think we could,
but those types of activities would tend to be handled
by the Government and not by us. We restrict
ourselves to things of more of a commercial nature.
Q311 Chair: Now, we have had evidence that has
been given to us by the head of the City of London
Police—the City of London Police in the UK deal
with cybercrime—who told this Committee, and I
quote, “We are not winning the war on online
criminals”. Do you think that the war has been lost?
Art Coviello: I do not think the war has been lost, but
we are not winning it either. I think what people need
to keep in mind is not so much the threat—obviously,
we have to keep in mind the threat environment—but
Mark Reckless
Chris Ruane
Mr David Winnick
what people sometimes overlook is what I call the
expansion of the attack surface. We have now
developed so many web applications, we have so
many remote access devices, mobile devices, we have
so many points of entry into our enterprise, and now
we starting to outsource a lot of our infrastructure and
applications to the cloud, that we have expanded the
attack surface and made it literally easier for the
attackers to take advantage of us. But having said that,
I am a technologist, so I am an optimist, and I believe
we can win the war, but we are not winning it yet.
Ilias Chantzos: If I were to address the question, let’s
say, in a lighter fashion, I would say that if we had
lost the war things would not be working very well
right now, would they? It seems to me that things are
actually still working quite well. We can go online to
the bank. We can order online tickets. We do order
online goods. The digital economy seems to be
operating and it seems to be operating quite well and
people trust it. This is not a question of winning or
just losing a war, but of understanding that security
is a moving target, security is a moving goal. The
technologies change. We see an expansion in cloud.
We see an expansion in mobility. As the technologies
change, the attack surface changes, the techniques that
the attackers are going to use change. What is
important is that we adjust ourselves and follow that
moving target in order to achieve that objective. We
will never have 100% security.
Professor Norton: I do not believe that we are losing
the war. It is a war we can win, but we will not win
it purely with technology. There are three things we
have to do, and the first and most important relates to
people. I could build you the most perfect security
system, as I am sure could my colleagues here, and I
am sure a thoroughly misunderstanding user of that
system could defeat it. We do not educate our people
properly. We do not train them in what is good
practice, and there is not a technological solution to
that. So, one, we need training; two, we need better
software, and we know how to write software very
much better than we actually do in practice in most
cases today; and thirdly, we need better resourcing for
the police. That is not just nationally but
internationally.
Q312 Chair: Mr Coviello, I am concerned at the
number of social media sites or internet sites that offer
people packages for fraud on the internet as part of
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internet services. Do you know whether there are any
well-known social media sites that have been used for
that purpose?
Art Coviello: As a matter of fact, recently—and I
think we are going to release the coverage this week—
an Indonesian hacker was actually using Facebook as
a means to disseminate information about his fraud as
a service. That was, quite frankly, very unusual but
it is a disturbing change to anything we have seen
previously. It just suggests an utter disrespect of
being caught.
Q313 Chair: Has that stopped, do you know?
Art Coviello: I am sorry?
Chair: Is it still ongoing on Facebook that people
can—
Art Coviello: I do not know if the site has been
brought down as yet. I am assuming that it will be
brought down quite shortly.
Q314 Chair: I do not know whether you all have
seen the survey that has just been published by
Verizon, which shows that state-sponsored industrial
espionage is now the second most common form of
cybercrime. Have you all seen that survey? It has just
been published today. Is it a surprise to you that there
is so much state-sponsored espionage, and, if so, do
you have any indication of which countries are doing
this? We have had a list from the City of London
Police. They have talked about Russia and the Eastern
European states, but do you know which states might
be responsible?
Art Coviello: One of the problems with any attack is
attribution, being able to trace the attack back to its
source. That is where people have to be very careful
because unless you have evidence, to point the finger
at a particular nation is clearly not the right thing to
do, and I see too much of that. Having said that, given
the level of sophistication that we see in attacks, it can
only be sponsored by nation states. We see it clearly.
We see it in the form of economic espionage. It is
ongoing, and it is increasing.
Q315 Chair: Thank you. Just one final thing: could
you confirm the Norton study, which shows that there
are 556 million victims of cybercrime every year—
is that a figure that you recognise? Also, the cost of
cybercrime to the UK at £1.8 billion. Do you have any
fresh figures or are those figures that you can endorse?
Ilias Chantzos: I believe the Norton study that you
are quoting is the latest study that has been released
from us until now. We have actually released very
recently the Internet Security Threat Report, which is
the latest statistics that we have analysed for activities
in 2012, which are not focused on the consumer side
only. Having said that, I should emphasise that the
methodology of the Norton study is such that the
results of the study are based on self-reporting. We
went out and asked individuals whether they had been
victimised. It is not based so much on attacks that we
have actually observed but rather on what the public
has told us. The numbers in terms of financial losses
is based on the numbers that the victims claim that
they have lost.
Chair: Sure.
Q316 Mr Winnick: RSA apparently suffered a
serious security breach, which has been dealt with. In
fact, the company has been commended for its
response. Was that the first major security breach?
Art Coviello: In terms of RSA, clearly it was, yes.
Q317 Mr Winnick: What did it involve?
Art Coviello: It was a very sophisticated attack. It was
two separate APT groups, as we define them;
advanced persistent threat groups. Again, one of the
things we did was immediately contact law
enforcement and request additional help from the
National Security Agency as well as from Homeland
Security. The Government responded very quickly in
helping us understand—
Q318 Mr Winnick: About what time was this?
Art Coviello: The attack commenced on March 4th,
2011, and within two days they were on-site helping
us. These kinds of attacks are very difficult for a
number of reasons. You have to ensure that you find
all the places where they have compromised your
infrastructure before you take them out because you
do not want to tip them off that you know that they
are in there. This is the kind of help and assistance
that was provided by the Government. Of course, we
have our own capabilities. Fortunately, while we were
not able to stop them from exfiltrating some important
information from our infrastructure, because we
discovered the attack timely enough and disclosed the
attack timely enough, there were no losses sustained
by any company as a result of the attack.
Mr Winnick: I see.
Art Coviello: But I should add that it was the first time
that law enforcement had seen two separate groups
attacking a company at the same time. Again, the
sophistication of the attack could only have been
carried out by a nation state based on our point of
view and that of law enforcement. Another interesting
aspect of this is that the attack commenced at a
supplier of ours. Emails from that supplier, targeted
emails, were sent into our employees, and that is how
they were able to breach our perimeter. Also, we were
not the ultimate victim of the attack. What they
wanted to do was use the first company to get to us,
and ultimately, in our point of view, they were after
our defence industrial base. They were going to use
our information to attack our defence industrial base
and potentially our Government.
Q319 Mr Winnick: Do you think lessons can be
learnt by other companies from the manner in which
you dealt with this and the support that was given, as
you say, by the authorities?
Art Coviello: Well, yes. I believe that any company
who is breached, which could potentially result in
harm to another company, has a moral if not legal
obligation to disclose that breach so that they can
prevent other companies from being hurt, and that is
exactly what we did.
Q320 Dr Huppert: Can we step back for a second to
this issue of what we should aspire to? Mr Chantzos,
I think you said that we cannot have 100% security,
and, Professor Norton, you made the point that a lot
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of it is about behaviour and what information there is.
To what extent would you subscribe to the principle
that if people put data out online in the broader sense
it is fundamentally vulnerable, and so if you want to
make data safe, you do not collect it, you do not put
it out there? Would you accept that as a principle?
Ilias Chantzos: Well, I think it is very important to
understand the value of our personal data. Most
people do not appreciate the importance that our
personal data has and, frankly, you see whole lives,
whole lifelines, timelines, on social networks. That is
extremely dangerous. The reason why it is extremely
dangerous is that, to follow up on the points that Mr
Coviello so accurately described, you launch a
targeted attack—and by the way if you look at the
Internet Security Threat Report that we just released,
we have seen a 42% increase in targeted attacks—
by targeting the individuals. How do you target the
individuals? You profile them. The fact that you have
your lifecycle of friends, your information about
yourself on a social network publicly visibly
available, makes them a perfect open-source
intelligence tool, and makes it very, very easy for you
to be profiled, followed, and then attacked.
One of the most frequent examples that I give is
people put their birthdays on social networks and then
they accept congratulations on their birthdays, but, by
the way, that is one of the three to four authentication
questions every time you call your credit card
company. What is your date of birth? Yet this is an
example of how it can go terribly wrong. Professor
Norton was correct in saying that security is not just
about the technology, it is also about the people and
the process, and this is exactly why there are the social
network problems that we see.
Dr Huppert: I was hoping for more of a yes or no,
but thank you for that anyway.
Professor Norton: May I just add to that a little? In
an information economy personal information is now
traded as value. That is fine if the person whose
information is traded is doing that knowingly, but we
have, I am afraid, miserably failed, not just here but
probably around the world, in educating people about
the impact of that. Yet we are trading information as
value not just on social media sites but in all sorts of
other ways as well without a true understanding by
the individuals concerned of its implications.
Q321 Dr Huppert: But just in terms of the principle
that I was trying to outline, you would broadly agree
with it or broadly disagree that if you really want to
avoid data loss, you do not make the data available?
Professor Norton: No.
Q322 Dr Huppert: You disagree?
Art Coviello: Absolutely.
Professor Norton: There is a hierarchy of data, and it
is very important that people are trained to understand
that. There is some data you may want to release, and
it may be greatly beneficial to you to release. There
are others you do not want to release. I think simply
treating it as inaccessible is wrong.
Ilias Chantzos: You have to effectively risk-manage
the type of information you release about yourself.
Q323 Dr Huppert: I am being prompted to ask about
some other issues. Professor Norton, you said
something about poor software design being a big
problem.
Professor Norton: Yes.
Dr Huppert: I used to write a bit of Perl script, so I
am probably responsible for much of this. Why do
you think the security is so poor, and what do we need
to do in order to get standards higher in terms of the
software that is being produced so that it does not
have injection holes and all sorts of things?
Professor Norton: We do not use the formal
mathematical methods that we have available, which
we have had for 40 years, to produce better software.
Q324 Dr Huppert: Are they applicable to all
complex software, though?
Professor Norton: Any piece of complex software can
be decomposed into pieces of less complex software.
However, you are right, it is much more of a challenge
if you are writing a global operating system, but much
of what we do, and I am thinking here, for example,
of infrastructure, are actually very simple systems, and
they are entirely amenable to being written with
formal methods. What I am getting at there is that we
have a culture in the software industry of testing.
Testing will only prove what faults you have; it will
not tell you what you have not found. It would be
far better to have a culture of better design, which is
designing out the faults before you have to test them
out, which is impossible anyway.
Q325 Dr Huppert: Is that something that could be
done easily, or do people have to be specially trained?
I have never tried formal methods myself, so I do not
know how easy it is.
Professor Norton: The National Security Agency in
the States has pioneered the use of this in a thing
called AdaCore. They demonstrated that it could be
done at a very comparable cost to writing less good
software. It is a matter of habit. Our universities used
to train in it, but the industry did not hire the people
who were trained, so they stopped giving the courses
in it. This is a Catch-22 situation we need to resolve.
Q326 Dr Huppert: Mr Chantzos, I think Symantec
said that providers will only be willing to accept
liability for their products if they get control over the
way in which consumers use them. Is that right? Do
you think that slightly insulates companies from any
responsibility?
Ilias Chantzos: I think you are perhaps reading more
in there than what we have actually said. First of all,
we already have liability under law for the stuff that
we make within the marketplace. The question really
is if we look into extending that liability, what is a
reasonable level, and what is appropriate given the
controls that the software manufacturer has or does
not have on this product? As Professor Norton I think
also admitted, there cannot be such thing as a perfect
software. It is not possible right now. The issue is that
we do not have an effective control of the way that
our customers use the software that we make
available. Should we be liable also for the fact that,
for example, users take the software and do not patch
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it? You look around; systems get vulnerable and get
attacked for malware that exists from 2008. The third
most popular infection is Configure back in 2008, for
instance. It is not as simple as saying there is defective
software out there. It is also about how do the people
install it and use it; is it fit for purpose for what it is
being used for at the moment?
Q327 Nicola Blackwood: I just wanted to go back a
little bit to follow up on the issue of the security
breaches, which you were speaking about, Mr
Coviello. You mentioned the fact that you think it is
very important that organisations and institutions
come forward when they have been breached but that
many are reluctant to do so for reputational reasons.
Now, I believe that you came forward in 2011 saying
that you had been breached, but you mentioned the
fact that the breach had occurred in 2004. Is that
correct, or am I mistaken?
Art Coviello: No, mistaken.
Nicola Blackwood: Sorry, that is just the information
that we have here.
Art Coviello: No, the breach occurred in 2011. We
determined that information was taken around the
16th and we went public around the 17th, in that fast
a timeframe, yes.
Q328 Nicola Blackwood: Do you think that other
companies would do the same, or do you think that
there is a general reluctance to do so?
Art Coviello: Well, I can only speak for my company,
but obviously there is a fair amount of humiliation
and embarrassment. In our case, it is our primary
responsibility to protect our customers. It would be a
total abdication of everything we stand for if we had
not come forward and said there was a breach and
give remedial advice to our customers to protect
themselves.
Q329 Nicola Blackwood: Are you aware that the
Government has brought forward a new cyber-
security fusion cell in order to create an environment
for companies and organisations to gather information
and bring information forward in order to improve the
gathering of information on such attacks?
Art Coviello: Yes.
Q330 Nicola Blackwood: Do you think that this will
be helpful in these matters?
Art Coviello: Absolutely.
Q331 Nicola Blackwood: Why do you think it will
be helpful?
Art Coviello: Because any opportunity you can timely
share information about attacks, as long as you
disseminate the information broadly, which is what
our Department of Homeland Security did in our case,
mans that all potentially affected companies can be on
the lookout for a similar-type attack, whether it is the
IP addresses from which the attack has been launched
or the particular malware itself.
Q332 Nicola Blackwood: Do you think that there is
anything they should be doing better with this
particular cell? Do you have any advice for
improving it?
Art Coviello: I am not deeply familiar with it, so I
cannot give you such advice. I would say as a general
statement the more you can do the better.
Q333 Nicola Blackwood: Did you have anything
you wanted to add?
Ilias Chantzos: I do, actually. Very quickly, there are
two different issues here. One is the question of
information sharing, and the other one is the question
of security breaches. You should be aware that already
in the UK the ICO has encouraged the reporting on a
voluntary basis of security breaches when personal
data have been lost. I think that is very important and
a step in the right direction, and I agree with Mr
Coviello and his points about transparency and
responsibility of the companies. I would also argue
that that policy results in better security because
nobody wants to be in a position where they have to
go and report something that unpleasant. At the same
time, you also need to be aware that this discussion is
taking place in Brussels, so there will be legislation.
It already exists for the telecoms, and it has been
proposed for other policy areas as well.
Q334 Chris Ruane: To Art Coviello, you have said
that the traditional models of security, such as using
firewalls and antivirus software, are no longer
effective against sophisticated online threats. What
should companies do instead?
Art Coviello: In an age where the attack surface has
broadened, as I pointed out earlier, in an age where
there is no discernible perimeter, perimeter-oriented
defences are less and less effective. So, the game
shifts from outright prevention of breaches to early
detection and response to breaches. The model that
we advocate is one where you have technology that
can detect these breaches far more timely. To do that,
you have to have a lot of data. You have to be able to
see the faint signal from the attacker that anomalous
behaviour or anomalous flow or use of data is
occurring. To do that requires a substantial capability
to correlate and analyse vast streams of data at very
fast speeds.
Q335 Chris Ruane: Okay. This is to all of you. We
understand that the Zeus Trojan, the malware most
widely used by criminals to target financial
institutions, is detected less than 40% of the time by
antivirus software. Does this indicate that the antivirus
software is no longer fit for purpose? Is our
technology—the good guys’ technology, the good
guys’ brains—better than the bad guys’?
Ilias Chantzos: I would like to actually see those
detection statistics, but I would begin by saying that,
first of all, we need to bear it in mind that the
traditional antivirus technology, meaning the
signature-based detection, is by no means any more
sufficient. Why? Because it is based on the premise
that I will see the virus, I will capture it, analyse it,
and therefore I can detect it. What we see right now
is attackers using polymorphism, meaning techniques
whereby they constantly mutate, to use a biological
example, the virus so that it can be less easily
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detectable by the antivirus software. Rather than
focusing on the antivirus, modern-day security needs
to focus on protecting the information in multiple
layers by doing things like behavioural blocking, by
doing things like intelligence analysis and by doing
things like correlation, not just signature-based
detection.
Chair: Professor Norton, you do not need to put up
your hand.
Professor Norton: We are missing a huge resource
here, and that resource is the people who work for us.
You will probably have seen BIS published a report
this morning that suggested that the vast majority of
UK companies never bother to train their people in
any kind of information security or the reasons why it
is important. If they were so trained, you would be
doing exactly the same thing as used to happen in the
physical world. You would detect fraud in particular
because you had a member of staff who would never
go on holiday and so on. If people were sensitised to
looking for unusual activity in the systems they use,
we would have another entire line of detection here.
Instead, we tend to regard the people who work for us
as the enemy and the danger, not the people who could
be helping.
Q336 Chris Ruane: How do you turn around that
mindset?
Professor Norton: It is a major task in training, and
it is not just for jobs; it is across the generations. You
have to explain why this matters and why you have to
treat those systems as if they were yours, not just your
company’s, and you care about it.
Art Coviello: I guess I have to respectfully disagree.
While I believe fervently in defence in depth and
while I believe fervently in educating our people in
terms of policy, attackers today are far too
sophisticated, and the average person is no match for
the attacks. Now, could you prevent a small
percentage of them if you had better training?
Absolutely, but that is not going to get us there. Again,
I would not say do not do it, but I would not expect a
major return from it.
Ilias Chantzos: Mr Chairman, can I give a very
simple, practical—
Chair: So long as it is very quick.
Ilias Chantzos: Very quick; think for a moment what
the job of our HR colleagues, human resources, is.
Their job is to do exactly what we are told on email
not to do: receive emails from people they do not
know and open attachments that say CVs, which can
very easily contain malware. I am giving this as an
example of how social engineering is actually easy
despite perhaps the training that people will do. Still,
training is important, no question about it.
Q337 Michael Ellis: Gentlemen, you have referred
earlier to examples of individual responsibility for
online security, and you used the birthday example—
we all know people who tend to either use their
birthdays as passwords or give them in social media
and then get asked those sorts of questions by banks
looking for authorisation. I notice, Professor Norton,
that you used the Highway Code as an analogy for
increasing the responsibility of individuals to keep
their information secure online. What practical
changes could be made, do you think, to increase
responsibility in this area?
Professor Norton: At the risk of being boring, I am
going to go back to education again. We do expect
certain levels of behaviour of the people who drive on
the road. In the various organisations I have been part
of, the British Computer Society, where I was
president, pioneered various elements of simple
training in this area, and I think it is absolutely crucial.
We released a series of technologies. I will give you
an example. In Germany, when broadband internet
was introduced, it came complete with antivirus
packages. It was not sold without it. We did not do
that here. We just let the technology out there without
the help and support that people would need to use it
safely. You would not dream of doing that with a car.
Michael Ellis: The problem is, as is so often the case
with the internet, how would you enforce that? We
know how we enforce rules of the road and other
regulations, but how is it possible to enforce
behaviour so that people are not cavalier with their
own security and then introduce breaches?
Professor Norton: There is no simple solution to that,
I have to concede, but I think the work that is going
on in Government at the moment, for example, to
throw out the teaching of information technology and
bring in teaching of coding and computer science is a
huge step forward. It should also include basic
computer hygiene and security.
Q338 Michael Ellis: Mr Chantzos, do you have any
observations to make further to that?
Ilias Chantzos: There is no doubt that education and
people is a big component. Clearly, we are already
doing a number of things like Get Safe Online, for
example, or the child NGOs that exist in the UK and
continue to engage them. At the same time, from the
perspective of the provider, we try to offer security by
creating more distance between the security and the
user so that it is more invisible yet it works for the
individual. The security becomes something that he
does not need to modify or change. It does not become
an obstruction; it becomes an enabler. Obviously, on
the commercial side, try to make available security
through the ISP to the end user through the OEM
channel.
Q339 Michael Ellis: This is what I want to press you
on, because isn’t it up to people like yourselves and
the companies to actually take some responsibility in
this area rather than putting it on the individual and
say, “We can develop technology that can do away
possibly with passwords as we currently know them
so people do not have to remember passwords and
they are not so open to abuse or interception as we
currently see them”? Is that not something that could
be developed? Can we not improve this area?
Ilias Chantzos: It can be improved, but at the same
time you need to bear in mind the kind of risk that
you are going to have. For example, if we do do away
with passwords and we use fingerprints, you cannot
cut off your finger if you lose your fingerprint. As a
user, you see the challenge.
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Art Coviello: Once again, I think education is an
admirable thing. I think personal responsibility is an
admirable thing; we should encourage it. But the fact
of the matter is the consumer-facing organisations are
the place to solve this problem. Whether you should
know it or not, 10 out of the top 11 UK banks use our
risk-based authentication in online transactions. It is a
technology that is seamless and transparent to the user.
The software takes a device fingerprint of the device
you log on from and it recognises you based on the
geographic area of your IP address and certain
characteristics of that device. We also have the
capability in software to allow the bank to monitor
your transactions looking for anomalies. The way
security has to move is towards understanding
anomalies in human behaviour, as I said earlier, and
anomalies in the flow and use of data, and we can use
technology to do that.
Q340 Michael Ellis: Recognising something that
looks suspicious?
Art Coviello: Exactly.
Professor Norton: Let me emphasise the two points I
made in my opening answer, and also say it is a
question of better software. We should not have
websites that are open to SQL attacks and things of
that kind. We should do this much better. It is also
down to better enforcement and a much better chance
of getting caught.
Ilias Chantzos: And integrated.
Professor Norton: Yes.
Chair: Thank you very much.
Q341 Nicola Blackwood: I think in the course of this
session we have heard a lot about the scale of the
challenge and the pace of the threat as it changes. I
think I heard from Professor Norton an emphasis on
individual responsibility and at this end an emphasis
on technological resilience. Can I have some kind of
an assessment on how you think the private sector and
the public sector—so, policing but also those who
hold a huge amount of data such as perhaps the NHS
and our schools—are working together at the moment
and how we need to work on improving that, starting
with Professor Norton, perhaps—
Professor Norton: Can I make a proposal, and that
is—
Nicola Blackwood:—who still does not need to raise
his hand to answer.
Professor Norton: It is a habit; absolutely. We have
some interesting tools in the accounting world that we
ought to be using. I am a chartered director and I am
also the Chief External Examiner of the Institute of
Directors. One thing we could do is cause the
accounting profession to take much more seriously
intangible assets, which are all those databases that
you were mentioning. If they were valued on the
balance sheet and if the board were to take a stonking
great impairment write-down if they were lost or
compromised, this issue would rise up the priority of
boardrooms remarkably. That should apply equally in
the public sector. The point is we have tools to do this;
we are just not using them, and that is a great shame.
Ilias Chantzos: It is going to be a combination of
policy; it is going to be a combination of technology,
quite frankly. One of the biggest challenges that we
see right now in information-sharing is the creation of
the trust environment, the creation of the
infrastructure to share that information, and very often
as well we see challenges around legislation, data
protection being one of them. I think it is critical, and
I think the UK is a very good example of a country
that is working in order to address all these issues,
so bringing together public and private sector, finding
mechanisms to exchange information and building an
environment of trust. I think that a number of other
European countries are trying to follow that example,
but I think in the UK very good work is done in that
direction.
Art Coviello: Once again, I have to disagree with my
colleague. I actually started my career as a certified
public accountant, and I think grossing up the balance
sheet for some value of a database would be an
extremely bureaucratic answer to a problem, so I
would not advise it.
In terms of public/private partnership, in the US we
have been talking about public/private partnerships
since 2003, and we have got nowhere. Quite frankly,
it is an extreme frustration. I do not know the details
of how it is working over here, although just in
general the outline of your strategy is far more
coherent than anything that is being done in the US, I
can tell you that. I can also tell you that it appears that
you are on the right track around information sharing.
Unfortunately, in the US we have not been able to get
a Bill passed to facilitate information sharing, which
to me is quite a pity. Anything that can be done to
use Government as a clearing house to receive and
disseminate information broadly about attacks is
going to increase the effectiveness of our ability to
detect and respond to attacks. If, as I said earlier,
breaches are probable, if not inevitable, then having
intelligence sooner as opposed to later is fundamental
to building out a new model of security so that we can
shrink the window of vulnerability from all attacks.
Q342 Chair: Thank you. Professor Norton, finally,
you were not one of the nine cyber-security experts
who wrote to The Times this week asking the Prime
Minister to drop his proposed legislation. Is it because
you do not agree with them or that you agree with the
Government’s legislation?
Professor Norton: No, I agree with those who wrote
to The Times.
Q343 Chair: You feel that it would hinder innovation
and would undermine the privacy of the citizen if this
legislation goes through?
Professor Norton: I think these are very complex
arguments that have not been properly addressed in
that legislation.
Q344 Chair: Mr Coviello, this is almost the last
session on e-crime for us. We started this inquiry in
November. We have heard about your set-up in Israel
with 150 experts trying to protect your clients. Would
we be able to find in another part of the world 150
criminals all working together in a similar
organisation or in a similar place trying to do exactly
the opposite, or is it still tightly knit groups of people
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all over the world? Has this become now a very
organised way of perpetrating crime?
Art Coviello: You would not find them all assembled
in one place, but you would find far more than 150
scattered around the world, absolutely. There is no
question about that in my mind. To make a guess of
whether it is hundreds or thousands I could not
speculate, but it is certainly a significant number given
the volume and the capabilities and the activity that is
going on.
Q345 Chair: I do not know whether you have been
to the spy museum in Washington, which I visited last
August. As you go in there, the very first video is
President Obama with a chilling account of what is
happening in cybercrime and how this is the No 1
danger faced in the history of the United States of
America, on a par with terrorism. Can you compare
what is happening in America to what is happening
here? Is it possible for you to tell us is something
going on there that is better than what we are doing
here or vice versa?
Art Coviello: Unfortunately, no. The internet knows
no boundaries, so the attacks can be launched from
anywhere to anyone. When I travel to Asia they tell
me the attacks are coming from the United States and
Europe. When I am in Europe they tell me the attacks
are coming from Asia and the United States. So, quite
frankly, the attacks are coming from everywhere, and,
again, it is incumbent on Government to do exactly
what you are doing and I laud this Committee’s
activity.
One thing I did want to point out: in the charter of
your Committee you talk about “increasing the
understanding”. I contrast that with the word
“awareness”. There is almost too much awareness.
There is not a day that goes by that we do not see
some publication, but unless we achieve a high level
of understanding we are not going to be able to take
the measures necessary to address this problem.
Awareness is not it; understanding is, and that is what
this Committee is trying to accomplish, and I laud
your efforts.
Chair: Mr Coviello, Mr Chantzos and Professor
Norton, thank you very much for coming.
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Introduction
1. This paper sets out the Government evidence to the Home Affairs Committee inquiry into e-crime. This
response refers to “e-crime” as “cyber crime” throughout in order to be consistent with the Government’s
Cyber Security Strategy. It has been prepared in consultation with officials from other Government departments
including Cabinet Office, Department for Education, Ministry of Justice, Department for Business, Innovation
and Skills, Government Communications Headquarters and officers and staff from the Serious Organised Crime
Agency (SOCA), the Police Central e-Crime Unit (PCeU), the Child Exploitation and Online Protection
(CEOP) Centre and the National Fraud Authority.
2. The Science and Technology Committee previously examined the risks of both malware and cyber crime
in the following reports: the third report of the 2010–12 Session entitled Scientific advice and evidence in
emergencies and the 12th report of that same session entitled Malware and Cyber Crime. The Government
welcomed both reports as a valuable contribution to its work on cyber crime.
3. The internet has revolutionised our economy, our society and our personal lives. It enables innovative
new businesses to start and grow. It allows existing businesses to lower their costs and increase efficiency, and
it gives customers the opportunity to demand better, cheaper and more convenient services.
4. However with such benefits and opportunities come threats. The Government’s National Security Strategy,
published in 2010, ranked UK cyber security, of which cyber crime is an element, as a tier 1 national security
priority. The Government has committed £650m to the transformational National Cyber Security Programme
(NCSP) to bolster its cyber defences. Last November, the Government published its Cyber Security Strategy
which set out how the UK will support economic prosperity, protect national security and safeguard the public’s
way of life by building a more trusted and resilient digital environment.
What is e-crime is understood to be and how does this affect crime recording?
Types of Cyber Crime
5. Cyber crime falls into a number of categories, within the general principle that what is illegal offline is
illegal online. The first category encapsulates crimes that can only be committed by using computers and the
internet, and that occur where a digital system is the target as well as the means of attack. This includes attacks
on computer systems to cause disruption (for example Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks), and the
stealing of data over a network often to enable further crime (for example through the spread of viruses and
other malware, or computer and network intrusions (hacking).
6. The second category encapsulates “existing” or traditional crimes that have been transformed in scale or
form by the use of the internet, such as fraud or the sharing of indecent images of children. Although these
crimes have always existed, the growth of the internet has opened up a new (often global) market, which
allows for a degree of anonymity, operation on an industrial scale, and has created new opportunities for
organised criminal groups to finance their activities.
7. The final category comprises crimes that use the internet but that are not dependent on it. Here, networks
are used for communication, organisation or to try to evade law enforcement. In the same way as the internet
is indispensable to legitimate businesses, it can be used to organise more effectively a range of “traditional”
crime types such as drug dealing, people smuggling and child exploitation and to conceal them more easily
from law enforcement agencies.
8. This is a category of crime that is often neglected when discussing the scope of cyber crime. An increasing
number of police investigations of crimes, both serious and volume, now have a cyber crime component,
requiring the examination of computers, smartphones and digital CCTV evidence. These may not be recorded
as cyber crime, but they do require the police to have access to both the skills and the technology to undertake
this type of examination as a matter of routine.
9. The online environment provides opportunities for organised criminals to communicate anonymously,
particularly through the use of Internet Relay Chat (IRC) and social media. The sole use of these
communication services does not in itself constitute cyber crime, but is a clear example of how technology can
assist criminals across a range of activities, including drugs, organised immigration crime and firearms.
10. Knowledge regarding the extent and nature of e-crimes is currently limited, but improving. We have
more knowledge regarding some forms of e-crimes than others. It is not currently possible to provide an overall
measure of the extent of e-crime. It is also not clear whether e-crimes are decreasing or increasing from the
evidence currently available, and whether this varies according to the type of e-crime. However work is
underway to address these gaps and gather robust evidence in this area.
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Recording
11. There is no such crime as an “e-crime” formally defined in legislation. Police record offences1
categorised in traditional crime terms, and do not capture offences as a “cyber” or “e-crime”. So, whilst a
fraud, for example, might be facilitated by use of computers, it would be recorded as a fraud offence, or a
denial of service with financial demands may well be recorded as extortion.
12. The computer or other technology used to commit crimes is the method (or modus operandi) by which
a crime was committed. The details on methods are not collected centrally. In general, what is illegal offline
is illegal online, and UK legislation on fraud or other forms of criminal behaviour applies to both. For example,
on-line frauds such as lottery scams, dating scams, boiler room scams all constitute the offence of fraud by
false representation, contrary to section 2 of the 2006 Fraud Act. Another example relates to online theft
offences, which may be recorded under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (1988), Computer Misuse Act
(1990) or the Communications Act (2003) depending on what is actually stolen.
13. The Home Office has introduced new crime recording classifications to enable law enforcement agencies
to capture specific cyber crime offences as laid out in the Computer Misuse Act (1990), such as computer
misuse crime, malware, DDoS attacks and hacking offences.
14. Cyber crime is also captured through victim surveys, such as the British Crime Survey (BCS). The
Government is continuing to explore further opportunities to working with the police and other partners to
improve the identification of cyber crimes within recorded crimes and crime and victim surveys.
How we are Improving Reporting
15. The Cyber Security Strategy emphasises the importance of increasing the reporting of cyber crimes and
there is significant activity under way to address this. The Government has taken steps to expand the role of
Action Fraud, which is led by the National Fraud Authority, to become the single reporting point for financially
motivated crime. Over the coming months Action Fraud, in partnership with the National Fraud Intelligence
Bureau, will press ahead with the roll out of an improved reporting capability to all UK police forces. For the
first time the police and the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau will have the capacity and capability to analyse
all fraud and cyber crime data from one source. This will provide a much more coordinated and joined up
approach to targeting those who attack our citizens and businesses.
What is the extent and the nature of the threats on which e-crime policy is based?
16. In October 2010, the National Security Strategy identified the cyber threat to the UK, which includes
cyber crime, as a Tier One threat. £650 million of new funding was allocated to the National Cyber Security
Programme (NCSP) which will bolster our cyber capabilities in order to help protect the UK’s national security,
its citizens and our growing economy in cyber space. At least £63 million of this will go towards enabling the
UK to transform our response to cyber crime, in addition to resources ordinarily allocated to law enforcement
to tackle crime.
17. There has been some attempt to measure the cost of cyber crime, but it will not be possible to provide
a robust estimate until data regarding prevalence and scale of cyber crime has been improved. One widely
cited estimate from “The Cost of Cyber Crime”2 produced by Detica in February 2011, approximates the cost
to the UK of cyber crime to be up to £27 billion per year, or around 2% of GDP. Whatever the cost, as
businesses and Government move more of their operations online, the scope of potential targets will continue
to grow.
18. GCHQ is the operational hub for cyber security in the UK and, through its information assurance and
intelligence work is the best place in which to concentrate UK expertise in understanding threats and exploiting
opportunities in cyber space. GCHQ also hosts the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC), whose role is
to provide greater awareness of threats and developments in cyberspace, and ensure that the UK can respond
effectively in the event of a major cyber incident. Law enforcement agencies contribute learning from their
activities to CSOC. Within the NCSP, a key element of CSOC’s role is to act as a central hub, to cultivate a
greater holistic awareness of threats, vulnerabilities and developments in cyberspace and to communicate these
to NCSP stakeholders and ultimately policy makers. CSOC have produced baseline assessments pertaining to
various aspects of the cyber crime landscape and regularly produce topic reports, to which the PCeU, SOCA
and GCHQ contribute. The most recent example of this involved contributing learning from their operations
in relation to the “Hacktivist” threat.
1 Police recording of crimes is governed by the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) and the Home office Counting Rules
(HOCR). These set out the principles under which reports received from victims are recorded. Police recorded crime statistics
are based on a notifiable list of offences. The HOCR set out the broad classification groups into which those offences are
managed for statistical purposes.
2 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/cost-of-cyber-crime
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19. The Government is also supporting law enforcement agencies in their work to improve the timely
exchange of intelligence with a broad range of industry, academia and other agencies both in the UK and
abroad. This intelligence contributes to law enforcement operations and informs threat assessments and
subsequent programmes of activity. Intelligence may take various forms, including brigaded victim reports and
the latest network vulnerabilities or methodology. For example, the PCeU routinely shares intelligence
concerning threats with industry, academic and law enforcement partners, in addition to tactical and strategic
learning from their operational and prisoner debriefing activity. The benefits to this approach mean that law
enforcement can respond with one timely investigation, rather than dealing with numerous isolated, reports
from individual members of the public. Furthermore, once a trusted space within industry is established and a
common vulnerability or attack is experienced, then businesses are more likely to report the issue.
20. The cyber crime Threat Reduction Board, established under the Government’s organised crime strategy
“Local to Global” provides an operational context in which law enforcement and intelligence agencies can
assess operational and intelligence activity against the Stem, Strengthen and Safeguard themes of the organised
crime strategy and provide assurance to Ministers that the cyber crime threat is being effectively tackled. A
Cyber Crime Board, chaired by the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Crime and Security (James Brokenshire
MP), has been established to deliver appropriate Ministerial oversight and ensure that policy development is
fully informed by the best possible understanding of the threats.
21. What is the effectiveness of current law enforcement and legislative capabilities, including local and
regional capabilities and what are the potential impacts of proposed organisational change?
Are there any gaps in the response to e-crime and, if so, how should they should be addressed?
The Current Law Enforcement Landscape
22. Co-ordination of law enforcement efforts is key to providing a joined up, end-to-end response to cyber
crime. Our agencies and law enforcement partners work closely together to make this happen, including the
UK Intelligence Agencies, Ministry of Defence (MOD), Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
(CPNI), Police Central e-Crime Unit (PCeU), Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), HM Revenue &
Customs (HMRC), UK Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), the National Fraud Authority
and City of London Police among others.
23. The Government has committed £63 million specifically to tackle cyber crime, which has significantly
strengthened the capacity and capability of the PCeU and SOCA. In the first six months of the programme,
PCeU operational intervention has resulted in a reduction of impact on the UK independently assessed as £140
million. Last financial year (2011–12) there were 45 arrests for cyber crime with 100% victim satisfaction.
Over 21,377 web sites have been taken down from April 2011 to April 2012, resulting from evidence gathered
by the PCeU Internet Governance Team.
24. There has been significant progress internationally, specifically cooperation to progress cyber
investigations with Ukraine and China, and a cyber Joint Investigation Team (JIT) with Estonia which has been
authorised and funded by Europol, and which resulted in substantial prison sentences for an Eastern European
organised crime network working in the UK. SOCA has carried out a number of investigations (further details
at paragraph 44), and further examples can be found in SOCA’s separate submission which sets out its recent
successes against cyber crime.
Legislative Capability
25. What is a crime offline is a crime online, and whilst some cyber crime offences such as hacking,
phishing, malware or virus attacks are set out in the Computer Misuse Act (1990), many crimes committed
online are prosecuted under existing legislation such as the Fraud Act (2006) or the Communications Act
(2003).
26. The Government has committed to reviewing the existing legislation relating to cyber crime, to ensure
that it is fit for purpose, and remains relevant and effective.
27. In particular, the Government wants the Police and the Courts to have the most effective powers to
disrupt, prevent and prosecute those responsible for these crimes. We are therefore reviewing our powers to
support law enforcement, including on areas such as gathering and preserving data for use as evidence and
information-sharing between sectors and internationally. We have also committed, as part of the Cyber Security
Strategy, to encourage Courts in the UK to use existing powers to impose appropriate online sanctions for
online offences.
Proposed Organisational Change
28. Subject to the will of Parliament, the National Crime Agency (NCA) will be established by the end of
2013, at the centre of the reformed law enforcement landscape.
29. The National Cyber Crime Unit (NCCU), which will be part of the National Crime Agency, will focus
on tackling the first two types of cyber crime, as set out in paragraphs 5 and 6 above. This will allow the
NCCU, to focus its resources and skills on the most sophisticated areas of cyber crime, whilst supporting the
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NCA and wider law enforcement to take responsibility for tackling cyber-enabled crime. This principle of
supporting law enforcement to take responsibility for tackling cyber enabled crime, rather than looking to a
specialist cyber unit to lead, will underpin the work of the NCCU. The third definition of cyber crime, that of
crimes that are facilitated by the internet, is being tackled through the police who are mainstreaming cyber
awareness, capacity and capabilities throughout their service.
30. The creation of the National Cyber Crime Unit (NCCU) is a critical part of the Government’s wider
National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP). It will bring together the national law enforcement response to
cyber crime under one roof. This single capability will work closely with other partners, such as GCHQ, to
strengthen the UK’s overall resilience and incident response to cyber threats and to ensure individuals and
industry can take full advantage of the many opportunities presented by the internet.
31. The National Cyber Crime Unit will deliver a range of benefits to the current law enforcement response
to cyber-enabled crime. By bringing together the PCeU and SOCA Cyber, the NCCU will eliminate remit
overlaps, delivering efficiencies and spare capacity that can be utilised to bear down harder on organised cyber
criminals. Building on the successes of SOCA Cyber and the PCeU, the NCCU will deliver:
— A single, high-profile law enforcement lead dedicated to combating organised cyber criminals;
— A more targeted focus on the most serious incidents of cyber crime, removing the criminals
who facilitate cyber-enabled crime further downstream;
— A stronger, more cohesive response to the most serious cyber-enabled crime;
— Dedicated resources to drive a step-change in cyber capabilities across law enforcement, police
service and wider partners;
— Stronger partnerships at all levels, including delivery of a single point of contact for rapid
response to dynamic threats and closer engagement with industry and academia; and
— Closer joint working with the Security and Intelligence Agencies through improved ICT
connectivity and intelligence sharing.
32. Police and Crime Commissioners will be a powerful local representative, able to set the priorities for
the police force within their force area, respond to the needs and demands of their communities more
effectively, ensure that local and national priorities are suitably funded by setting a budget and the local precept,
and hold to account the local Chief Constable for the delivery and performance of the force.
Local Capability
33. In 2008 the National e-Crime Programme conducted a national survey of police capability on cyber. A
new project is being developed by PCeU to update this research including staffing numbers, training, equipment
and best practice. This will further inform in relation to capability and provide updated information in relation
to national response.
34. The publication of the Strategic Policing Requirement will support national co-ordination and
collaboration between police forces to respond to serious and cross-border criminality. In order to ensure that
local police forces can still access specialist services, the Strategic Policing Requirement seeks to ensure that
local policing plans account for cyber capability as well as the contributions that local agencies will provide
to the national response.
35. On a national scale, the police response has had limited resources and infrastructure to respond to,
exploit, and harness the benefits of the digital environment owing to a fragmented approach to policing cyber
crime. The National e-Crime Programme delivered three PCeU hubs to address this situation. The Hubs
enhance existing PCeU national operational capability to respond and investigate cyber crime. The regional
hubs are based in the North West, East Midlands and Yorkshire & the Humber. The “hubs” were launched in
February 2012 and despite their infancy and early stages of development are already contributing to PCeU
operations contributing to a fast and dynamic response outside London.
Bringing together Law Enforcement Capabilities
36. Building on the successes of both SOCA Cyber and the PCeU, the establishment of the NCCU will
further strengthen the law enforcement response to the most serious cyber crime by addressing a number of
gaps that we know exist in law enforcement’s response to cyber crime.
37. First and foremost the NCCU will deliver a single, high-profile law enforcement lead dedicated to
combating organised cyber criminals. This will provide increased clarity and coherence in the law enforcement
response and a more targeted focus on the most serious incidents of cyber crime where the NCCU can add
most value.
38. This ambition fits with the overall goal of the NCA to address the sometimes fragmented law enforcement
response to serious and organised crime by creating a new Agency with the mandate to task and co-ordinate
the UK law enforcement response. The NCCU will form a vital part of the NCA, able to undertake tasking
and coordination across the whole of operational law enforcement, ensuring that appropriate action is taken
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against criminals at the right level, led by the right agency. The NCCU will also benefit from the NCA’s single
national intelligence picture of serious and organised crime to inform its operational activity.
39. As part of this, a key principle of the NCCU is to support law enforcement partners to take the lead in
tackling cyber and cyber-enabled crime, rather than looking to a specialist cyber unit. We know that mainstream
cyber capability across law enforcement needs to be enhanced, and so the NCCU will house dedicated resources
to drive a step-change across law enforcement, the police service and wider partners. This will build on the
existing work of the PCeU in the National e-Crime Programme, including roll-out of the digital forensic triage
tools, supporting the Police Professional Body on developing cyber training, providing a single national centre
of expertise to provide guidance to wider law enforcement, as well as ensuring that cyber capability is
mainstreamed throughout the NCA itself as a role model for wider law enforcement.
40. The expertise and information needed to combat cyber crime sits largely outside law enforcement
including in the Security and Intelligence Agencies (SIAs), industry, international partners and others. The
NCCU will draw upon the range of experience and expertise from these partners in order to stay effective
against cyber criminals. This will involve closer joint working facilitated by enhanced ICT connectivity and
intelligence sharing and maintaining a diverse workforce with experience from a range of sectors. The NCCU
will look to utilise NCA Special Constables to bring in the relevant expertise, as well as seconding staff out to
industry to strengthen relationships and gain experience. The NCCU will also work with operational partners
to ensure that there are clear lines of responsibility when responding to the range of cyber threats, from terrorist
cyber attacks to cyber attacks on critical national infrastructure.
41. Given the rapid increase in both the volume of digital data generated by individuals and the range of
devices and locations on which it can be found (computers, smartphones, CCTV systems, games consoles, in-
vehicle GPS systems, remote (cloud) storage etc.), there is a corresponding increase in the number and type of
traditional crimes that now have at least some e-crime component to them. These are generally crimes that
would be investigated at a local force level rather than by specialist cyber crime units such as PCeU. One of
the key emerging gaps is therefore in the provision at a local level of suitable tools, techniques, skills and
common processes to enable the police to routinely investigate these crimes effectively.
Addressing Gaps in the Response
42. In order to improve our local policing response and appropriately direct police resources, law
enforcement agencies and the Home Office are working to improve our knowledge around the prevalence and
nature of cyber crime, particularly where they relate to volume crimes. This will allow us to effectively train
and equip local police officers to tackle these crimes on a day-to-day basis. In this regard, the Home Office
Centre for Applied Science and Technology (CAST) is working with policing to evaluate and develop specialist
tools and techniques for use both in serious and volume crime investigations, particularly to assist with rapid
and automated examination of large volumes of data.
43. Other activities are being considered to improve knowledge on prevalence and nature of cyber crime in
relation to volume crime, for example, ensuring appropriate data capture mechanisms are in place and that we
are addressing under-awareness and under-reporting of cyber crimes amongst businesses and the general public.
More widely, there is consideration around how we address gaps in knowledge regarding “what works” in
terms of preventing cyber crime by encouraging the public and businesses to better protect themselves online.
44. There is evidence of a number of successful SOCA, PeCU, CEOP and NFIB disruptive operations in
tackling cyber related activities and reporting to agencies such as Action Fraud, NFIB and CEOP has increased.
However, wider evaluations of cyber policing structures, initiatives and performance are currently lacking:
— The PCeU have taken forward work to mainstream cyber awareness, capacity and capability
throughout their service. The regional hubs of PCeU launched in February 2012 increase
operational capacity and capability and awareness of cyber within the regions. Work is ongoing
with Skills For Justice to produce a competency framework for PCeU enforcement and
intelligence officers. This framework will be available nationally.
— Over the coming year, funding from the National e-Crime Programme is supporting an interim
National Hash Set database, which will amalgamate law enforcement databases and apply
consistency to grading and processing indecent images of children.
— Virgin Media worked with SOCA to warn customers on its network that they might have been
infected with the dangerous SpyEye Trojan variant. This collects personal and banking
information and poses a high level threat to infected users. It is comparable in severity to the
“Zeus” Trojan which reportedly siphoned over half a million pounds from UK consumers’ bank
accounts last year. SOCA detected around 1,500 Virgin Media customers’ Internet Service
Providers (ISPs) infected with the SpyEye Trojan and at risk of identity theft or fraud. Virgin
Media wrote to these customers to get help if they were unable to manage the disinfection
process themselves.
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— SOCA identified and, through its Alerts system, reported several hundred cases of domain name
abuse directly to ICANN3, highlighting continuous failures in the customer validation of
domain name registrations by the specific “registrars” directly responsible for the sale of domain
names to users. Targeted SOCA Alerts highlighted areas of abuse and registrar practice that
disrupted a major online malware distribution group by preventing it from registering and using
malicious domain names over a long term period. Collaboration with ICANN to amend the
Registrar’s Accreditation Agreement (RAA) has assisted law enforcement efforts in crime
prevention and detection, and direct reporting to ICANN, highlighting specific criminal use of
domain names and methodology, has encouraged due diligence measures to prevent abuse.
— Following a referral from the Internet Watch Foundation, CEOP identified a website that was
hosted in Germany, which contained a large number of child abuse material and a section for
people to buy and sell children from sexual exploitation. CEOP worked to identify a suspect
who was thought to have produced the website and assisted Kent Police in setting up an
undercover operation to gather further evidence against the suspect. This was successful and
the suspect, Darren Leggett, was arrested. Leggett was found to have committed a number of
sexual offences against young children, and was given an indeterminate sentence on 21 June
this year, with a minimum term of seven years.
— Action Fraud has reported over 33,000 instances of cyber-enabled fraud or internet crime-
related issues, of which 2017 were crimes under the Computer Misuse Act (1990). In addition
19,000 instances of attempted online scams have been reported to the service along with 1,200
reports of virus attacks.
Working with Stakeholders
45. The Government recognises that in tackling cyber crime there is a key opportunity for industry,
Government agencies and law enforcement to come together to provide a joint threat picture, to gather
intelligence and to provide a joint response.
Building trust and confidence between the private sector and law enforcement authorities is vital to address
any gaps in the response the threat of cyber crime. Industry has a vital role to play and also needs to invest in
effective information security in order to reduce the threat from cyber crime. We cannot achieve our goals in
isolation. The prosperity of the UK, creating a secure UK business environment, a secure UK (critical) national
infrastructure is just as important as bringing criminals to justice. The Cyber Security Strategy creates a
framework for an alliance that is greater than its constituent parts An excellent example of this cross-sector
working is the UK Council for Child Internet Safety (UKCCIS) which brings together government, industry,
law enforcement, academia and charities to work in partnership to help keep children and young people
safe online.
46. We are now considering how best to build on this successful formula to address the interests of industry
and Government in dealing with cyber crime. We are also looking at international partnership models for
operational information-sharing, such as the National Cyber-Forensics Training Alliance (NCFTA), based in
Pittsburgh, USA. The NCFTA brings together private industry and law enforcement in a neutral, trusted
environment to identify, mitigate and prevent cyber crime through joint working and data exchange. We will
be looking at this, and other such structures, to inform our work to enhance operational-level partnerships
between Government and the private sector on cyber crime.
47. At a tactical level, the PCeU continues to build upon the good work with the existing Virtual Task Force
(VTF). The VTF was established in July 2009, incorporates staff from the Police Central e-Crime Unit and
has achieved considerable success which has resulted in international recognition of the benefits of this model
of public/private sector operational delivery. Member organisations have committed a strategic lead member
and tactical representatives.
International Work
48. Cyber crime is an international crime, and the Government has been clear that a major part of our
response is to work internationally at Government and at law enforcement levels.
49. The Government has ratified the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, as the main international
agreement in this area, and has taken an active approach to encouraging countries to sign and ratify it. The
Government believes that all countries should put in place the appropriate legislation and law enforcement
capability to tackle cyber crime, and the ability to support international partners. The Government believes that
the Convention offers the only current and comprehensive framework for this.
50. The Government has opted in to the EU Directive on attacks on information systems to ensure that there
is common agreement across EU Member States on offences and sentences to allow our law enforcement
agencies to together to identify suspects, gather evidence and bring criminals to justice.
3 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, the body responsible for the administration and allocation of domain
names.
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51. The Government supports the creation of the EU Cybercrime Centre, and in particular the decision to
locate it in Europol, which will build on its existing high-tech crimes capability. The Government expects the
Centre to support Member States in working together to tackle cyber crime, and to develop effective best
practice in areas such as cross-border cooperation and information sharing.
52. The Government strongly supports the EU Council Conclusions on the creation of a Global Alliance
Against Child Sexual Abuse, put forward by the Presidency and the Commission. The Government recognises
the need for Member States, third countries, international law enforcement and industry to continue to work
together to prevent the spread of child pornography. The Alliance will build on the existing work in this area.
53. The Government strongly supports the work of the Hungarian Government in organising the Budapest
Conference on cyber issues that will be held in October. This is a follow up to the London Conference on
Cyberspace that was hosted by the Foreign Secretary in November 2011.
What are the options for addressing key emerging issues that will affect the public such as liability over
personal computer security, personal data held by social networking sites and its vulnerability to criminal
use?
54. All processing of personal data in the UK, online and offline, must comply with the Data Protection Act
1998 (DPA) and its data protection principles. Importantly, the seventh principle requires that “appropriate
technical and organisational measures shall be taken against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal
data and against accidental loss or destruction of, or damage to, personal data”.
55. The expansion of the Internet and the emergence of social media networks has recently led the European
Commission to publish proposals for updated data protection legislation. These proposals were published on
25 January 2012 and contain a Regulation (setting out a general EU framework for data protection) and a
Directive (covering authorities dealing with criminal offences and penalties). Amongst other things, the
proposals seek to provide individuals with strengthened rights to delete their personal data (including a so-
called “right to be forgotten”), which could affect the way in which people’s information is held by online
services, such as social networks.
56. Given the practicalities, costs and potential for confusion of a full-scale “right to be forgotten”, the UK
Government will push in negotiations for an overhaul of the provisions as drafted. However, the Government
is committed to giving individuals the right to delete their personal data, where this is appropriate. The
principles of “data minimisation” and “privacy by design”, if adopted by organisations in their systems, should
help to ensure that people’s personal data does not proliferate online and is held securely, minimising the
opportunities for those who would seek to use it for criminal purposes.
57. The Information Commissioner, the UK’s independent data protection supervisory authority, enforces
the DPA’s requirements and promotes good practice. As part of the latter role, the Information Commissioner’s
Office (ICO) has produced guidance for individuals and young people on keeping their personal data safe
online, including specific advice on using social networks.
58. There is work under way across Government and industry to improve data protection for customers. BIS
and the Home Office are working in partnership with the six major Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in the
UK: BT, TalkTalk, Sky, Everything Everywhere, Vodafone, and VirginMedia, to explore what more could be
done or done differently to better protect businesses and consumers from online threats such as malware and
botnets. This covers the basic security packages that ISPs are offering to their customers, as well as raising
awareness amongst customers about the importance of behaving securely online.
59. Further work is under way with Government, industry and law enforcement through the Forum for
Innovation in Crime Prevention. This is a strategic expert advisory group drawn from science, business and
industry, law enforcement agencies and Government that identifies major opportunities for preventing and
disrupting crime through innovative design, technology and behavioural change and proposes solutions that
incentivise business engagement.
60. Our law enforcement agencies work with their counterparts overseas to carry out work such as restricting
criminal access to the Internet. This is achieved through work with organisations such as the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers.
How effective are current initiatives to promote awareness of using the internet safely and what are the
implications of peoples’ online behaviours for related public policy?
61. Prevention is key, and we are working to raise awareness and to educate and empower people and firms
to protect themselves online. GCHQ estimates that 80% or more of currently successful attacks could be
defeated by simple best practice, such as updating anti-virus software regularly. The Government works in
close partnership with industry on cyber security, recognising that this is crucial to protecting individuals and
their data.
62. Organisations can be attractive targets for cyber criminals, who may seek to exploit security
vulnerabilities in order to access intellectual property or other commercially sensitive information. In the Cyber
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Security Strategy, the Government committed to improving both the information sharing and risk management
between businesses, law enforcement and business service providers.
63. The Government supports Get Safe Online, which is a joint public and private sector campaign which
provides up to date, accurate and authoritative advice to online consumers on how to protect themselves, their
families and their businesses online. We have increased funding for Get Safe Online to £395,000 this year to
improve the website and enable it to reach out to more people across the UK. The campaign is working in
partnership with various police forces, as well as their private sector partners to provide advice on cyber
security that is accessible to everyone.
64. Action Fraud has a key role to play in terms of encouraging and enabling behaviour change in relation
to preventing citizens and businesses from becoming victims of crime in this area. An excellent start has been
made in this arena with the successful delivery of the “Devil’s in Your Detail” campaign which was a joint
initiative between the NFA and private sector organisations from the banking and telecoms industries. This
campaign was video-driven and aimed to encourage people to treat their personal information as a valuable
commodity. The campaign reached over four million people. Subsequent analysis of 4,000 people who watched
the videos resulted in over 60% stating that they would take more steps to protect themselves from fraud.
August 2012
Written evidence submitted by the Serious Organised Crime Agency [EC 01]
Introduction
1. This submission sets out the Serious Organised Crime Agency’s (SOCA) written evidence to the Home
Affairs Select Committee’s inquiry into e-crime. In the terms of this response we will refer to e-crime as cyber
crime throughout the submission.
2. The submission outlines the current level of knowledge within the organisation on cyber crime. This
submission has been written in coordination with the Home Office, and should be considered supplementary
to its submission.
What e-crime is understood to be and how this affects crime recording
3. SOCA works with its partners, under the Home Office’s Organised Crime Strategy (“Local to Global”),
to address the threat of organised cyber crime. Under the Strategy, the multi-agency Cyber Threat Reduction
Board4 (TRB), chaired by SOCA, adopted the following definition of cyber crime in November 2011:
— “pure” online crimes, where a digital system is the target as well as the means of attack. These
include attacks on computer systems to disrupt IT infrastructure, and stealing data over a
network using malware (the purpose of the data theft is usually to enable further crime);
— “existing” crimes that have been transformed in scale or form by their use of the internet. The
growth of the internet has allowed these crimes to be carried out on an industrial scale; and
— use of the internet to facilitate drug dealing, people smuggling and many other “traditional”
types of crime.
The extent and nature of the threats on which e-crime policy is based and how well they are understood by
policy makers
4. Organised crime is increasingly globalised and IT-enabled, a trend inevitably accelerating with society’s
dependence on the internet. Organised criminals operate their own self-regulated market for cyber crime goods
and services, including stolen data, malicious software, technical infrastructure and money laundering: and they
operate on an industrial scale. As more data is acquired, stored and shared and ever increasing use is made of
mobile devices, so the risk increases. SOCA contributed to the development of the Government’s Cyber
Security Strategy which was published in November 2011. The Strategy references research suggesting that
the costs to the UK of cyber crime could be in the order of £27 billion per year.5
5. SOCA, along with other departments and agencies, has also played a part in contributing to activity led
by the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), helping to raise awareness at a senior level within
private sector organisations of the threat posed by on-line crime to business performance, shareholder value,
reputation, intellectual property and the security of information systems.
4 Threat Reduction Boards were established under the Government’s Organised Crime Strategy to provide focus for law
enforcement partners including HMRC, SOCA and UKBA. Each board is chaired by a senior operational partner, responsible
for assessing operational and intelligence activity against the three themes set out in the Organised Crime Strategy (stem,
strengthen, safeguard). The activities of the boards are subject to scrutiny by the senior officials group and Ministerial structure
5
“The Cost of Cyber Crime”, Detica—14 February 2011
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The effectiveness of current law enforcement and legislative capabilities, including local and regional
capabilities and the potential impacts of proposed organisational change
6. Key activity aligned to the Organised Crime Strategy in respect of cyber crime includes:
— improving the understanding of, and intelligence about, cyber crime in order to identify changes
to drive the response;
— ensuring that the operational response to cyber crime is being coordinated effectively and is
reducing the risk to the UK of cyber crime; and
— providing assurance that identified organised crime groups are subject to an appropriate level
of operational response and that the maximum impact against the threat area is being achieved,
improving our understanding of the threat that impacts on the UK.
7. SOCA responded to the Government’s National Cyber Security Programme by expanding its current cyber
capability, including the posting of dedicated Cyber Liaison Officers in key locations overseas.
8. Recent successes achieved against cyber crime include:
— a SOCA led global day of action took place on the 25 April 2012 to tackle Automated Vending
Cart (AVC)6 websites selling compromised financial data. Two UK arrests were made and
SOCA intelligence assisted the US in seizing data for 26 AVCs and 36 domains. In addition,
as a direct result of eight alerts issued, a further 44 AVCs have been taken down—resulting in
significant disruption.
— in 2011–12 SOCA and its partners seized over 1,200,000 items of compromised card data from
cybercriminals and passed these details to industry via the Alerts system.
— as a result of SOCA operational activity two men who provided a range of services to credit
card fraudsters were sentenced to almost five years imprisonment after facilitating fraud valued
at more than £26 million. Both pleaded guilty to a range of fraud, money laundering and
computer misuse offences, and were sentenced at Bristol Crown Court to three years and 21
months respectively. Forensic analysis revealed payment card details of more than 340,000
individuals. The estimated losses are a conservative figure and the actual loss is likely to be
considerably more. In addition, the information brokered would also have been sufficient to
enable fake bank accounts to be set up, which could be used to commit further fraud, such as
cheque or identity fraud.
9. SOCA has been involved in dealing with cyber crime on an international level as well. Cyber crime
investigations almost inevitably have an international element, with criminals, data and infrastructure typically
based across multiple jurisdictions. SOCA has therefore developed close working relationships with many
foreign partners, which enables intelligence sharing, evidence gathering—support with the preservation of data
in particular—and operational engagement. Recent examples include joint working on the selling of
compromised financial data online. A coalition of overseas partners worked together to make arrests and take
down websites, multiplying the effectiveness of UK law enforcement activity. Tackling cyber crime
internationally will also require new ways of working. The UK is working closely with Interpol, Europol and
United States partners to establish more innovative approaches to tackling cyber crime.
10. Mainstreaming of cyber capabilities is underway within SOCA, and will harness the potential of every
investigator to use cyber crime tools, not solely those from dedicated cyber units. All officers will receive
training on cyber crime, internet security, open source capabilities and online investigation techniques,
following the completion of a comprehensive training needs analysis. SOCA operational teams have embedded
officers specialising in digital forensics and open source research, making these techniques more readily
available at every stage of an investigation. In addition, officers with a dedicated cyber remit have also been
placed within other key business areas enabling cyber mainstreaming to grow from within departments.
11. Going forward, the National Crime Agency (NCA) presents the UK with the opportunity to improve its
national law enforcement response to crime perpetrated in cyber space or enabled by the internet, through the
establishment of a National Cyber Crime Unit (NCCU). The NCCU will act as a centre of expertise for tackling
cyber crime. The NCA will have the specialist operational capabilities and the latest technology to ensure that
its intelligence gathering and analytical capabilities match the threat posed by cyber criminals. It will bring
together the digital investigation capabilities of SOCA and the MPS Police Central e-crime Unit (PCeU) to
provide an enhanced response to the cyber crime threat.
Whether there are any gaps in the response to e-crime and, if so how they should be addressed
12. There are a number of factors that can hinder law enforcement in the response to cyber crime. For
example, the majority of cyber criminals are not within UK jurisdiction, and international barriers inhibit their
identification and prosecution. Differing domestic legislation is also an issue, for example in some countries
cyber crime is not recognised in domestic legislation.
6 Automated Vending Cart (AVC) is a term coined by SOCA (and now adopted internationally) to describe click and buy e-
commerce websites that automate the sale of compromised personal financial data
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13. In response SOCA has worked closely with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and other government
departments to encourage the implementation of legislation and recognition of cyber crime in key countries.
For example the Commonwealth Initiative has agreed to target priority countries for assistance.7 SOCA Cyber
Liaison Officers overseas will work to ensure that cyber crime is also identified as a priority and enhance
overall international relations.
14. The UK is also working with global partners to encourage wider adoption of the Budapest Convention
on cyber crime, putting in place compatible frameworks of law that enable effective cross-border law
enforcement and deny safe havens to cyber criminals.8
15. Beyond those law enforcement agencies with a specialist role there is also a general lack of awareness
of cyber crime, which hinders the ability to investigate and target both “pure” cyber crime and “digitally
enabled crime”. It is essential that the message is conveyed across the whole law enforcement community that
cyber crime is a priority. The establishment of the NCCU in the NCA, bringing together SOCA and other
cyber law enforcement units, will help to further improve the UK’s response.
Options for addressing key emerging issues that will affect the public such as liability over personal
computer security, personal data held by social networking sites and its vulnerability to criminal use. The
effectiveness of current initiatives to promote awareness of using the internet safety and the implications of
peoples’ online behaviours for related public policy
16. The Government’s Organised Crime Strategy identified “Safeguarding” as one of the key themes for
tackling organised crime by reducing the vulnerability of communities, business and the state to become victims
of crime. In line with this theme SOCA supports raising awareness of cyber crime to prevent consumers
becoming victim to cyber criminals. For example, Get Safe Online (GSOL) is one a number of initiatives
between the Government, SOCA, and the private sector. This highlighted the increased use of smart phone
malware during “Get Safe Online Week” in November 2011. Criminals use online application stores to entice
smart phone users to download rogue applications. The malware is often disguised as “free levels” to popular
and legitimate games, or even as security tools. Users are often unaware that fraudsters have control of their
phone (and access to personal and payment data) until they receive their monthly bills or otherwise find
themselves victims of identity crime. GSOL has produced a free download, The Rough Guide to Online Safety,
in order to reduce the threat.
11 July 2012
Supplementary written evidence submitted by the Serious Organised Crime Agency [EC 01a]
During my appearance before the Committee on the 11 December 2012 to give evidence to the e-Crime
inquiry, I promised to write listing the EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) measures that SOCA utilises in
regards to cyber crime investigations.
There is extensive law enforcement collaboration at an operational level between SOCA and partners across
Europe, which supports and informs EU policy. This joint activity takes place through a number of JHA
measures. I set out details of these, with a particular emphasis on cyber crime below.
— With the support of other UK law enforcement agencies, SOCA has established a multi-agency
UK Liaison Bureau at Europol which, via a network of other national liaison bureaux and
contact points, coordinates international operational engagement with other Member States and
third countries/organisations which have cooperation agreements with Europol. The UK
(SOCA) participates in Europol’s Focal Points Cyborg, Twins and Terminal, working with
other partners to address the threat of cyber crime through operational cooperation and sharing
intelligence, utilising Europol’s expert analytical capability as the EU’s information hub to
identify opportunities for further cooperation.
— On 11 January 2013 the EU Cyber Crime Centre based within Europol opened. This centre will
support Member States and EU institutions in coordinating operations and investigations with
international partners in line with Europol’s wider mandate; and, will provide an expert
analytical capability to partners. The Centre will improve evaluation and monitoring of existing
preventive and investigative measures, support the development of training and awareness-
raising for law enforcement and judiciary, establish cooperation with the European Network and
Information Security Agency (ENISA) and interface with a network of national/governmental
Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs).
7 The Commonwealth Initiative is a new multi-stakeholder approach to developing a safe cyberspace internationally, drawing
together the combined mandates of existing organisations such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Council of Europe, International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) and Commonwealth Secretariat to develop and implement coherent, holistic cyber capacity building programmes
for developing Commonwealth states. It is co-funded by the UK Government (Department of Culture Media and Sport). SOCA
chairs the Executive Board
8 The Budapest Convention on Cyber Crime is the first international treaty on crimes committed via the internet and other computer
networks, dealing particularly with infringements of copyright, computer-related fraud, child pornography and violations of
network security. It also contains a series of powers and procedures such as the search of computer networks and interception.
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— SOCA also participates in a European Multidisclinary Platform against Criminal Threats
(EMPACT) project on cybercrime, which is led by Romania. This is one of eight EMPACT
projects overseen by the EU Standing Committee on Operational Cooperation on Internal
Security (COSI) set up to streamline and help coordinate operational cooperation on priority
threats to the EU, as part of the EU Policy Cycle on serious and organised international crime.
Europol plays a supportive role to this work, through its Focal Points, hosting project meetings
and assisting in coordinating operational activity associated with the project.
— SOCA also partakes in the use of Joint Investigation Teams (JITs) to support international
operational engagement. The use of JITs provides a mechanism for Member States to cooperate
operationally, establishing a clear agreement between participating countries setting out terms
of engagement for cooperation and information sharing in accordance with Member States’
national legislation. Both Europol and Eurojust provide support to JITs; Europol in providing
analytical support and Eurojust in providing judicial expertise, legal assistance and funding.
In addition to the above measures SOCA also regularly utilises the following JHA measures:
— European Arrest Warrant.
— Schengen Article 40.
— Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) Cooperation.
— Asset Recovery Offices (ARO).
Andy Archibald
Deputy Director
Serious Organised Crime Agency
Written evidence submitted by the British Retail Consortium [EC 02]
1. Introduction
1.1 The British Retail Consortium (BRC) is the lead trade association for the retail sector representing the
whole range of retailers, from small independent stores through to the large multiples and department stores,
selling a wide selection of products through centre of town, out of town, rural and online stores.
2. Summary
2.1 Retail is at the heart of local communities, employing close to three million people across the country
and providing important local goods and services to consumers. The sector is an essential contributor to
economic growth and to the regeneration of areas affected by crime and disorder.
2.2 Online retailing is a significant element of the future strategy for many businesses and increasingly
important to the economy. The value of UK internet retailing in 2011 was £25 billion (up from £21 billion in
2010). Internet sales growth averaged 15% in 2011 and the sector represented 10% of total retail spending over
the 2010–11 period. The growth of e-commerce and corresponding opportunities for increasing fraudulent
behaviour should not be underestimated. Retailers need to be sure that as they seek to expand their businesses
via e-commerce the customers they attract will be well protected. Retailers invest significant resources in
protecting their customers. But, too often, the current law enforcement response to e-crime and fraud is
inadequate. The BRC is calling for a dedicated national unit tasked to investigate and respond to the increasing
levels of e-crime.
2.3 Engagement between the private sector and law enforcement agencies should be focused on finding the
most effective way to achieve a better response to e-crime and fraud. The focus must be on finding ways in
which the public and private sectors can work more effectively together to reduce the level of offending and
to raise consumer confidence.
3. What e-crime is understood to be
3.1 The BRC uses the following ACPO definition of e-crime:
3.2 The use of networked computers or internet technology to commit or facilitate the commission of crime.
4. The effectiveness of current law enforcement and the potential impacts of proposed organisational change
4.1 Retailers are concerned that the law enforcement community has failed to keep pace with the rapidly
expanding threat of e-crime. This situation may be exacerbated in the future by diminishing police resources
and the introduction of locally elected police commissioners who may, in some cases consider business crime
a low priority.
4.2 A number of BRC members have reported dissatisfaction with the level and quality of communications
they receive from the police regarding e-crime. Retailers want far more clarity about what they can expect in
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terms of support and engagement throughout the process of prevention, detection and punishment of e-crime
and fraud.
4.3 Retailers are generally dissatisfied with current police responses to e-crime and often do not report
incidents. The reason for this is that e-crime is not considered to be a priority for many police forces. There
are also concerns that national units such as the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau of Police Central e-Crime
Unit (PCeU) do not have the resources or capacity to carry out further investigations.
4.4 Currently, there is no mechanism for retailers to report offences directly to Government/the law
enforcement community via a centralised model for reporting. BRC members believe that this would be a
valuable innovation which would permit more effective analysis of combined data from all sectors. It would
also ensure greater awareness of the threat of e-crime to the UK and better inform the public, private and SME
sector about potential threats to their businesses.
5. Gaps in the response to e-crime and how they should be addressed
5.1 The central concern of BRC members relates to the case acceptance criteria for each of the national
agencies who deal with e-crime and fraud. Too often, retailers find themselves preparing detailed reports with
the expectation that the relevant agency will accept the case. However, because of the opaque and diverse
range of case acceptance criteria, retailers frequently find their case falls just short of the requirements for
acceptance. When offences do not reach the acceptance criteria they need to be reported locally. Retailers
therefore need clarity around where, in the first instance, offences should be reported and, if they must be
reported locally, then it is vital that local operational capacity is available to progress an investigation
adequately.
6. Options for addressing key emerging issues
6.1 The BRC has identified two distinct areas where challenges are likely to arise in the future. These are
the increase in the use of mobile technology and the introduction of locally elected Police and Crime
Commissioners.
6.2 The shift towards m-commerce will undoubtedly bring a number of challenges for the retail sector. The
balance between providing flexibility for consumers versus protecting consumers and brands will become
increasingly complex.
6.3 Some industry observers predict that mobile payments are likely to be an important trend for the future
and fraudsters will certainly be looking to exploit this new channel. However, until adoption increases it is too
early to tell exactly where the risk lies for merchants. What is clear, however, is that retailers will have to
become increasingly aware of the end-to-end process involved in m-commerce and understand exactly where
the risks and liability lie for any fraud that is carried out.
6.4 However, developments in electronic crime are fast paced and highly unpredictable. BRC members
would like to see the Government and law enforcement community issuing alerts on key and emerging threats
to UK retail businesses and working with these businesses to ensure that the threats against them are clearly
understood.
6.5 The British Retail Consortium is supportive of the introduction of elected PCCs. Retailers across the UK
are keen to work with the police to build and support safer communities. We believe it is important that newly
elected PCCs are supported in reconciling demands from the community and the needs of business when
setting local policing priorities. It is also vitally important that candidates have opportunities to engage with a
wide range of stakeholders before the elections and that, if necessary, Government should facilitate this.
6.6 It is also vital that new PCCs are encouraged to share best practice to ensure that crime is tackled
consistently across England and Wales. This is especially true for retailers who operate national businesses and
expect a standard response from the authorities no matter where a crime takes place. A consistent approach is
vital when tackling e-crime and fraud.
7. The effectiveness of current initiatives to promote awareness of using the internet safely
7.1 Retailers invest heavily in anti-fraud systems and are continually seeking ways to safeguard themselves
and their customers. However, more needs to be done to encourage consumers to keep their details safe. As e-
commerce grows, the burden of educating customers must be spread further than the retail sector. There is a
real role for the Government and the third sector to provide such support. BRC members would welcome a
Government campaign aimed at helping consumers stay safe online.
7.2 Emphasis also needs to be placed on the public keeping their details safe offline as well—information
collected in the real world is often used as the basis upon which virtual crimes are perpetrated. Though these
precautions alone will not eliminate e-crime and fraud, they are part of a package of steps that can be taken to
reduce the risk of crime.
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8. BRC recommendations
8.1 In in our 2011 report The Futures of E-crime, the BRC made six key recommendations around how to
make the future of online sales more secure:
8.1.1 Improve Law Enforcement Communication
8.1.1.1 Communication between law enforcement agencies and retailers should be improved so
that each is clear about the evidence that is needed to support a successful investigation.
Frequently law enforcement agencies waste time and resources by unnecessarily
conducting investigative work which has already been undertaken by the retailer.
8.1.2 Clearly Define Law Enforcement Responsibilities
8.1.2.1 There needs to be more comprehensive information about which law enforcement agencies
have responsibility for e-crime and online fraud, and the extent of those responsibilities.
Such information should identify overlaps and intelligence gaps. There should also be
greater transparency about the case acceptance criteria for each of these agencies.
8.1.3 Make Effective use of Intelligence
8.1.3.1 The National Fraud Intelligence Bureau should work with third party screening companies
to enable more effective use of intelligence. There is a wealth of intelligence held by third
party screening companies which could prevent offences occurring by enabling action
before an offence is committed. This would reduce the number of victims and help provide
reassurance to the public that they are being fully protected.
8.1.4 Undertake a National Threat Assessment
8.1.4.1 There should be a National Threat Assessment on Online Shopping. This will help to
identify the extent of the need for an economic crime capability as part of the new National
Crime Agency.
8.1.5 Communicate with Banks/Card Issuers
8.1.5.1 There needs to be better communication and information exchanged between the bank
and card issuers, and retailers to facilitate greater detection and prevention of e-crime
and fraud.
8.1.6 Identify Effective Practice
8.1.6.1 Good practice guidance should be developed to enable retailers to reduce incidents of
internal fraud and to increase the understanding of how to best protect consumers. Police
forces should be encouraged to share best practice on how to engage with retailers and
each other on detection and prevention of e-crime and fraud.
August 2012
Written evidence submitted by Engineering the Future [EC 05]
This is an Engineering the Future response to the Home Affairs Select Committee call for evidence on
E-Crime.
This response has been developed by:
— BCS, The Chartered Institute for IT.
— The Institution of Engineering and Technology.
The response is supported by:
— The Engineering Council.
— The Institution of Mechanical Engineers.
— The Royal Academy of Engineering.
Please note that a glossary of terms that are used in this response is provided at the end of the submission.
1. What e-crime is understood to be and how this affects crime recording
“E-crime” (and its near-synonym “cyber-crime”) is an ambiguous term that is used to mean, variously,
crimes whose nature intrinsically requires the involvement of one or more computers. These offences fall
within the remit of The Computer Misuse Act or what might be termed “traditional” crimes, such as fraud or
extortion, where the use of a computer is a subsidiary element. Crimes such as “phishing”, where an email is
used to obtain private information for fraudulent purposes, possibly in concert with a fraudulent website, are
recent variants on a technique known in the security community as “social engineering” and among journalists
as “blagging”.
For this reason, any reported statistics that purport to state the extent of, growth in, or damage caused by
cyber crime or e-crime, should be regarded with considerable caution unless they are accompanied by full
definitions of these terms, a breakdown of the incidents that fall into each sub-category and full details of how
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any losses have been calculated. It would be absurd, for example, to count every illegally downloaded music
track as a lost sale at the retail price, just as it would be absurd to assume that everyone who buys a fake
Rolex watch at a car boot sale was, in fact, intending to buy the real thing.
It is noticeable that the highest estimates of the prevalence of cyber crime or cyber attacks come from
organisations whose business depends on the sales of technical countermeasures or whose budgets could be
seen to depend on the degree of alarm about cyber security within government. So far as we are aware, there
are no independently verified statistics about the extent of any individual categories of cyber crime.
It is likely that a great deal of e-crime goes unreported and unrecorded. Most internet users will receive
several phishing emails, malicious attachments or attempted money-laundering or advance-fee-fraud
approaches each week. In practice, most of these will be deleted. While there is a facility for recipients to
forward such email to phishing@cityoflondon.police.uk with all the headers intact, it is unclear whether they
are recorded or are followed up.
While the police are the natural first line responders for any crime, few of the UK’s 52 geographical police
forces have the expertise and the resources to deal with large scale e-crime, especially on a national or
international scale. While there are specialist units, the UK does not have a single authority for the reporting
and investigation of e-crime. The present system appears to lack the coordination and process to reassure the
citizen and deal with an industrial scale threat. Victims and suspected victims of e-crime would benefit from a
greater awareness, more transparency and a single point of contact when seeking advice and incident reporting.
2. The extent and nature of the threats on which e-crime policy is based and how well they are understood by
policy makers
The Cabinet Office has stated that government and the citizen are affected by rising levels of e-crime, at an
estimated cost of £2.2 billion and £3.1 billion respectively. However it acknowledges that business bears the
lion’s share of the cost of e-crime, at a total estimated cost of £21 billion.9 These figures should be treated
with caution for the reasons given earlier. It is clear, however that e-crime is a significant threat to UK citizens
and businesses.
The rapid growth of eCommerce increases our dependency on the availability and integrity of the internet
and our computer and communications infrastructure. While the extent of that dependency is easy to understand
in terms of the potential impact of the denial or corruption of those services, it is more difficult to comprehend
the true extent and nature of the threat. The source of the threat is extensive, ranging from the substantial
resources of a nation state to the ingenuity of an inspired individual or the copycat behaviour of “script kiddies”
(see glossary of terms, page 6). The nature of the threat is variable depending on the business and technology
employed. However, in the modern industrial-size processing environments on which our economy depends,
the integrity and availability of information will remain our principal vulnerability and the focus of any attack,
while the vulnerabilities in systems controlling industrial plant and national infrastructure should not be
overlooked.
Some threats have been researched, clearly defined and are understood by policy makers: such as online
child exploitation covered by Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre (CEOP) and understanding of
online phishing, identity theft and crimes involving financial fraud by the Serious Organised Crime Agency
(SOCA). However other areas like bullying online, defamation, invasion of privacy, particularly where social
media are employed, are not so well defined or understood by policymakers.
The UK is experiencing a period of rapid social, economic, technical and political change which has
engendered a more challenging and permissive environment. New technology enables a raft of traditional non-
violent crimes to be committed in new ways, across borders and at scale previously unimagined. Policy makers
must remain vigilant and maintain a far greater awareness of the potential and the vulnerability of our
information society to malicious attack.
3. The effectiveness of current law enforcement and legislative capabilities, including local and regional
capabilities and the potential impacts of proposed organisational change
Law enforcement in the UK struggles to address the magnitude of the task of combating e-crime. While
there are some notable successes in combating serious online crime, anti-terrorism and espionage, the vast bulk
of e-crime inevitably goes undetected or unreported and therefore unresolved. Policing is nearly non-existent
at the more mundane levels that most citizens experience e-crimes. This is very serious since it creates an
impression that the police do not care about e-crime as it affects the ordinary citizen, particularly where the
local response is close to non-existent or patchy at best. E-crime is now much more frequent than physical
crime but is largely unrecorded and unresolved.
There is growing action to increase the percentage of police officers who have been trained to handle the
burgeoning amount of digital evidence that is relevant to solving and successfully prosecuting all kinds of
crime and this will increase the potential resources that could be used to address the more serious forms of e-
crime. Resources will always be limited and the potential task faced by the police is huge. A single seizure
following a referral by CEOP may contain hundreds of hard disks containing hundreds or thousands of
9 www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/resource-library/cost-of-cyber-crime
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gigabytes of data, dozens of mobile phones and other digital devices. These will need to be properly recorded,
managed and controlled to preserve the evidence chain, and forensically examined as a matter of urgency as a
child’s life may be at risk. Yet each phone examined and each email chain may lead to one or more addresses
across the country that must be searched and where similar scale seizures may be required. Resources are soon
stretched beyond breaking point.
Recent legislation has promised much but delivered little to aid the combating of e-crime. The Digital
Economy Act 2012 has been widely perceived as supporting intellectual property interests and placing the onus
of policing on the ISP, while potentially stifling creativity and offering little in the way of protection to the
citizen with few barriers to those who wish to avoid the additional restrictions. In effect, the planned legislation
has been designed to address the perceived terrorist and organised conventional crime threat, rather than
addressing the wider e-crime threat which in an international context may not be within its powers. The election
of Police and Crime Commissioners may affect the priority that local Chief Constables give to e-crime but will
not increase the available resources. The Strategic Policing power that the Director General of the new National
Crime Agency (NCA) will have is a further factor that will influence prioritisation by Chief Constables. The
cyber resources of the NCA will be limited and will probably be directed against the highest priority targets.
While the devolved administrations of Scotland10 and Wales11 have introduced schemes to better
coordinate the fight against e-crime little progress has been made on a UK scale. Proposed organisational
change appears to offer little in the short term to combat the rapid growth in e-crime and provide greater clarity
and reassurance to the citizen.
4. Whether there are any gaps in the response to e-crime and, if so, how they should be addressed
The UK response to e-crime presently lacks the clarity and co-ordination seen elsewhere in the world.12
There needs to be greater clarity about the types of e-crime, with a clear definition and understanding of what
is criminal, what is civil and where responsibility lies between business and law enforcement. There needs to
be a simple well-coordinated process for reporting e-crime with clear lines of responsibility for recording,
investigating and where necessary apprehending and prosecuting offenders. We need to move away from any
presumption that the banks’ technology is secure and that customers who report fraudulent activity on their
accounts are at fault or lying—there have been too many examples of weaknesses in banks’ security for it to
be reasonable for the burden of proof to lie with the customer.
There are major problems in investigating crimes and pursuing criminals where the offence originates
overseas. The UK does not have the same power to require foreign telecommunication service providers to
provide communications and user data that can be required from UK-based companies. Attempts to negotiate
bilateral agreements could easily founder because of understandable reluctance to open UK companies’ and
citizens’ private data to scrutiny by agencies in countries that may have national interests that are not wholly
aligned with the UK’s. Our growing dependency on technology and the magnitude of the threat demands a
balance of legislative framework and administrative structures that protect the citizen while supporting e-
business and innovation; promoting the UK as a safe well regulated environment in which business can thrive.
To achieve this will require a more collaborative approach between the public and private sector in addressing
the threat and the acquisition and development of new capabilities and skills by our regulators and law
enforcement professionals.
5. Options for addressing key emerging issues that will affect the public such as liability over personal
computer security, personal data held by social networking sites and its vulnerability to criminal use
The massive and growing volumes of personal data held by social networking sites already expose individual
users to significant risk. This data can be employed for a wide range of criminal purposes including identity
theft, extortion, stalking, and defamation. Our society has embraced a more open and transparent attitude to
free expression and personal information. While embracing this culture, individuals need to be aware of the
risks they expose themselves to and the level of personal accountability and liability they must accept. They
also need to understand the precautions they need to take to minimise their personal exposure to malicious
attack. At the same time, all large databases of personal information need to be designed and managed in a
way appropriate to the risk to citizens if the data is misused. In general, this should mean that such databases
conform to GCHQ guidance for databases handling secret data and, where they do not, the data controller
should carry liability for any misuse of the data.
In attempting to address this issue any legislative framework must be perceived as fair, setting the right
balance between protecting an individual’s right to privacy and protecting society from irresponsible behaviour.
The frequently employed analogy is that of the Highway Code, where a set of laws and best practices have
been applied for the common good to protect the users of our roads and the individual must operate within
those rules or face legal or commercial penalties. Perhaps we need to capitalise on aspects of this analogy in
mounting a national education campaign to improve awareness of our vulnerability to e-crime and correctly
assign accountability for protecting our personal data.
10 www.ecrimescotland.org.uk
11 www.ecrimewales.com
12 www.coe.int/t/dghl/cooperation/economiccrime/cybercrime/documents/countryprofiles/default_en.asp
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Nevertheless, it is essential to recognise the software vulnerabilities that expose computer users to risk,
through the propagation of viruses and worms. The capability of seemingly benign attachments, such as pdf
files or jpeg pictures to execute malicious code or website attacks such as SQL injection, all result from wholly
avoidable mistakes by the developers of the faulty software. It is misguided and ineffective to try to change
the natural way in which millions of computer users use their computers without creating sufficient incentive
for software manufacturers to create products that do not expose their customers to such serious risks. We
would like to see a timetable announced for introducing a Europe-wide measure of liability on manufacturers
and importers of faulty software for the damage that these avoidable defects cause. This would build on the
precedent set by the Consumer Protection Directive and similar UK legislation and should similarly allow a
state-of-the-art defence.
6. The effectiveness of current initiatives to promote awareness of using the internet safely and the
implications of peoples’ online behaviours for related public policy
Current national initiatives appear to have been largely ineffective. The “Get safe online”13 joint initiative
between the government, law enforcement and leading businesses provides free, independent, user-friendly
advice to users that allows them to use the internet confidently, safely and securely. While an excellent concept
which was well implemented, it has not been widely promoted and there is little evidence that it has achieved
significant engagement with the citizen or commerce. In any case, the guidance cannot address the real sources
of vulnerability, as explained above.
BCS has produced the “Personal Data Guardianship Code” and “Top Tips for Security” to better protect
personal data and improve computer and internet security. Whilst these have been deployed by a growing
number of public and private sector organisations, the impact on the bulk of online users has been minimal.
To enable any new initiatives to succeed requires a co-ordinated, comprehensive, continuing education and
change programme aimed at changing peoples’ online behaviours by increasing awareness and creating a safety
conscious online society although, as we said earlier, the main source of risk is not, as widely claimed, unsafe
behaviour by computer users but, rather, the design flaws and programming errors that make normal, reasonable
behaviour unsafe.
Glossary of Terms and Acronyms
pdf—Portable Document Format—A standard for storing documents electronically in a form that is readable
on most computer platforms using freely available reader software. File names often end with a “pdf” file
extension.
jpeg—Joint Photographic Expert Group—A file format commonly used to electronically store graphical/
photographic images. File names often end with a “jpg” file extension.
SQL injection—Structured Query Language. A common database language used to extract or display
information held within a database. The injection element refers to a process whereby SQL commands can be
inserted within user input strings, such as usernames, addresses or passwords, to exploit system weaknesses
that in turn may allow access to the database or operating system in a way that effectively bypasses system
security checks and safeguards.
Script kiddies—Usually fall into the category of younger or immature users who unfortunately can often be
dangerous exploiters of security vulnerabilities in communications systems such as the Internet or the attached
computer based systems. A typical script kiddy uses existing and frequently well known, easy-to-find
techniques and programs or scripts to search for and exploit these vulnerabilities. These are often carried
out randomly with little regard or perhaps even understanding of the potentially harmful consequences of
such actions.
August 2012
Written evidence submitted by the Foundation for Information Policy Research [EC 06]
The Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR) is an independent body that studies the interaction
between information technology and society. Its goal is to identify technical developments with significant
social impact, commission and undertake research into public policy alternatives, and promote public
understanding and dialogue between technologists and policy-makers in the UK and Europe.
Last year, the Cabinet Office put its imprimatur on a marketing brochure from Detica claiming that the UK
was losing £27 billion a year to cyber-crime. This was greeted with widespread ridicule, whereupon Sir Mark
Welland, then Chief Scientific Advisor at the Ministry of Defence, asked us whether we could come up with
more defensible numbers. The result was “Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime”, a major study of what’s known
and what’s not known about cyber-crime, in the UK and internationally. This was published in June at the
Workshop on the Economics of Information Security, the leading peer-reviewed academic conference in the
13 www.getsafeonline.org/
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field. The authors included two members of FIPR’s advisory council (Ross Anderson and Richard Clayton)
plus industry experts and academics from the UK, the USA, Germany and the Netherlands.
We urge the Committee to read our report, which we include here by reference14. Its main points are
summarised below.
1. The Committee first wants to know “what e-crime is understood to be and how this affects
crime recording”. The EU issued a Communication in 2007 where the definition extended from
traditional forms of crime such as fraud and forgery committed over electronic networks, to
crimes unique to electronic networks such as service denial attacks. Our report teased this out
into three categories. The first, the traditional frauds now conducted electronically, includes tax
fraud and welfare fraud as its biggest components by value. The actual crimes here are mostly
unchanged from a generation ago, having to do with misrepresentation of circumstances rather
than any technical wizardry. The second, which we called “transitional cybercrime”, consists
of crimes such as card fraud which existed already but where the modus operandi has changed
almost completely. The third, the “pure” cyber-crimes which did not exist before the Internet,
range from stranded-traveller and fake escrow scams to extortion via fake antivirus software.
2. The UK government takes a different view. VAT fraud is not seen as cyber-crime despite the
fact that all VAT returns are now filed electronically. Most seriously, it has been policy since
2005 to tell fraud victims to report the fraud to their banks first. This had the advantage, from
the viewpoint of the Home Office, of making fraud almost disappear as a recorded offence. Yet
according to the British Crime Survey UK households are more than twice as likely to be
victims of fraud as of “traditional” acquisitive crimes such as burglary and car theft; and
according to Eurostat’s 2010 survey, the UK ranks second behind Latvia for fraudulent payment
card use and for losses caused by phishing/pharming.
3. The Committee’s second question is “the extent and nature of the threats on which e-crime
policy is based and how well they are understood by policy makers”. In our experience,
policymakers have a very poor understanding of cyber-crime; it is truly disturbing that the
Cabinet Office was willing to co-brand the Detica brochure. Policy appears to be driven by
scaremongering from GCHQ and the major suppliers who want the Government to spend ever
more money on cyber-war preparations and on surveillance. As for the reality of the threats,
we refer the Committee once more to our report.
4. The Committee’s third topic is “the effectiveness of current law enforcement and legislative
capabilities, including local and regional capabilities and the potential impacts of proposed
organisational change”. As our report makes clear, most of the global law-enforcement response
to cybercrime is in the USA, and the rest of the world tends to free ride. The reasons are easy
enough to understand and follow directly from cyber-crime’s global nature. Suppose a bad man
in St Petersburg sends out a million phishing emails; as London is 1% of the Internet, the
Commissioner of the Met will see 10,000 of them in his manor. He will be tempted to say “The
FBI will have seen 200,000 of these; let them deal with it.” This classic public goods problem
has made it very difficult to sustain cyber-crime enforcement activities in the UK (and in most
other countries). Things are made more complex in Britain by the capture of some crime-
fighting resources by particular interests; for example, the banks pay most of the budget of the
Dedicated Plastic Card and Cheque Unit, which is unsurprisingly perceived to be reluctant to
investigate insider frauds seriously.
5. The Committee than asks “whether there are any gaps in the response to e-crime and, if so,
how they should be addressed”. The top priority should be arresting cyber-criminals and putting
them in jail. A lot of economic damage is done by a small number of gangs, yet many police
forces throw up their hands and assume it’s all too difficult. Government has from time to time
advocated that users take more care, or that people buy more anti-virus software. Yet these
measures are ineffective, inefficient or both (see 7 below). A small additional effort in
enforcement could yield much bigger returns. The Government should have given more of the
cyber-security budget to the police, and less to GCHQ.
6. The Committee wants “options for addressing key emerging issues that will affect the public
such as liability over personal computer security, personal data held by social networking sites
and its vulnerability to criminal use”. When bad things happen to citizens online, the material
harm that results usually amounts to disputed transactions on the citizen’s bank or credit-card
account. The biggest failing in the UK, of those which could be tackled by legislative means,
is in bank regulation: specifically poor consumer protection, the incompetence and indifference
of the FSA, and the fact the Financial Ombudsman Service is not up to dealing with the
consequences of online and electronic fraud. The problem is not, as is sometimes said, a matter
of the burden of proof. British banks found that they could get away with dumping much of
the liability for fraud on the customer, by asserting in disputes that their system provided
evidence that carried the day on the balance of probabilities. That assertion is routinely accepted
by the Ombudsman, and cannot easily be challenged by the customer for want of access to the
banks’ systems for expert examination. The few customers with the stomach and resources to
14 See http://weis2012.econinfosec.org/papers/Anderson_WEIS2012.pdf
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make a fight of it in the courts have often found that the bank fold, in order to avoid a precedent,
but this has not helped the others. The banks’ greed was exacerbated by ministers’ decision to
have people report fraud to the banks rather than the police, in order to minimise the fraud
statistics. What Parliament might usefully do here is to hold hearings into the failures of the
FSA and the Ombudsman. This could document the problems: citizens have suffered, and the
UK has failed to meet its international obligations, in that the Payment Services Directive has
not been adequately implemented.
7. The Committee finally asks about “the effectiveness of current initiatives to promote awareness
of using the internet safely and the implications of peoples’ online behaviours for related public
policy”. A number of ministers have in the past claimed that Internet security could be promoted
by raising public awareness. This view is also echoed by banks and software vendors—anyone
who seeks to externalise liability for poorly designed systems. However the experience of
system engineers is that poor design cannot be fixed by “blame and train” as the strategy is
known. This strategy does not even work in environments such as aviation, where the users
(pilots) are subject to mandatory and regular retraining and recertification; it is accepted that
when safety hazards arise from poor cockpit design, the vendors must change the design rather
than blaming pilots for the resulting accidents. It is even less likely to work in the world of
consumer electronics and online services, where vendors no longer ship manuals with their
products; users are expected to learn to use them through exploration. And while knowledgeable
users might mitigate risks, vendors and system operators usually push the wrong way. For
example, a good rule for naïve Internet users would be “if you get to a website by clicking on
a link, don’t even think of entering a bank password there. If you want to do bank transactions,
always go to your bank using a browser bookmark or by typing in the URL directly.” Yet bank
marketing departments deluge customers with marketing emails which entreat them to click on
links. Against this marketing barrage, government PR can achieve nothing. Legislators should
merely ensure that if banks’ poorly-designed systems and risk-encouraging marketing
programmes lead to customers losing money to phishing attacks, then the customers must be
made good.
Ross Anderson FRS FREng
Professor of Security Engineering, Cambridge University
Chair, Foundation for Information Policy Research
Supplementary written evidence submitted by the Foundation for Information Policy Research
[EC 06a]
The Foundation for Information Policy Research (FIPR) is an independent body that studies the interaction
between information technology and society. Its goal is to identify technical developments with significant
social impact, commission and undertake research into public policy alternatives, and promote public
understanding and dialogue between technologists and policy-makers in the UK and Europe.
We refer to the evidence I gave to your inquiry on 20 December and the subsequent letter from the banks’
trade association Financial Fraud Action (FFA) to the Chairman, the Right Honourable Keith Vaz MP, of 29
January this year. We would like to offer the following observations and suggest a few questions for the
FFA witness.
1. The FFA’s Ms Worobec objects to my remark to you that banks find it easy to blame customers
for fraud, and often blame people as a routine matter, even when there is no evidence of
negligence at all.
2. Ms Worobec claims that “the innocent victims of fraud can expect to receive full protection
against any losses … it is only in circumstances where customers have been grossly negligent
in protecting their PIN and card that they sustain any loss—which is a high threshold to
overcome”.
3. This has been the line taken by the banking industry since at least 1994 but it is at variance
with both the statistical evidence and the facts of many cases.
4. I was recently the expert witness for the defence of Mr W, a national of Sri Lanka who has
been granted asylum in the UK. He disputed 38 transactions totaling £7,861.85 on his account
at the Nationwide. The Nationwide claimed that according to their records his card and PIN
had been used so he must have been negligent or complicit. When he complained, he was
arrested for fraud by false representation; the police believed the bank’s claim that fraud was
not possible. I submitted an expert witness report showing how fraud was indeed possible and
the case collapsed. My report described how the bank’s fraud analyst, on whom the police
relied, had made more than one untrue statement. However Mr W has not been reimbursed;
and he also lost his job as a consequence of being arrested. Honourable members might ask Mr
Worobec whether she will get the Nationwide to refund and compensate Mr W. (I have his
permission to send you the papers so long as his name is not published.)
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5. My colleagues and I at Cambridge University Computer Lab have published most of the
academic research on payment fraud over the last 20 years, so victims often find us when they
search online and come to us with their stories. It is thankfully rare for a complaining cardholder
to be actually prosecuted (Mr W is only the third we’ve come across in 18 years, and all three
were acquitted). But it is extremely common for cardholders to be told “Our records show that
your card and PIN were used, so you must have been negligent or complicit”.
6. The steady stream of victims is scientifically useful as it enables us to see how fraud tools and
methods are developing. In the last five years we have seen and documented a number of clever
technical frauds that enable card data to be captured from tampered terminals, and which even
enable stolen cards to be used without knowledge of the PIN. The fact that a bank’s records
claim that the correct PIN was used usually proves nothing of the sort. We have a series of
technical papers and videos on fraud methods available online.15
7. But the stream of victims is also frustrating and at times heart-rending, as there is often little
we can do. Given current rules on legal aid and costs, and given that he does not speak good
enough English to act as a litigant in person, Mr W seems to have little chance of getting his
money back.
8. In general the victims who come to us having been given the brush-off by the banks and then
by the Financial Ombudsman Service are disproportionately less white, less male and less
middle-class than the population as a whole. They are precisely those people who are not in a
position to take the bank to court.
9. The police are usually not much help either, especially since an ACPO decision in 2005 to get
people to report fraud to their bank in the first instance rather than to the police. The House of
Lords Science and Technology Committee examined “Personal Internet Security” in 2008; their
Lordships concluded that that decision had been the wrong one. Yet they could not get ministers
to change their minds.
10. So the only really dependable fraud figures appear to be those from victim surveys, such as
those conducted by the British Crime Survey and Eurostat, mentioned in our original submission
to the committee. These suggest that about 4% of the population become fraud victims in any
year and about half don’t get their money back. What’s more, the fear of online crime is
real and it discourages many people from doing more things online, causing real harm to
the economy.
11. Ms Worobec talks of the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS). Yet this routinely finds in favour
of the bank and against its customer, even when this flied in the face of both the law and the
facts. FIPR made a submission to this effect to the review of the ombudsman that was conducted
in 2008, before the ombudsman became the adjudicator required by the Payment Services
Directive.
12. In that submission16 we included the full papers of a sadly typical case. Donald and Hazel
Reddell were intimidated by Barclaycard into paying up £3000 that had been stolen from their
account after their card was cloned—on the single occasion when they used it, namely in a
Barclays Bank ATM! The bank showed its confidence in the Ombudsman by sending in the
debt collectors in while that august body’s formalities were still in progress. Donald and Hazel
appeared on “Tonight with Trevor McDonald”; I raised their case with a nonexecutive director
of Barclays; I wrote to Bob Diamond after he made a speech saying the bank would have to
rediscover its ethics; and I even put their case before the bank’s much-heralded Salz review.
Yet despite a complete lack of evidence of any contributory negligence on their part, Barclays
have still not given the Reddells their money back. I suggest that honourable members ask Ms
Worobec when the Reddells will receive their refund. They can hardly be described as “having
practically colluded with the fraudster”.
13. Ms Worobec also talks of the Payment Services Regulations 2009, which transpose the Payment
Services Directive. I would like to draw the committee’s attention to article 59.2 of the
Directive: “Where a payment service user denies having authorised an executed payment
transaction, the use of a payment instrument recorded by the payment service provider shall in
itself not necessarily be sufficient to prove either that the payment transaction was authorised
by the payer or that the payer acted fraudulently or failed with intent or gross negligence to
fulfil one or more of his obligations under Article 56.” The UK banking industry lobbied long
and hard to get the word “necessarily” inserted into this text. I invite the committee to ask Ms
Worobec why. Was it not so that UK banks could continue saying “Your card and PIN were
used so you must have been negligent or complicit”?
14. Indeed as recently as a year ago, complainants to the Ombudsman reported that adjudicators
there had not even heard of the Payment Services Regulations. We wrote to the Business
Secretary Vince Cable (having discussed the matter with him while he was in opposition); his
response was that he could do nothing as the ombudsman was “independent”, but that we might
see the FSA who assumed the power to regulate her as of April 1st. We met with the FSA in
15 Bank fraud resource page, at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/banksec.html
16 FIPR submission to the Hunt Review of the Financial Ombudsman Service, 2008; at http://www.fipr.org/080116huntreview.pdf
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January but learned that despite the ombudsman’s manifest failings they did not propose to do
anything about her at all. Their line is that “the basis for Ombudsman decisions is what is fair
and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case, rather than on a strict legal basis”. We
disagree; if the ombudsman service does not have to follow the PSRs and the rest of the law
(including the Human Rights Act) then the UK does not have an adequate transposition of the
Payment Services Directive.
15. NGO efforts towards securing better financial consumer protection in the UK are now aimed at
persuading the European Commission to remove the word “necessarily” from the Payment
Services Directive in the current review of that legislation, and require explicitly that
adjudicators act according to law. The committee might ask Ms Worobec whether UK banks
will resist either or both of these changes.
16. Yet, despite its serious flaws, the Financial Ombudsman Service is finding against the bank in
tens of thousands of cases per year. In 2012 there were 64,234 complaints to the ombudsman
regarding banking and credit17; 31% of these for current accounts and 54% of these for credit
cards were found against the bank. The figures are not broken down enough to give the phantom
withdrawal figures, but it is clear the banks’ system for refunding customers is not working.
17. So I am delighted to see Ms Worobec claim that 98% of fraud victims are reimbursed. I
encourage the committee to ask her to provide the data from which this figure was derived.
98% of what, precisely?
18. The committee should be aware that when customers complain of transactions that are “chip
and pin” (according to bank records) some banks see these simply as attempted frauds where
the bank was the victim, not the cardholder, and record them under another heading. If
customers are told to go away as “Our systems are secure so you must have been negligent or
complicit”, a complaint may not be recorded at all. And a third example of non-recording is
where the bank claims the dispute is purely between the cardholder and a merchant; the line is
that where there was a “willing buyer and willing seller” the dispute does not concern them. A
common example is where a British tourist in southern or eastern Europe gets a large card bill
after eating in a restaurant where a waiter made a copy of their card and cashed it out in a
nearby nightclub. UK banks then hide behind card scheme refund rules (which we understand
even the FSA are not allowed to see). UK banks’ unwillingness to file chargebacks even for
clearly fraudulent transactions encourages crime gangs in other countries. You might ask Ms
Worobec whether eating tapas in Spain amounts to “having practically colluded with the
fraudster”.
19. Ms Worobec claims that the burden of proof is on the bank, not the customer. This is somewhat
disingenuous. The problem is that the fact that the banks assert that their system provides
evidence that carries the day on the balance of probabilities. The ombudsman accepts this; it
cannot easily be challenged by an ordinary customer for want of being able to get access to the
banks’ systems for expert examination; and the courts do not usually order wholesale disclosure
because there is so much of it that such an order would never be proportionate to an ordinary
civil case. Where disclosure is ordered in a criminal matter (as in Mr W’s case), or where a
fraud victim has the stomach and resources to make a fight of it in the courts, the banks fold.
But ordinary fraud victims have little chance.
20. A matter that Ms Worobec failed to mention in her letter is that after colleagues and I revealed
how stolen cards could be used by a criminal who did not know the PIN on Newsnight in
February 2010, her colleague Melanie Johnson wrote to the University of Cambridge asking
for one of our students’ Masters thesis to be removed from the web. The banks claimed it might
help the bad guys, but this was nonsense. We had found that vulnerability after studying fraud
patterns; the villains knew how to do it already. Ms Johnson appears to have simply been trying
to defend the industry line that “Our systems are secure so you must be negligent or complicit”.
We made her go away by pointing out to her that section 2 of the Fraud Act 2006 makes it an
offence to dishonestly make a false representation to benefit yourself or another, or to put a
third party at risk of loss. But perhaps many people who work in the banking industry still
imagine that this law applies only to poor people like Mr W, and not to them.
Ross Anderson FRS FREng
Professor of Security Engineering, Cambridge University
Chair, Foundation for Information Policy Research
April 2013
17 Financial Ombudsman Service, Annual review 2011/2; at http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/publications/ar12/
about.html#a2 and /dealt.html#a5
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Written evidence submitted by the City of London Police [EC 07]
SUBMITTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE CITY REMEMBRANCER
1. Introduction
1.1 The internet has revolutionised society, and provided communities and business with great opportunities,
and usage is set for a further prodigious increase over the next few years. The internet has encouraged and
assisted new businesses by promoting innovation and the sharing of ideas, which has also boosted both the
economy and job growth. It has allowed businesses to lower their costs, promote their brand and increase
efficiency, and gives customers immeasurable choice and access to better, cheaper and more convenient
services. The UK economy is very dependent on the internet as a basis for business and communications which
is exemplified by the fact that in 2010, three quarters of UK consumers shopped online, spending nearly £60
billion, while 42% of all UK adults bank online.
1.2 These benefits, however, also provide opportunities for criminals. It allows them to exploit new ideas
for fraud, identity theft, intellectual property theft and other forms of crime on an unprecedented scale through
access to victims, data and commodities. They have done this by using a variety of cyber tools, techniques and
online services. Criminals also utilise international boundaries to develop inventive and complex infrastructures
that enable them to commit e-Crime. They have done this by using a variety of cyber tools, techniques and
online services. Criminals are also adopting new technology to enhance their operational security or improve
the efficiency of their operations.
1.3 The City of London Police (CoLP) has led the implementation of the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau
(NFIB) since 2010. Prior to this, due to its unique relationships with the financial community in the City and
the specialist fraud investigations skills and experience of its detectives, the City Police had been designated
the National “Lead (Police) Force (NLF)” for fraud since 2003. The force receives additional funding from the
Home Office to investigate serious and complex fraud and also to run the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau.
These fraud functions come together as the Force’s Economic Crime Directorate (ECD) and are match funded
by the City of London Corporation. Within policing, the force leads the Association of Chief Police Officers
(ACPO) Economic Crime Portfolio and has been working with Chief Constables across the country over the
passed 12 months to define a new model for recording and investigating fraud.
1.4 The NLF provides specialist advice on law enforcement dealing with often highly complicated and
detailed criminality. Its objectives are to provide advice to all police forces, industry investigators and other
law enforcement agencies to disseminate best practice, deliver training and act in an independent advisory
capacity to other forces on request. The NLF provides a national investigative capacity to deal with all types
of fraud (subject to agreed case acceptance criteria) and to assist other police forces in local investigations,
and act as a single point of contact for anti-fraud advice.
1.5 As a result of the Fraud Review in 2006, the concept of the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB)
was created along with Action Fraud (the brand name of the National Fraud Reporting Centre launched and
run by the National Fraud Authority) to help UK law enforcement agencies and their partners catch and disrupt
criminals and to alert communities to fraud threats. The NFIB gathers a large volume of information on
suspected fraud from both public and private sector sources, much of which is not reported to, or made
routinely accessible to the police. This is analysed and turned into intelligence such as the identification of the
scale of fraudsters’ criminal activities. The intelligence is used to support law enforcement operations and also
provide prevention advice to industry.
1.6 The Government’s National Security Strategy, published in 2010, ranked UK cyber security (of which
e-Crime is an element) as a Tier 1 national security priority. As a result of this threat, the Government has
committed £650 million to the National Cyber Security Programme (NCSP). The City Police is one of a
number of organisations that has received funding to help deliver this programme.
1.7 At the end of 2011, the Government published its Cyber Security Strategy, which illustrated how the
UK will support the economy; protect national security and safeguard communities by building a secure and
resilient digital environment.
2. What is e-Crime understood to be and how does this affect crime recording?
Types of e-Crime
2.1 The NFIB sees e-Crime (also variously described as internet crime, cyber crime and technology enabled
crime) at two levels. At the simplest level, it is crime that exists only because of computer technology, for
example hacking of email accounts, denial of service attacks and the production and deployment of malicious
software (“malware”). These offences are largely covered by the Computer Misuse Act 1990. Additionally,
there is “electronic” or cyber-enabled crime which can be described as the use of the internet to enable other
crimes to be committed. The latter features particularly strongly within the NFIB’s remit as cyber enabled
fraud. The most damaging cyber enabled frauds are those where the ease of communications through the
internet has allowed an existing type of fraud to be attempted much more easily (for example, advanced fee or
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“419 letter”18 frauds have developed and grown into fraud perpetrated by “phishing”19 emails) or frauds
exploiting the methods of genuine e-business such as ticketing fraud using bogus websites or online shopping
fraud.
2.2 The bulk of e-Crime data that NFIB assesses is received from Action Fraud. Action Fraud records crime
aligned to the Home Office Counting Rules for Fraud and Forgery, which includes crimes committed under
the Computer Misuse Act 1990. However the reports it receives at present are limited to individual calls or
reports from the public. Police forces still represent the bulk reporting for fraud and the service recognises that
through the complex method of cyber crime and also because of jurisdictional issues, victims can receive a
very different service depending on how or where they report their crime. Chief Constables have therefore
agreed to a new business model lead by the City of London Police which will involve a national reporting and
case allocation model to offer victims, a more professional service.
Recording
2.3 The recording of crime by the police is governed by the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS)
and the Home Office Counting Rules (HOCR). These set out the principles under which reports received from
victims are recorded. Crime statistics that are recorded by police are based on a notifiable list of offences. The
HOCR set out the classification groups into which offences are managed for statistical purposes.
2.4 However, individual police forces record crimes, particularly those enabled by technology, in different
ways. This is because there is no such crime type as an “e-Crime” formally defined in legislation. The use of
a computer or other cyber technology is an enabler to the crime, and not a crime type in its own right.
Therefore, it is not centrally recorded. This presents difficulties to the law enforcement community in assessing
the scale and nature of the e-Crime threat.
2.5 The City of London Police is currently leading a programme of work to introduce Action Fraud reporting
to all police forces in England and Wales. This will reduce some of the issues created by the lack of
harmonisation that currently exists by creating a national call centre and on line facility to report fraud and
cyber crime.
2.6 Over the coming months, Action Fraud, in partnership with the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau, will
press ahead with the “roll out” of an improved crime reporting capability with the support of all UK police
forces. Within this programme is the development of an enhanced reporting method for businesses who are
victims of cyber crime. This will ensure the police, through the NFIB, will have the capacity and capability to
analyse all fraud and cyber crime data from one source, allowing for a much better understanding of the extent
and nature of the e-Crime threat, and also provide for an enhanced service to victims.
2.7 New crime recording classifications have also been introduced by the Home Office to enable law
enforcement agencies to capture specific cyber crime offences as laid out in the Computer Misuse Act (1990),
but many crimes committed online are also prosecuted under existing legislation such as the Fraud Act (2006)
or the Communications Act (2003).
3. What is the extent and the nature of the threats on which e-crime policy is based?
3.1 The significance of cyber criminals has grown in line with the development of online technology and
the proliferation of electronically held data. Although it is difficult to estimate accurately the scale of losses to
the UK economy as a result of e-Crime, one report puts the figure at £27 billion per year.20 Whatever the true
cost, its reach is known to be extensive, affecting individuals, businesses and government institutions.
3.2 The Government has expressed the need for partnership with the private sector and academia to combat
crime. The City of London Police enjoy close working relationships with the private sector (who are represented
at the ACPO Economic Crime Portfolio meetings), through private data sharing agreements with the NFIB and
also through industry funded police investigation units such as the Insurance and Cheque Fraud investigation
units. There is a very clear common message concerning the co-ordination of engagement with the private
sector across government. Whilst government policy has provided a useful high level perspective, they have
only resulted in bespoke isolated programmes of engagement and there are still no clearly identified “nodes”
for the formulation of policy, strategic forecasting and operational collaboration with the private sector on a
national scale. Given this confused picture, there may be merit in an initial “mapping” exercise to identify the
optimal mechanisms for engagement that already cut across different government departments.
3.3 The rapid pace of change in terms of technology and techniques used by cyber criminals make mitigating
e-Crime a unique challenge. The ever-increasing amount of public and private data held online and the
significant increase of internet usage, both privately and commercially, also allows for an increase in
opportunities for criminals to exploit weaknesses. Further evidence of the threat posed was illustrated in a BBC
18 This type of fraud is a commonly attempted fraud whereby victims are asked to help transfer money out of another country—
such as Iraq, South Africa or West Africa—by paying a fee in advance. In return, the victim is promised a percentage of the
money that the fraudster says will be transferred.
19 Phishing is attempting to acquire information such as usernames, passwords, and credit card details by masquerading as a
trustworthy entity in an email.
20 The Cost of Cyber Crime, Detica (for The Cabinet Office), February 2011
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report in July 2012,21 which shows fraudsters traded 12 million pieces of stolen personal information online
between January and April 2012. The figure represents a threefold increase on 2010. Credit-checking company
Experian, which produced the figures, said the increase was partly due to consumers having a growing number
of online accounts. Consumers now have an average of 26 separate online logins but just five different
passwords. Experian said many people were unaware their identity had been stolen until they were refused
credit cards or phone contracts.
3.4 Attacks on businesses have risen markedly over the past year, with most UK based companies reporting
malicious software infections. The 2010 Information Security Breaches Survey22 found that 90% of “large”
organisations and 74% of “small” organisations had experienced a malicious security incident within the last
year, including hacking, viruses, data theft and fraud.
3.5 In August 2011, Action Fraud launched the capability to record the enablers of fraud within fraud
reporting. Since August to the end of the financial year, the NFIB have received a total of 49,037 fraud and
internet crime reports from Action Fraud of which 45% were enabled23 online.24 The highest volume of
frauds reported to Action Fraud are concerned with online shopping and auctions, many of which are linked
to organised crime. As an indication of the scale of only one aspect of e-Crime, over 25,000 “phishing” emails
were forwarded by members of the public to the NFIB in less than one week during the Office of Fair Trading’s
SCAMNESTY campaign. The majority of traditional frauds have been eclipsed by an internet enabled variant
and all forms of legitimate internet commerce are vulnerable.
3.6 In considering the impact of e-Crime, the experience and effect on fraud victims has also to be
considered. It is the experience of the City of London Police, that, a large number of victims have found fraud
to be as harmful to them as violent crime, with tens of thousands of victims requiring medical intervention for
psychological and physical stress related injury each year as a direct result of being defrauded.
4. What is the effectiveness of current law enforcement and legislative capabilities, including local and
regional capabilities and what are the potential impacts of proposed organisational change?
Are there any gaps in the response to e-crime and, if so, how should they be addressed?
Effectiveness of current law enforcement and legislative capabilities
4.1 The Serious and Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) and the Police Central e-Crime Unit (PCeU), hosted
by the Metropolitan Police Service, undertake national e-Crime investigation and international joint
investigation. The introduction of the new National Crime Agency (NCA) in 2013, which will replace SOCA,
will continue with and expand on this role. Whilst the NCA is not yet operationally effective, the activity and
linkage currently being initiated in the build up to the 2013 start date indicates that the operational response
will be enhanced. Within the Shadow Command of the NCA, the City of London Police is member of the
Economic Crime Coordination Board (ECCB) and also supports the three sub groups; Prevention, Intelligence
and Enforcement. Early pathfinder joint operations have targeted criminals who are using the internet to
facilitate money laundering and fraud.
4.2 The development of the partnership and coordinating functions of the National Cyber Crime Unit
(NCCU) being established within the NCA will also provide a better-coordinated and standardised approach
to the e-Crime threat. Many of the concerns and issues will, in part, be addressed by the unit, which draws
together and adds to the work currently carried out by SOCA’s Cyber Unit and the PCeU.
4.3 The NCCU will focus its resources and skills on the most sophisticated areas of cyber crime, whilst
supporting the NCA and wider law enforcement to take responsibility for tackling cyber-enabled crime. This
principle of supporting law enforcement to take responsibility for tackling cyber-enabled crime will underpin
the work of the NCCU. Cyber crime that is facilitated by the internet will continue to be investigated by
the police.
4.4 The creation of the NCCU is a critical part of the Government’s wider National Cyber Security
Programme (NCSP). It will consolidate the national law enforcement response to cyber crime into one unit.
The NCCU will work closely with other partners to strengthen the UK’s overall response to e-Crime and
ensure individuals and industry can utilise the opportunities presented by the internet. The NCCU is responsible
for building the cyber capability of the NCA, across all four operational commands to manage high impact
incidents of cyber and cyber-enabled crime.
4.5 An improved response to e-Crime can also be seen with the development of the Cyber Crime Threat
Reduction Board (TRB), and of the Fraud Threat Reduction Board. These were established under the
Government’s organised crime strategy25 which provides an operational context in which law enforcement
21
“Warning about online fraud as information theft rises”, BBC News Website, 17 July 2012, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/
technology-18866347
22 The Information Security Breaches Survey 2010, PwC, April 2010
23 Reporting consists of both crime and information reporting; either by the nature of the offence ie, online shopping and auction
fraud, hacking, etc or as had been selected by the victim during the reporting process.
24 It is believed the true proportion of internet enabled fraud is higher than this as an accurate assessment depends on the victims
correctly knowing, identifying and recording an enabler when reporting the crime
25 Local to Global: Reducing the Risk from Organised Crime, Home Office, July 2011.
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and intelligence agencies can assess operational and intelligence activity against the “Stem, Strengthen and
Safeguard” themes of the Organised Crime Strategy. Both of these boards bring together representatives from
key organisations to tackle specific issues within their remit, with a partnership-based approach. Whilst only
recently established, both TRBs have already made significant progress, assisted by the Threat Reduction
Assurance Forum, which oversees and links the work of both these boards, alongside the other seven TRBs
responsible for their respective crime types. The Threat Reduction Action Plans, identified and implemented
on a bespoke basis by both boards, ensures clarity, effectiveness and coordination for the first time.
4.6 The ECCB has also produced several significant products in 2012 that have allowed a greater
understanding of the fraud threat, identified gaps in knowledge, and highlighted key threats and risks. The
intelligence gap analysis report and Strategic Threat Assessment are now being used to inform the formulating
of a Control Strategy to manage economic crime nationally in a coordinated, effective and efficient way. These
products incorporate e-Crime.
4.7 A significant amount of e-Crime is also the responsibility of the NFIB, and the police service as a whole.
This has resource and capability implications as it lands alongside other priorities as part of the general demand
on policing. As an intelligence bureau, the NFIB assesses the crimes it receives and then distributes them to
the appropriate police force or law enforcement agency for investigation; this can include PCeU and SOCA.
In reality, due to competing priorities, and the complexity and resources often required, many police forces
have difficulty in investigating e-Crime.26
4.8 Police forces across England and Wales are faced with a 20% reduction in national funding in the period
2011–2014. This means that resources for targeting financial crime, including much e-Crime are likely to be
reduced in some regions. The City of London Police has proposed a joint funding initiative with the
Government and the banking sector to fund additional police resources in the 10 ACPO police regions to
investigate fraud, a great proportion of which is now conducted through the internet. These resources would
complement the existing regional units that investigate organised crime and asset recovery, and would also be
closely aligned to the NCA build, including the specialist PCeU resources. Initial first year funding has been
approved by the Home Office, resulting in intelligence officers being deployed in the 10 ACPO regions, to
liaise with the NFIB and assist further in identifying and understanding the associated regional fraud threats.
If further funding for an additional two years is approved, the intelligence officers will work alongside new
regional fraud enforcement teams to provide a comprehensive intelligence-led response on a regional to
national level.
4.9 Whilst individual police forces do provide a local response to e-Crime, this can be uncoordinated and
inconsistent, with many factors impacting on a variable policing response from region to region. A project has
been developed by PCeU to provide additional regional resources that are effectively trained and equipped.
The National e-Crime Programme has delivered three pilot PCeU “hubs” to address a lack of regional focus.
The “hubs” enhance existing PCeU national operational capability to respond and investigate cyber crime. The
regional “hubs” are based in the North West, East Midlands and Yorkshire & the Humber. The “hubs” were
launched in February 2012 and are already providing a fast and effective response. The PCeU “hubs” have
enhanced the local policing response but further dedicated resources are still required to investigate the
underlying fraud offences.
4.10 The publication of the Strategic Policing Requirement (SPR) will support national co-ordination and
collaboration between police forces to respond to serious and cross-border criminality. The SPR is also intended
to ensure local policing plans account for cyber capability, and that local police forces can access the necessary
specialist services required.
4.11 The introduction of Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) in late 2012 is intended to provide strong
local representation, with the PCCs able to set the priorities for the police force within their force area, respond
to the needs and demands of their communities more effectively, set the force budget and priorities, and hold
the local Chief Officer to account for delivery and performance. With the extent of internet enabled crime
effecting local communities, fraud and e-Crime should be seen as a serious and growing problem that needs to
be addressed.
Gaps in response to e-Crime
4.12 The greatest challenge to an effective response by UK law enforcement agencies is the globalised
nature of the threat. The most effective e-Crime groups are organisations that operate internationally, separating
the component parts of their criminal enterprise across different countries for their utility and selecting
jurisdictions for their permissiveness. There are challenges associated with delivering an effective solution in
this environment due to the current varying international police response and enforcement. Differences in
legislative, regulatory and practical arrangements for managing cyber security have potentially serious
implications for all organisations. Whilst there is not necessarily the need for new international legislation, the
promotion of standards and norms could help to strengthen the global threat mitigation architecture. Lessons
can be learned from examining best practice in some sectors, and from the experiences of international partners.
There is also a need to consider intelligence requirements through a global perspective.
26 Due to investigative capacity, the difficulty in identifying the criminals behind e-Crime and the jurisdictional challenges of
dealing with criminals who are frequently located outside of the UK.
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4.13 In addressing the issue of e-Crime, the use of terminology needs to be clearer and more consistently
used. There is a requirement for a common understanding of some of the general terms and an agreed list of
the cyber crime techniques and tools, and the criminal infrastructure that poses the most risk to the UK. Both
public and private sectors are the victims of cyber crime, but these are very wide categories and in the first
instance prioritisation should be given to specific parts within these sectors that face the most risk and harm.
A common understanding of terminology both in terms of threats and mitigation is a vital component of the
UK response.
4.14 The current challenges in assessing the scale and nature of the UK e-Crime threat affects both the
policy around e-Crime and the operational response to it.27 The impact of this is magnified by the tendency
of cyber criminals to be highly adaptive and innovative. As a result, they can often be a few steps ahead of
the law enforcement community’s ability to respond and are often in the process of exploiting the next criminal
opportunity whilst law enforcement is trying to target the previous one. An effective law enforcement response
is challenged further by the need for many industries to harness new technology to enable a more efficient and
effective service. For example, new payment technologies and alternative banking mechanisms are rapidly
evolving both in the UK and overseas. In a highly competitive market, the desire (and need) to generate new
products rapidly makes delivering comprehensive security controls for these products a formidable challenge.
Many organisations’ decision-making in relation to innovation is heavily driven by market forces and ease of
use, with security concerns sometimes taking second place.
4.15 Key risk areas that need to be prioritised for affirmative action include online tax and benefit/tax credit
systems (Universal Credit) in the public sector, banking and payments and retail (the UK has the second largest
in the world) for the private sector, and personal computers and devices used to access public and private
sector systems. The means by which these systems are accessed are often the weak links which cyber criminals
attack. Government has a key role to play in working with the private sector to mitigate the threat posed by
these systems.
5. How effective are current initiatives to promote awareness of using the internet safely and what are the
implications of peoples’ online behaviours for related public policy?
5.1 Whilst the UK has seen some recent initiatives to promote awareness of internet safety, it is clear that
more needs to be done within this area.
5.2 Through its regional hubs, the PCeU have worked hard to mainstream cyber awareness, capacity and
capability since its inception.
5.3 The National Fraud Authority (NFA) as part of the “Shadow” NCA—ECCB Prevention Sub Group,
plays a key national preventative role, in terms of reducing repeat victimisation by advising callers to Action
Fraud. This service also plays a vital role for crime victims by offering reassurance and other advice through
a bespoke service in partnership with Victim Support. The NFA also initiated and developed the “Devil’s in
Your Detail” campaign, a joint initiative between the NFA and private sector organisations from the banking
and telecoms industries. The campaign was video-driven and raised awareness of the importance of protecting
personal information. The campaign reached over four million people through initiatives involving social
media. Subsequent analysis of 4,000 people who watched the videos resulted in over 60% stating that they
would take more steps to protect themselves from fraud.
6. What are the options for addressing key emerging issues that will affect the public such as liability over
personal computer security, personal data held by social networking sites and its vulnerability to criminal
use?
6.1 The key to addressing e-Crime effectively is through greater collaboration, effective intelligence sharing,
improved engagement with business, and a comprehensive awareness programme. Prevention is a vital theme
that threads through all of these areas.
Greater Collaboration
6.2 The Government’s National Cyber Security Strategy makes clear, and this is applicable to information
security in general, that it is only through engagement between government, law enforcement and the private
sector that the UK will become more resilient from attack, shaping an open and stable environment and
developing our skills base. As criminals will target a range of industries it will be vital for all sectors to come
together to share experiences and develop common strategies for addressing threats. A particular focus must
lie in the security of the millions of personal information records held by both the public and private sector.
There is a wealth of intelligence from various sources that this data is being targeted, stolen and traded as a
commodity by criminal gangs. A comprehensive approach to the threat is required and collaboration is the key
to success. Ad hoc groups promoting collaboration across the sectors do exist however, there is a need for a
stronger coordinated and formalised process across both the public and private sectors.
6.3 Collaboration can come in many forms, and the proposed City of London Police joint funding initiative
to provide a national policing capability for fraud would provide a very effective specialist resource, aligned
27 Response tends to be reactive rather than proactive and strategically targeted
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to the national law enforcement picture on a local, regional and national basis, and tackling an area of crime
that has had limited resources. Whilst already supported by ACPO and all police chiefs, such a venture needs
the financial support of the Government and the banking sector. Whilst the three-year pilot requires investment,
the benefits to potential supporters, and the UK as a whole, are expected to be commensurately higher.
6.4 Criminals may target third parties, partner companies and other industries to access data. Advances in
technology, such as the development of Cloud Computing, are also a source of new risk as well as opportunity.
There is a wealth of expertise and information across all sectors in the UK that could greatly enhance protection
against such wide-ranging threats, and collaboration must be co-ordinated across the wider private sector and
government. To facilitate such comprehensive co-ordination and collaboration, there is a need for a point of
focus around which stakeholders can rally.
Improved intelligence sharing
6.5 An improved and more effective intelligence sharing protocol between law enforcement agencies would
also have a great impact on preventing e-Crime. There is still much to be done in this area, and many agencies
could collaborate and share their intelligence more effectively. The fact they are not is due to many reasons,
including cost, culture, and their respective regulations, but none are insurmountable, and a greater effort is
required from all agencies to share the intelligence they possess.
6.6 The National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) is an example where intelligence sharing can lead to an
effective preventative response. It disseminates products, including alerts, as a result of analysing intelligence
provided by a range of organisations and industry sectors. This collaborative approach has been extended
further with some also providing staff to work within the bureau. The NFIB works with private sector partners
to close down criminally managed websites. Between January to April 2012, 261 websites were sent for
suspension request. Between April to August 2012, 52 websites have been confirmed as suspended. In
September 2012, 152 have been sent for suspension, with 143 being confirmed as suspended. Between January
to August 2012, 248 telephone numbers were identified for suspension. The submission of bank account alerts
was instigated from April 2012 and since this date 221 account details have been disseminated to the banking
industry in 177 alerts. These are sent to the banking industry for intelligence purposes, and an example of the
impact that these alerts provide was when a single customer had £70,000 prevented from being defrauded in
September 2012. These timely actions are calculated to have saved the finance sector millions of pounds.
6.7 In May 2012 alone, the NFIB developed and disseminated 449 crime investigation packages, 28 tactical
intelligence products and 112 alerts via a new partnership with the British Bankers Association. Whilst the work
of the NFIB encompasses all areas of fraud, this approach should be expanded upon, and further supported, to
encourage greater intelligence sharing of e-Crime related threats.
Engagement with business
6.8 The majority of victims of banking and plastic card fraud are protected by compensation from the finance
and banking industry. Whilst much is done within this sector, the industry needs to continue to be supported
and encouraged to provide enhanced and effective security to mitigate the ever changing and often innovative
exploitation by criminals and criminal finance. A robust coordinated approach by Government, law enforcement
and business will ensure a better understanding of the true level of crime and raise public awareness to the
threat and how to reduce it.
Education
6.9 The safe use of the internet requires a continuous, pervasive and constantly updated approach to
education. This needs to be mainstreamed throughout an individual’s lifetime education. This would need to
be on the scale of other public safety education, such as road safety and “stranger danger”, with initiatives
seeking message adoption and understanding through all sectors of society. Although public awareness of
“cyber enabled fraud” has greatly improved (for example the significant amount of education built into the
school curriculum to manage children’s online behaviour by the Child Exploitation and Online Protection
Centre), increasingly sophisticated attacks continue to target home computer users, and much more coordinated
work is required.
October 2012
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Written evidence submitted by EMC and RSA [EC 08]
Introduction
1. EMC welcomes the opportunity to contribute to the Home Affairs Select Committee’s important and
timely enquiry into e-crime. This response begins with an executive summary followed by a short introduction
to EMC, its global reach, and its expertise and capabilities in cyber security, before addressing the committee’s
specific questions.
Executive Summary
— EMC is one of the world’s major IT infrastructure and services providers and has a significant
presence in the cyber security market through its RSA division.
— The cyber-crime threat is sophisticated, complex, and rapidly evolving. There is a thriving
criminal ecosystem that mirrors the legitimate IT market where criminals can freely buy and
sell malicious software and services. This rapidly maturing online black market has led to a
tenfold reduction in the cost to access cyber crime tools and services and an increase in the
volume and sophistication of attacks seen.
— If the UK online environment is to remain safe for citizens, as well as the public and private
sectors, there must be continued and increasing efforts to raise awareness of the extent and
rapidly evolving nature of the e-crime threat, both in terms of the actors involved and the new
threat vectors they are developing. Intelligence must also be shared and best practice spread in
a two-way process involving both the public and private sector.
— In this era of tight budgets and rapidly evolving threats, new regulations stipulating particular
technologies or practices to address cyber threats are not necessarily required, or indeed
appropriate. Instead a dynamic, outcome based and technology neutral approach should be
encouraged, requiring sectors to collaborate and individual organisations to conduct risk
assessments and put appropriate controls in place that are commensurate with the identified
risk. In this way organisations will be able to develop and maintain more flexible security
programmes, processes, and technologies that can evolve ahead of—or at least alongside—the
threat landscape.
About EMC and its Security Division RSA
2. EMC was founded in 1979 and is today one of the world’s major IT companies. It has annual turnover
of around $20 billion and employs over 54,000 people worldwide, including around 1,650 in the UK.
3. EMC is a global leader in enabling organisations in both the private and public sector transform their
operations and deliver IT as a service. Fundamental to this transformation is cloud computing. Through
innovative products and services, EMC accelerates the journey to cloud computing, helping organisations store,
manage, protect and analyse one of their most valuable assets—information—in a more agile, trusted and cost-
efficient way.
4. This journey to cloud computing supports improved information security because organisations are able
to replace the disparate and piecemeal legacy IT systems that are so common today with centralised monitoring,
management, compliance, and security solutions. In addition, security is being built into the information
infrastructure that makes up the foundation for cloud computing including virtualisation and data storage
platforms.
5. Another key priority for EMC is “big data” analytics, which refers to the ability to analyse and gain real
time insights on vast data sets of unprecedented scale and formats gathered from various sources. EMC’s big
data division Greenplum provides this capability to leading organisations including T-Mobile and Skype,
enabling them to gain real time insights on their business and provide a better service to their customers. EMC
is increasingly leveraging its expertise in big data to support information security by providing organisations
with real-time access to the entirety of information relevant to the detection of security problems.
6. EMC’s security division, RSA, provides security, compliance and risk management solutions for
organisations worldwide. RSA helps the world’s leading organisations succeed by solving their most complex
and sensitive security challenges so they can safely benefit from the tremendous cost and productivity gains of
digital technology and the internet.
7. RSA has been driving innovation in the information security industry for over 25 years. Today, RSA
protects the identities of over 250 million people around the world, including, in the UK, the online banking
customers of nine out the country’s top 10 retail banks, more than 800 public sector organisations, and 30
defence and aerospace companies. RSA’s technology can be found in BlackBerry devices, PlayStation games
consoles, and checks more than five billion URLs per day for malicious activity.
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Response to Specific Questions
What e-crime is understood to be, and how this affects crime recording
8. To successfully defend against cyber security threats it is important to understand the actors involved
better. The attackers can be categorised into three major classes of cyber adversaries: criminals, non-state
actors, and nation states. Each has distinct motives and modus operandi but may, at times, collaborate if their
goals align. For the purposes of the committee’s enquiry, this response focusses on the criminal element.
9. Whether loosely affiliated or tightly organised, cyber criminals are out to steal personal information for
financial gain. This information can range from an individual’s credit card details and web or corporate logins,
to an organisation’s highly confidential plans or data. Indeed the value of personal data to a cyber criminal is
much higher than a credit card or bank account number alone. For example, the average selling price of a US
credit card on the criminal black market is around $1.50. But when that card is sold with a full identity profile,
the value can be up to ten times greater.
10. It is typical to see cyber criminals auctioning “on-demand” access to large numbers of infected computers
under their control, and knowledge of “zero-day” exploits of previously unknown software vulnerabilities, on
the black market to the highest bidder for use in automated cyber-attacks. Indeed criminal groups are able to
purchase all manner of malicious software and services online, including “do-it-yourself” kits to create
networks of compromised computers (“botnets”) that then can be used for the mass distribution of “malware”
(malicious software) and benign “bulletproof hosting” environments from which to undertake their activities.
Today’s malware is incredibly sophisticated—capable of sitting undetected on a user’s machine and stealing
personal and financial data, taking over accounts, and sending spam emails to proliferate and infect other users.
11. Unfortunately, as the criminal ecosystem matures, the cost of entry for cyber criminals to access these
capabilities continues to fall. Research published by RSA in June 2012 found that the rapidly maturing online
black market, which mimics functions seen in the legitimate IT supply chain including manufacturing,
purchasing, outsourcing, partnerships, development, sales, distribution, performance optimisation, and customer
support, has led to a tenfold reduction in the prices being charged for malicious software and services.28 In
2011, RSA found that roughly one in every 300 emails in circulation contained some element of “phishing”,
whereby cyber criminals attempt to acquire sensitive information by posing as a legitimate entity, with 50% of
these attacks focussed on financial institutions.29
12. Although the tools available to cyber criminals are becoming increasingly sophisticated, the preferred
method by which they exploit these capabilities centres on people. Security professionals have long understood
that IT users will click on links they should not and unwittingly install malware hidden through simple ruses.
Security professionals have traditionally deployed multiple perimeter controls, such as anti-virus software,
firewalls and intrusion detection systems, to help deal with this threat. This process may work well for generic
attacks, but not for the most sophisticated malware or zero-day exploits. For example, the Zeus Trojan, the
malware most widely used by criminals to target financial institutions, is detected less than 40% of the time
by anti-virus software.
13. Similarly, attackers are increasingly gathering intelligence on their targets, sometimes months in advance
of an attack, using social media and other means to understand which individuals possess the assets they want,
and crucially how to tailor, or “socially engineer”, their attacks to increase their likelihood of success. Indeed
cyber attackers prefer using social engineering in this way because in so doing they are able to evade traditional
perimeter controls more easily.
The extent and nature of the threats on which e-crime policy is based and how well they are understood by
policy makers
The effectiveness of current law enforcement and legislative capabilities, including local and regional
capabilities and the potential impacts of proposed organisational change
14. The tripartite distinction to the cyber threat outlined above appears to be well understood by policy
makers and is reflected in the UK National Cyber Security Strategy published in November 2011. However
RSA’s experience dealing with both the public and private sectors suggests that, while recent policy initiatives
such as last year’s National Cyber Security Strategy have advanced government’s understanding of the cyber
threat and how best to respond to it, the private sector remains ahead in terms of understanding its scale and
maturity, and implementing appropriate measures to deliver advanced security.
15. Research published by RSA’s Anti Fraud Command Centre (AFCC) in July 2012 found that the global
volume of phishing attacks seen in the first half of 2012 had increased by 19% compared with the second half
of 2011, costing organisations an estimated $687 million in total losses. The UK was among the top 10
countries experiencing phishing attacks over this period.30
28 Life in the FaaS (Fraud as a Service) Track, RSA, 12 June 2012, http://www.rsa.com/products/consumer/whitepapers/11794_
120612_Life_in_The_FaaS_Track.pdf
29 Faces of Fraud 2012 Survey, Information Security Media Group, http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/p-survey-fraud-2012.
30 RSA Monthly Fraud Report, July 2012, http://www.rsa.com/solutions/consumer_authentication/intelreport/11752_Online_Fraud_
report_0712.pdf
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16. The AFCC, based in Herzliya, Israel, is one of the most advanced facilities in the world dedicated to
fighting international cyber-crime. Established in 2005, the AFCC combines counter-intelligence, threat
monitoring, and threat analysis capabilities to neutralise attempts by cyber criminals to steal money and
information. Nearly 150 analysts work around the clock, 365 days a year at AFCC, protecting nearly 15,000
private and public sector customers in over 180 countries from cyber security threats and are able to shut down
attacks in an industry-record time of five hours.
17. In the first seven years of its operation, AFCC shut down more than 500,000 cyber attacks. But in the
first six months of 2012, AFCC shut down an additional 150,000 attacks, at a rate of 1,000 attacks per day.
Clearly, the cyber threat is increasing significantly and it is now crucial for all sectors to recognise the dangers
involved and respond.
18. If the UK online environment is to remain safe for citizens as well as the public and private sectors,
there must be continued and increasing efforts to raise awareness of the extent and rapidly evolving nature of
the e-crime threat, both in terms of the actors involved and the new threat vectors they are developing, among
senior and mid-level policy makers. Intelligence must also be shared and best practice spread in a two-way
process involving both the public and private sector.
19. One successful example of this from the United States is the Financial Services Information Sharing and
Analysis Centre (FS-ISAC), which was formed in 1999 and brings together the public and private sector to
enhance cooperation and information sharing to combat cyber and physical threats. It is entirely funded by its
membership of over 4,200 organisations which include commercial banks and credit unions of all sizes,
brokerage firms, insurance companies, payments processors, and over 30 trade associations representing the
majority of the US financial services sector, and works closely with relevant federal, state, and local agencies.
It acts as a trusted third party, providing anonymity to allow members to submit threat, vulnerability and
incident information in a non-attributable and trusted manner so that information that would normally not be
shared, is able to be provided, thereby benefiting the whole of the sector.
20. In this era of tight budgets and rapidly evolving threats, new regulations stipulating particular
technologies or practices to address cyber threats are not necessarily required, or indeed appropriate. Instead
an outcome based, technology neutral approach should be encouraged, requiring sectors to collaborate and
individual organisations to conduct risk assessments, and then put controls in place that are appropriate and
commensurate with the identified risk.
21. It is necessary, however, for the government to start taking a more proactive approach to tackling e-
crime, rather than the largely reactive structures currently in place. One notable exception is the highly
successful Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre which actively seeks to prevent the sexual abuse
of children and catch those involved perpetrating these crimes. The government should consider expanding
this pre-emptive policing framework to confront other forms of cyber crime head on.
22. The establishment of the National Crime Agency (NCA) next year provides an opportunity to put such
pre-emptive structures in pace. As the government prepares for its formation, it must ensure that NCA’s remit,
and the boundaries and inter-relationships with other agencies involved with e-rime, are well understood by
all. Furthermore, it is imperative for the agencies currently involved in the response to e-crime to continue
functioning at their optimum level throughout the transition process to prevent criminals taking advantage of
any potential lapses in effectiveness or increased vulnerability.
Whether there are any gaps in the response to e-crime and, if so, how they should be addressed
23. In light of the increasing volume of attacks and rapid pace of change associated with the cyber threat, it
is a given that organisations will be in a state of persistent, dynamic, and intelligent threat and disruption. In
these circumstances the security dogmas of the past, which rely on an uncoordinated line up of static perimeter
defences, can no longer be seen as adequate. Indeed many of the security technologies in common use today
across the public and private sector, such as anti-virus software and firewalls, are no longer fit for purpose and
offer diminished value in today’s world of advanced threats.
24. Security must evolve to a new more agile, risk-based, and contextual paradigm, that takes advantage of
the latest advances such as cloud computing and big data analytics, and is able to meet the challenges posed
by today’s dynamic threats and “hyper-extended” world where information is exchanged in more ways and
more places than ever before, and people are using the same devices for their work and personal lives, all
enabled by technologies such as smartphones and tablets, cloud computing, and social networking.
25. By doing this, organisations will be able to develop and maintain more flexible security programmes,
processes, and technologies that can evolve ahead of—or at least alongside—the threat landscape—and not
simply protect themselves against “known bad” threats.
Options for addressing key emerging issues that will affect the public such as liability over personal
computer security, personal data held by social networking sites and its vulnerability to criminal use
26. A key barrier hampering the response to e-crime is the fact that organisations that have been targeted by
cyber criminals are often reluctant to admit this publicly. This is partly because many organisations fear that
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doing so will undermine their corporate reputation and the trust placed in them by their customers and
stakeholders. Organisations also perceive that the Data Protection Act and other statutes hamper the sharing of
effective actionable intelligence with partners, which as outlined above, can be one of the most effective means
of combating cyber crime.
27. RSA recently gained first-hand experience of the importance of both these points, and in particular the
importance of transparency and sharing information.
28. On 17 March 2011, RSA publicly disclosed that it had detected a targeted, socially engineered, cyber
attack on the company’s systems and that certain information related to the RSA SecurID® product had been
extracted. RSA immediately developed and published best practices and remediation steps, and proactively
reached out to thousands of customers around the world across the public and private sectors to help them
implement those steps. Furthermore, RSA worked with the appropriate government agencies and industry
bodies in the United States, the United Kingdom and other territories to ensure broad communication of these
best practices and remediation steps as well as information about the attack.
29. The attack on RSA has become a valuable lesson that has redoubled the company’s commitment to
leading industry efforts to increase understanding of today’s advanced threats while also collaborating with a
broader community of stakeholders to better prepare for and mitigate advanced cyber attacks.
30. To counter these challenges, RSA would urge policy makers to consider legislation providing a safe
harbour or similar protections for organisations that voluntarily share sensitive threat information with the
government and/or the extant industry information sharing and analysis infrastructure. Such an approach could
help improve situational awareness and cyber readiness for many organisations while reducing serious concerns
about legal risk. Policy makers should also consider the work being undertaken by the insurance industry to
provide innovative means of addressing this issue.
31. In relation to the personal data held by social networking sites, as discussed above it is clear that the
preferred method of exploitation for cyber attackers centres on people. With social engineering now the number
one avenue of attack, the new security perimeter is in fact the human being.
32. In addition to reinforcing the need for better and increased efforts to share best practice and actionable
intelligence on the latest threats and how they can be mitigated, this also demonstrates the need for a shift in
corporate culture from the old IT security paradigms towards a more agile, risk-based, and contextual approach
that is able to cope with the reality of today’s “hyper-extended” world described above.
The effectiveness of current initiatives to promote awareness of using the internet safely and the implications
of peoples’ online behaviours for related public policy
33. EMC believes consumer education initiatives such as www.getsafeonline.org are crucial to combating e-
crime by raising awareness and sharing the latest information on e-crime threat vectors, and how to combat
them, as they evolve. EMC has been heavily involved in developing and driving similar initiatives in other
countries, notably www.staysafeonline.org, the US equivalent of Get Safe Online, of which EMC was a
founding member. The company’s global experience of such initiatives suggests their effectiveness is
maximised when they are inclusive and involve the broadest possible range of public, private, and third sector
partners. EMC would therefore encourage Get Safe Online to enable a broader range of stakeholders beyond
the current list of established sponsors and partners to contribute to the initiative, including voluntary groups
with established links into the youth sector such as The Prince’s Trust. Other private sector partners should
also be encouraged to contribute via non-financial means such as by donating staff time and expertise.
34. Finally, the government should consider the tone and positioning of the messages communicated by such
educational programmes. Ultimately, the aim should not be to frighten the public or make them think nothing
can be done about the cyber threat, and thereby discourage them from enjoying the benefits of today’s digital
world. Instead the goal should be to convey a simple and positive set of steps that both adults and children can
follow to protect themselves, in a same way as was achieved by previous public information campaigns
such as the “Green Cross Code” or “Clunk click Every Trip” campaigns to promote road safety. The US
31 http://www.staysafeonline.org/stop-think-connect/about
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Stop.Think.Connect campaign, of which RSA is a founding partner, is a good example of attempting to educate
the public on internet security with a clear and engaging set of messages.32
August 2012
Written evidence submitted by Get Safe Online [EC 10]
I write to you in my capacity as Chief Executive of Get Safe Online.
As you are probably aware Get Safe Online is part of the Governments supported national major public-
private sector initiative to raise awareness of online security. It is aimed at consumers and micro-businesses. It
is a not-for-profit organisation and relies on contributions from private and public sector organisations. Current
sponsors are: Cabinet Office, BIS, Home Office, Association of Chief Police Officers, The Serious Organised
Crime Agency (SOCA), HSBC, Cable & Wireless, PayPal, Gumtree, VeriSign, Symantec, Ofcom and the
National Fraud Authority (Action Fraud), Cable and Wireless, Creative Virtual, Trend Micro and Microsoft. It
has a board of directors and an active steering group that meets on a bi-monthly basis to set both the strategic
and tactical aims and objectives for the initiative on an on-going basis.
The Get Safe Online initiative is largely Internet based. The website at (www.getsafeonline.org) is a one-
stop-shop for reliable, independent and easily understood up-to-date information about online safety. It gives
home users and small businesses the advice they need to use the Internet safely. It includes information on
protecting your PC, yourself and your business as well as advice on topics such as Internet shopping, social
networking sites, data theft and identity fraud.
The key messages of the initiative are that online sales and transactions are increasing at an incredible pace.
Get Safe Online wants people to be able to continue using the Internet, enjoying the many benefits it has to
offer, but also to be aware of the risks and take the steps necessary to protect themselves and their families
online. In addition, people are increasingly opting to use the Internet when transacting or interacting with
Government and it is important they are online safely and securely.
The Get Safe Online initiative provides a significant contribution to helping computer users and small
businesses to take steps to protect themselves, not least because the Get Safe Online name and branding has
significant potential and is easy for consumers to remember and therefore access. Government and the private
sector will need to continue to work together to ensure that the potential of the Get Safe Online initiative
is maximised.
Having outlined the work that Get Safe Online is doing in the area of Internet Security we would welcome
the opportunity to give evidence to select committee and to suggest a number of our active partners are also
well place to provide significant information to assist you.
Tony Neate
Chief Executive
Get Safe Online
August 2012
Written evidence submitted by Symantec [EC 11]
Given Symantec’s position as one of the world’s leaders in internet and information security we welcome
the opportunity to provide the following information to the Committee in this important inquiry.
Executive Summary
— Today more than ever cyber security incidents have become headline news given the increasingly
complex, sophisticated and organised nature of cybercrime which is determined as crime committed
using a computer, network, or hardware device.
— Online attacks that were once conducted solely for fame and notoriety are now conducted by
organised professionals motivated by economic gain.
— Information continues to be a key target with cyber criminals seeking access to data that can be used
to conduct further online attacks or sold as a commodity on the underground economy.
— Cyber criminals tactics continue to evolve by increasing targeting mobile devices and social networks
where users may be less aware of cyber security threats and where criminals may be able to avoid
detection for as long as possible.
— Recognition by the UK Government that cyber incidents are a tier one level threat is welcomed but
given the rapidly changing nature and extent of the threat addressing cyber security must remain a
long term overarching public policy objective.
32 http://www.staysafeonline.org/stop-think-connect/about
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— Neither government, industry, law enforcement, individual citizens or Parliamentarian can solve the
problem of cyber crime alone.
— Recognition by UK law enforcement of the need to work together and in partnership with industry
is a key factor in the effective leadership by the UK in this area.
— But cyber crime is not just a problem for the UK but a global problem that requires a global
approach. The involvement of UK law enforcement in international efforts is welcomed and should
continue. The rise in data loss incidents has resulted in data protection issues become front page
news.
— With personal data a valuable commodity for cyber criminals a sector wider data breach notification
requirement should be introduced as part of the current review of the EU data protection legal
framework.
— Technology has an important role to play in building and maintaining UK citizens online trust and
confidence in the online world. But technology alone is not the answer.
— Raising awareness initiatives that increase understanding of the online threat environment and
educate individuals of all agers how to protect their information and identity from the threat of cyber
criminals must continue to be supported and funded by both government and industry.
What e-crime is understood to be and how this affects crime recording?
1. To answer this question it is necessary to first define what is meant by e-crime. For Symantec e-crime is
included in the term cyber crime defined as any crime that is committed using a computer, network, or hardware
device. The computer or device may be the agent, facilitator, or the target of the crime.
2. The broad range of cybercrime can be divided into two categories defined as either a single event or an
ongoing series of events. An example of a single event would be where a victim might receive an e-mail
containing what claims to be a link to known entity but in reality is a link to a hostile website controlled by a
cyber criminal. Once the victim is sent to the hostile website the criminal is in control of a users machine and
may take advantage of this control to commit fraud and/or steal individual’s information.
3. The second category is an on-going series of events. This can be where there are repeated interactions
between the cyber criminal and the victim. For example, the target is contacted in an online chat room by
someone who, over time, attempts to establish a relationship. Eventually, by using such use tools as social
engineering, the criminal exploits the relationship to commit a crime.
4. When considering what is understood by the term e-crime it may be useful for the Committee to consider
the definitions of cybercrime within the Council of Europe Cybercrime Treaty. The Treaty (which the UK
government has ratified) is the most comprehensive legal instrument in the fight against cyber crime. In the
Treaty cybercrime refers to a number of offences perpetrated using electronic means ranging from criminal
activity against data to content and copyright infringement.
5. Overall however it should be remembered that e-crime is not a new phenomenon it is simply traditional
crimes conducted using electronic means. For example fraud, harassment and theft has always existed but the
new technology is simply the latest tool being used by criminals to conduct their illegal activities. Although
clearly depending on what type of crimes are included in the term e-crime this will affect the way in which
such crimes are recorded.
The extent and nature of the threats on which e-crime policy is based and how well they are understood by
policy makers
6. For the last eight years Symantec has produced its Internet Security Threat Report33 which provides an
overview and analysis of worldwide internet threat activity and a review of known vulnerability and trends in
areas such as phishing, botnets and spam. The report is based on the most comprehensive sources of internet
threat data which is gathered from Symantec’s Global Intelligence Network. Information on the key finding of
the latest Internet Security Threat Report published in May 2012, can be found at the end of this submission.
7. The findings of the latest report indicate the extent and nature of current cyber threats with Symantec
blocking more than 5.5 billion malicious attacks in 2011 which is an increase of more than 81% from the
previous year. The number of unique malware identified also increased by 41%. The number of web attacks
blocked per day also increased dramatically by 36% as cyber attacks become increasingly complex,
sophisticated and targeted.
8. The report shows an increasingly high volumes of malware34 attacks along with an increase in
sophisticated targeted attacks, where the user may not know they are being attacked due to the ability of the
attacker to slip under the radar and evade detection, as well as a rise in advanced persistent threats and attacks
on the infrastructure of the internet itself. Also identified was an increase in the number of data breaches of
individuals and business information with more than 232.4 million identities worldwide exposed overall during
33 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report 2011 : http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
34 Malware is malicious computer code that can be classified into four main threat types: viruses, backdoors, worms and Trojans.
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2011. Information remains a key target for cyber criminals who can use personal and business information to
conduct other attacks through phishing or social engineering.
9. While the volume and sophistication of cyber attacks globally increased in 2011 the overall level of spam
a popular vehicle for conducting cyber crime fell from 85.5% of all email in 2010 to 75.1% in 2011. This
reduction is largely seen as due to law enforcement action which shut down Rustock a massive worldwide
botnet responsible for sending out large amounts of spam.
10. Cyber criminals are not only continuing to use existing vulnerability but are also increasing in their use
of social networks as a propagation vector for attacks. Due to social engineering techniques and the viral nature
of social networks it is unfortunately much easier for threats to spread from one person to the next.
11. The growth in viruses and malware attacking mobile devices was also seen with the 2011 report being
the first year that mobile malware presented a tangible threat to users. Attacks being seen included malware
that sends premium SMS text messages from a users phone. This can earn the cyber criminal $9.99 for each
text sent but unfortunately costs the victim dearly when their mobile phone bill arrives. As the take up of
mobile phones and tablets continue to rise Symantec expects that cyber criminals will continue to explore
ways to attack mobile devices and once they find something effective and money making they will exploit
it ruthlessly.
12. Individuals continue to be a key target for cyber criminals according to the findings of the latest Norton
Cybercrime Report published on 5 September. One of the world’s largest consumer cybercrime studies the
report is based on the findings of a survey of more than 13,000 adults across 24 countries.
13. According to the report there are 556 million victims of cyber crime per year, which is more than the
entire population of the European Union. In the UK it s estimated that more than 12.5 million people fell
victim to cybercrime in the past 12 months. The cost of cyber crime to the UK was £1.8 billion with an average
cost of £144 per cybercrime victim. This means that cybercrime costs UK consumer more than a week’s worth
of food for a family of four.
14. The 2012 report showed cyber criminals are targeting users of social networking and mobile devices
which is further evidence of how the tactics of cyber criminals are changing based on the popularity of
particular technologies and online platforms and networks. It is estimated that two thirds of adults use a mobile
device to access the internet. One in five adults globally (21%) has been a victim of either social or mobile
cyber crime. In the UK 30% of adults have fallen victim to cybercrime on social networking platforms.
Although 63% of adults are accessing social network accounts and 24% access their bank accounts over free
or unsecured Wi-Fi connections, around 53% of the adults surveyed were concerned about the security of these
Wi-Fi connections.
15. While the 2012 report revealed that internet users are taking basic steps to protect themselves and their
personal information, such as deleting suspicious emails and protecting their personal information online other
precautions are still not being taken. For example 40% of UK adults don’t use complex passwords or change
their passwords frequently. More than a third of adults do not check for the padlock symbol in the browser
before entering sensitive personal information such a online banking details.
16. The recognition of the cyber threats as a tier one level threat to the UK in the National Security and
Defence Strategy and the subsequent Cyber Security Strategy are seen by Symantec as evidence that policy
makers recognise the extent and nature of the threat being faced in the UK. The focus on the economic and
social impact of e-crime in the strategy document indicates an understanding of the impact of cyber threats not
only to the ongoing resilience and stability of the internet but to the societal and economic stability of the UK.
Going forward as the online threat environment continues to evolve there is a need to ensure policy makers up
to date on the changing nature and extent of the threat to the UK from cyber crime and that cyber security
remain a long term overarching public policy objective.
17. However, addressing cyber threats is not a responsibility of policy makers alone but a responsibility that
is shared by all those using the Internet. The nature of the internet and IT technology is such that no single
person can be held accountable and we all share a collective responsibility to protect ourselves and our
customers whether they are businesses, users or citizens. Public and private sector co-operation and
collaboration are a key factor to assisting not only the policy makers but also businesses and individuals
to understand, assess and evaluate the level of seriousness of cyber incidents and their level of risk from
cyber crime.
The effectiveness of current law enforcement and legislative capabilities, including local and regional
capabilities and the potential impacts of proposed organisational change
18. The UK continues to be seen by Symantec as among the best placed countries in countering cybercrime;
particularly in comparison to several other EU Member States. The UK’s Police e-Crime Unit and SOCA’s e-
crime task force and the work of CPNI on cyber threats all play an important role in addressing cyber crime
issues facing UK businesses, organisation and individuals.
19. A particular element of the effectiveness of UK law enforcement is the strong collaboration with the
private sector. Coordination and cooperation between the public and private sector on addressing the spread of
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cyber crime are an important component to a cyber security strategy not only in the UK but also globally. The
UK’s understanding that it is the private sector that has most knowledge about cyber threats and the need for
law enforcement and industry to work together in collaboration, where appropriate, should be seen as a key
success factor of the UK approach. However, it is also suggested that providing more training and resources
to UK police , particularly at a local and regional level to fight cyber crime would be welcomed.
20. Given that the proposed organisational changes have not been implemented yet, it remains to be seen
how the establishment of the National Crime Agency (NCA) will affect enforcement activities in this area. The
proposals outlined by the Home Office in June 2011 point towards a continued focus on cyber crime as there
currently is within SOCA and the Police e-Crime Unit. The creation of a National Cyber Crime Unit that it is
understood will sit within the NCA is also welcomed as by Symantec. This step forward points the way forward
for law enforcement capabilities already in place to be enhanced and bolstered going forward. Before the NCA
is in place the emphasis in the Home Office document s on the importance of the continued cooperation
between SOCA and the Police e-Crime Unit before the NCA is established is supported.
21. However, it should also be remembered that cyber crime is not just a local, regional or even national
problem for the UK. Cyber crime is a global problem that requires a global approach particularly as threats
and attacks can travel around the world at the click of a button. It is suggested that a move towards a more
European wide approach by law enforcement to cybercrime issues could support and enhance the effectiveness
of current UK efforts. Symantec has welcomed the recent announcement of the establishment of a Europol
Cybercrime Centre. It is hoped that this initiative will continue to develop cooperation and coordination by
law enforcement and that UK law enforcement will play a key role in supporting the Centre’s activities.
22. In terms of legislative capabilities the UK’s legal framework for addressing cyber crime is supported by
Symantec. The Computer Misuse Act is a key legislative tool and provides the capability for prosecutions
related to cyber crime offences. However, as explained above new forms of cyber crime emerge as new
technologies develop. Given the rise in online threats since the Computer Misuse Act was last amended in
2007 it is suggested that the Committee should considered whether there are aspects of cyber crime seen today
that remain unaddressed within UK’s legislation. For example while unauthorised access to a computer is
criminalised under the CMA the actual theft of confidential information is not specifically addressed. In light
of the significant number of UK citizens being affected by identity related online fraud it is suggested that a
discussion is held on whether this offence should be specifically addressed within UK law. Also given the take
up and use of cloud computing by both businesses and citizens increases a legislative gap currently exists in
both UK and EU law given that the use and also misuse of computing resources delivered via the cloud without
right is currently not covered within either UK or EU law. These offences are suggested as areas that the
Committee could considered to ensure that the UK’s legislative capabilities are sufficient to address current
and possible future online criminal activity.
Options for addressing key emerging issues that will affect the public such as liability over personal
computer security, personal data held by social networking sites and its vulnerability to criminal use
23. As the Committee’s question highlights the findings of Symantec’s latest internet security threat report
shows that information continues to be a key target for cyber criminals as well as a rise in the use of social
networks by cyber criminals to conduct attacks. With hundreds of millions of people on social networking sites
it is inevitable that online criminals would look to attack users there. However according to Symantec’s findings
more than half of all attacks identified on social networking Web sites were related to malware hosted on
compromised blogs or communication sites rather than the theft of information from social networking sites.
It appears that a key threat from social networking is where a hyperlink for a compromised website is shared
to a large number of users on a social network. Users then click on the link and are sent to the website where
malware, which may include threats such as key loggers that seek access to personal information such as
passwords, can then attack their machines.
24. Given the rise in data breaches and the threats seen to personal information Symantec has welcomed the
European Commission review of the current European data protection legal framework in place in Europe
since 1995 which is proposing the introduction of a sector wide data breach notification requirement The
review of the current Data Protection Directive (95/46) from which the UK Data Protection Act 1998 derives,
is an opportunity to ensure the legal framework, first introduced in 1995 is appropriate and relevant today;
particularly in an era where information has become the digital currency for users but, unfortunately, also a
focus for e-crime.
25. Gaining and maintaining the trust and confidence of individuals that their information is protected and
secured given the level of cybercrime being seen is a challenge that must be faced and addressed by
organisations. Introducing a requirement to notify if data has been lost or stolen in the legal framework not
only ensures data is fully protected throughout its lifecycle but also that users are informed if a serious incident
occurs that may impact them, thus creating a sense of empowerment and individuals’ confidence in taking
action if they want or need to. However, any breach requirements introduced needs to be appropriate and non
burdensome to either organisations or citizens.
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26. While ensuring the data protection legal framework in Europe is appropriate and relevant to the way
information is being processed, accessed, shared and managed online, there is also a responsibly of individual
users to ensure that they protect their information particularly when sharing personal information online.
27. The computer security industry has an important role to play in developing technological tools and
solutions that are appropriate to deal with cyber threats and can help individuals to protect their identifies and
information online. Symantec will continue to develop and offer solutions that enable users to put in place
appropriate measures to protect their systems, networks and information. However it should be recognised that
software companies cannot and should not be held responsible for what they do not effectively controls such
as how a users may install, configure, use and update (or perhaps even chose not to update) security software.
It is also difficult to see how a technology provider would measure the responsibly of the consumer in the way
it has selected, installed, configured and users the software when ascertaining liability.
28. Factors that would need to be considered in measuring and determining possible liability would include
whether the software being used by an individual user is fitness for the purpose it is being used. For example
is the software being used in line with its intended purpose. Also whether the software being used is up to date
and properly maintained by the user. For example a user may have decided to turn off the automatic software
updates provided by the provider when the user configured the software. This is a decision that the provider
of the software will not be aware of nevertheless this action could result in the user being left unprotected
whilst online and suffer a cyber incident. In such a scenario the individual user may suffer cyber attack not
because the software failed but because of a decision made by the user.
29. If such an approach was taken for it to be workable it is suggested that software vendors would need to
be able to gain the necessary control over the way that users are using their technology. This could include the
ability to monitor and control the behaviour and actions of people for example to ensure that the software, or
tool, is being used for only the purpose for which it was supplied or sold. Moves in such a direction would
not only raise political, privacy and legal questions but it is not clear whether such a evolution in the way in
which technology interacts with users is a journey that users would be willing to embark on and potentially
cover the costs of.
30. An approach where the liability burden is placed on the provider of software products alone could lead
to a situation where companies would not be prepared to take liability for their products unless they can assume
a level of control over the way it is being used in order to avoid or limit liability. This could lead providers to
using more privacy invasive technological to provide the ability to monitor and control the behaviour and
actions of users for example to ensure that the software is being used for only the purpose for which it was
supplied or sold.
31. An approach along these lines could not only impact the control users have on their PC’s but could also
stifle technological innovation and competition in the marketplace by promoting particular business models. A
move towards more closed platforms or a situation where one dominant technology provider could dictate what
can, or cannot, be installed on its system due to liability concerns may limit consumer choices to only sites or
online content that are approved by PC providers based on a level of risk.
32. Moves towards liability in this area could not only raise political and legal questions but it is not clear
whether such a evolution in the way in which technology is provided and interacts with users is a journey that
users would be willing to embark on and potentially cover the costs of its development and implementation.
33. As the online threat environment continues to evolve and cyber criminals tactics adapt and change it is
only right that we continue to consider options for addressing current as well as emerging issues. However in
light of the rapid speed in which cyber threats and attacks evolve it is important that legislation and law makers
should not try to run behind technology but rather support the market to develop the appropriate tools and
solutions to current and future online threats. Also it is also important that users continue to be educated about
online threats and understand the value of their personal data and the importance of having protection measures
in place that are appropriate to their online activities.
The effectiveness of current initiatives to promote awareness of using the internet safely and the implications
of peoples’ online behaviours for related public policy
34. Having appropriate technological solutions and tools in place can support citizens to have the confidence
that their activities and information and identity online are being protected. However, Symantec believes that
technology alone is not enough to address the online security challenges we all face today. An effective
cyber security approach is one that combines appropriate technology, the development of policies, procedures
particularly for reporting, responding and recording cyber incidents and raising awareness initiatives to ensure
people have the necessary skills and knowledge to protect themselves from cyber criminals.
35. Symantec continues to be a supporter of initiatives around the world that promote awareness of internet
security and safety issues to different online users from children to silver surfers. In the UK Symantec has
been a long term supporter of Get Safe Online the government-industry campaign aimed at raising greater
awareness amongst citizens and small businesses of the importance of online security. We are also members
of the UK Council for Child Online Safety which is another example of how industry and government are
working in partnership to increase understanding of online safety by both children and parents.
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36. At a time when public and private sector organisations continue to look to online platforms and networks
to interact and provide goods and services directly to citizens, it is important that internet security and safety
remains on the public policy agenda. Initiative and activities that can raise awareness of the online threat
environment and the importance of online security and safety have a key role to play not only in protecting
individuals information online but also creating greater trust and confidence of internet technology. This will
remain important if we are to ensure UK citizens can gain from the full opportunity and advantages offered by
the internet and have confidence to enjoy the connected world safely and securely.
37. As mentioned earlier in this submission addressing cyber crime threat facing the UK is not something
that industry, government, individuals or law enforcement can do alone. Users also have a responsibility to
protect themselves by installing and using available internet products and tools effectively to ensure they
remain secure. Education on online security and activities that raise awareness will continue to be vital to
ensuring users are aware of not only the constantly evolving online threat environment but also what they can
do to be safe and secure online.
38. While the current economic climate presents many resources challenges, it is important to continue to
invest in ensuring individuals are aware of cyber security issues if the full social and economic opportunities
and benefits offered by online networks and platforms are to be fully realised.
Symantec is a world leader in providing solutions to help individuals and enterprises assure the security,
availability, and integrity of their information. Headquartered in Cupertino, Calif., Symantec has operations in
more than 40 countries. Further information can be found at www.symantec.com. Symantec appreciates this
opportunity to submit comments to the House of Commons Home Affairs Select Committee.
October 2012
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Joint written evidence submitted by the National Trading Standards Board, the National Trading
Standards eCrime Centre, the Association of Chief Trading Standards Officers and the Trading
Standards Institute [EC 12]
This response has been submitted to the Home Affairs Committee eCrime Inquiry by the National Trading
Standards Board (NTSB), the National Trading Standards eCrime Centre (NTSeCC), the Association of Chief
Trading Standards Officers (ACTSO) and the Trading Standards Institute (TSI) and was produced by Mike
Andrews (NTSeCC) and Paul Thompson (Warrington & Halton Trading Standards).
Introduction
1. Local Authority Trading Standards Services (LATSS) enforce a wide range of consumer protection
legislation across the UK. In the past this has been focussed on the traditional “high street” where a physical
premise could be visited and problems could be addressed in a much more tangible way. However, the internet
cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [29-07-2013 13:16] Job: 029956 Unit: PG08
Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 99
has brought a whole new market place to consumers in the UK which has led to Trading Standards having to
adopt new and innovative approaches to ensuring adequate protection for consumers carrying out their
transactions online. As more and more consumers and businesses now routinely use technology (be that
internet, e-mail or mobile/smart phones), Trading Standards faces further challenges in ensuring internet scams
are properly tackled.
2. Trading Standards has a vital role to play in an overall strategy of e-crime enforcement. The security and
integrity of the internet is key to the future economic success of the UK. Consumers need to feel they are
adequately protected when carrying out their business online and equally, businesses need to be confident that
rogue traders operating online are robustly tackled. Trading Standards takes the leading role in ensuring both
these priorities are met and welcomes the opportunity to submit written evidence in relation to this inquiry.
What e-crime is understood to be and how this affects crime recording
3. The terms e-crime and cyber crime are often used interchangeably but are, broadly speaking, one and the
same. The ACPO definition of e-crime is; “The use of networked computers or internet technology to commit
or facilitate the commission of crime”. This is a perfectly reasonable definition but can cover a wide range of
offending and there is often a lack of clarity as to the types of criminality that fall within that definition.
Indeed, there is (in law) no such crime as an “e-crime”. This in itself can lead to problems in the effective
reporting and recording of e-crime, as outlined later in this section.
4. The UK Cyber Security Strategy and previous discussions on the subject of e-crime have tended to focus,
quite reasonably, on the higher level criminality such as hacking, Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks,
cyber terrorism and large scale data/identity theft. However, in relation to consumer and business impact, there
are a number of areas that whilst individually may be perceived as low level criminality, they can often have
a disproportionate effect on the individuals concerned. These are often crimes that are not specifically dependant
on technology to facilitate the crime, as would be the case for DDoS for example. However, the proliferation
of technology has made the commission of the offences far easier and allowed the offenders to target a much
wider audience than they would previously been able to using “traditional” methods. For example, the sale of
counterfeit goods or websites set up to encourage consumers (and businesses) to part with their money without
the product or service ultimately being provided. In terms of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) much of
this would appear at first glance to be Level 1 criminality. However, when the scale of offending is assessed it
can quite often become apparent that this in fact Level 2 (and in some cases Level 3) criminality.
5. In relation to the recording of e-crime, in practice the ACPO definition and most other definitions fail to
provide for the successful recording of all instances of e-crime. This is primarily because the e-crime element
is often a sub-element of the actual mischief of the crime. For example, a trader using a website to commit
some sort of advance fee fraud might be classified as a fraud offence, when the principal mechanism to facilitate
the crime is the internet. Furthermore, there is a proliferation of mechanisms by which consumers and
businesses can report/record instances of e-crime. This in itself leads to an inaccurate picture as to the true
scale of e-crime (see paragraph 16).
The extent and nature of the threats on which e-crime policy is based and how well they are understood by
policy makers
6. Broadly speaking, Central Government would appear to have a good understanding of the higher level
threats posed by e-crime. However, there is probably less of an understanding of the threats posed directly to
consumers and businesses when going about their normal day to day business, for example; websites offering
fake job opportunities, companies offering to provide a service with up front fees that then fail to deliver the
service (advance fee fraud) and websites selling counterfeit, dangerous and/or illicit products. The Federation
of Small Businesses believes e-crime is having a serious detrimental impact on their economic success.
7. The creation of the National Trading Standards eCrime Centre (NTSeCC) (see paragraph 15) has gone
some way to begin to address this issue. However, there still remains a lack of recognition amongst policy
makers as to how that may fit within an overall approach to tackling e-crime. The priority thus far, as one
would expect, has been tackling the high level threats to national security. From a local policing perspective,
the policy has tended towards tackling the spread of child pornography. As a consequence, the very real threat
from general scams that are targeted at UK consumers has tended to be poorly understood. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that, what appears to be relatively low-level criminality can have a disproportionate impact on those
individuals affected. To someone on a relatively low income, losing £100 through some form of internet scam
could be extremely detrimental to their well-being. As an economy we are increasingly reliant on e-commerce
so policy makers need to fully understand the impact of this type of criminality and the detrimental effect it
has in creating a trusted online environment.
8. As outlined above, policies are often considered and devised based upon serious and organised criminality
(eg Home Office Guidance and Implementation of RIPA Notice for use with Facebook, Charles Miller April
2010—which focused primarily on SOCA/Police access to Facebook). Much more detailed consideration needs
to be given to the impact e-crime has at Level 1, particularly from a Trading Standards perspective as this
often forms part of much wider Level 2 and Level 3 criminality. If one considers the Home Office guidance
referred to above, the process was considered and is only relevant for SOCA/Police, as a result the disclosure
cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [29-07-2013 13:16] Job: 029956 Unit: PG08
Ev 100 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence
process can only be accessed by SOCA/Police Single Points of Contact (SPoC). Even then the disclosure
process does not go far enough to assist with localised law enforcement issues faced by Trading Standards.
9. Purely from a Trading Standards view point current legislation in relation to e-crime is often a case of
applying square pegs to round holes. For example, obtaining disclosure from a hosting company should
ordinarily be a straight forward Data Protection Act request. However, quite frequently hosting companies will
refuse on the grounds the information is telecommunications data. Another example would include obtaining
disclosure from social networking sites, for example Facebook, as referred to previously. The inability of
regional law enforcement officers to obtain data pertinent to a Facebook account, whereby the account holder
involved in criminality has closed privacy settings, is in effect giving the criminal fraternity an open passport
to trade illegally.
10. These examples highlight the gaps between policy makers and law enforcement agencies which have a
duty to enforce e-crime at Level 1. Unfortunately, the difficulties posed by these gaps often result in little or
no action being taken to identify and apprehend individuals involved in e-crime, let alone anyone connected
to organised gangs. Furthermore, this fundamental lack of enforcement ability at Level 1 fails to provide the
information necessary to deliver the intelligence building blocks which are required to carry out successful
enforcement at Level 2 and Level 3.
The effectiveness of current law enforcement and legislative capabilities, including local and regional
capabilities and the potential impacts of proposed organisational change
11. Recent organisational changes would appear to have been successful in having an impact in tackling the
serious, national e-crime threats that we are faced with. The creation of PCeU, SOCA Cyber and others is
certainly a step in the right direction. Clearly, it remains to be seen what impact the creation of the National
Crime Agency (and in turn the National Cyber Crime Unit) will have in tackling e-crime.
12. In respect of Trading Standards, changes to consumer protection enforcement that have led to the creation
of NTSeCC are a welcome move in recognising the importance of tackling all forms of e-crime and not just
those at a high or serious organised crime level. However, there still remain some fundamental issues which
need to be tackled:
(a) Resource issues/training: hindering the appropriate investigation into e-crime, impacting on
appropriately trained staff and the ability to keep up to date with technology and the ever
changing techniques of the e-criminal.
(b) Localised political agendas: the level of e-crime enforcement within Trading Standards at a
local level is very much at the discretion of local political priorities and their views of the
requirements of the communities they represent. For example, a rural local authority may have
more interest in animal feed enforcement than investigating intellectual property crime on the
internet. This factor has even more impact given the public sector cuts in recent times which
have forced local authorities to review their priorities which inevitably has removed resource
from enforcement functions.
(c) Central Government: the continued need for policy development to prioritise local/regional law
enforcement. This often results in the tools (resource & legislation) not being provided for law
enforcement officers to deal with e-crime effectively. The recent changes to RIPA are a point
in case whereby LATSS staff will now have to seek magistrates’ approval in order to gain
access to subscriber data. Although it is recognised why policy makers sought to restrict isolated
disproportionate use of RIPA, for Trading Standards enforcement, this appears to be a wholly
disproportionate change that will severely impact on the ability of local officers to tackle e-
crime.
13. With reference to resources and training, NTSeCC is about the undertake a programme of work to ensure
Trading Standards enforcement staff are suitably trained to carry out e-crime investigations at a local level.
This will include improving their knowledge of open source research, online investigation techniques and the
capture of digital evidence. Allied to that is a programme of equipment procurement to ensure local staff have
the correct tools (both software and hardware) to help them further their investigations.
Whether there are any gaps in the response to e-crime and, if so, how they should be addressed
14. The Consumer Landscape Review, commissioned by the Government in 2011, set out a vision to,
amongst other things, improve and simplify the way in which consumer protection legislation was enforced
locally, regionally and nationally. Traditionally, the majority of this work was split between the Office of Fair
Trading (OFT) and individual LATSS. With the differing remits (and geographical boundaries) of the two
bodies, this often led to “enforcement gaps”, particularly when dealing with cross-region and national issues.
In recognition of this, the National Trading Standards Board (NTSB) was formed to oversee the transition of
responsibilities from the OFT to LATSS, with particular emphasis on putting in place an infrastructure to tackle
cross-region and national issues and/or cases of a particularly complex nature (Level 2 and Level 3 criminality).
15. As part of this process, the provision of e-crime enforcement in relation to scams and rip-offs directed
at consumers and businesses was indentified as a key priority. Whilst there are a number of officers in individual
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LATSS who take an active role in e-crime enforcement, there was no coherent approach to tackle a problem
which, by its very nature, is a cross-region issue. It was also recognised that e-crime enforcement is a
specialised area, requiring specific expertise and skills. Furthermore, for reasons already identified, this area of
e-crime has not always been seen as a priority by other enforcement agencies. As a result, the new NTSeCC
has been formed to tackle the problem of internet scams directed at consumers and businesses.
16. Consumers and business are faced with a bewildering array of options when reporting e-crime. The local
police force, LATSS, Citizens Advice, Crimestoppers and Action Fraud are just some of the reporting
mechanisms available. As a result, it is sometimes difficult to build up a complete and accurate picture of the
current and emerging threats faced. NTSeCC has recognised this as a key issue and therefore the collection
and analysis of intelligence in relation to e-crime is core to its business. This will allow us to monitor current
and future trends so we can direct our limited resources in a way that is likely to have the most impact.
However, it is felt that greater clarity needs to be provided as to where to report instances of e-crime. If this
is through a central point (for example Action Fraud) then this needs to be backed up by clear, simple processes
that allow for the rapid dissemination of reports to the appropriate agencies for action (ie NTSeCC, LATSS etc).
Options for addressing key emerging issues that will affect the public such as liability over personal
computer security, personal data held by social networking sites and its vulnerability to criminal use
17. NTSeCC is currently undertaking a National Strategic Assessment with a view to identifying emerging
threats faced by consumers that are specific to areas that Trading Standards has a duty to enforce. However, as
part of the wider Trading Standards role, we have a duty in terms of safeguarding vulnerable people. In line
with this, Trading Standards would look to support any activities through its links with Citizens Advice and
their wider Consumer Empowerment Projects.
The effectiveness of current initiatives to promote awareness of using the internet safely and the implications
of peoples’ online behaviours for related public policy
18. There are a number of initiatives aimed at raising awareness such as Know The Net, Get Safe Online
and Action Fraud. Whilst these are worthy attempts to give the public a greater awareness, there doesn’t seem
to be a coherent response to tackling this issue. Frequently consumers and businesses put themselves in
positions whereby they are easy prey for online criminals. This is often as a result of being poorly educated in
the potential dangers of the internet and being unaware of the personal and financial risks they undertake whilst
using the internet/computers.
19. One could question whether this should be the sole responsibility of Government or whether the industry
(ISPs, search engines etc) should take on a more pro-active role in educating their customers to some of the
pitfalls of using and trading on the internet. Whilst we recognise that steps are already being taken by some
parts of the industry, there are elements that seem to “turn a blind eye” to both their moral (and in some cases
legal) responsibilities.
November 2012
Written evidence submitted by Professor Peter Sommer [EC 14]
1. I am currently a Visiting Professor at de Montfort University and a Visiting Reader at the Open University.
For 17 years I was first a Visiting Research Fellow and then a Visiting Professor at the London School of
Economics. I have acted as an expert witness in many trials involving complex computer evidence; many of
these would probably be regarded as E-Crime. They include: global hacking, terrorism, “phishing”, software
piracy. But my instructions have also included criminal matters where digital evidence was crucial although
the substantive crimes, including murder, large scale illegal immigration, art fraud, state corruption, money
laundering, insurance frauds, theft of gold bullion and paedophilia which would probably not be classified as
E-Crime.
2. I have provided advice for the UK’s National High Tech Crime Training Centre, was the external evaluator
and then external examiner for the MSc in Computer Forensics at the Defence Academy at Shrivenham which
is widely used for police training and while it existed I was the Joint Lead Assessor for the digital element in
the Home Office-backed Council for the Registration of Forensic Practitioners. I currently advise the Forensic
Science Regulator on matters of digital evidence.
3. As an academic I have had a very long-standing interest in the issues of the definitions and statistics of
computer-related or “cyber” incidents. In March 2009 I carried out a literature review, including statistics, of
Internet crime for the National Audit Office as a contribution to a value-for-money review of Government
initiatives in reducing the impact of such crimes.
4. From time to time I have been asked to contribute to a variety of government-sponsored inquiries into
the policing of e-crime, starting with Project Trawler in 1999 which lead up to the formation of the National
High Tech Crime Unit.
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5. My practical work as an expert witness has brought me into frequent and direct contact with successive
specialist police units, starting with the original Metropolitan Police Computer Crime Unit.
6. In February this year the House of Commons Science and Technology Select Committee published its
report Malware and Cyber crime (HC1537) for which I provided both written and oral evidence. Both appear
in their printed report. There is some slight overlap with the concerns of your Committee’s current inquiry and
this is reflected in my submission to you, though of course the two Committees proceed on different bases.
7. I attach a CV.35
Definitions of E-crime
8. There is no generally-agreed definition of E-crime and this lack directly impacts assessments of extent.
We can illustrate the diversity of definitions. The Council of Europe CyberCrime Convention,36 also known
as the Treaty of Budapest, covers in Articles 2–6 as “substantive offences”: “illegal access”, “illegal
interception”, “data interference”, “system interference”, and “misuse of devices”. It adds as “computer-related
offences”, articles 7 and 8, “computer-related forgery” and “computer-related fraud”. It further adds, articles 9
and 10, “offences related to child pornography” and “offences related to infringements of copyright and related
rights”. Articles 4 and 5 more-or-less correspond to s 3 of the UK Computer Misuse Act, 1990: “Unauthorised
acts with intent to impair, or with recklessness as to impairing, operation of computer, etc.”
9. If we now turn to a report produced in February 2011 by the BAE subsidiary Detica in partnership with
the Cabinet Office’s Office of Cybersecurity and Information Assurance (OCSIA), The Cost of Cyber Crime,37
this covers: “identity theft and online scams affecting UK citizens; IP theft, industrial espionage and extortion
targeted at UK businesses; and fiscal fraud committed against the Government”. “Industrial espionage” is not
a criminal offence in the UK38 and the report excludes any direct reference to malware or to child pornography.
10. A recent paper by academics at Cambridge and Cardiff Universities Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime39
has the great virtue that it carefully discusses the various elements that might go into “cybercrime” and
estimates of associated loss. At the very least the reader can see the workings and assess whether to accept
their particular decisions. A similar earlier and slightly less thorough exercise was carried out by the Oxford
Internet Institute in 2010: Mapping and measuring Cybercrime.40
11. The ACPO E-Crime Strategy41 dated August 2009 uses a much simpler definition: “The use of
networked computers or Internet technology to commit or facilitate the commission of crime”. This definition
appears to exclude, for example, the use of computers to carry out frauds which don’t involve networks, the
acquisition of illegal material such as child or extreme pornography and the deployment of techniques to
generate forged documents.
12. The previous ACPO Strategy, dated January 2005 and signed off by Trevor Pearce, then Acting Director
General of the National Crime Squad and now Director Designate of Operations at the National Crime Agency
(NCA), referred to “For the investigation of Computer-enabled Criminality and Digital Evidence”42 and did
not limit itself to “networked computers or Internet technology”.
13. It needs to be recognised that by 2011 PC ownership was 77% of the population and household internet
take-up was 78%.43 When the term “computer crime” first came into popular usage in the early 1970s the
proportion of the population that had access to computers was tiny. For that reason, right through to the end
of the last century it was possible to see computer/cyber/e-crime as distinct purely in terms of the demographics
of potential offenders. But today large numbers of crimes are likely to have a “computer” element simply
because for most of the population distinctions between their “non-virtual” and “cyber” selves are increasingly
difficult to make.
14. The computer and the network may not be central to a crime or its investigation but the role of some
form of digital evidence may be crucial.
15. A question for the Committee, therefore, is whether the current ACPO definition of E-Crime fully
addresses the range of policy issues facing police investigatory capability.
Impact on Crime Reporting
16. Most official forms of crime recording in the UK are on the basis of specific offences prosecuted. But
in relation to “E-crime” there are particular difficulties as a result of policies of the Crown Prosecution Service.
35 Not printed.
36 http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm. It dates from 2001 and came into force in 2004 and was ratified by
the UK in 2011.
37 http://www.detica.com/uploads/resources/THE_COST_OF_CYBER_CRIME_SUMMARY_FINAL_14_February_2011.pdf
38 http://www.justice.gov.uk/lawcommission/docs/cp150_Legislating_the_Criminal_Code__Misuse_of_Trade_Secrets_
Consultation.pdf
39 http://weis2012.econinfosec.org/papers/Anderson_WEIS2012.pdf
40 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1694107
41 http://www.met.police.uk/pceu/documents/ACPOecrimestrategy.pdf
42 I have been unable to discover a current online source for this, but retain my own copy
43 Ofcom http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr11/UK_CMR_2011_FINAL.pdf
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It sees the 1990 Computer Misuse Act as designed to fill in gaps in other forms of legislation44 and in framing
charges will concentrate on what it sees as the substantive offence rather than a modus operandi. Thus, if
some-one infiltrates a program to monitor the keystrokes on a computer and then subsequently uses the
passwords thereby obtained to access a computer from which to carry out a fraudulent transaction, the offence
will probably be recorded as a breach of the Fraud Act 2006, despite the fact that both s 3 and s 1 Computer
Misuse Act offences took place. A phishing attack would probably also be charged as fraud or money
laundering, a Distributed Denial of Service attack (which also tends to involve offences under s 3 Computer
Misuse Act when computers are remotely taken over by “back doors” or “Trojans”) would probably be charged
as an extortion as this is the most common way in which criminals can make money. A botnet is simply a
more extensive form of Distributed Denial of Service attack. In every year since the Computer Misuse Act
came into force, prosecutions have seldom exceeded 100 per year.
17. From a broader policy perspective many criminal activities can be classified in several different ways—
as the “substantive” offence such as fraud, sexual exploitation of children or extortion—or as a “computer
crime” (involving computers to some degree) or as an e-crime (on the current ACPO definition as involving
networked computers).
Impact on Policy Formation
18. The main justification for collecting statistics and arguing about categorisation is to see that resources
are available to meet the needs of law enforcement, a matter which I consider below.
Gaps in Legislation
19. There are no significant gaps in terms of substantive law, as a combination of existing conventional
criminal offences, principally the Fraud Act 2006, and the deployment of the Computer Misuse Act meet most
likely eventualities. There are however problems with the law covering investigators, which consists of a hotch-
potch of powers, the product of historical evolution. Seizure and subsequent examination of computer hard-
disks and other physical data media depend mostly on the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984.
Communications data is covered by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act, 2000 and subsequent laws
and orders about data retention, currently the subject of the Draft Data Communications Bill. Interception
evidence is, under RIPA, inadmissible and can only be used for intelligence purposes. The law covering access
by the police to suspect computers is particularly complex and I attach a copy of my article Police Powers to
Hack which is in Computer and Telecommunications Law Review (2012 CTLR, Issue 6 pp 13–19).45 There,
and also in my evidence to the Joint Committee Draft Data Communications Bill, I suggest that a more radical
review of police powers, including the circumstances in which warrants are issued, is required in order to
achieve an appropriate balance between providing the police with adequate investigatory powers and ensuring
that the public are not subject to unnecessary intrusion.
20. Interception evidence, currently excluded by s 17 RIPA, 2000, will need to be admitted in the same way
as all other forms of technical evidence and the distinctions between “communications data” and “content” are
now almost impossible to make within the technical protocols used on the Internet.
21. The Committee also ought to consider the position of the means by which evidence is obtained from
cloud computing services, the vast majority of which are not based in the UK either jurisdictionally or
physically. There are many forms of cloud computing, from consumer-orientated services like Google,
Facebook, Drpbox, Twitter and web-based email, to business facilities in which companies substantially reduce
their own local computing resources and pass their processing and storage requirements to large international
entities.
22. Although there are a number of legal procedures and Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties which give the
UK courts the ability eventually to obtain evidence from the cloud, they are lengthy and expensive. Swifter
results can be obtained by seeking the co-operation of cloud companies, but the UK government seems slow
to realise that the cloud companies will strongly prefer adherence to international legal norms of recognition
of privacy rights, transparency, strict application of necessity and proportionality tests, and proper judicial
process. In that connection, UK use of law enforcement-issued production orders and permission to intercept
in the hands of a politician, is significant handicap.
Issues in Investigation and Law Enforcement
23. Apart from the matter of investigatory powers, the very wide range of circumstances in which digital
evidence may play a part creates significant difficulties for determining a police response. A criminal event
may be local, national or international; it may be semi-opportunistic or highly organised; it may or may not,
be linked to other forms of organised crime; its primary focus might be fraud involving banking and financial
services, or retail fraud, or the sexual abuse of children, or the theft of copyright materials, or something else
entirely. And the digital evidence may be central to a trial or simply peripheral but essential.
44 Statements frequently made by CPS officials in public and private
45 Not printed.
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24. It is not enough to think in terms solely of specialist units. Every detective needs to know the basics of
digital evidence—where it is likely to be located, how it can be safely collected and preserved without being
contaminated in the process, and the core techniques that are used in analysis. The front-line detective needs
to be able to interact and work with forensic technicians. Because of the ever-changing nature of computer
hardware and software, and the rapid development of new criminal methods, basic training for all detectives
cannot be a one-off exercise but requires relatively frequent refreshment.
25. In effect the police response needs to be tiered—a level of knowledge for all, higher levels of skills for
detectives within particular specialisations such as child protection, fraud, terrorism. And a single elite
leadership unit to tackle the most complex and innovatory crimes and also provide research, advice and training
for the rest of the law enforcement community.
26. The first attempt at setting up such a unit was the National High Tech Crime Unit (NHTCU) and which
disappeared when the National Crime Squad was dissolved and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA)
created. NHCTU staff were then absorbed in to “SOCA e-Crime”, now “SOCA Cyber”. But SOCA was
separate from UK policing and the leadership role was lost until PCEU was set up from within the Metropolitan
Police Service. It is to be hoped that with the development of NCCU within NCA does not repeat the same
mistake—the unit must have a solid clearly articulated on-going relationship with the rest of UK law
enforcement.
27. Thought must also be given to how digital forensic expertise is made available. The expertise has to
extend to assisting in making decisions about what potential evidence to seize and what to examine in detail.
Because of the quantities of digital material available—numbers of computers, mobile phones, tablets etc plus
the ever-increasing storage capacity each holds, selections have to be made. Police refer to this process as
triage but insufficient thought has been given to how it executed—and by whom. There seems a very good
case for the development of specialist Digital Scenes of Crime Officers (SOCOs) as the skills required are
outside those routinely available to regular SOCOs or police officers attending a crime.
28. There is also a very good case for regional hubs of digital forensic expertise as opposed to each police
force having its own unit. This consolidation is already happening. However it is also essential that regular
police investigators have easy access to digital forensic technicians so that they can work together when
required.
29. A particularly productive route to the investigation of organised groups which deploy cyber techniques
appears to be the Covert Internet Investigator (CII). There are a number of courses in CII, for example from
Skills for Justice46 and NPIA47 but there is as yet no published Code of Practice, which would seem important
in developing public confidence in the ethicality and robustness of the methods
30. The use of private sector out-sourcing of digital forensic services needs to be deployed with care. There
are a number of highly competent companies and individuals, many former police officers and law enforcement
agency employees. But there is danger in current practices of aggressive competitive tendering—if a OIC
(Officer in Charge) lacks the knowledge fully to formulate his requirement, all that the tendering forensic
service provider will do is respond to that tender. If, as now often happens, the OIC and the successful forensic
service provider are geographically separated, police and technician will never work properly together and
opportunities are missed.
31. Anther often-neglected aspect of law enforcement is the role of the Crown Prosecution Service. For
some time the CPS has had specialist prosecutors who have enjoyed a certain level of training—indeed I have
done a small amount myself. But if my experience is anything to go by most CPS caseworkers lack much
knowledge of digital evidence and in particular evidence derived from hard disks. All too often one sees the
“particulars” on an indictment that make little or no sense. The fear is that mistakes in the framing charges
both generates expense elsewhere in the criminal justice system—showing up in defence criminal legal aid and
in court costs—and can sometimes result in the guilty going inadequately punished.
32. As with many issues within law enforcement response to digital evidence the problem is not a total
absence of activity but that the extent and quality of resource made available is not keeping pace with the rates
at which digital evidence in its various forms of growing throughout society.
33. See also my remarks about evidence from the cloud—paragraph 21 above.
International Dimensions
34. Although getting further international support and sign-up for the CoE Cyber Crime Convention (The
Treaty of Budapest, 2001) is an obvious ambition, the Committee needs to be alert to the possibility that in
some parts of the world it is perceived as too orientated to the conditions of Western Europe and North
America. Alternative initiatives are being developed by the International Telecommunications Union. The
Committee, in talking to UK government officials, may want to probe the UK government’s stance.
46 http://nos.ukces.org.uk/NOS%20Directory/NOS%20PDF%20%20Skills%20For%20Justice/ConversionDocuments/
SFJCECCO8.pdf
47 http://www.npia.police.uk/en/578.htm
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35. At a practical level much appears to depend on the quality of personal relationships between UK law
enforcement specialists and their opposite numbers in other countries. I note the role of SOCA in this regard.
36. A further issue the Committee may like to consider is the position where, although an offence may have
been committed within the jurisdiction of the English courts—the Computer Misuse Act, ss 4–5 are quite
widely drawn—there are significant difficulties in successful UK prosecution where the vast bulk of the
evidence is outside UK jurisdiction. The Crown Prosecution Service currently has a consultation:
http://www.cps.gov.uk/consultations/concurrent_jurisdiction_consultation.pdf
Promotion of Public Awareness
37. The investigation of crimes in which digital evidence is an important component will always be
expensive. Whatever arguments one has about definitions of e-crime it is unquestionably true that many are
transborder in nature. For both of these reasons it is unrealistic to expect successful law enforcement action in
anything other than a very small proportion of overall criminal acts. For these reasons prevention and mitigation
are critical. It is disappointing that the National Cyber Security Programme placed so little emphasis on helping
individuals and businesses help themselves. In the end the best people to apply protection to computers are
those who immediately use them. One of the big concerns in E crime is the extent to which social engineering
methods are deployed and education is the principal means by which it can spotted and thwarted. I notice that
out of a total of £650 million for the overall programme get safe online has received just under £400,000.
38. I hope the committee will consider the virtues of extending the notion of “public health” to the cyber
domain. We surely need much more frequent Government-sponsored official advice. Inevitably commercially
sponsored advice pushes the public towards the specific products and services of the sponsors.
November 2012
Written evidence submitted by Financial Fraud Action UK [EC 15]
I write in relation to the Home Affairs Committee Inquiry on e-crime and, in particular, the evidence given
by Professor Ross Anderson at your hearing on 20 December 2012. We are concerned over the accuracy of
several of Professor Anderson’s comments and would like the chance to put a more informed view before your
Committee’s members.
Financial Fraud Action UK is the name under which the financial services industry across the UK co-
ordinates its activity on fraud prevention. FFA UK works in partnership with The UK Cards Association which
represents credit cards, debit cards and charge cards in the UK. Its members are the leading retail banks and
financial institutions in the UK who issue payment cards and extend credit to their customers (the card issuers),
and those who process card transactions on behalf of merchants (the merchant acquirers).
During the hearing, Professor Anderson suggested that:
“ ... banks often find it easy to blame their customers for fraud... The banks certainly claim that they
will blame people if there was gross negligence. In practice, they often blame people as a routine
matter, even when it is not clear there was negligence at all.”
The position of the banks is, and always has been, very clear. The innocent victims of fraud can expect to
receive full protection against any losses—provided in the form of a full and timely refund, While both banks
and cardholders share responsibility for the security of the card, it is only in circumstances where customers
have been grossly negligent in protecting their PIN and card that they sustain any loss—which is a high
threshold to overcome. Processes embedded by the banks ensure that all customers who are genuine victims
of fraud will be refunded and will suffer no loss with the burden of proof on the bank to demonstrate otherwise,
The cross-industry picture is that 98% of cases are resolved with a full refund being delivered for the customer.
The remaining 2% is made up of a combination of the following scenarios: firstly, fraudulent claims, and
secondly where the customer has been found to have acted with such gross negligence as to have practically
colluded with the fraudster.
Banks are required to refund the victims of fraud immediately and, as a recent Which? study clearly showed,
the vast majority are refunded within a week. On the rare occasions when the situation is not clear cut and the
bank needs to investigate further, most card companies ensure that the available balance and interest payments
are unaffected whilst the transaction is investigated, which provides support and respite to customers.
The regulatory framework is overseen by the Financial Services Authority, while cardholders have recourse
to appeal the decisions of banks to the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS). All are able to use this additional
route to redress where they are unsatisfied with any decision.
While we are confident in the processes in place, we are always open to representations from FOS, where
the organisation feels there are systemic industry-wide issues that require extra attention. To this end, we are
hoping to meet with the Chief Ombudsman later this year.
Professor Anderson cast doubt, as part of his evidence, on the banks’ observance of the Payment Services
Regulations 2009, but the figures set out above make clear that the proportion of customers receiving prompt
cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [E] Processed: [29-07-2013 13:16] Job: 029956 Unit: PG08
Ev 106 Home Affairs Committee: Evidence
redress is overwhelming. This is backed by research into the customer experience when it comes to fraud
refunds: According to an independent study conducted by Accenture in 2012, less than 10% of respondents
rated the service from their banks as anything less than good or excellent.
I would be delighted to give you a more in-depth briefing on FFA UK and the impact we have had. If you
would find this helpful, I will ask my office to contact your team and arrange a suitable time.
Katy Worobec
Head of Fraud Control
Financial Fraud Action UK
February 2013
Supplementary written evidence submitted by Financial Fraud Action UK [EC 15a]
I write to thank you for inviting me to appear before the Home Affairs Committee this week, and for the
opportunity to discuss the work of Financial Fraud Action UK with your members.
Refunds for Fraud Victims
During the evidence session I promised to provide further information to the Committee on the figures I
cited during my submission concerning the number of refunded fraud claims. Financial Fraud Action UK and
our partner organisation, The UK Cards Association, conducted a survey of our major UK retail banking
members (list below) in advance of this session. The survey ran between 13 March 2013 and 12 April 2013
and collected data on the length of time taken to process fraud refunds during 2012. Our study found that
between 96% and 98% of all fraudulent transactions were refunded on either the same day or the following
day. On the basis of these findings, no more than 2% of customers receiving refunds have had to wait longer
than two days. These figures corroborate that of the Which? survey published in January which found that
98% of fraud claims were refunded, but gives a more up to date picture of the landscape than the Which?
survey, which included cases as long as up to five years ago.
Members surveyed:
— Bank of America.
— Danske Bank.
— Bank of Ireland.
— HSBC.
— Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi.
— Lloyds Banking Group.
— Barclays.
— National Australia Group.
— Capital One.
— Nationwide Building Society.
— CitiBank.
— Royal Bank of Scotland Group.
— Co-operative Banking Group.
— Santander.
— Coventry Building Society.
— Tesco Bank.
E-Crime
I would also like to take this opportunity to reinforce some of the other statistics I shared with you during the
session on the changing pattern of e-crime in the UK, from the perspective of e-commerce and online banking.
E-commerce fraud losses (that is, losses on cards used fraudulently over the internet) peaked in 2008 at
£181.7 million, a year when total online card spending reached £41 billion. During 2012 e-commerce fraud
losses stood at £140.2 million, a year when total online card spending reached £68 billion. Fraud losses for e-
commerce have therefore dropped 23% since their peak in 2008, despite a 66% increase in online card
spending.
Online banking fraud losses peaked in 2009 at £59.7 million, a year when there were 22.4 million registered
users of online banking. During 2012 online banking fraud losses stood at £39.6 million, a year when there
were 26.8 million registered users of online banking. Fraud losses for online banking have therefore dropped
34% since their peak in 2009, despite a 20% increase in the number of registered users of online banking.
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The National Fraud Authority (NFA) estimates that all types of fraud cost the UK £73 billion in 2011, of
which less than 1% consists of banking and card fraud. Total plastic fraud stood at £388 million in 2012, down
36% from its peak at £609.9 million in 2008. Fraud accounts for just 7p in every £100 spent on cards in the
UK, against the backdrop of a total of 9.9 billion card transactions in 2012.
Solutions
I feel these figures demonstrate that the broader picture is that we are winning the fight against fraud,
notwithstanding a constant need for vigilance in the light of changing modus operandi and developing
technologies both on the provider side and in relation to the “attack tools” used by fraudsters.
The banking industry has invested heavily in fraud prevention and detection activity, including £1 billion
spent on the roll-out of Chip and PIN and full sponsorship of the Dedicated Cheque and Plastic Crime Unit
(DCPCU) which has prevented fraud to the value of £433 million over 10 years. The banking industry has
also pioneered new ways of working with the public sector to address fraud, including work with government
on public-private fraud intelligence-sharing, and with the National Fraud Authority on consumer campaigns.
The figures around financial fraud, despite progress, remain higher than we would wish and, as the
Committee has heard in previous evidence sessions, there is a real concern among our law enforcement partners
that stolen funds are being used to bank-roll terrorist groups and support organised criminal gangs involved in
the trafficking of people and drugs.
I’d like to reiterate the point I made about the need to streamline ways to share intelligence between law
enforcement and the banking industry, and for data to be shared more effectively across borders. If we are to
be even more effective in the fight against financial crime then intelligence-sharing across industries and
between public and private sector (as well as internationally) is crucial. This should be reflected in the decisions
taken around the new data protection regulations stemming from Europe, as well as decisions to be taken on
existing Justice and Home Affairs measures.
There is also a need for a greater and more concerted effort from government, the police, and the private
sector on consumer education and awareness raising to encourage small changes in consumer behaviour so
that we are not “leaving doors and windows open” to online fraudsters, to use the analogy of ACPO’s DAC
Martin Hewitt. To this end, having successfully run a number of campaigns jointly with the NFA and other
sectors, we would ask for the Government to help in bringing other players to the table.
Chip & PIN
Finally, I would like to supplement my response to Dr Huppert’s questions on Chip & PIN to state for the
record that the use of PIN to authorise a transaction will not in itself preclude a cardholder from receiving a
full refund. Victims of card and banking fraud benefit from a legal and regulatory guarantee of being refunded
for any losses in a timely manner, irrespective of the nature of the transaction. In general, card payments are a
safer way to do business, attracting much greater protections than traditional payments such as cash or cheque.
We are confident in Chip & PIN as a system and believe it is largely responsible for the substantial decline
we have seen in card fraud. While we would never be complacent enough to claim that any system is infallible,
the evidence our police colleagues are seeing is that cards most commonly become compromised when
consumers unwittingly reveal their PIN, for example through common “shoulder surfing” and distraction thefts
at ATMs, or by telephone frauds where a criminal posing as a bank staff member or police officer dupe the
customer into disclosing his or her details.
I look forward to reading the Committee’s e-crime inquiry report, and please do not hesitate to contact me
if I can be of any further assistance.
Katy Worobec
Head of Fraud Control
Financial Fraud Action UK
April 2013
Written evidence submitted by Google [EC 17]
I am writing to you to follow up on questions you raised during my evidence session to the Committee as
part of your inquiry into E-crime.
YouTube
YouTube provides a forum for people to connect, inform, and inspire others across the globe. Every day,
hundreds of thousands of videos are uploaded to YouTube. In fact, 72 hours of video is uploaded to YouTube
every minute. Because of the massive scale of You Tube, it is simply not possible to pre-screen all of the
content.
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As I explained during the evidence session, to ensure that our Community Guidelines are followed, we have
developed an innovative community policing system that involves our users in helping us to enforce YouTube’s
standards. Every day, thousands of users report potential violations of our standards by selecting the “Flag”
link while watching videos. Once a user flags a video, a manual review is triggered, and content that breaks
our guidelines is promptly removed. Our global policy enforcement team reviews flagged content 24 hours a
day, seven days a week, routinely removing material that violates our policies.
Once a video that violates our policies is removed from YouTube, it will be blocked from ever being
uploaded to YouTube again. Our systems prevent the re-uploading of videos by creating a unique “fingerprint”
of every video we remove. If a user tries to upload an identical video again, it is automatically rejected,
regardless of whether the user is using a different user or file name. In addition, our policies ensure that users
who repeatedly upload material in violation of YouTube’s Guidelines have their accounts suspended.
As for the specific content policies that relate to terrorism, our Community Guidelines clearly prohibit videos
that promote terrorism, contain hate speech and videos that are posted with the purpose of inciting others to
commit violent acts including bomb-making, sniper attacks, or other terrorist acts. We also remove all videos
and terminate all accounts known to be registered by a member of a designated Foreign Terrorist Organization
(FTO) and used in an official capacity to further the interests of the FTO.
We take this matter very seriously. Hundreds of videos that use the term “Awlaki” and violate our policies
have been flagged by the YouTube Community and subsequently removed from the site by our Removals team.
But we are constantly looking to new ways to improve YouTube, most recently by introducing a programme
called “YouTube Deputise” where we invite a small set of users who flag policy-violating content regularly
and accurately to access more advanced flagging tools. Initial feedback from piloting this programme suggests
that it has resulted in a fivefold increase in flagging from these users without diminishing the accuracy.
We have invited the Counter Terrorism Unit, CEOP and SOCA to become part of this new system to assist
them in flagging videos to us at scale. We think this will ensure that UK law enforcement bodies are even
better equipped to alert us to policy-violating content as and when it is uploaded onto YouTube in the future.
There does remain, however, some videos that cite Awlaki or include his words on YouTube. While we will
continue to remove content that incites violence according to our policies, material that is newsworthy or that
does not promote violence will remain on the site. Our policies aim to draw a careful line between enabling
free expression and religious speech or political speech while prohibiting content that incites violence. We
strongly believe that YouTube is a richer and more relevant platform for users precisely because of the diverse
range of views it hosts.
Use of Google Ad Grants by UK Charities
Google Ad Grants is a programme whereby any not for profit can apply to receive up to $10k per month of
free advertising on our platforms. You can find out more about the programme at www.google.co.uk/grants.
By the end of 2012 we had donated over $33 million to over 11,000 UK charities through giving them this
free advertising (including the Samiritans).
Sarah Hunter
Head of UK Public Policy
Google
March 2013
Supplementary written evidence submitted by Google [EC 17a]
Thank you for your letter of 25 March following my evidence session to the Committee in February. The
issues raised in the session itself were addressed in my letter of March 19th. To address your additional
questions in turn:
Q: The default setting on Google+ accounts appears to be public. Would there be any merit in changing this
so that information is initially only shared with contacts and altered if the user wishes to make their profile
public?
A: On the desktop, the initial default for G+ is to share with no-one. The user has to choose which circles,
individuals, or broader choices—public and extended circles—they want to share with. Then their selection is
sticky, so that next time they go to share something, those same people, circles, and original choices will
appear. So if you wanted to always post to friends, you could just select “friends” the first time you post and
then that will remain your default until you change it. For mobile, the firsttime sharing default is with “your
circles”, so you do need to change this if you want to share otherwise.
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Q: Google’s data use and privacy policies state that it collects data about the web pages that service users
visit. How long does Google store this information for and how does it make sure it is secure? Does Google
share it with third parties? If so how does it vet the security of their systems and personnel?
A: Like most websites, our servers automatically record the page requests made when users visit our sites.
These server logs typically include your web request, IP address, browser type, browser language, the date and
time of your request, and one or more cookies that may uniquely identify your browser. We store this data for
a number of reasons, the most important of which are to improve our services and to maintain the security of
our systems. We anonymize this log data by removing part of the IP address (after nine months) and cookie
information (after 18 months). None of this data is shared with third parties.
Q: Does Google support Do Not Track technology? Do you think it’s important that users should be able to
choose privacy above a personally tailored service?
A: Our top priority is to protect our users’ privacy and security, and to give them easy ways to control their
information when they use our services. We are constantly innovating to find new ways to assist that effort.
We added a Do Not Track option into Chrome, and we’ll continue working with industry on a common
approach to responding to the Do Not Track feature. Over the past year we have introduced a number of other
features that seek to ensure users have more control:
— Introduction of a Cookies Consent Mechanism to users in Europe.
— We published information about how Google uses cookies, the types of cookies used by Google,
how we use cookies in advertising and how to manage cookies in your browser.
— We added a feature in Chrome that lets you easily manage cookies—just click on the page/lock
icon in the left corner of the omnibox to view and control any website’s permissions.
— We implemented the AdChoices icon in the interestbased ads we show in Europe.
Q: How many successful hacks have been made against Google in the last year and what types of data were
stolen?
A: None that we know of, and we look really hard. Our security teams and systems are highly effective at
fending off attacks—we have actually detected real attempts that failed. Our security team runs frequent tests
to estimate how well we’re doing at this detection. We also care about and seek to prevent attacks against our
users, through phishing or other means, even when the attack is not directed at Google.
Sarah Hunter
Head of UK Public Policy
Google
April 2013
Written evidence submitted by the British Bankers’ Association [EC 20]
Thank you for your invitation to provide evidence to the Home Affairs Committee on 16 April. I welcome
the opportunity to brief the Committee on the work of the BBA and our member banks to address cyber
enabled financial crimes. To inform the discussions, I thought it may be helpful to provide some advance
information to the Committee on:
— Supporting bank customers and victims of cyber enabled frauds.
— The evolving nature of cyber threats.
— The challenges in responding.
— The strategic industry approach to financial crime.
— Issues for future consideration.
Supporting Bank Customers and Victims of Cyber Enabled Frauds
BBA members have put in place highly sophisticated security and prevention measures to safeguard
customers from online frauds. Banks have also invested in intelligence and analysis systems, recruitment of
skilled staff and firm wide training and policies to ensure the most effective strategic defences against financial
crimes, as well as working closely with UK law enforcement. These efforts have been essential for driving
down online banking fraud losses but also important for maintaining confidence in online banking, particularly
given that many customers now use this channel.
Our members see supporting the innocent victims of fraud as a crucial priority. The vast majority of
customers that have been defrauded are refunded in accordance with regulatory requirements and banks also
provide practical advice and support as appropriate. At the industry level, the BBA works closely with our
members to promote best practice for addressing financial crimes including through the guidance materials that
we publish.
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BBA members are highly committed to raising customer awareness of fraud risks and the “self protection”
measures that can be taken. Many banks provide fraud prevention advice on their websites and a number of
firms hold awareness raising events for customers. At the industry level, Financial Fraud Action UK (FFA UK)
lead fraud prevention efforts on behalf of retail banks and card issuers and have managed a number of
awareness raising campaigns including:
— A national campaign, led by FFA UK and supported by the BBA, to raise awareness of the risks
posed by criminals that coerce or dupe members of the public into acting as “money mules”.
— A partnership48 between the National Fraud Authority (NFA) and FFA UK that highlighted
how cyber criminals steal and use personal information for the purposes of fraud.
— Advice sheets produced jointly by the BBA, FFA UK and the Police, to raise customer
awareness of the risks posed by Investment Fraud and a leaflet setting out advice for visitors
to Britain.
The Evolving Nature of Cyber Threats
BBA members have achieved good success in driving down the losses from online banking fraud. However,
given the size of the British banking sector and the ever growing number of people who conduct their banking
and everyday business online, we recognise that our customers will continue to be targeted by cyber criminals.
For example, criminals use stolen genuine card details to make fraudulent purchases over the internet via a
PC, smart phone or tablet. Criminals also use malicious software and/or “phishing” emails as a means to
compromise or steal customers’ sensitive banking credentials to enable fraud and money laundering. Criminals
also communicate with each other online to trade data and to share knowledge on offending methods.
As banks have strengthened their controls against cyber enabled financial crimes, the criminals have sought
to develop new cyber techniques, such as online social engineering, to dupe or coerce people into divulging
personal information or making payments. There is also evidence that criminals are targeting other sectors and
businesses that may have weaker controls than banks, to access customer information that can be then used for
fraud offending.
Cyber techniques may also be used for attacks against banks that are not financially motivated including:
— Subversion (often known as “hactivism”, this is generally carried out as part of a protest. The
attackers seek to expose perceived injustice, bad practise and/or exploitation by banks in order
to damage their reputation or force changes in policies).
— Sabotage (to disrupt the availability of banks online services and content thus eroding customer
trust and damaging the organisations reputation).
— Espionage (to steal and exploit sensitive information or intellectual property).
Challenges in Responding to these Threats
Whilst BBA members have developed some of the strongest financial crime controls anywhere in the world,
there are significant challenges that remain in responding to the cyber criminals including:
— Rapid evolution in criminal techniques—Criminals are adopting new cyber offending
techniques in response to the counter measures that are put in place, quickly spotting new
opportunities and often operating through organised global networks. Highly advanced
analytical capabilities are needed in banks, alongside effective intelligence arrangements with
law enforcement, to keep up-to-speed with this rapidly changing threat picture.
— Balancing customer service and financial crime prevention—There is a challenge in balancing
effective measures for spotting and stopping financial crimes with good customer service, as
some necessary control measures can cause delays. Our members are constantly striving to
ensure that they have the most effective policies and practice in this respect, as well as providing
as much information as possible to customers.
— Conflicting policies and laws—Compliance with financial crime obligations can at times conflict
with other legal obligations on banks. For example, data protection requirements pose
challenges to the efficient sharing of information by banks that is needed to spot and stop
financial crimes. Similarly, banks are required by the Proceeds of Crime Act to ensure that they
do not “tip off” customers that an investigation is taking place whilst also meeting customer
demands for detailed explanations when actions have been taken on accounts.
— Enforcement capabilities—Often the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases involving
cyber crime can be complex, lengthy and expensive, especially where offenders are located
outside the UK. Adequate resources are therefore needed to ensure law enforcement is able to
provide an effective response to cyber crime cases reported by banks and their customers.
This is vital not only for ensuring that justice is served to victims but also to deter potential
future offenders.
48
“The Devils in your Details” campaign
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The Strategic Industry Approach to Addressing Cyber Enabled Financial Crimes
The role of the BBA
The BBA, as the leading association for the banking and financial services sector, supports our members’
efforts to address all forms of financial crime49 by coordinating strategy and policy, providing guidance,
promoting best practice and facilitating operational interaction between banks and law enforcement. The
following are some examples of our work in 2012 on fraud matters:
— Thought Leadership: We provided a report to the NFA in April 2012 setting out an industry
perspective on international fraud threats and challenges, including recommendations for
enhanced cooperation between banks and HM Government in this area. The Chief Executive
of the NFA in his written response described our report as “well written” and “an example of
where work conducted by one sector can highlight wider issues and identify joint working
opportunities between other sectors and organisations…..”.
— UK Policy: In August 2012 the BBA responded to the FSA Guidance Consultation on “Banks
defences against investment fraud”. Since our response we have agreed a programme of work
with our members to follow up on the FSA recommendations and we are also liaising with the
Financial Conduct Authority on this matter. Through 2012 we also provided views to the Home
Office on the fraud intelligence arrangements for the National Crime Agency and to the
Department of Work and Pensions on the financial crime controls for the Universal Credit.
— International Policy: As well as responding to a number of EU level consultations, the BBA
supported United Nations work on financial crime in 2012. This included participation in the
UN Experts Group on Economic Crime and Identity Fraud and support for an initiative to
promote financial crime compliance in the EurAsia region.
— Industry Analysis: In December 2012 we provided a report50 to BBA members setting out
analysis of cyber threats and challenges as a basis for strengthened industry collaboration in
this area (more details on work in this area are set out below).
— Operational/practical support: In early 2012 the BBA established a mechanism with the
Metropolitan Police to ensure the most efficient exchange of information with BBA members
to prevent financial crimes during the Olympics. Later in 2012 we agreed a new arrangement
for the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau to provide fraud alerts to investment banks and
smaller banks through an online system managed by the BBA.
The BBA Financial Crime Strategy 2013–14
Our members recognise the importance of collaboration across the industry on financial crime. With this in
mind, the BBA Board in October 2012 agreed a two year strategy to address financial crime comprising the
following priority initiatives:
— An Annual BBA Financial Crime Report to publicly outline how the industry is responding to
financial crime, the challenges we face and our future priorities.
— A review of industry intelligence arrangements for financial crime, to enhance industry
knowledge of emerging financial crime risks.
— Dialogue with the Home Office on BBA proposals for improvements to the legal and policy
framework for financial crime and on bank partnership with the National Crime Agency.
— Proactive engagement with the Financial Conduct Authority to support our members to
understand and meet Regulatory expectations on financial crime.
— Intensified BBA led engagement with EU and international bodies, to promote public/private
partnerships at the global level to address financial crimes.
The BBA Financial Crime Policy Group acts as our key oversight committee for delivery of the strategy,
though regular reports will be provided to the BBA Board over the coming years. Consideration of cyber crime
is an intrinsic element of our strategic approach in this area given that criminals employ cyber techniques for
a range of financial crimes, particularly fraud and money laundering. The BBA has also recently established a
new dedicated Cyber Advisory Panel, bringing together senior bank representatives to coordinate industry
strategy and policy on strategic cyber security and cyber risk management issues.
Our partnership with Financial Fraud Action UK
The BBA works closely with FFA UK to support our members’ efforts to address cyber enabled frauds. Key
areas of collaboration include:
— Campaigns to raise customer awareness of fraud and promote bank best practice.
— Promoting the sharing of knowledge and expertise within the banking sector on emerging
fraud threats.
49 Our portfolio includes work to tackle bribery, corruption, fraud, money laundering, terrorist financing, cyber crimes and physical
crimes.
50 BBA report titled “Defining the cyber threats and challenges to the banking sector”
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— Developing common approaches on fraud policy issues, including joint representations to UK
and international bodies where appropriate.
The FFA UK and the BBA will continue to work together to promote effective fraud prevention and raise
customer awareness of emerging risks. Whilst the BBA and FFA UK have some common retail bank members
the BBA also is keen to further ensure that investment bank, smaller bank and private bank members are
brought into industry level initiatives where appropriate.
Areas for Future Consideration
The BBA welcomes the proactive approach of HM Government to engagement with the private sector on
cyber crime matters. In particular, the BBA is pleased to be participating in the recently formed Cyber Crime
Reduction Partnership that brings together industries, HM Government and academia to develop collaborative
efforts to address cyber crimes.
Beyond this, we would suggest that the following could be considered to strengthen our collective
capabilities to address cyber offending:
Intensified public awareness campaigns
Whilst recent banking industry led campaigns have successfully raised public awareness of cyber crime
risks, there is a need for an intensified multi-sector approach to ensure that members of the public better
understand the threats they face. Further targeted campaigns are needed to ensure that prevention messages are
reaching key audiences, such as younger online users and the vulnerable.
Reforms to the legal and policy framework
BBA members are of the view that government should consider possible improvements to the legal and
policy framework for financial crime. Specifically there may be merit in considering updates to the Proceeds
of Crime Act, to ensure it is up-to-date with modern financial crime offending techniques. Policy or legislative
change may also support a more effective balance between data protection obligations and the requirement for
firms to share information to address financial crimes.
Enhanced investigation and enforcement capabilities
The establishment of the National Crime Agency is a real opportunity to develop the highest quality
capabilities for investigation and enforcement against cyber offenders. BBA members are keen to support the
strengthening of enforcement capabilities by putting in place the strongest possible information exchange
mechanisms and through the exploration of potential “two-way” sharing of staff between the National Cyber
Crime Unit in the NCA and BBA member banks.
A coordinated global partnership
Given the global nature of cyber offending and the widespread harm it causes, the BBA is of the view that
a coordinated international multi-sector approach is required. The UN Experts Group on Cyber Crime may
provide a useful mechanism for international policy development but we believe that beyond this can be done
globally at a practical level. This could include sharing of knowledge between different sectors to enhance
understanding of emerging cyber offending techniques, improvements to international standards for addressing
cyber crimes and the promotion of greater public awareness of cyber crime risks.
I hope this provides useful supporting information to the Committee and I look forward to discussing these
issues further on 16 April.
Anthony Browne
Chief Executive
British Bankers’ Association
April 2013
Written evidence submitted by Facebook [EC 21]
Further to your letter of 25 March 2013, I have provided further information from Facebook relating to
your inquiry:
1. Facebook user numbers in the EU: Facebook does not provide public data on the number of active
Facebook users in the European Union as a whole. However here are the monthly active user numbers for the
largest five markets in the EU made public at the time of our most recent quarterly results:
UK 33 million.
France 26 million.
Germany 25 million.
cobber Pack: U PL: CWE1 [O] Processed: [29-07-2013 13:16] Job: 029956 Unit: PG08
Home Affairs Committee: Evidence Ev 113
Italy 23 million.
Spain 18 million.
2. HTC phone and pre-installed Facebook features: In retrospect, Mr Ruane’s question was probably
prompted by press speculation about a product launch, which was pure speculation on the day of the hearing
itself. On 4 April 2013, Facebook announced the launch of Facebook Home. This will come preinstalled on
HTC phones in the US. It can be turned off at any point by the user and can also be uninstalled at any time.
When Facebook Home is active, we will log information about the user’s activity on Facebook’s suite of
products. In addition to the standard information we log with all our apps, we will also log notifications and
app information when they interact with Facebook Home. We do not log or track the user when they use apps
independent of Facebook on the phone.
3. People reporting crime on Facebook: While Facebook makes it easy for people who use our service to
report potential abuse or violations of our terms of service, we do not have any specific data which relates to
the Committee’s question about reports of crime. Instead our Help Centre advises users to contact local law
enforcement if they wish to report a crime. An example of that advice is shown in the screenshot below, from
the Help Centre, relating to human traffic:
4. Data collected when people use other sites: All the questions raised under this point are addressed in
considerable detail in two reports of the Office of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner (I-DPC) in December
2011 and September 2012, which can be accessed at the links below, including detailed, independent technical
appendices. Both reports and their technical appendices were published in full.
http://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/Facebook_Ireland_Audit_Report_December_2011/1187.htm
http://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/Appendices_to_Facebook_Ireland_Audit_Report_Dec_2011/1
188.htm
http://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/21–09–12—Facebook-Ireland-Audit-Review-Report/1232.htm
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In summary:
— Facebook’s Data Use Policy states that we delete or anonymize data collected through social
plugins on other sites within 90 days. This has been verified by the I-DPC.
— The I-DPC reviewed Facebook’s data security operations and concluded that: It is important to
state at the outset that as could be expected FB-I places an enormous and ongoing focus on
the protection and security of user data. Our audit has confirmed this focus. (December 2011
report, para 3.9.4)
— And further: The majority of the controls described by FB-I appeared to this Office to be
effective. It can be reasonably concluded that if large-scale, frequent data breaches were taking
place on Facebook’s corporate networks, that this would be widely reported, particularly
considering Facebook’s global profile. Since this is not the case, the information security
controls in Facebook appear to be preventing these types of incidents. (ibid, para 3.9.6)
— Facebook does not share information collected via social plugins with third parties over and
above the information shared by an individual making use of those websites. This extract from
our Help Centre makes this clear and explains the reasons we collect this information:
What information does Facebook get when I visit a site with the Like button or another social plugin?
If you’re logged in to Facebook and visit a website with the Like button or another social plugin, your
browser sends us information about your visit. It’s important to note that Facebook is not retrieving this
information. Rather, since the Like button is a little piece of Facebook embedded on another website, the
browser is sending information about the request to load Facebook content on that page.
We record some of this information for a limited amount of time to help show you a personalized experience
on that site and to improve our products. For example, when you go to a website with a Like button, we need
to know who you are in order to show you what your Facebook friends have liked on that site. The data we
receive includes your user ID, the website you’re visiting, the date and time and other browser-related
information.
If you’re logged out or don’t have a Facebook account and visit a website with the Like button or another
social plugin, your browser sends us a more limited set of information. For example, because you’re not logged
into Facebook, you’ll have fewer cookies than someone who is logged in. Like other sites on the internet, we
receive information about the web page you’re visiting, the date and time and other browser-related
information. We record this information for a limited amount of time to help us improve our products. For
example, we sometimes find bugs in the systems we’ve built to gather aggregate data on how people are
interacting with sites that use the Like button or other social plugins. It’s helpful to be able to reference this
anonymized information when investigating these bugs so we can find their sources and fix them quickly.
As our Data Use Policy indicates, we use cookies to show you ads on and off Facebook. Regardless of
whether or not you’re logged in, we don’t use the information we receive when you visit a site with the Like
button or another social plugin to create a profile of your browsing behavior on third-party sites to show you
ads. However, we may use anonymous or aggregate data to improve ads generally and information we receive
to study, develop or test new and existing products or services. We delete or anonymize the information we
receive within 90 days, and we don’t sell it to advertisers or share it without your permission.
5. Do Not Track (DNT): Facebook believes in the importance of user control of data about them and therefore
we are supportive of the efforts of stakeholders, including at the World Wide Web Consortium and the Digital
Advertising Alliance, to develop a standard for DNT that will enable people to control their information as
they browse the web. We are actively involved in those industry-wide discussions, which cover many difficult
technical questions that will need to be resolved before any DNT standard can be adopted.
6. Review processes for Facebook apps: Facebook provides extensive information to users in respect of
applications, including the data being shared with each application upon its installation. Applications can only
be installed once the user has given permission for such sharing. The policies which developers have to comply
with are clear and we take a number of steps to enforce them. Our actions in this respect were audited by the
I-DPC and this excerpt from the audit report summarises the I-DPC’s assessment:
“The role of Platform Operations is to enforce Facebook’s Platform Policy, interacting with
developers of third party apps and developers using the social graph, ie, social plugins, to ensure
adherence to Platform Policy. An examination was conducted of the work queues of the Platform
Operations Team. It was noted that Facebook has now introduced a number of automated tools,
developed in Dublin, to proactively and automatically identify and disable applications engaged in
inappropriate activity such as spamming friends or friends of friends, excessive wall posting, etc.
The Team also responds to specific user complaints regarding the behaviour of applications and
enforces a graduated response against the application and the application provider depending on
the nature of the contravention of the Platform policy. We examined one complaint from a user in
relation to unauthorised use of Intellectual Property by another developer which was received on 9
November and action was taken to delete the application within 2 hours. The account of the
developer was disabled and all other applications which they had developed were also subjected to
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review. We also examined a phishing complaint received from a user who reported an application
trying to retrieve their email and password. The application was immediately disabled and further
action taken. It was also pointed out that in line with Facebook’s real name culture that all
applications (even those developed by the large games developers) must be developed by and
attributable to an identifiable user on Facebook.” (December 2011 report, para 3.6.5)
7. Reports of hijacked accounts or scams: Anyone believing that their account has been hijacked or hacked
is advised on our Help Centre to go to: www.facebook.com/hacked where they can manually lock down their
account with immediate effect, reset their password and take other steps to secure their account. Any user
reporting that their friend’s account may have been hacked is provided with the same advice—ie their friend
should take these steps. We also take a number of preventative steps to guard against the possibility of an
account being hacked:
— Recognised devices: Facebook allows people to register devices that they use Facebook on
regularly.
— Remote log-out: If someone forgets to log out of Facebook, they can remotely log off any live
session they have running by accessing this tool in their security settings.
— Secure browsing: Facebook encourages all users to turn on secure browsing for added protection
(add “s” to the end of http in their browser address).
— Login notifications: We send notifications every time an account is accessed from an unsaved
device.
— Login approvals: If someone logs in from an unsaved device, we will send a code to their
registered mobile phone to authorize that log-in.
8. Hacks against Facebook: Security is a top priority for us, and we devote significant resources to protecting
people’s accounts and information. We maintain a strong relationship with security experts around the world
and work closely with them in the rare instances in which they find vulnerabilities on Facebook. We’ve created
a simple form for these people to contact us that we link to both from our Help Centre and from the “Whitehats”
tab on the Facebook Security Page https://www.facebook.com/whitehat. We also recently rewrote our
responsible disclosure policy to make it even easier for researchers to let us know when they find a vulnerability,
so we can fix it quickly and before it is exploited.
I hope that this further information is useful to the Committee.
Simon Milner
Policy Director, UK
Facebook
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